DICKERSON v. NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY BOARD OF TRUSTEES

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

GLORIA DICKERSON,

Civil Action No. 19-8344 (SDW) (MAH)

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24-10425 (SDW) (MAH)

v.

NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF OPINION

TECHNOLOGY and ANNIE CRAWFORD,

July 29, 2025

Defendants.

GLORIA DICKERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF

TECHNOLOGY BOARD OF TRUSTEES,

DR. TIEIK C. LIM, HOLLY STERN, and

MARISELA COTRINA,

Defendants.

WIGENTON, District Judge.

This opinion resolves three related motions pending in separate but overlapping cases

brought by the same pro se plaintiff, Gloria Dickerson (“Ms. Dickerson” or “Plaintiff”). In the

first case (No. 19-CV-8344, “Dickerson I”), the defendants moved for summary judgment. While

that motion was pending, Plaintiff initiated a second action (No. 24-CV-10425, “Dickerson II”),

asserting similar claims, but against different defendants. The defendants in the second case

moved to dismiss the complaint. Because the two actions have the same plaintiff, arise from the

same core set of facts, and raise overlapping legal issues, this Court addresses all the motions in

this opinion, which will be filed separately on both dockets with corresponding orders. Jurisdiction

in each action is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. Venue in each action is proper

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). This opinion is issued without oral argument pursuant to Rule

78. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in

Dickerson I, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in Dickerson II, and Defendants’

motion for sanctions is DENIED in Dickerson II.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

The underlying facts in both cases stem from Plaintiff’s employment at the New Jersey

Institute of Technology (“NJIT”), where she was hired in 2015 as a customer service representative

1 The facts cited in this section are drawn both from the Dickerson I Defendants’ statements of undisputed facts and

the complaint in Dickerson II. Plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment in Dickerson I did not comply with the

requirements of Local Civil Rule 56.1. Accordingly, the facts contained in Defendants’ statements are deemed

undisputed for purposes of summary judgment. See L. Civ. R. 56.1(a) (“The opponent of summary judgment shall

furnish, with its opposition papers, a responsive statement of material facts, addressing each paragraph of the movant’s

statement, indicating agreement or disagreement and, if not agreed, stating each material fact in dispute and citing to

the affidavits and other documents submitted in connection with the motion; any material fact not disputed shall be

deemed undisputed for purposes of the summary judgment motion.”) Plaintiff has submitted several self-signed

affidavits and a filing alleging that she was “denied permission to receive all of her University emails to support her

claims.” (Dickerson I, D.E. 189.) These affidavits are all conclusory and/or irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claims, and are

not competent evidence at this stage. See Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir.

2009) (“It is true that ‘conclusory, self-serving affidavits are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary

judgment.’”) (quoting Blair v. Scott Specialty Glass, 283 F.3d 595, 608 (3d Cir. 2002)). To the extent Plaintiff’s

submission can be construed to be requesting additional discovery, the Third Circuit has explained “that a party

seeking further discovery in response to a summary judgment motion submit an affidavit specifying, for example,

what particular information is sought; how, if uncovered, it would preclude summary judgment; and why it has not

previously been obtained.” Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 139–40 (3d Cir. 1988). Plaintiff has not

made such a showing and, in any event, this Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s submissions and has considered them in

the light most favorable to her.

In resolving the motion to dismiss filed in Dickerson II, the Court considers the allegations in the complaint,

documents attached to or integral to the complaint, and matters of public record. See Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch.

Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). This Court also takes judicial notice of the filings and rulings in Dickerson

I. Judicial notice is appropriate for such records when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, particularly where, as here,

Plaintiff’s claims may depend on or reference events litigated in the earlier action. See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate

Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 559–60 (3d Cir. 2002).

in the Human Resources Department. (NJIT Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“NJIT

SOUMF”) 2 ¶ 1, Dickerson I, D.E. 186-1.) During her tenure, Plaintiff was frequently absent from

work on Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and other medical leave. (Id. ¶ 4.) In August

2018, during one such leave, she attended a colleague’s retirement party and was observed

dancing. (Id. ¶¶ 13–17.) Plaintiff remained out of work the following week. (Id. ¶¶ 18–22.) When

she returned to work in September 2018, she was questioned by then–Vice President of Human

Resources Annie Crawford (“Ms. Crawford”) about her activities during leave, including a now

well-documented and well-litigated comment: “How can you dance on FMLA?” (Id. ¶¶ 26–29.)

According to Plaintiff, this remark and related events gave rise to harassment and retaliation.

Plaintiff continued to take leave throughout the duration of her employment, and remained

employed at NJIT until July 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 40–42.) Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in November 2018 and, in March 2019, initiated

Dickerson I against NJIT and several individuals. (Dickerson I, D.E. 1.) That lawsuit has been

the subject of multiple motions to dismiss and amendments. This Court has previously dismissed

with prejudice a wide range of claims, including those brought under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), Title VII, the

New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), the Equal Pay Act, and other theories, as

well as all claims against defendants other than NJIT and Ms. Crawford. What remains in

Dickerson I are limited claims under the ADA and NJLAD for harassment and retaliation, arising

solely from the September 2018 meeting and directed at NJIT and Ms. Crawford. Following

2 Certain information contained in the NJIT SOUMF is subject to a sealing order. (Dickerson I, D.E. 199.) To

avoid the need to seal this opinion, this Court has endeavored to only reference portions that are not under seal.

discovery, Defendants in Dickerson I moved for summary judgment on all claims. (Dickerson I,

D.E. 186; 188.)

On November 7, 2024, while NJIT’s motion for summary judgment was pending in

Dickerson I, plaintiff filed Dickerson II, naming a new set of defendants: NJIT’s Board of Trustees,

Dr. Teik C. Lim, General Counsel Holly Stern, and HR professional Marisela Cotrina. The

complaint in Dickerson II alleges that Plaintiff was “treated like a slave” and subjected to

“harassment, emotional stress, denial of promotions, age discrimination, and a host of

discriminatory behaviors.” (Dickerson II, D.E. 1.) The complaint does not identify any specific

new acts or events apart from those already addressed in Dickerson I, and it includes factual

references to individuals who were previously named in the first lawsuit, including some whose

claims were dismissed with prejudice. The defendants in Dickerson II moved to dismiss under

Rule 12(b) on multiple grounds, including insufficient service of process, res judicata, collateral

estoppel, and the statute of limitations.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no

genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986)

(emphases in original). A fact is only “material” for purposes of a summary judgment motion if a

dispute over that fact “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. at 248.

A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The dispute is not genuine if it merely involves

“some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

The moving party must show that if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to

admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its

burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). If the moving party

meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant who “must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288–

89 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268–69 (3d Cir. 2014)).

The nonmoving party “must present more than just ‘bare assertions, conclusory allegations or

suspicions’ to show the existence of a genuine issue.” Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d

584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325). If the nonmoving party “fails

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which . . . [it has] the burden of proof[,]” then the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23. In considering a motion for summary

judgment, this Court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the

evidence; instead, the nonmoving party’s evidence “is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences

are to be drawn in [her] favor.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651, 656–57 (2014) (per curiam)

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

B. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants in Dickerson II move to dismiss on several grounds – insufficient service of

process, res judicata and collateral estoppel, statute of limitations, and failure to state a claim – and

move for sanctions against Plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. This Court

will address the various legal standards in the “Discussion” section below.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Dickerson I

a. ADA and NJLAD Harassment

To prevail on a harassment claim under the ADA or the NJLAD, a plaintiff must show that

(1) she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment;

(3) the harassment was based on her disability; (4) it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter

the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment; and (5) the employer

knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. See

Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999); Brown v. City of Long

Branch, 380 F. App’x 235, 238 (3d Cir. 2010) (“NJLAD claims generally are governed by the

same standards [as the ADA].”)

For purposes of this motion, the Court assumes and Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff

is a qualified individual with a disability and that Ms. Crawford’s alleged question — “how can

you dance on FMLA?” — was asked at the September 2018 meeting. Even accepting Plaintiff’s

version of events as true, the record fails to show that this single incident constituted harassment

based on disability, let alone that it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to sustain a hostile work

environment claim under either statute. Courts have consistently held that isolated comments

about attendance or FMLA leave, even when insensitive, do not constitute actionable harassment

under the ADA or NJLAD. See Barclay v. Amtrak, 240 F. App’x 505, 509 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e

have rejected a theory of harassment so broad as to dictate that any time a supervisor harasses an

employee for absences the employee claims are due to a disability, that harassment is based on the

employee’s disability under the ADA.”) (emphasis in original); Vanhook v. Cooper Health Sys.,

Civ. No. 19-14864, 2021 WL 2186989, at *8–9 (D.N.J. May 28, 2021) (granting summary

judgment where supervisor inquired as to whether plaintiff would use FMLA leave for particular

days); Torres v. Cnty. of Berks, Civ. No. 17-1890, 2018 WL 564406, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26,

2018) (comments such as “oh, you’re here today” and “wow, you actually work here” did not

support disability harassment claim); Velcko v. Saker Shoprites, Inc., Civ. No. 15-1217, 2016 WL

4728106, at *6 (D.N.J. Sep. 9, 2016) (work environment not hostile where the plaintiff was

allegedly “ridiculed because of his health condition,” coworkers bet on when he would return to

work, a supervisor commented that plaintiff was “always ... sick” and “asked how long would he

be out this time,” and a different supervisor “repeatedly called him ‘Family Leave Larry’ in front

[of] other employees”). Moreover, there is no evidence that the comment at issue reflected animus

toward Plaintiff’s disability. On the contrary, the record shows that Ms. Crawford raised the issue

to clarify the nature of Plaintiff’s condition in light of recent absences, and that Plaintiff’s job

responsibilities, compensation, and access to leave remained unchanged for nearly two years

afterward. Finally, even if the comment could be considered harassment, it was not nearly severe

or pervasive enough to alter the terms or conditions of plaintiff’s employment. The Third Circuit

has emphasized that isolated comments such as this rarely suffice to sustain a hostile work

environment claim. See Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2017); Lehmann v.

Toys ‘R’ Us, 132 N.J. 587, 606–07 (N.J. 1993) (noting that only “rare and extreme” single incidents

satisfy the standard). The isolated nature and relatively innocuous context of the question at issue

here fall far short of establishing such a claim.

To the extent Plaintiff relies on the outcome of the Department of Labor (“DOL”)

investigation report that was attached to the Second Amended Complaint (the “DOL Report”),3

such reliance is misplaced. The DOL Report indicates that, after investigation, a discrimination

violation was found with respect to 29 C.F.R. § 825.220. (D.E. 186-2, Ex. 28.) While potentially

admissible and possibly tangentially related to the matters at hand, this Court finds that this

conclusory paragraph in the DOL Report with respect to discrimination does not supplant the

above analysis as to whether Ms. Crawford’s question constitutes harassment, nor whether the

question was sufficiently severe or pervasive to make out a harassment claim under the ADA or

NJLAD.

Accordingly, summary judgment in Defendants’ favor is warranted on Plaintiff’s ADA and

NJLAD harassment claims in Dickerson I.

b. ADA and NJLAD Retaliation

To establish retaliation under the ADA or NJLAD, a plaintiff must show (1) she engaged

in protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link exists

between the two. See Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997); Lawrence

v. Nat’l Westminster Bank New Jersey, 98 F.3d 61, 70 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining that the NJLAD

and ADA have been held to be governed by the same standards).

Defendants concede that Plaintiff’s use of FMLA leave in these circumstances constitutes

protected activity. This Court makes no findings on that issue, but the summary judgment record

contains no evidence of any adverse employment action taken against her in response. Plaintiff

remained employed at NJIT for nearly two years following the September 2018 meeting, received

no formal discipline or warnings, experienced no change in her role or compensation, and

3 While the DOL Report does not have a date, it appears that Plaintiff was notified of its outcome on January 28, 2019.

continued to access FMLA and other leave without interference. Adverse employment actions

typically involve tangible changes such as termination, demotion, suspension, or significant

changes in responsibilities. See Whitehead v. County of Monmouth, No. 15-5352, 2015 WL

7776896, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 2, 2015) (“An adverse employment action must rise above something

that makes an employee unhappy, resentful or otherwise cause an incidental workplace

dissatisfaction.”) (citation omitted). Here, Ms. Crawford’s question did not result in any such

action, nor is there any evidence of coercion, threats, or interference with Plaintiff’s exercise of

her rights.

Because Plaintiff cannot establish that she suffered any adverse employment action, she

cannot sustain a retaliation claim under the ADA or NJLAD. Summary judgment is therefore

appropriate.

c. Claims Against Ms. Crawford

Finally, to the extent any ambiguity remains regarding the scope of the claims asserted

against Ms. Crawford, it is well established that individual liability under the NJLAD requires a

showing of a principal violation by the employer. Where no actionable discrimination or

retaliation by the employer is found, claims against individual employees must also fail. See

Taylor v. Lincare, Inc., Civ. No. 15-6284, 2016 WL 3849852, at *7 (D.N.J. July 15, 2016)

(“Therefore, because Plaintiff's underlying causes of action fail, there can be no claim for aiding

and abetting in violation of the NJLAD.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Plaintiff’s

claims against NJIT in Dickerson I fail as a matter of law, summary judgment must also be granted

in favor of Ms. Crawford on any individual liability theory under the NJLAD.

B. Dickerson II

a. Motion to Dismiss

At the outset, this Court notes that Plaintiff did not file an opposition to either the motion

to dismiss or the motion for sanctions in Dickerson II. On February 19, 2025, Plaintiff submitted

a letter requesting an extension of time to respond, but she did not indicate how much additional

time she sought, and she has not followed up or filed any further submission since then. (Dickerson

II, D.E. 14.) This Court has afforded Plaintiff more than sufficient time to respond and has

considered the motions on the full record, including the prior proceedings in this Court and in New

Jersey Superior Court. Based on that record, this Court concludes that any opposition Plaintiff

might have submitted would not have changed the outcome. The arguments in favor of dismissal

rest on procedural and substantive bars that are clear from the face of the complaint and the

publicly available history of Plaintiff’s litigation and, because this Court will not award sanctions

at this time, Plaintiff has not been unduly prejudiced by her lack of opposition.

i. Insufficient Service of Process

The Dickerson II Defendants first move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5). To effect proper service of process, a plaintiff must comply with Rule

4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When the defendant is an entity such as a private school,

Rule 4(h)(1) governs and permits service by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to

an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law

to receive service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). Alternatively, Rule 4(h)(1)(A) allows service

in accordance with the law of the state where the district court is located or where service is made.

Under New Jersey Court Rule 4:4-4(a)(5), service on a private entity such as an unincorporated

association must be made on “an officer or managing agent.” N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(a)(5).

Here, the returns of service indicate that copies of the summons and complaint were

delivered to an individual identified only by last name and described as the “custodian of records.”

(Dickerson II, D.E. 4.) There is no indication that this individual was a trustee, officer, or

authorized agent of the Board of Trustees, nor is there any suggestion that the individual was

authorized to accept service on behalf of the named individual defendants in Dickerson II.

Accordingly, service was insufficient as to both the Board of Trustees and the individual

defendants under both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and New Jersey Court Rules 4:4-4(a)(1)

and (a)(5).

While dismissal would be warranted on insufficient service grounds, this Court will address

the remaining grounds for dismissal in the interest of judicial efficiency, clarity, and finality for

all parties.

ii. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

Defendants move to dismiss the Dickerson II complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and

collateral estoppel. These doctrines play a central role in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of

the judicial process. The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, promotes finality, prevents

inconsistent judgments, and protects litigants from the burden of defending repeated lawsuits

arising from the same operative facts. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008); United

States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Williamson v. Columbia

Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 469 (3d Cir. 1950) (“The theory [of res judicata] is that parties

should not have to litigate issues which they have already litigated or had a reasonable opportunity

to litigate.”), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951). These principles apply with equal force to pro se

litigants such as Plaintiff. See King v. E. Lampeter Twp., 69 F. App’x 94, 96 (3d Cir. 2003)

(affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s complaint on res judicata and

collateral estoppel grounds).

Res judicata bars a claim when the following factors are present: “(1) a final judgment on

the merits in a prior suit involving; (2) the same parties or their privities; and (3) a subsequent suit

based on the same cause of action.” CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Huls Am., Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 194

(3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). As Defendants note, the Honorable Kevin J. McNulty (Ret.)

previously dismissed claims in Dickerson I for race and age discrimination and violations of the

Equal Pay Act against NJIT and individual defendants, including Ms. Crawford, and denied leave

to file a proposed Second Amended Complaint on the grounds that such amendments were clearly

futile. (Dickerson I, D.E. 54.) These dismissals with prejudice “operate[] as an adjudication on

the merits” for purposes of the instant res judicata analysis. Landon v. Hunt, 977 F.2d 829, 832–

33 (3d Cir. 1992). The second requirement of identity or privity of the parties is also satisfied.

Although the defendants named in Dickerson II may somewhat differ from those in Dickerson I,

the changes are immaterial for purposes of res judicata. The Board of Trustees of NJIT is legally

and functionally aligned with NJIT, which was named in Dickerson I. Courts have recognized

that closely related defendants, such as a board and the entity it governs, are in privity for

preclusion purposes. See Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 966 (3d Cir. 1991) (entities

with a “close or significant relationship” are in privity, and noting that “a lesser degree of privity

is required for a new defendant to benefit from claim preclusion than for a plaintiff to bind a new

defendant in a later action”) (citations omitted). The same holds true for the newly named

individual defendants, whose alleged actions arose solely from their employment at or authority

within NJIT. Indeed, the fact that Plaintiff chose to name overlapping institutional actors and

similarly situated employees, while omitting previously named parties, strongly suggests an

attempt to circumvent the preclusive effect of prior rulings. But res judicata cannot be avoided by

simply identifying additional related defendants. See Ouaziz v. Murphy, Civ. No. 23-2696, 2024

WL 397708, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2024) (finding that res judicata extends to new defendants where

a plaintiff “‘assert[s] essentially the same claim against different defendants’”) (quoting

Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 422 (3d Cir. 1950)). While the complaint in Dickerson

II is bereft of specific allegations, it is clear to this Court that both actions concern the same

transactional nucleus: Plaintiff’s employment at NJIT and her complaints of mistreatment. That

is sufficient to meet the third requirement.

Not to be deterred after Judge McNulty dismissed those several claims with prejudice,

Plaintiff proceeded to file an action in New Jersey Superior Court, the existence of which further

reinforces this Court’s conclusion that Dickerson II is an impermissible attempt to relitigate claims

already decided. In that case, Plaintiff again sued NJIT and individuals affiliated with the

institution based on the same alleged conduct. The state court dismissed that complaint on

preclusion grounds, and in doing so, specifically engaged Plaintiff concerning the duplicative

nature of her claims and the effect of Dickerson I. (Dickerson II, D.E. 10-2, Ex. D, at 26:17-

27:11.) This exchange underscores that, despite proceeding pro se, Plaintiff was made aware by

both this Court and the state court of the prior adjudications and the legal principles that bar

repeated litigation of the same events. The state court’s consistent treatment of Plaintiff’s claims

confirms the soundness of this Court’s application of res judicata.

Although the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are distinct — res judicata

bars re-litigation of the same claims, while collateral estoppel bars re-litigation of specific issues

actually litigated and essential to a prior judgment — only res judicata is necessary to dispose of

the overlapping claims here. Because the dismissed claims in Dickerson I resulted in a final

judgment on the merits involving the same core set of facts and legally related parties, and Plaintiff

had a full opportunity to litigate those claims, Dickerson II is barred in its entirety under the broader

doctrine of claim preclusion. As such, this Court need not reach the narrower application of

collateral estoppel.

iii. Statute of Limitations and Failure to State a Claim

Having found that Dickerson II is clearly barred by the doctrine of res judicata, this Court

will only briefly address the remaining bases.

Even if preclusion did not apply, the complaint in Dickerson II is plainly deficient on its

face. It consists of a single paragraph of vague and conclusory assertions, devoid of any supporting

facts, legal theory, or specific conduct attributed to the named defendants. The complaint does not

allege what actions the Board of Trustees or any individual defendant purportedly took, when those

actions occurred, or how they violated any specific statute or legal right. This lack of detail is

insufficient to meet the pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and warrants

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Moreover, any potential claim raised in Dickerson II would be time-barred under both

federal and state law. Plaintiff was terminated from her position at NJIT in July 2020. To the

extent she seeks relief under Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA, such claims were subject to a 90-

day filing window following receipt of a right-to-sue letter. Plaintiff did not file Dickerson II until

November 2024, and does not attach the right-to-sue letter that she claims she received on August

8, 2024. Likewise, claims brought under the NJLAD and any related tort claims are governed by

a two-year statute of limitations under New Jersey law, which would have expired well before

Dickerson II was filed. See Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 286 (1993); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-

2. Nothing in the Dickerson II complaint plausibly suggests a continuing violation, equitable

tolling, or any other basis to extend these deadlines.

Accordingly, even if this action were not barred by res judicata or claim-splitting, it would

still warrant dismissal on these independent grounds. Given the conclusory nature of the

allegations, the lack of any new or timely asserted facts, and Plaintiff’s repeated attempts to litigate

the same issues across multiple forums, this Court finds that amendment would be futile. The

claims in Dickerson II are therefore dismissed with prejudice.

b. Motion for Sanctions

Defendants in Dickerson II have moved for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 11 in light of Plaintiff’s initiation of a second lawsuit involving substantially the same

parties, facts, and legal claims that have already been the subject of prior rulings in this Court and

in New Jersey Superior Court. Rule 11 provides that by presenting a pleading to the court, a party

certifies that to the best of their knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable

inquiry, the pleading is not being presented for any improper purpose, the claims are warranted by

existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for its extension, and the factual contentions have

evidentiary support. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Sanctions under Rule 11 are intended to deter

abusive litigation and promote judicial efficiency, but they are discretionary and must be applied

with care, especially where the litigant is proceeding pro se. The Third Circuit has emphasized

that sanctions are to be applied only in the exceptional circumstance “where a claim or motion is

patently unmeritorious or frivolous.” Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857

F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir.1988) (citation omitted). While pro se litigants are not exempt from Rule

11, a court “may take a party’s pro se status into account when considering Rule 11 sanctions.”

Asanov v. Davidson, Civ. No. 06-611, 2007 WL 1140632, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2007); but see

Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[O]ne acting pro se has

no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already

overloaded court dockets”).

Here, the claims in Dickerson II are largely duplicative of claims already raised and, in

many instances, dismissed with prejudice in both this Court and the New Jersey Superior Court.

The factual allegations arise from the same employment relationship at the New Jersey Institute of

Technology, and Plaintiff has already been afforded multiple opportunities to litigate those claims.

Filing a lawsuit without a legitimate basis wastes both judicial and party resources, and, under

normal circumstances, likely would result in the imposition of sanctions. Nevertheless, in light of

Plaintiff’s pro se status and the possibility that she may not have fully appreciated the legal

consequences of filing Dickerson II, this Court will exercise its discretion to deny the request for

Rule 11 sanctions. See McCarthy v. Minnesota Laws. Mut. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 23-450, 2023 WL

4636889, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 19, 2023) (“[C]aselaw construing Rule 11 sanctions is marked by a

single overarching principle; namely, when in doubt, one should decline to sanction parties.”)

However, Plaintiff is now on clear notice that these claims have been fully and finally

adjudicated repeatedly and in multiple forums, and that any future attempt to reassert the same or

substantially similar claims against these or related defendants may result in the imposition of

sanctions, including monetary penalties or a filing injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c); Brow v.

Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993) (affirming district court’s authority to limit filings

by a pro se litigant after fair warning and an opportunity to be heard). Simply put, while this Court

is willing to give Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt this time, it will not permit ongoing misuse of

the judicial process, particularly when such misuse blatantly disregards the finality of prior rulings.

F

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED

in Dickerson I, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in Dickerson II, and Defendants’

motion for sanctions is DENIED in Dickerson II. Appropriate orders will follow in both actions.

___/s/ Susan D. Wigenton_____

SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk

cc: Michael A. Hammer, U.S.M.J.

Parties