Vancamp v. Baltimore County Maryland

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

GINA VANCAMP ET AL., oe,

Plaintiffs, *

Vv. ‘ *

Civil No. 24-3097-BAH

BALTIMORE COUNTY, *

MARYLAND ET AL., .

Defendants. .

* * * * * * * * * * * x *

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Gina Vancamp, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Brian

McCourry, Isis Weaver, as next friend of N.W., a minor child, Brian R. MeCourry, Sr, Sabrina .

McCourry, and Shakira White, as next friend of B.M., a minor child (collectively “Plaintiffs”)

brought suit against Baltimore County and Detective J. Trenary (collectively “Defendants”)

alleging battery (Count I against Trenary), excessive force under 42 USC, § 1983 (Count II

against Trenary), excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under a theory of Monel! liability! (Count

III against Baltimore County), excessive force under Article 24 and Article 26 of the Maryland

Declaration of Rights (Count IV against all Defendants), excessive force under Article 24 and

Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights under a theory of Longtin liability? (Count V

against Baltimore County), gross négligence (Count: VI against Trenary), and wrongful death

(Count VII against all Defendants). ECF 1 (complaint). Pending before the Court is Defendants’

' Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). °

2 Prince George's Cnty. v. Longtin, 19 A.3d 859 (Md. 201 1).

Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”). ECF 15. Plaintiffs filed an opposition’, ECF 21,

and Defendants filed a reply, ECF 25. The Motion includes two exhibits.* The Court has reviewed

all relevant filings and finds that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2023).

Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.

I. | BACKGROUND .

This case stems from the death of Brian McCourry due to injuries sustained when he was

shot by police on January 31, 2023 as he attempted to flee an arrest in his car. ECF 1, at 3. That

evening, a specialized police unit called the Criminal Apprehension Support Team (CAST)

followed McCourry and a passenger to a Royal Farms gas station.» ECF 21, at 10; Ex. B. Video

footage of the incident shows six unmarked police vehicles, not all of which utilized flashing lights,

simultaneously pulling around McCourry’s vehicle to block him in. Ex B, 6:40-49. Trenary

3 Brian McCourry, Sr., Shakira White, Gina Vancamp, and Isis Weaver filed a response in

opposition to the Motion. ECF 21. Sabrina Tores filed a separate response in opposition to the

Motion, but “adopt[ed] the arguments and exhibits set forth” in ECF 21. See ECF 22, at 1.

* The Court references all filings by their respective ECF numbers and page numbers by the ECF-

generated page numbers at the top of the page, except for Exhibit B. Exhibit B is a CD containing

video footage of the incident at the heart of this case. The Court granted Defendants’ motion for

. leave to file a physical exhibit, ECF 17, and will cite the video footage as “Ex. B, time stamp.”

> Defendants maintain that at the time he was shot, McCourry “had an outstanding warrant and

was wanted for attempted first-degree murder and-other violent crimes.” ECF 15-1, at 2 (citing an

arrest warrant for various crimes including attempted murder and assault found at ECF 15-2, at 2).

Plaintiffs respond that “Defendants’ Exhibit 2 purports to be an arrest warrant for [] McCourry on

charges including attempted first-degree murder,” but “[t]his document was signed on February 1,

2023, a month after the incident, and [is] therefore. irrelevant.” ECF 21, at 20 n.7. The warrant

provided by Defendants appears to have been signed by the commissioner on February 1, 2023 at

2:05 in the afternoon. ECF 15-2, at 2. The video footage of the incident, also provided by

Defendants, is dated January 31, 2023, and Plaintiffs state in their brief that the incident took place

on January 31, 2023, one day before the signing of the warrant. See ECF 21, at 10. Thus,

Plaintiffs’ assertion that the arrest warrant was signed a month after the incident appears to be an

error. However, Plaintiffs’ underlying objection to the relevance of the arrest warrant retains merit

nonetheless. At this stage, the arrest warrant cannot establish, by itself, that the officers knew

McCourry was wanted for the above-referenced charges given that it was apparently signed on the

day following the incident in question. .

. 5 .

approached McCourry’s vehicle, a Kia, from the right-side and used his vehicle to run into the

right side of the Kia, pushing it toward the gas pump. /d..6:48-50. McCourry then accelerated

forward and ran into the side of another unmarked vehicle. /d. 6:50-53. He then slowly reversed

the car a few inches. □□□ 6:53-56. It appears at least two: officers were running toward or were

already behind the Kia as McCourry reversed. /d. McCourry then accelerated forward, again

swiping the side of the unmarked police car he had previously hit. fd. 6:56-59. As McCourry was

driving away from the gas station, an officer ran after the Kia with his gun pointed. fd. 6:59-7:01.

All of the remaining officers then run off screen. Id. 7:02-15. The video does not contain audio.

‘Tt is not clear to the Court, after reviewing the video footage, when exactly the gun that

fired the fatal shot was discharged. However, it appears undisputed that Trenary fired a-shot at the

driver’s side window of McCourry’s vehicle after McCourry drove forward the second time. See □

ECF 15-1, at 3; ECF 21, at 11. It is also undisputed that ‘Trenary shot McCourry in the neck, which

“caus[ed] the K[ia] to careen into a busy intersection and strike a civilian vehicle.” ECF 21, at 12;

ECF 15-1, at 3. McCourry died in March of 2023 as a result of the gunshot wound. ECF 21, at □

12; ECF 15-1, at3.

Plaintiffs filed suit in October 2024 .against Baltimore County and Trenary alleging □

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Maryland Declaration ‘of Rights,

and various state law claims. Defendants moved for summary judgment before discovery

commenced. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as the Court is required

to do at this,stage of the proceedings, disputes of material fact-preclude an award of summary

judgment.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 56(a) ao

.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The relevant inquiry is “whether

the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [trier of fact] or whether

it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).

“Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party

has the burden of showing that a genuine factual dispute exists.” Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. Jireh

House, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 3d 369, 373 (E.D. Va. 2022) (citing Matsushita Elec: Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986)). “A dispute is genuine if ‘a reasonable jury could

"return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Libertarian Party of Va. yv. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313

(4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012)).

“A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” id. (quoting

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Accordingly, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute

‘between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary

judgment...” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original).

The Court must-view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor, Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (per

curiam); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007), and the Court “may not make credibility

determinations or weigh the evidence,” Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 608 F. Supp. 3d at 373 (citing

Holland v. Wash Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 2007)). For this reason, summary

judgment ordinarily is inappropriate when there is conflicting evidence because it is the function

of the factfinder to resolve factual disputes, including matters of witness credibility. See Black &

Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 442 (4th Cir. 2006); Dennis vy. Columbia Colleton

Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). ’ □

At the same time, the Court must “prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from

_ proceeding to trial.” Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir.

2003) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 2003)). “The existence of a mere

scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party as-well as conclusory allegations or denials,

without more, are insufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion.” Progressive Am. Ins.

Co., 608 F. Supp. 3d at 373 (citing Tom v. Hosp. Ventures LLC, 980 F.3d 1027, 1037-(4th Cir, □

2020). -

_B. Rule 56(d)

“Rule 56(d) requires that summary judgment be refused where the nonmoving party has

not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition. The rule is

intended as a safeguard against a premature grant of summary judgment.” 7yree v. United States,

642 F. App’x. 228, 230 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal: citations omitted). Specifically, Rule 56(d)

provides that “[i]f a movant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot

present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may . . . defer considering the motion or

deny it[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Rule 56(d) motions are “broadly favored and should be liberally

granted.” McCray v. Md. Dep 't of Transp., Md. Transit Admin., 741 F.3d 480, 483-84 (4th Cir.

2014) (quoting Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Ine. v. Mayor & CityCouncil of Balt,

‘721 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2013)). “A court should hesitate before denying a Rule 56(d) motion

when the nonmovant seeks necessary information possessed only by the movant. But a court may

deny a Rule 56(d) motion when the information sought would not by itself create a genuine issue

of material fact sufficient for the nonmovant to survive summary judgment.” Pisano v. Stranch,

.

-743 F.3d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Jngle ex rel. Estate of Ingle v. Yelton, 439 F.3d 191, 195

(4th Cir. 2006)).

To succeed on a request to defer summary judgment until the completion of discovery, the

nonmoving party must submit a Rule 56(d) affidavit demonstrating why it cannot yet properly

oppose a motion for summary judgment. Pine Ridge Coal v. Local 8377, 187 F.3d 4 15, 42] (4th

Cir. 1999). “The purpose of the affidavit is to ensure that the nonmoving party is invoking the

protections of Rule 56[(d)] in good faith and to afford the trial court with the showing necessary

to assess the merit of a party’s opposition.” Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302

214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing First Chicago Int'l v. United Exchange Co., 836 F.2d 1375,

1380 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). “A [Rule 56(d)] affidavit that conclusorily states that discovery is required

is insufficient; the affidavit must specify the reasons the party is unable to present the necessary

facts and describe with particularity the evidence that the party seeks to obtain.” Radi v. Sebelius,

434 F. App’x. 177, 178 (4th Cir. 2011). Ifthe nonmovant is able to identify specific reasons why

_ it cannot present facts essential to support its opposition in its Rule 56(d) affidavit, “the court may:

(1) defer considering the motion [for summary judgment] or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain

affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(d). .

TI. ANALYSIS

A. The Motion is Premature.

The Court again notes that discovery has not yet taken place in this case.° In the response

in opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiffs attached a Rule 56(d) affidavit requesting discovery.

See ECF 21-1. Plaintiffs argue that because they have not yet been afforded an opportunity to

® Defendants have.not filed a response to the complaint outside of the instant motion, and the Court

has not yet entered a discovery order or scheduling order.

. □ .

conduct discovery, they are “in the proverbial fencing match without a mask or sword.” ECF 21,

at 7. Defendants argue that there is no genuine dispute of fact in the case, without explicitly

addressing Plaintiffs’ request for discovery. See ECF 25, at 3-4. For the reasons that follow, the

Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown they are entitled to conduct discovery to support

their opposition to summary judgment.

A party may move for summary judgment before the commencement of discovery. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). However, “[s]ummary judgment before discovery forces the non-moving

party into a fencing match without a sword or mask.” MeCray, 741 F.3d at 483. “Consequently,

summary judgment [must] be denied when the nonmovant has not had the opportunity discover □

information that is essential to his opposition.” Callender v. Callender, Civ. No. TDC-15-4015,

2016 WL 3647613, at *6 (D. Md. June 30, 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

To satisfy Rule 56(d)’s mandates and obtain additional discovery, the nonmoving party “must

specifically allege why the information sought would [be] sufficient to create a genuine issue of

. Material fact such that it would [] defeat[] summary judgment.” Strag v. Bd. of Trustees, Craven

Cmty. Coll., 55 F.3d 943, 954 (4th Cir. 1995).

Based on the Rule 56(d) affidavit attached to the opposition to summary judgment, the

Court is convinced that Plaintiffs’ request for discovery is appropriate. Plaintiffs note that

“Tajlthough [] McCourry died as a result of the shooting, there was a passenger in his vehicle at

the time of the encounter. There were also numerous civilian witnesses and non-Defendant police

officers present.” ECF 21-1, at 2 47. According to Plaintiffs, “[d]iscovery as to the accounts of

these witnesses is required to show, among other things: .

. a Records related to the pre-incident, surveillance of Mr. McCourry,

including whether officers had opportunities to apprehend Mr.

McCourry without creating a dangerous situation at a busy gas station;

7 .

b. Whether any of the police officers activated emergency sirens and, if

they did, whether Mr. McCourry could have reasonably perceived the

sirens (the surveillance footage from the Royal Farms gas station does

not have sound);

c. Whether any of the police officers issued any verbal commands to Mr.

McCourry and, if they did, whether Mr. McCourry could have

reasonably perceived the commands (the surveillance footage from the

Royal Farms gas station does not have sound);

d. As all of the police vehicles were unmarked and with dark tinted

windows, and the officers were all wearing tactical clothing, whether

Mr. McCourry perceived that the vehicles were, in fact, police vehicles;

e. ‘Whether Mr. McCourry reasonably perceived that he was under arrest;

f. What information the officers, including Det. Trenary, knew about Mr.-

McCourry prior to, and during the encounter. For example, Defendants

rely on Exhibit A, ECF 15-2, an arrest warrant, for the officers’ basis of

knowledge about Mr. McCourry’s alleged crimes, but that warrant was

executed more than a month after the events of this case;

g. Whether any individuals were in the direct path of Mr. McCourry’s

vehicle when Det. Trenary fired his weapon.”

Id. at 2-3-4 8. These discovery requests directly address the ultimate issue of the reasonableness

-of the force. Defendants argue that “[w]hat McCourry knew has no bearing on the objective

reasonableness of [] Trenary’s acts.” ECF 25, at 3. But this argument ignores well-established

precedent. See Betton v. Belue, 942 F.3d 184, 193 (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining that if the court

were to “ignore the officers’ failure to identify themselves or to give any verbal commands, we

would be discounting the analysis in Cooper [v. Sheehan] and other prior decisions in which we

found such facts critical in determining whether excessive force was used”). Plaintiffs have

plausibly argued that discovery may reveal facts that could show that Trenary’s use of deadly force

was unreasonable. This is not an instance when “the evidence sought [is] almost certainly

nonexistent or [is] the object of pure speculation.” See Ingle, 439 F.3d at 196 (citation omitted).

A recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confirms that,

particularly in cases involving the use of deadly force, discovery is required when “the record

presents a potential material dispute of fact.” Boyle v. Azzari, 107 F.4th 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2024).

_ In Boyle, the Fourth Circuit reversed the pre-discovery award of summary judgment in a § 1983 □

case in which a police officer, shot and killed a man holding a replica firearm and a knife -

approximately “fifteen to twenty-five feet away” from the officer. /d. at 300. The Fourth Circuit |

found that the district court erred in granting summaty judgment because the plaintiff “explicitly

informed the court of the importance of discovery to her case” and sought access to specific

discovery, namely an autopsy report and an opportunity to depose defendant.about what occurred.

302. In reversing the district court, the Fourth Circuit held that “[t]he district court was []

well aware of the insufficiency of the summary judgment record and should have allowed time for

discovery before assessing [defendant’s] motion.” Jd. Critical to the dispute at bar, the appellate

also explained that “special difficulties can arise during summary judgment in use of deadly

force cases where a defendant has killed a key witness who can refute the defendant’s account.”

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Given Plaintiffs’ clear articulation of the

importance of discovery in this case, which centers on the reasonableness of the use of deadly

force, Boyle counsels that summary judgment would be inappropriate at this time.” -

It also bears noting that the Fourth Circuit found pre-discovery summary judgment

inappropriate in Boyle “because the record present[ed] a potential material dispute of fact.” Boyle,

107 F.4th at 302. Of note were conflicting accounts “of the moments immediately preceding the

’ Moreover, just four months ago, the Fourth Circuit again reiterated, in vacating a district court’s

grant of summary judgment pre-discovery, that Rule 56(d) is broadly favored in this Circuit. See

Farabee v. Gardella, 131 F.4th 185, 193 (4th Cir. 2025) (“[T]his Court has cautioned that district

courts should not consider summary judgment motions where the nonmoving party has not had an

opportunity to discover information essential to its opposition.”).

0 .

use of force, the core issue in every excessive force case[.]” Jd. The Fourth Circuit reiterated that

“Twjhen faced with a Fourth Amendment claim involving the use of deadly force, ‘the question

comes down to whether the circumstances presented an immediate threat that justified the officer’s □

resort to lethal force as objectively reasonable.”” Id. at 303 (quoting Franklin y, City of Charlotte,

64 F 4th 519, 530 (4th Cir. 2023)). As noted above, the video of the incident—the only

_ indisputably relevant piece of evidence currently before the Court—teflects that McCourry may

have been driving away from officers when he was shot, thus discovery may “provide additional

color regarding whether that use of force was reasonable given [Trenary’s] training and the

circumstances.” Jd. (citing Hupp v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307, 323 (4th Cir. 2019)). Indeed, the record

before the Court at this time reflects disputes of material fact in several key areas, which the Court

addresses below. ,

1.: Reasonableness of Force

The following claims hinge, at least in some respect, on the reasonableness of the use of

deadly force: battery (Count I), excessive force pursuant to Section 1983 (Count II), excessive

force under Articles 24 ‘and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count IV), gross negligence

(Count VJ), and wrongful death (Count VII). Defendants urge this-Court to find, based solely on

the video footage, that “Trenary’s use of force was objectively reasonable considering the danger

McCourry presented to law enforcement and the public.” ECF 25, at 4. Plaintiffs respond that

Defendants’ argument “turns on disputed facts . .. specifically whether the information available

to Det. Trenary at the moment—and immediately before—he used deadly force gave him probable

cause to believe that [] McCourry posed an imminent threat of severe injury to the officers or

others.” ECF 21, at 7 (emphasis in original).

10

In assessing the reasonableness of force, a court should consider: (1) the severity of the

crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or

others, and (3) whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

‘flight. See Graham vy. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). It is important to recognize that

“[t]he intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched.” Tennessee v. Garner,

471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). Nevertheless, a police officer may employ deadly force when the officer has

- “probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the

officer or to others.” /d. at 11.

In Scott v. Harris, which also involved a Fouith Amendment excessive force claim, the

Supreme Court evaluated a taped recording of the incident in question. 550 U.S. at 375-76. The

Court found that “[r]espondent’s version of events [was] so utterly discredited by the record that

no reasonable jury could have believed him,” and therefore, “[t]he Court of Appeals should not

have relied on such visible fiction: it should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the.

videotape.” Jd, at 380-81. However, as the Fourth Circuit explained in Harris v. Pittman,

“TsJummary judgment is proper under Scott only when there is evidence... undisputed

authenticity that shows some material element of the plaintiff's account to be ‘blatantly and

demonstrably false.’” 927 F.3d 266, 275 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Blaylock v. City of Phila, 504

F.3d 405, 414 (3d Cir. 2007)).

Here, while Defendants advance an argument that McCourry was using his vehicle as a

weapon and placing the officers in immediate danger, ECF 25, at 4, the video evidence does not

conclusively support this theory such that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Rather, as Plaintiffs suggest, this is a “subjective interpretation[] of the limited video evidence

available,” ECF 21, at 9, given that the video reflects that McCourry reversed slowly, and only a

11

a few inches, before changing course and driving in a direction where, at least as shown on the

video footage, there were no officers or bystanders.® Ex. B, 6:50-58. According to Plaintiffs,

‘“Trenary applied such force with his SUV that it pushed [] McCourry’s smaller vehicle sideways

toward the gas pump,” and “[a] reasonable juror could conclude that [] McCourry was merely

attempting to flee a dangerous situation created by [] Trenary, and that it was therefore

unreasonable for [] Trenary to interpret [] McCourry’s attempt to flee, alone, as animminent □□□□□□

justifying the use of deadly force.” ECF 21, at 19. Because the video evidence does not render

Plaintiffs’ account a “visible fiction,” but rather confirms that the evidence lends itself to multiple

interpretations, the Court declines to award summary judgment before discovery. See Harris, 927

F.3d at 276 (explaining that at summary judgment, the court’s obligation to construe the facts in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party “continues to apply in the face of documentary

evidence that lends support to a government official’s account of events, or even makes it unlikely

that the plaintiff's account is true” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

Along those same lines, there is a genuine dispute of material fact over whether the

justification for the force had been eliminated by the time Trenary fired his weapon. Plaintiffs

allege that “no officer or other person was in the trajectory of [] McCourry’s vehicle when []

8 As described below, the Court disregards Defendants’ argument that McCourry posed a threat to

officers and the public because he “was speeding in the trajectory of a ‘busy road’ occupied by

innocent drivers.” ECF 25, at 5 (quoting ECF 1, at 11 941). The footage provided to the Court

does not reflect that people (or vehicles) were in McCourry’s way as his car accelerated out of the

parking lot and Trenary apparently fired at him. Ex B, 6:57-7:00. Any argument that McCourry

endangered the public must be supported by record evidence, and this Court is “required to

construe the record evidence favorably to [Plaintiffs],” despite any views on whether they will

“ultimately [] prevail at trial.” Harris, 927 F.3d at 272. Because the only evidence submitted was

the video footage and the disputed arrest warrant, there is no basis in the record at this time for

Defendants’ implied assertion that deadly force was necessary to protect officers and bystanders

who may have been struck by McCourry after he had successfully evaded the officers’ attempt to

pin his vehicle in and was accelerating out of the parking lot.

19

Trenary used deadly force. ECF 21, at 27 (citing ECF lat { 35, 40). Defendants counter that

deadly force was necessary because “McCourry struck an officer’s vehicle, then reversed his

vehicle in the direction of Sgt. Bakhsh and then struck a police vehicle again,” ECF 25, at 4

(emphasis in original), perhaps implying that there was a reasonable fear that McCourry would .

again reverse his vehicle in the direction of the officers despite having apparently escaped their

attempts to pin him in. Regardless, the video indisputably shows Trenary running after

MeCourry’s vehicle with his gun drawn after McCourry maneuvered his car out of the enclosure

created by the six police cars. See Ex. B, 6:57~7:00. Moreover, because there is-no sound, it is

not clear from the video footage when the gun was actually fired,? or whether McCourry paused.

his acceleration’? in a manner that might suggest an intention to again reverse in the direction of

the officers. Therefore, the Court is “left with a soundless video containing mere images,” and

is difficult to decipher from reviewing the video the true sequence of events.” Witt v. West

Virginia State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 277 (4th Cir. 2011). .

Defendants indicate that “Trenary fired a single shot into the driver’s side window of McCourry’s

Vehicle,” and cite 6:59 of the video footage for that assertion. See ECF 15-1, at 3. At this point

in the video, McCourry is driving out of the gas station and the video does not reflect that anyone

is in the immediate trajectory of his vehicle as he accelerates forward. Ex. B, 6:59-7:00.

'0 The Court notes that Defendants do not appear to endorse the unlikely scenario that McCourry

intended to again reverse toward officers after successfully escaping their barricade given that the

video reflects McCourry’s persistent efforts to flee arrest. However, Defendants do argue that

McCourry’s earlier decision to reverse his car in the direction of officers, albeit slowly and only

for a short distance, is critical to evaluating the reasonableness of Trenary’s subsequent decision

to use deadly force. See ECF 15-1, at 6—-7.(“Despite the CAST officers’ efforts to.quickly block

McCourry’s vehicle using six police vehicles ... McCourry did not yield. Instead, he attempted

to evade arrest by driving his car into Detective Depew’s vehicle (while Det. Depew was near it),

reversing back towards Sgt. Bakhsh, and striking Detective Depew’s vehicle again. [McCourry’s]

unlawful actions were made without regard to human life and presented.an immediate threat to the

safety of not only the officers involved; particularly Depew and Baksh, but also any member of

the public frequenting the gas station that morning.”).

13.

The Court cannot decide on this bare record whether the use of deadly force was warranted

. when the video reflects that no one was in the trajectory of McCourry’s vehicle as-he drove off.

Defendants argue that McCourry “created an immediate threat to officers-and the public” by

“driving into [a Detective’s] vehicle, reversing in the direction of [another officer], and then

- striking [the Detective’s] vehicle again.” ECF 15-1, at 6. Plaintiffs respond that “it is objectively

reasonable to expect [] Trenary to know that using his vehicle, unmarked and without emergency

lights or sirens, as a batteving ram ‘before [] McCourry had been given any verbal commands,’ was

likely to cause [] McCourry to panic and flee,” and that McCourry’s reaction alone did not justify

the use of deadly force. ECF 21, at 18. The video evidence does not-unambiguously show that

when he was shot, McCourry was attempting to run officers over or otherwise place them, or the

public, in immediate danger. Thus, discovery is necessary to determine additional facts about the

circumstances giving rise to the fatal shooting, as these facts are not indisputably discemnable from

the silent video clip provided by Defendants. Of course, additional discovery may shed more light _

on the events of that evening such that Trenary’s decision can best be described as reasonable. See

Barnes v, Felix, 145 §. Ct. 1353, 1356 (2025) (rejecting “moment-of-threat” rule and holding that

assess whether an officer acted reasonably in using force, a court must consider all the

relevant circumstances, including facts and events leading up to the climactic moment”).

However, on the thin record presently before it, the Court cannot conclude that it was, as a matter

of law, reasonable for Trenary to utilize deadly force as McCourry sped out of the parking lot away

from officers. .

Indeed, another judge of this district recently reached the same conclusion after examining

similar facts in which another man was shot by Trenary while he was attempting “to flee in his

vehicle by heading toward an open pathway in [a parking] lot.” Rose v. Baltimore Cniy., Ma. , Civ.

14 □

No. 23-02078-JRR, 2024 WIL 3924595, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 23, 2024). Judge Rubin denied a

motion for judgment on the. pleadings, holding that the plaintiff s “allegations that he was shot

while no officer or other person was in the trajectory of his vehicle plausibly alleges a violation of

his Fourth Amendment right” to be free from seizure by means of excessive force.'! Jd at .*7.

While the motion in the case at bar is one for summary judgment, the same principle applied by

Judge Rubin holds true here, namely that “Plaintiff's allegations that he was shot while no officer

or other person was in the trajectory of his vehicle plausibly alleges a violation of his Fourth.

Amendment right.” Id. At this point, there is a genuine dispute of fact over the circumstances

giving rise to the deadly shooting and by extension, whether there was an immediate threat

sufficient to justify the use of deadly force at the time the force was employed. See, e.g., Waterman

Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 483 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[O]nce Waterman’s vehicle passed the officers, the

threat to their safety was eliminated and thus could not justify the subsequent shots.”); Williams v.

Strickland, 917 F.3d 763, 769 (4th Cir. 2019) (“Following Waterman, we have no difficulty

concluding that if [officers] started or continued to fire on Williams after they were no longer in □

the trajectory of Williams’s car, they violated Williams’s Fourth Amendment right to freedom

from excessive force.”).

Plaintiffs also argue that there is “at a minimum, a dispute of material fact about whether

McCourry knew that the vehicles, ‘surrounding him were police vehicles, whether the officers

gave any verbal commands, and, even if they did, whether [] McCourry heard any commands.”

ECF 21, at 17. Accordingly, Plaintiffs maintain that “Twiithout relevant ‘evidence, Defendants

After Judge Rubin granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion for judgment on the

pleadings, Defendants filed a motion under Rule 54(b) asking the. court to reconsider its denial of

: qualified immunity. Judge Rubin denied that motion on January 10, 2025, and Defendants

appealed. See Docket No. 23-2078-JRR, ECFs 24; 26; 37,43. .

15.

cannot use their assertions about | McCourry’s ‘non-compliance’ as a justification for the use of

force.” Jd. at 17-18. The video footage reveals that the cars used to trap McCourry were unmarked

police cars. Ex. B, 6:48. The vehicles did not activate sirens and did not have lights, or other

traditional indicators of a police car, on top of their vehicles. Id. While Defendants assert that two

vehicles activated' emergency lights, ECF 15-1 at 2, Plaintiffs maintain that a reasonable juror

could conclude that McCourry “could not have’seen these lights at all, as‘they were obscured by

another vehicle and the gas pump.” ECF 21, at 17. The video evidence does not resolve that

dispute of fact, particularly because the Court identifies only one vehicle with lights activated in

the video and it is entirely unclear from the footage whether McCourry could see those lights from

his vantage point. Ex. B, 6:55. Clarification of these facts could create a triable issue of fact.!?

Therefore, the Court declines to award summary judgment to Defendants before the benefit of □

discovery. See Boyle, 107 F.4th at 302 (holding that where the “accounts of the moments -

immediately preceding the use of force, the core issue in every excessive. force case, directly

conflict,” pre-discovery summary judgment is inappropriate); Witt, 633 F.3d 277 (affirming

district court’s denial of summary judgment where the “parties’ dispute as to what actually

'2 Defendants are correct that “McCourry’s state of mind” does not decide the issue since it is the

objective reasonableness of Trenary’s decision to use deadly force that is at issue. See Rowland vy.

Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 172 (Ath Cir. 1994) (“The reasonableness inquiry is ari objective one. To

gauge objective reasonableness, a court examines only the actions at issue and measures them

against what a reasonable police officer would do under the circumstances.”). However, this does

not mean that McCourry’s perceptions are entirely irrelevant to the inquiry, either. See Smith v.

Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 103 (4th Cir. 2015) (denying summary judgment in an excessive force case

where defendants argued that the plaintiff was attempting to flee arrest but the appellate court

found that “[a] reasonable jury could find that at that moment any perception by [the defendant

officer] that [the plaintiff] had attempted or was attempting to flee would have been

unreasonable.”); Rowland, 41 F.3d. at 174 (denying qualified immunity where there was “some

evidence” that the plaintiff resisted arrest where plaintiff “maintain[ed] that he resisted only to the .

extent of instinctively trying to’protect himself from the defendant’s onslaught.”).

; (VE

happened during these seven seconds is critical to the summary judgment analysis, because that

dispute goes directly to the reasonableness of the troopers’ use of force”).

Moreover, as the Court has repeatedly acknowledged, the video has no sound. Plaintiffs

argue that “Defendants assume that verbal commands were given or, if they were, that [] McCourry

heard them,” however, “ECF 15-3 has no volume, and there is no other evidence in the record

suggesting that any verbal commands were given or heard.” ECF 21, at 17. According to

Plaintiffs, “[w]ithout that evidence, Defendants cannot argue that [] McCourry ignoring such

commands justified the use of deadly force.” Id. The Court agrees. See Cooper v. Sheehan, 735

F.3d 153, 159 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding excessive force where officers “never identified themselves”

and plaintiff “ignored no commands”). Thus, the Court finds it inappropriate to grant summary

‘Judgment based solely on a silent video before Plaintiffs have had an opportunity to conduct

discovery.

In short, there are several material disputes of fact that preclude this Court from _

determining the reasonableness of the force as a matter of law. Plaintiffs have requested discovery

of evidence which, if available, could shed light on those issues. Discovery seems particularly

important given that Plaintiffs have asserted that “there was a passenger in [the] vehicle at the time

of the encounter,” and “[t]here were also numerous civilian witnesses and non-Defendant police

officers present.” ECF 21-1, at 2 §7. Because Defendants’ arguments as to Plaintiffs’ claims for

battery (Count I), excessive force pursuant to Section 1983: (Count II), excessive force under

Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count IV), gross negligence (Count

VI), and wrongful death (Count VID all rely on the reasonableness inquiry, those claims must

proceed to discovery. Based on Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) affidavit and response brief, the Court is

persuaded that, at the current stage of ligation, Plaintiffs cannot present facts essential to justify .

17 .

opposition ‘and should be afforded the opportunity to obtain all discovery necessary to

adequately respond to Defendants’ motion. See Boyle, 107 F.4th at 302 (“Courts must take care

to consider all contradictory evidence, which necessarily cautions against eranting summary

judgment before plaintiffs challenging the use of deadly force have the opportunity to conduct

discovery.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is denied without prejudice. If they so choose,

Defendants may ‘refile their motion after discovery closes and by the deadline for dispositive

motions, which will be set in the Scheduling Order.

B. Genuine Disputes of Material Fact Prechide Qualified Immunity.

“{O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a

federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly

established at the time.’” D.C. v. Wesdy, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards,

5660.8, 658, 664 (2012)). “In the Fourth Circuit, we have a split burden of proof for the qualified-

immunity defense. The plaintiff bears the burden on the first prong, and the officer bears the

burden on the second prong.” Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022). .

As to the first prong, whether Defendants violated a constitutiorial right depends upon the

resolution of material fact disputes as to whether Trenary acted reasonably. As to the second

prong, it was clearly established at the time of the incident that officers “violate the Fourth

Amendment if they employ deadly force against the driver once they are no longer in the car’s_

trajectory.” Williams, 917 F.3d at 770. .

“Ordinarily, the question of qualified immunity should be decided at the summary

judgment stage.” Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 558-59 (4th Cir. 3005). Further, because

qualified immunity is in part designed “to protect public officials from the ‘broad-ranging

' 12

discovery’ that can be ‘peculiarly disruptive of effective government,’” the Supreme Court “has

emphasized that qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage □□

litigation.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 US. 63 5, 646 n.6 (1987) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 817-818 (1982)). However, disputed factual issues may preclude such a

determination. See, e.g, Burno-Whalen v. Maryland, Civ. No. GJH-15-564, 2016 WL 1259556,

© at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2016) (“[D]isputes of material fact may preclude a finding by the Court

about whether qualified immunity applies, and instead convert the inguity into a question for the

trier of fact.”); Gray v. Torres, Civ. No. WDQ-08-1380, 2009 WL 2169044, at #7 (D. Md. July

17, 2009) (noting that, in the summary judgment context, “the qualified immunity question

can...at times require factual determinations respecting disputed aspects of [a defendant’s]

conduct” and therefore the summary judgment doctrine should not be “skewed from its ordinary

operation to give substantive favor to the defense” (citations omitted)); Raub v. Bowen, 960 F.

Supp. 2d 602, 608 n.8 (B.D. Va. 2013) (“So long as qualified immunity does not turn on disputed

facts, ‘whether the officer’s actions were reasonable is a question of pure law.’”) (emphasis in.

original) (citing Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 201-1) (en banc)).

Here, whether qualified immunity shields Defendants ‘from liability in this case depends

upon the answer to the question of whether the deadly force employed by Trenary was reasonable.

Because the justification for the force and the circumstances giving rise to that use of force are

genuinely disputed, this Court cannot answer that question at this early stage of the litigation. See

Farabee, 131 F.Ath at 194 (“Whether Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity [] depends on

whether their decisions are justified... and summary judgment on this basis is inappropriate

absent resolution of that issue.”).

19

Of course, it may be the case that, after discovery, this Court may conclude, like the Fourth

Circuit did in Waterman, that the officers “interpreted the acceleration in the face of their show of

force as the initiation [by the victim]... to avoid capture by using his vehicle as a wveapon against

law enforcement personnel,” and thus there was probable cause to believe the victim posed an

immediate threat. Waterman, 393 F.3d at 479. However, on the record presently before it—which

essentially consists of a short, silent video—the Court cannot agree with Defendants that the

evidence unambiguously establishes an immediate threat to Trenary, other officers, or the public,

such that the use of deadly force was reasonable as a matter of law. See Witt, 633 F.3d at

277 (holding Scott inapplicable to soundless video that does not capture key disputed facts).

The Court’s review of the video footage has confirmed that. it is subject to different

interpretations and the lack'of audio makes it difficult, if not impossible, to discern key facts that

at the heart of the reasonableness of force inquiry. In Witt v. Bowman, the district court

_ declined to grant qualified immunity to defendants because plaintiff had produced evidence raising

questions “of material fact with regard to his § 1983 excessive force claim.” No. 08—cv—183, 2009

WL 8641706, at *5 (N:D. W. Va. Nov. 12, 2009). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the

district court*s decision, finding that “the documentary evidence in this case—the dashboard -

video—does not blatantly contradict [plaintiff's] account of the facts; therefore, it does not

establish that the officers are entitled to summary judgment.” Witt, 633 F.3d at 277 (cleaned up).

As relevant here, in Witt, the video lacked sound and thus “[t]he viewer cannot hear whether □

[plaintiff] properly answered [the trooper’s] questions and followed the trooper’s orders (as

13 The Fourth Circuit also held that “the troopers’ attempt to ‘rehash[] the factual dispute below’

provides no basis for interlocutory appeal of the district court’s order denying summary judgment

on qualified immunity grounds.” Witt, 633 F.3d at 277-78 (quoting Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225,

235 (4th Cir. 2008)). .

a0

[plaintiff] claims) or resisted arrest posing a threat to the troopers’ safety (as the troopers claim).”

id. The same result is compelled here. The video “provides little assistance in resolving the |

parties’ disputes as to the facts.” Jd. Defendants’ only record evidence is the video tape and an

arrest. warrant that contains a date after the fatal shooting. As the Court already described, the

video footage. does not provide “all of the necessary context that would allow the Court to assess

the reasonableness of that conduct.” Blaylock, 504 F.3d at 414. Moreover, there are genuine

disputes of fact, and multiple reasonable interpretations, of the sequence of events, therefore

Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity before. resolution of these fact disputes. See

Rose, 2024 WL 3924595, at *10 (Officer Defendants’ assertion of materially disputed facts

bearing on whether [the victim’s] allegedly violated right was ‘clearly established’ at the time □

Officer Defendants shot him do not militate in favor of the outcome they seek at this time; a finding

as to qualified immunity is premature.”). As such, the Court declines to grant Defendants qualified

immunity as the reasonableness of the shooting remains in dispute.

With respect to the second inquiry—whether Defendants violated a clearly established

law—it is clearly established that the use of deadly force is unreasonable “if a reasonable officer

would have recognized when the force was employed that the threat no longer existed.”

Waterman, 393 F.3d at 482. “To determine whether a right was clearly established, we first look

to cases from.the Supreme Court, this Court, or the highest court of the state in which the action

arose.” Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 229 (4th Cir. 2020). “In the absence of ‘directly on-point,

binding authority,’ courts may also consider whether ‘the right was clearly established based on

general constitutional principles or a consensus of persuasive authority.’” fd. (quoting Booker v.

S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 543 (4th Cir. 2017)). “[T]he Supreme Court instructs [lower

courts] ‘not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality[, |’” however, “defendants

21 oe

can violate clearly established law even under ‘novel factual circumstances.’” Williams, 917 F.3d

770 (first citing Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014), then citing Williamson v.

Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 187 (4th Cir. 2018). “Thus, although we must avoid ambushing □

government officials with liability for good-faith mistakes made at the unsettled peripheries of the □

law, we need not—and should not—assume that government officials are incapable of drawing

logical inferences, reasoning by analogy, or exercising common sense. In some cases, government

officials can be expected to know that if X is illegal, then Y is also illegal, despite factual

differences between the two.” Id. Thus, though it is clear that “to ring the ‘clearly established’

bell, there need not exist a case on all fours with the facts at hand,” Hunter v. Town of Mocksville,

N. Carolina; 789 F.3d 389, 401 (4th Cir. 2015), the inquiry into whether the relevant law was

clearly established at the time of Trenary’s 2023 shooting is relatively straightforward given

precedent from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals that.is directly on point.

As noted previously, in a 2005 deadly force case, the Fourth Circuit held that.“once [the

driver’s vehicle] passed the officers, the threat to their safety was eliminated and thus could not

justify the subsequent shots.” Waterman, 393 F.3d at 483. However, the Fourth Circuit

nonetheless granted qualified immunity in Waterman because it had not been previously

established in the Fourth Circuit that at the time of the shooting in that case “a passing risk to an

officer does not authorize him to employ deadly force moments after he should have recognized

the passing of the risk.” Jd. Later, in the 2019 case of Williams v. Strickland, the Fourth Circuit

confirmed that Waterman: □□

clearly established that (1) law enforcement officers may—under certain conditions—be

justified in using deadly force against the driver of a car when they are in the car’s trajectory

and have reason to believe that the driver will imminently and intentionally run over them,

but (2) the same officers violate the Fourth Amendment if they employ deadly force against

the driver once they are no longer in the car’s trajectory. .

i

917 F.3d at 770 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs maintain that “no officer or other person was in the

trajectory of [] McCourry’s vehicle when [] Trenary used deadly force.” ECF 21, at 27-28 (citing

ECF 1, at 9 35, 40), As the Court already described, because discovery has not yet taken place,

the video footage is the only probative evidence on this point. Defendants cite 6:59 of the video

footage for the proposition that “Trenary fired a single shot into the driver’s side window of

McCourry’s vehicle.” ECF 15-1, at 3. At 6:59 of the footage, McCourry is pulling forward out

of the gas station and there is no officer or member of the public directly in front of his vehicle.

Thus, the Court declines to award qualified immunity at this time because if Plaintiffs’ version of

events is accepted and no officer or person was in the trajectory of the car when Trenary fired his

weapon, then, as was the case in Williams, “[t]he right that the officers allegedly violated falls well

within the ambit of clearly established law.” 917 F.3d. at 770.

Additionally, the Court is unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument that Waterman and

Williams are distinguishable from the instant case because “McCourry posed a clear threat to the

public,” and “rapidly accelerated toward a busy highway active with morning commuters.” ECF

25, at 6. First, there is no record evidence to support this argument. The video footage only

captures McCourry driving away from the police officers and then out of frame. Ex. B, 6:40-7:10.

Any argument that McCourry endangered the public must be supported by citation to “particular

parts of materials in the record,” not Defendants’ bare assertions in their pre-discovery summary

judgment briefing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, the Court disregards this entire line

of argument. See ECF 25, at 6-8. The same is true for Defendants’ argument that. “Trenary

reasonably believed [McCourry] could be armed.” Jd. at 4. Defendants cite no record evidence

for this proposition, and the video footage does not conclusively establish this assertion. Thus, the

Court will not consider it in deciding the instant motion.

33

Second, to accept Defendants’ argument would require the Court to endorse the proposition

that deadly force is justified whenever a suspect flees in a vehicle on, or in the direction of, a public

roadway because such roads will almost always be filled with other drivers. Defendants cite no

cases that eridorse such an expansive view of deadly force in the context of fleeing vehicles.

Indeed, though the shooting in Waterman occurred mid-afternoon at a toll plaza just beyond the

Fort McHenry tunnel, one of the busiest stretches of highway in the state, if not: the country, the

Fourth Circuit still found that the use of deadly force was unreasonable “once Waterman’s vehicle

passed the officers [and] the threat to their safety was eliminated.” Waterman, 393 F.3d at 474.

Such a conclusion would be untenable if the mere presence of other motorists was enough to justify

deadly force whenever a suspect flees in a car.!4 Moreover, on the bare record before the Court

at this time, it would be improper to conclude that Plaintiffs’ assertion that McCourry drove toward

a “busy road,” ECF 1, at 11 941, means that, as a matter of law, Trenary had “probable cause to

believe that the suspect pose[d] a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.”

Garner, 471 U.S. at 9. Accordingly, “the qualified immunity defense is unavailing, both because

the constitutional rights were well-established at the time of the incident[] at issue and because

there exists a material dispute of fact regarding whether conduct allegedly violative of [the

The Court acknowledges that there are cases supporting the use of deadly force when a fleeing

suspect in a car has successfully evaded officers but still poses an immediate threat to other

motorists or pedestrians. For example, in Scott v. Edinburg, a case cited in Waterman, the Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that shooting at a fleeing suspect in a car after the

immediate threat to officers subsided was nonetheless reasonable since the fleeing suspect “had ~

committed a forcible felony and had attempted to run [an officer] down in order to escape or at

least had acted recklessly with respect to that possibility” and the suspect “was escaping at a high

rate of speed through a parking lot with twelve to fourteen bystanders and demonstrating little

concern for anyone’s safety.” 346 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2003). However, the proposition floated

by Defendants—that deadly force is permissible whenever a suspect flees in the direction of a

“busy road”—would go far beyond the parameters of Scoft by endorsing the use of deadly force

whenever a suspect fleeing in a car makes contact with a police vehicle and then heads toward a

public road.

4 □

plaintiff's] constitutional rights actually occurred.” Canty v. Bishop, Civ..No. SAG-21-3151, 2023

WL 284446, at *7 (D. Md. Jan. 18, 2023).

Cc. Monell and Longtin Claims

Defendants styled the instant. pre-discovery motion as one for summary judgment.'°

Despite this, Defendants appear to be exclusively challenging the sufficiency of the pleading as to

Plaintiffs’ Monell and Longtin claims. See ECF 25, at 8 (“Plaintiffs have not sufficiently supported ~

a plausible claim for relief under Monell and Longtin.”). Plaintiffs respond that “Defendants have

provided no basis for dismissal of these claims before. discovery,” and “for the reasons stated in

[the Rule 56(d) affidavit], discovery is required before the Court can rule.” ECF 21, at 31.. The

Court agrees and exercises its discretion under Rule 56(d) to deny the motion without prejudice to

give Plaintiffs an opportunity to-proceed to discovery. In the Rule 56(d) affidavit, Plaintiffs argue

that the Monell and Longtin claims require discovery about, among other things:

a. Prior excessive force incidents involving Baltimore County Police; : □

Baltimore County’s investigation of, □□□ response to, prior excessive force

incidents, including the shooting involving Det. Trenary that 'is the subject of

. current litigation (See Rose v. Balt. Cnty., No. 1:23-cv-02078-JRR, 2024 U.S..

Dist. LEXIS 151257 (D. Md. Aug. 23, 2024));

c. Baltimore County’s policies and procedures concerning their body~worn

camera program, including the alleged intentional decision to omit Det. .

_Trenary’s unit from same;

d. Baltimore County’s policies and procedures concerning training officers on the

use of deadly force; .

e. Baltimore County’s policies and procedures for training the CAST special unit

in suspect confrontation, including the use of force to prevent escape; and >

15 Defendants could have filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative a motion for summary.

- judgment, but declined to do so. Accordingly, the Court evaluates the Motion under Rule 56.

25

f. Modifications, ‘if any, to Baltimore County’s policies and procedures for -

. training officers, including Det. Trenary specifically, in the use of deadly force

after the Radomski shooting incident set forth in Rose; ,

ECF 21-1, at 3-49 10. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs have “specif[ied] the reasons [they

are] unable to present the necessary facts and describe[d] with particularity the evidence that [they]

seek[] to obtain.” Radi, 434 F. App’x. at 178; see also Munoz'v. Peerce’s Operating, LLC, No. .

22-cv-1670-JMC, 2023 WL 2537543, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 2023) (allowing case to proceed to

discovery where “Tp|laintiffs have brought to the Court’s attention additional documents, such as

employee handbooks and payroll records, which may distort or completely transform the picture

painted by the documents upon which Defendants currently rely”). Additionally, the evidence

Plaintiffs seek is information possessed by Defendants, which also favors allowing discovery. See,

e.g., Ingle, 439 F.3d at 196-97 (“[C]ourts should hesitate before denying Rule 56[d] motions when

the party opposing summary judgment is attempting to obtain necessary discovery of information

possessed only by her opponent.”).

The Court declines to further analyze Count.II (Moneil claim) or Count V (Longtin claim)

on a motion for summary judgment given that Plaintiffs have adequately shown a need for

discovery through their Rule 56(d) affidavit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (stating that if the

nonmovant is able to identify specific reasons why it cannot present facts essential to support its

opposition in its Rule 56(d) affidavit, “the court may: (1) defer considering the motion [for

summary judgment] or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or.declarations or to take

discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order”).!*

16 As the Court has explained, summary judgment is not appropriate at this stage of the.case. The

case will proceed to discovery; however, Defendants are free to file a motion to bifurcate discovery

if they so choose. See Johnson v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 500 F. Supp. 3d 454, 460 (D. Md. 2020)

(explaining that cases containing Afoneil claims are “good candidates” for bifurcation because “in

most cases, a plaintiff's § 1983 claims against a municipality or a supervisor ‘hinge on his ability

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion, ECF 15, is denied without prejudice.

A separate implementing Order will issue.

Dated: July 29, 2025 ‘sf

Brendan A. Hurson

United States District Judge □

to show that [individual defendants] violated his constitutional rights.” (citing Dawson v. Prince

George’s Cuty., 896 F, Supp. 537, 540 (D. Md. 1995))).

27