Opinion

Ordonye v. Clement

Court
District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Filed
Jul 29, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 38.4%

Section 1367(a) “is a broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction over other claims within the same case or controversy, as long as the action is one in which the district courts would have original jurisdiction.”

How later courts described this case

  • Section 1367(a) “is a broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction over other claims within the same case or controversy, as long as the action is one in which the district courts would have original jurisdiction.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RYAN ORDONYE, CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff

VERSUS NO. 24-2084

KEVIN CLEMENT, ET AL., SECTION: “E” (4)

Defendants

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

filed by Defendants, Mayor Kevin Clement, in his individual capacity (“Mayor Clement”),

and the City of Thibodaux (“the City”) (sometimes collectively referred to as “the

Defendants.”). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim

for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against Mayor Clement in his

individual capacity, (2) Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim against both Mayor

Clement in his individual capacity and the City, and (3) state law defamation claim against

the City.1 Plaintiff, Ryan Ordonye, opposes the motion.2 Defendants filed a reply.3

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

On August 24, 2024, Plaintiff, a former police officer in Thibodaux, Louisiana, filed

this civil rights action against the Defendants.4 In his second amended complaint,5 filed

on May 7, 2025, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “undertook a campaign of defamation

and violation of privacy rights against the Plaintiff in effort to undermine while violating

1 R. Doc. 27; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

2 R. Doc. 33.

3 R. Doc. 36.

4 R. Doc. 1.

5 R. Doc. 26.

various administrative policies and constitutional laws.”6 Plaintiff asserts causes of action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;7 the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) at 42 U.S.C. §

12112(d);8 and Louisiana state law claims for defamation and invasion of privacy.9

Plaintiff seeks to recover from the City for the alleged state law torts under theories of

respondeat superior and vicarious liability.10

Plaintiff alleges he began working for the Thibodaux Police Department in August

2020 as a “Supervisor of Trustees, Police Guard.”11 Plaintiff alleges that, “[a]t all times

relevant hereto, the Plaintiff was a full-time commissioned-police officer,” and the

position was “qualified as a Civil Service position under the Civil Service system, meaning

that the Plaintiff could be terminated from his position only for good cause.”12

Plaintiff alleges that, on August 28, 2023, while “experiencing a mental health

crisis,” he was working a security position at the Thibodaux City Courthouse.13 Plaintiff

alleges “an unfortunate incident arose” where he was “allegedly seen on security video

footage taking about $200 . . . from a lost-and-found purse” at the courthouse.14 Shortly

after the incident, Plaintiff alleges he told another Thibodaux police officer about his

mental health challenges.15 Plaintiff alleges he was placed under an Order of Protective

Custody on August 30, 2023 and transported to Thibodaux Regional Medical Center,

where it was determined he required more intensive mental health treatment.16 Plaintiff

6 Id. at ¶ 1, p. 1.

7 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

8 42 U.S.C. § 12112.

9 See generally R. Doc. 26. Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for emotional distress under his state law

claims.

10 R. Doc. 26, at ¶¶ 97-100, pp. 15-16.

11 Id. at ¶ 20, p. 5.

12 Id. at ¶ 19, p. 5.

13 Id. at ¶¶ 21-22, p. 6.

14 Id. at ¶¶ 22-23, p. 6.

15 Id. at ¶ 24, p. 6.

16 Id. at ¶¶ 25-26, p. 6.

alleges he was transported to Universal Behavioral Health Hospital that same evening.17

Plaintiff alleges he remained at the behavioral health hospital for fifteen days prior to his

release on September 14, 2023.18 Plaintiff alleges that, while at the hospital, few people

knew of his whereabouts or actively communicated with him.19

Plaintiff alleges that, at some point during his stay at the hospital, he was “charged

with theft after taking money from the purse in the lost-and-found.”20 As a result, Plaintiff

alleges he was placed on administrative leave by the Thibodaux Police Department.21

Plaintiff alleges that his placement on administrative leave triggered his procedural due

process rights, including his “right to notice and an opportunity to be heard” prior to any

final employment decision being reached.22

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that, on October 16, 2023, the Houma Courier-Daily

Comet published an article titled “Thibodaux Police officer charged with theft in incident

caught on security camera.”23 Plaintiff alleges that Mayor Clement, “[d]espite being

subject to the Louisiana Police [Officer] Bill of Rights with an ongoing investigation . . .

disclosed extremely private information regarding [Plaintiff’s] mental health, which he

was not priv[y] to or had permission to release to the public.”24 Plaintiff alleges that,

referring to whether Plaintiff would ever work for the Thibodaux Police Department

again, Mayor Clement stated:

“He can't, I mean he can't,” Clement said. “It's our policy to act on that stuff,

and any time that happens to anyone, if they commit a crime, there's

automatic termination. Our hands are kind of tied right now, because we

17 Id. at ¶ 26, p. 6.

18 Id. at ¶ 34, p. 7.

19 Id. at ¶ 33, p. 7.

20 Id. at ¶ 27, p. 6.

21 Id. at ¶ 28, p. 6.

22 Id. at ¶ 32, p. 7.

23 Id. at ¶ 35, p. 7. Plaintiff attached a copy of the article to his second amended complaint. Id. at Exhibit A,

p. 22.

24 Id. at ¶ 36, p. 8.

acted on some mental-health issues that he was having to protect his rights

and make sure things were done in a proper fashion. We have to wait until

those 20 days are up, and we have to wait until he is cleared by the

physician. But no, he won’t be coming back to work for our police

department.”25

Plaintiff alleges that, on January 10, 2024, the Thibodaux Civil Service Director

sent a letter to him notifying him that a Loudermill26 hearing had been scheduled.27 The

letter, attached to Plaintiff’s second amended complaint,28 included a statement that the

hearing would be held on January 17, 2024, and that Plaintiff would “have the opportunity

to make a reply in writing or orally at this informal hearing . . . . fail[ure] to appear for the

set hearing . . . [suggests] you are waiving your right to this informal hearing and do not

wish to rebut any of the reasons listed for this action.”29 Plaintiff alleges that, on or about

January 17, 2024, he was forced to resign from the Thibodaux Police Department.30

Plaintiff alleges that, “[w]hen Defendant Clement disclosed Mr. Ordonye’s mental

health [status], he created a working condition that was intolerable for him, giving him

no choice but to resign.”31 Plaintiff alleges he lost job opportunities at the Thibodaux

Police Department as a result of the incident.32 Plaintiff also alleges he was never

convicted of misdemeanor theft.33

“Because this case arises from a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the factual

25 Id. at ¶ 37, p. 8.

26 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). Loudermill hearings represent “[t]he essential

requirements of due process” in allowing civil service employees “notice and an opportunity to respond”

prior to termination. Id. at 546.

27 R. Doc. 26, at Exhibit B, p. 23.

28 Id.

29 Id.

30 Id. at ¶ 112, p. 18.

31 Id. at ¶ 54, p. 10.

32 Id. at ¶ 43, p. 8.

33 Id. at ¶ 42, p. 8.

allegations in [Plaintiff’s] complaint,”34 but do not accept as true legal conclusions or mere

conclusory statements.35

II. Procedural History

Defendants filed their first motion to dismiss on November 4, 2024.36 In response

to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff requested leave to amend his complaint.37 The Court

granted Plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint to “address[], fully and

completely, all arguments raised in the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.”38 After Plaintiff

timely filed his first amended complaint,39 the Court denied Defendants’ first motion to

dismiss without prejudice.40

Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss on December 30, 2024.41 Defendants

sought dismissal of Plaintiff’s (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for violation of the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments against Mayor Clement in both his individual and official

capacities, (2) Monell v. Department of Social Services42 claim against the City of

Thibodaux, and (3) ADA claim against both Mayor Clement and the City.43 Defendants

also requested that, “in the event this [m]otion is granted, . . . . Defendants respectfully

request the Court deny exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and

remand the case to state court.”44 The Court granted Defendants’ second motion to

34 Santander v. Salazar, 133 F.4th 471, 476 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 734

(2011)).

35 S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing

Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)).

36 R. Doc. 6.

37 R. Doc. 7, at p. 11.

38 R. Doc. 9, at p. 3.

39 R. Doc. 10.

40 R. Doc. 11.

41 R. Doc. 13.

42 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

43 See R. Doc. 13.

44 R. Doc. 13-1, at p. 16.

dismiss in part and denied it in part.45 The Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s

Monell claims against the City of Thibodaux and Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against

Mayor Clement prejudice and dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s ADA claim for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies.46 The Court denied Defendants’ second

motion to dismiss regarding Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Mayor Clement in

his individual capacity, and continued to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s state law claims.47

Defendants filed an answer and affirmative defenses to Plaintiff’s first amended

complaint on February 18, 2025,48 specifically raising the affirmative defense of qualified

immunity.49

Plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint on May 7, 2025.50 This complaint

omitted Plaintiff’s Monell claims and official capacity claims against Mayor Clement,

which had been dismissed by the Court with prejudice,51 and again alleged his ADA claim

against Mayor Clement and the City.52

Defendants filed a third motion to dismiss on May 19, 2025.53 Defendants seek

dismissal of Plaintiff’s (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutional claims for violations of the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against Mayor Clement in his individual capacity,

(2) ADA claim against both Mayor Clement in his individual capacity and the City, and

45 R. Doc. 17.

46 Id.

47 Id.

48 R. Doc. 19.

49 R. Doc. 19, at ¶ 133, p. 37.

50 R. Doc. 26. Plaintiff requested leave of Court to file a second amended complaint, representing that he

had received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC and wished to again allege his ADA claim. R. Doc. 24. The

Court granted Plaintiff’s motion. R. Doc. 25.

51 R. Doc. 17.

52 R. Doc. 26, at ¶¶ 101-118, pp. 16-19.

53 R. Doc. 27.

(3) state law defamation claim against the City.54 Defendants also request that, if the

motion to dismiss is granted, the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

the remaining state law claims.55

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss

a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the plaintiff

has not set forth factual allegations in support of his claim that would entitle him to

relief.56 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”57 “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”58

The Court, however, does not accept as true legal conclusions or mere conclusory

statements, and “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual

conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.”59 Indeed, “threadbare recitals

of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” or “naked

assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” are not sufficient.60

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the

mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that

the pleader is entitled to relief.’”61 However, “legal conclusions can provide the framework

54 Id. at p. 1.

55 Id. at pp. 1-2.

56 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.

2007).

57 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

58 Id.

59 S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing

Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)).

60 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663, 678 (citations omitted).

61 Id. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).

of a complaint, [if] they [are] supported by factual allegations.”62 “Determining whether

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”63 “Although

detailed factual allegations are not required,” “[d]ismissal is appropriate when the

complaint ‘on its face show[s] a bar to relief.’”64 Whether a plaintiff “will be able to offer

sufficient proof to support [his or her] claims is more appropriate in the context of a

motion for summary judgment or a trial on the merits” rather than in a motion to

dismiss.65 “[I]ntensive disputes of material fact . . . are usually more appropriate for

summary judgment . . . .”66

LAW AND ANALYSIS

III. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims are

based on violations of privacy and due process rights.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .67

“Section 1983 confers no substantive rights, but merely provides a remedy for the

violation [by a person acting under color of state law,] of rights secured under the

Constitution and laws of the United States.”68 “To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, a

62 Id. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555.

63 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

64 Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 Fed.Appx. 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

65 Smith v. GE Healthcare, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-00492, 2019 WL 4565246, at *7 (W.D. La. Sept. 4, 2019).

66 Dong Phuong Bakery, Inc. v. Gemini Soc'y, LLC, No. CV 21-1109, 2022 WL 898750, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar.

28, 2022).

67 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

68 Broussard v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov't, 45 F.Supp.3d 553 (W.D. La. 2014) (quoting

Southwestern Bell Telephone, LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2008)).

plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the color of state law deprived him of a

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”69

In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against Mayor Clement

in his individual capacity for violations of his privacy and due process rights under the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.70 Plaintiff alleges that Mayor Clement, acting under

color of law, violated Plaintiff’s right to substantive and procedural due process as

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”71

In its previous Order and Reasons on February 3, 2025, the Court found that, in

the first amended complaint, Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a § 1983 claim against

Mayor Clement in his individual capacity.72 Because the Court now has additional

information before it, and Mayor Clement has raised the defense of qualified immunity,

the Court will re-examine its prior opinion to the extent necessary.73

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) asserting that Mayor Clement in his individual capacity is entitled to qualified

immunity.74

“Qualified immunity is a defense available to government officials in their

individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”75 “Qualified immunity is an ‘immunity from

suit rather than a mere defense to liability.’”76 “Qualified immunity protects ‘government

69 Barker on Behalf of Barker v. City of Plaquemine, No. CV 17-340-SDD-RLB, 2019 WL 4580047, at *3

(M.D. La. Sept. 20, 2019) (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997)); Daniels v. Williams, 474

U.S. 327, 330 (1986)).

70 R. Doc. 26, at ¶¶ 48-61, pp. 9-11. Plaintiff titles “Count One” of his second amended complaint “42 U.S.C.

§ 1983─Violation of the 4th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution.” Id. at p. 9.

71 Id. at ¶ 56, p. 10

72 R. Doc. 17, p. 18.

73 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)).

74 R. Doc. 27.

75 Livingston v. Ward, 4:20-CV-00474-SDJ-CAN, 2021 WL 3480007, at *5 (E.D. Tex. June 4, 2021).

76 Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009)).

officials performing discretionary functions’ from liability for civil damages so long as

their ‘conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.’”77

Once a defendant invokes the defense of qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss,

“[i]t is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that qualified immunity is inappropriate.”78

The Plaintiff argues that “just recently, the United States Fifth Circuit has held that, on a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in a § 1983 action on ground that defendant

is entitled to qualified immunity, it is inappropriate to state that [it is] the Plaintiff’s

burden to demonstrate that qualified immunity” does not apply,79 citing Benfer v. City of

Baytown, Texas,80 but Baytown clearly says it is the plaintiff’s burden, citing the

Terwiliger case, and the Court rejects this argument.81

It is true, however, that “an assertion of qualified immunity...does not subject the

complaint to a heightened pleading standard.”82 Thus, “[an] immunity-from-suit interest

does not require that the plaintiff’s original complaint exceed the ... standard of Rule 8”

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.83 As for the substance of the Plaintiff’s claims,

“the court determines whether the plaintiff has alleged a plausible constitutional violation

before turning to the qualified immunity analysis.”84 Plaintiff is required to “plead specific

facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal

77 Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

78 Guerra v. Castillo, 82 F.4th 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 280

(5th Cir. 2021)).

79 R. Doc. 33, pp. 10-11.

80 Benfer v. City of Baytown, Texas, 120 F.4th 1272 (5th Cir. 2024).

81 Id. at 1279 (citing Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2021)).

82 Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2020).

83 Id.

84 Santander v. Salazar, 133 F.4th 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Guerra v. Castillo, 82 F.4th 278, 285

(5th Cir. 2020)).

specificity.“85 Mere “conclusory allegations will not suffice to prevent dismissal for failure

to state a claim.”86

As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Mayor Clement was acting under color of

state law. The Court must determine whether the Plaintiff alleged plausible Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment constitutional violations under § 1983. Only then is it necessary

for the Court to undertake a qualified immunity analysis.87

IV. The Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due process violation for constructive discharge.

In Count 1 of the second amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constructive

discharge alleging that he “was forced to resign” on January 17, 2024.88 Plaintiff alleges

that, “[o]n October 16, 2023, the Houma Courier-Daily Comet published an article titled

‘Thibodaux Police officer charged with theft in incident caught on security camera.’”89

Plaintiff alleges that Mayor Clement, “[d]espite [Plaintiff] being subject to the Louisiana

Police [Officer] Bill of Rights with an ongoing investigation . . . disclosed extremely private

information regarding [Plaintiff’s] mental health, which he was not priv[y] to or had

permission to release to the public.”90 Plaintiff alleges that, referring to whether Plaintiff

would ever work for the Thibodaux Police Department again, Mayor Clement stated:

“He can't, I mean he can't,” Clement said. “It's our policy to act on that stuff,

and any time that happens to anyone, if they commit a crime, there's

automatic termination. Our hands are kind of tied right now, because we

acted on some mental-health issues that he was having to protect his rights

and make sure things were done in a proper fashion. We have to wait until

85 Id.

86 Penley v. Sandoval, No. Civ.A. 4:04CV24, 2005 WL 3970822, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2005).

87 Santander, 133 F.4th at 479.

88 R. Doc. 26, at ¶ 112, p. 18.

89 Id. at ¶ 35, p. 7. Plaintiff attached a copy of the article to his second amended complaint. Id. at Exhibit A,

p. 22.

90 Id. at ¶ 36, p. 8.

those 20 days are up, and we have to wait until he is cleared by the

physician. But no, he won’t be coming back to work for our police

department.”91

Plaintiff alleges that on January 10, 2024, the Thibodaux Civil Service Director sent

a letter to Plaintiff notifying him that a Loudermill92 hearing had been scheduled.93 The

letter, attached to Plaintiff’s second amended complaint,94 included a statement that the

hearing would be held on January 17, 2024, and that Plaintiff would “have the opportunity

to make a reply in writing or orally at this informal hearing . . . fail[ure] to appear for the

set hearing . . . [suggests] you are waiving your right to this informal hearing and do not

wish to rebut any of the reasons listed for this action.”95 Plaintiff alleges that Mayor

Clement already had decided to terminate him prior to the hearing. Plaintiff alleges that

on or about January 17, 2024 he was forced to resign from the Thibodaux Police

Department.96 Plaintiff alleges that, “[w]hen Defendant Clement disclosed Mr. Ordonye’s

mental health [status], he created a working condition that was intolerable for him, giving

him no choice but to resign.”97

At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Court must assess whether the allegations of

Plaintiff’s complaint, taken as true, are sufficient to allege a plausible constitutional

violation before turning to the qualified immunity analysis.98 “[A] plaintiff seeking to

overcome qualified immunity must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that

91 Id. at ¶ 37, p. 8.

92 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).

93 R. Doc. 26, at Exhibit B, p. 23.

94 Id.

95 Id.

96 Id. at ¶ 112, p. 18.

97 Id. at ¶ 54, p. 10.

98 Santander, 133 F.4th at 479.

defeat qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.”99 Thus, the Court must first

determine whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

make out a constitutional violation.100

The Plaintiff claims he was deprived of his procedural due process rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment because he was constructively discharged. Plaintiff alleges he

was deprived of his due process right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard when Mayor

Clement “engaged in a pattern disclosure in order to retaliate against the Plaintiff and to

create an intolerable work environment . . . to have him quit his employment.”101 Plaintiff

also alleges he was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard when Defendant

Clement “disclosed a pre-determined outcome of termination… despite the fact no

Loudermill hearing had been conducted.”102

To state a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for

constructive discharge, Plaintiff must allege the following elements: (1) that his working

conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to resign,103 and

(2) that his employer acted to avoid affording pretermination hearing procedures.104

99 Arnold, 979 F.3d at 267 (quoting Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012).

100 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).

101 R. Doc. 26, at ¶ 56, p. 10 (sic).

102 Id. at ¶ 39, p. 8.

103 Lightell v. Walker, 527 F.Supp.3d 866, 888 (E.D. La. 2021).

104 Fowler v. Carrollton Public Library, 799 F.2d 976, 981 (5th Cir. 1986). In Fowler, the Fifth Circuit

required two elements for a constructive discharge claim: (1) that the employee was forced to choose

between resignation and termination, and (2) that the employer was motivated by a desire to avoid pre-

termination procedures. 799 F.2d at 981. However, in Brown v. Texas A&M University, the court stated

that either showing is sufficient. Specifically, this panel of the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff may establish

a constructive discharge claim by alleging particular facts showing either (a) that the employee was forced

into a resignation to avoid certain termination, or (b) that the employer acted with the intent to evade

procedural protections. 804 F.2d at 333. Some subsequent decisions, such as Holden v. Knight, appear to

adopt this interpretation by recognizing constructive discharge claims based solely on the involuntariness

of the resignation, without requiring proof of the employer’s motive to bypass process. 155 Fed.Appx. 735,

739 (5th Cir. 2005). In contrast, Rutland v. Pepper applied only the motive-to-evade-process prong and did

not consider whether the employee had no real choice but to resign. 404 F.3d 921, 922-23 (5th Cir. 2005).

Because Fowler was decided first, the Fifth Circuit’s rule of orderliness dictates that Fowler governs if there

is a conflict. Billiot v. Puckett, 135 F.3d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining that where two previous holdings

For working conditions to be so intolerable that a “reasonable employee would feel

compelled to resign,”105 the plaintiff must be placed ‘between the Scylla of voluntary

resignation and the Charybdis of forced termination.’”106 Even if this is shown, a

“[c]onstructive discharge in a procedural due process case constitutes a § 1983 claim only

if it amounts to forced discharge to avoid affording pretermination hearing

procedures.”107

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff, the Court finds Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a constructive discharge

occurred.108 A reasonable employee might perceive that Mayor Clement created an

intolerable working environment when he publicly disclosed that Plaintiff would be

terminated in advance of a hearing. Faced with a foregone conclusion, Plaintiff might

reasonably have believed that resignation was his only option. This scenario falls squarely

within the situation of forcing reasonable employees to choose “between the Scylla of

voluntary resignation and the Charybdis of forced termination.”109 However, nowhere in

Plaintiff’s complaint does he allege that Mayor Clement’s motivation amounted to a

“forced discharge to avoid affording pretermination hearing procedures.”110 Because both

elements must be plausibly alleged, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded that he was

denied procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and the claim must be

dismissed.

conflict, the earlier opinion controls and is binding precedent)). Accordingly, Plaintiff must allege facts

which plausibly infer that (1) the employee was forced to choose between resignation and termination, and

(2) that the employer was motivated by a desire to avoid pretermination procedures.

105 Lightell, 527 F.Supp.3d at 888 (quoting Finch v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 333 F.3d 555, 562 (5th Cir.

2003)).

106 Id. (quoting Fowler v. Carrollton Publ. Library, 799 F.2d 976, 981 (5th Cir. 1986)).

107 Fowler, 799 F.2d at 981.

108 R. Doc. 26, at ¶ 48-61, pp. 9-11.

109 Fowler, 799 F.2d at 981.

110 Id.

V. Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible Fourteenth Amendment privacy

right.

As explained above, the Court must determine whether the Plaintiff has plausibly

alleged a Fourteenth Amendment privacy violation before considering whether Mayor

Clement has qualified immunity. Plaintiff alleges that Mayor Clement “violated Plaintiff’s

privacy…rights by obtaining [Plaintiff’s] private mental health information under

knowingly false pretenses, and further, by providing that information to Houma Courier-

Daily Comet.”111 Plaintiff alleges that, referring to Plaintiff’s mental health information,

Mayor Clement was quoted, in part, by the Houma Courier-Daily Comet as follows:

“Our hands are kind of tied right now, because we acted on some mental-health

issues that he was having to protect his rights and make sure things were done in

a proper fashion. We have to wait until those 20 days are up, and we have to wait

until he is cleared by the physician. But no, he won’t be coming back to work for

our police department.”112

Plaintiff alleges he was “mortified that such personal information…was disclosed to third

parties regarding his mental health.”113

The Fourteenth Amendment protects the “individual interest in avoiding

disclosure of personal matters,” also known as the “confidentiality branch” of substantive

due process privacy rights.114 The confidentiality branch, “includes the right to be free

from the government disclosing private facts about its citizens and from the government

inquiring into matters in which it does not have a legitimate and proper concern.”115

To state a viable Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim, Plaintiff must allege facts

establishing (1) the existence of a constitutionally protected privacy interest, and (2) that

111 R. Doc. 26, at ¶ 59, p. 9.

112 Id. at ¶ 37, p. 8.

113 Id. at ¶ 38, p. 8.

114 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977),

115 Ramie v. City of Hedwig Village, Texas, 765 F.2d 490, 492 (5th Cir. 1985).

his interest outweighs the government’s legitimate state interest. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court finds Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the existence of a

constitutional right to privacy in keeping the information that was disclosed confidential

from public disclosure.

In Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the

constitutional right to privacy and declined to extend it to a police officer’s claim based

on the public disclosure that he did not like some of his bosses.116 The Fifth Circuit

explained that while it “has never explicitly determined what type of disclosures are

‘personal’ enough to create a constitutional cause of action, other courts have clearly been

limiting the scope of confidentiality branch actions.”117 The Fifth Circuit cited Davis III v.

Bucher with approval, a case in which the Ninth Circuit held that a corrections officer’s

disclosure of nude photos of an inmate’s wife did not rise to a constitutional violation, as

the case presented “two isolated instances of poor judgment” and elevating this to a

“constitutional dimension would trivialize the Fourteenth Amendment by making it a

magnet for all claims involving personal information, state officers, and unfortunate

indignities.”118 Accordingly, “[t]he constitutional right to privacy is generally limited to

only the most intimate aspects of human affairs.”119

Further, in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, the United States Supreme

Court emphasized that it has “rejected claims that the Due Process Clause should be

interpreted to impose federal duties that are analogous to those traditionally imposed by

state tort law.”120 The Supreme Court further noted that this reasoning “applies with

116 Zaffuto v. City of Hammond, 308 F.3d 485, 490-91 (5th Cir. 2002).

117 Id. at 490.

118 Id. at 490-91 (quoting Davis III v. Bucher, 853 F.2d 718, 720-21 (9th Cir. 1988)).

119 Id. at 490 (quoting Wade v. Goodwin, 843 F.2d 1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 1988)).

120 Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992).

special force to claims asserted against public employers because state law, rather than

the Federal Constitution, generally governs the substance of the employment

relationship.”121

The Court notes that Plaintiff has, in fact, made a claim against Mayor Clement

under Louisiana state law. In Count Two (“State Law Defamation”),122 Plaintiff asserts a

state law defamation claim, alleging that Mayor Clement’s disclosure “regarding his

mental health and job status” was “defamatory per se” under Louisiana tort law.123 As in

Zaffuto, Plaintiff’s allegations concern an isolated, employment-related disclosure by a

public official that, while potentially defamatory under state law, does not rise to the level

of a constitutional violation.124 The Fifth Circuit has made clear that not all disclosures of

personal or sensitive information by public employers implicate a constitutional right,

particularly when the information does not concern an intimate matter or where the

disclosure is isolated and employment-related.125 While Plaintiff’s mental health

information is undoubtedly sensitive, its disclosure in this context was an isolated

occurrence and employment related. The disclosure does not implicate the kind of privacy

interest protected by substantive due process.

Moreover, as Collins emphasized, claims concerning the conduct of public

employers are generally governed by state law, not the Constitution.126 Framing the claim

as a Fourteenth Amendment violation does not overcome the Supreme Court’s settled

precedent that such claims, where they sound in defamation or other state tort law, are

121 Id.

122 R. Doc. 26, at p. 11.

123 Id. at ¶ 68, p. 12.

124 Zaffuto, at 490-91 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Davis III v. Bucher, 853 F.2d 718, 720-21 (9th Cir. 1988)).

125 Id.

126 Collins, 503 U.S. at 128.

generally more properly addressed through state tort remedies.127

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to

establish the existence of a constitutionally protected Fourteenth Amendment privacy

interest. Because no such privacy interest is implicated, Plaintiff’s claim fails at the outset

and must be dismissed.128

VI. Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible Fourth Amendment privacy

violation.

The Court must determine whether Plaintiff has alleged a plausible Fourth

Amendment violation of his right to privacy before turning to a qualified immunity

analysis. The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated.”129 As the Supreme Court has recognized, the amendment’s purpose

is to safeguard an individual’s privacy against arbitrary invasions by the

government.130 Although this case does not involve any criminal conduct, “[i]t is well

settled that the Fourth Amendment's protection extends beyond the sphere of criminal

investigations,”131 and “applies . . . when the Government acts in its capacity as an

employer.”132

127 Id.

128 Even assuming Plaintiff had plausibly alleged a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy,

his claim still fails because the right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged disclosure. In

Zaffuto, the Fifth Circuit stated that “the contours of the confidentiality branch are murky.” 308 F.3d 485,

490. In his reply, Plaintiff concedes the case noted that “there is no Fifth Circuit authority on what type of

disclosures are personal enough to trigger the protection of the confidentiality branch.” Id. Accordingly,

Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy was clearly

established.

129 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

130 Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 303 (2018).

131 City of Ontario, Cal. V. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 755 (2010).

132 Id. (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (2010)).

To state a viable Fourth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must allege facts establishing

(1) a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurred, and (2)

that the search or seizure was unreasonable. The Supreme Court has recognized two tests

for determining whether a search has occurred under the Fourth Amendment.

Under Katz v. United States,133 “[a] ‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that

society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”134 For an infringement to occur,

“a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’” must be “invaded by government

action.”135

Katz’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” test has two elements; there must be (1)

an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” that (2) “society is prepared to recognize as

‘reasonable.’”136 As Katz explains, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public even

in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what [a

person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be

constitutionally protected.”137 Further, “a Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone

a search unless it is done to obtain information; and the obtaining of information is not

alone a search unless it is achieved” by such an invasion of privacy.138

Second is the “trespassory” or property-based test articulated in United States v.

Jones.139 In Jones, the Supreme Court held that a search occurs where there is (1) a

trespass or physical intrusion upon a protected area (persons, houses, papers, or effects)

133 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

134 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (citing Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983)).

135 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).

136 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.

137 Id. at 351.

138 Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.

139 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).

that is (2) conjoined with “an attempt to find something or obtain information.”140 The

Jones and Katz tests coexist, and government conduct constitutes a Fourth Amendment

search if it satisfies either standard—that is, if it infringes on a reasonable expectation of

privacy or involves a physical intrusion into a protected area for the purpose of gathering

information.141

Plaintiff’s allegations do not implicate the Jones test. The only conduct alleged is

that Mayor Clement obtained the information “under knowingly false pretenses”142 and

that Plaintiff had “confided with another officer at the Thibodaux Police Department

about his mental health issues.”143 Plaintiff acknowledges the information was obtained

through the Plaintiff’s own conversation with a police officer—not through any physical

intrusion into a constitutionally protected space. Accordingly, the Court will turn to

whether Plaintiff alleged a sufficient claim under Katz.

There is no allegation that a search occurred. The only allegations that could

possibly support Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment privacy claim under Katz are: (1) the

allegation in Count One that “Defendant Clement further violated Plaintiff’s privacy and

due process rights by obtaining private mental health information under knowingly false

pretenses, and further, by providing that information to Houma Courier-Daily Comet;”144

and (2) an allegation that Plaintiff “confided with another officer at the Thibodaux Police

Department about his mental health issues [he was] experiencing at the time of the

events.”145

140 Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 n.5.

141 United States v. Ackerman 831 F.3d 1292, 1307 (10th Cir. 2016).

142 R. Doc. 26, at ¶ 59, p. 10.

143 Id. at ¶ 24, p. 6.

144 Id. at ¶ 59, p. 10.

145 Id. at ¶ 24, p. 6. Under Count Three “State Law Invasion of Privacy,” Plaintiff alleges in support of his

state law claim that “he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in and to the information concerning the

Plaintiff’s allegations fall short of showing there was a search under Katz. Plaintiff’s

voluntary disclosure of his mental health information to a police officer undermines any

claim he had a subjective expectation of privacy in information that was obtained by an

unreasonable search. As Katz makes clear, “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the

public even in his own home or office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection.”146

Once Plaintiff shared this information with a third party, any reasonable expectation of

privacy in that information was diminished, if not extinguished.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to

establish that a search occurred. Without a search, there can be no unreasonable seizure.

Absent a constitutional violation, Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim under the

Fourth Amendment, and the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss this claim.

VII. Plaintiff failed to administratively exhaust his claim for unauthorized

disclosure under section 12112(d) of the ADA.

In Count Eight of his second amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim against

Defendants under the ADA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d).147 Section 12112(d) prohibits

accusations of misconduct in accordance with La. Const. Art. 1 § 5 and Louisiana jurisprudence regarding

invasion of privacy.” Although the Court notes this allegation and mentions it here for completeness,

Plaintiff does not allege any additional facts under Count One, which alleges a Fourth Amendment violation,

or elsewhere in the Second Amended Complaint, to support the reasonable expectation of privacy prong.

Accordingly, the Court will not consider this allegation under Count Three in support of Plaintiff’s federal

constitutional claims.

146 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.

147 R. Doc. 26, at ¶¶ 101-118, pp. 16-19. In paragraph 6 of his second amended complaint, the Plaintiff states

that he “brings this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) and 42 U.S.C. §

1983….” Id. at ¶ 6, p. 2. The Plaintiff cites 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) in paragraph 102 of the second amended

complaint but does not allege the elements of any cause of action under this subsection. Id. at ¶ 102, p. 16.

In Plaintiff’s letter to the Court pursuant to the scheduling order, identifying the causes of action asserted,

the Plaintiff lists only a claim for improper disclosure of confidential medical information under 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(d). R. Doc. 21. Plaintiff’s charge letter to the EEOC quotes 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) and (c) but does not

assert a claim under those sections and, instead, mentions a claim only under § 12112(d). See Attachment

1. In fact, on the attached Louisiana Commission on Human Rights Intake Questionnaire, Plaintiff checks

a box indicating that he is not disabled. See Attachment 1. Even if Plaintiff’s second amended complaint and

charge letter are generously construed to include a claim under § 12112(a), Plaintiff failed to allege the

elements of such a claim and the motion to dismiss would be granted for this reason. Plaintiff’s arguments

in his opposition to the motion to dismiss cannot substitute for the lack of allegations in his complaint. R.

Doc. 33, at pp. 12-14; Roebuck v. Dothan Sec., Inc., 515 FedAppx. 275, 280 (5th Cir. 2013).

employers from disclosing employees’ confidential medical information obtained during

an entrance exam or a disability-related inquiry.148 Plaintiff alleges that Mayor Clement

and the City violated section 12112(d) by disclosing his confidential medical information

to the press without authorization, resulting in a “tangible injury,”149 including “severe

emotional distress, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation, and physical pain and

suffering.150 Plaintiff alleges the disclosure occurred on October 16, 2023.151

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s ADA claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies, asserting Plaintiff failed to timely file a charge with the EEOC

before initiating suit.152 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint referenced an EEOC charge

number,153 but the date of the charge letter was not included, and the charge letter was

not attached. Defendants argue that without the charge letter “there is no way to verify

the timeliness of the charge or its subject matter.”154 Plaintiff eventually provided a copy

of the charge letter, which is dated August 24, 2024.155

The ADA incorporates by reference the procedures applicable to actions under

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.156 Title 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) provides:

The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-

148 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d).

149 R. Doc. 26, at ¶ 113, p. 18.

150 Id. at ¶¶ 101-118, pp. 16-19.

151 Id. at ¶ 109, p. 17.

152 R. Doc. 27-1, at pp. 12-14.

153 R. Doc. 26, at ¶ 103, p. 16.

154 R. Doc. 27-1, at p. 13.

155 See Attachment 1. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may consider “(1) the facts set

forth in the complaint, (2) documents attached to the complaint, and (3) matters of which judicial notice

may be taken under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.” Krystal One Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Bank of America,

N.A., 805 Fed.Appx. 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2020). Federal Rule of Evidence 201 provides: “[t]he court may

judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it …. can be accurately and readily

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” The Court finds that Plaintiff’s

EEOC charge letter is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Accordingly, the Court

takes judicial notice of Plaintiff’s EEOC charge letter, attaches it to its Order & Reasons as “Attachment 1,”

and properly considered it when deciding this Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

156 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); Wesley v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3-08-CV-2025-K, 2009 WL 193786, at *2

(N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2009) (citing Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 788-789 (5th Cir. 1996)).

5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers, remedies, and

procedures this subchapter provides to the Commission, to the Attorney General,

or to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of

any provision of this chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 12116 of

this title, concerning employment.157

Accordingly, the exhaustion requirement for ADA claims is satisfied when the

plaintiff files a timely charge with the EEOC and receives a statutory right-to-sue notice.158

A charge is timely if filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged ADA violations,

and a suit is timely if filed within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter.159 In Green v.

Brennan,160 the Supreme Court further clarified that the limitations period for

discrimination claims begins to run when the claim accrues.161 This requirement is strictly

construed, and courts have routinely dismissed cases in which the plaintiff did not provide

proof that the administrative remedy had been exhausted prior to bringing suit.162

Plaintiff alleges Mayor Clement “intentionally disclosed his personal healthcare

information to third-parties in a nonmedical setting, which he did not have permission to

do.”163 Plaintiff’s unauthorized disclosure claim accrued on the date of the alleged

disclosure, October 16, 2023.164 To be timely, Plaintiff must have filed a charge letter with

the EEOC regarding his claim by August 12, 2024, which is within 300 days of the alleged

disclosure.165 Plaintiff’s charge letter was dated August 24, 2024.166 Plaintiff has offered

157 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).

158 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e), (f); 42 U.S.C. § 12117; E.E.O.C. v. Res. for Hum. Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d

688, 697 (E.D. La. 2011).

159 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e), (f); 42 U.S.C. § 12117.

160 578 U.S. 547 (2016).

161 Id. at 563.

162 Banks v. Hazlehurst City Sch., No. 3:15CV355-DPJ-FKB, 2016 WL 2654369 (S.D. Miss. May 4, 2016)

(citations omitted) (citing Hall v. Ouachita Parish Corr. Center, No. 07-2187, 2008 WL 724230, at *2 (W.D.

La. Mar. 17, 2008) (dismissing claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies where plaintiff did not

provide evidence that he exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing a claim)).

163 R. Doc. 26, at ¶ 40, p. 8.

164 Id. at ¶¶ 108-109, p. 17; Green, 578 U.S. at 563.

165 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e), (f); 42 U.S.C. § 12117.

166 See Attachment 1.

no argument or evidence that the letter actually was sent to the EEOC prior to that date.

Because Plaintiff’s charge letter was sent after August 12, 2024, he could not have timely

filed it with the EEOC. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s unauthorized disclosure claim against

Mayor Clement and the City is untimely and will be dismissed with prejudice.167

VIII. The Court will not allow Plaintiff to amend his complaint.

Plaintiff requests leave to amend his complaint if “the [C]ourt disagrees that

Plaintiff has sufficiently set forth any of the foregoing causes of action.”168 “Rule 15(a)

requires a trial court to grant leave to amend [the complaint] freely, and the language of

this rule evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.”169 In exercising its discretion,

the Court may consider such factors as “undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the

part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,

and futility of the amendment.”170 An amendment is considered futile when “the amended

complaint would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”171

Plaintiff has already been granted leave to amend his complaint twice and has

failed to cure the identified deficiencies.172 Further amendment would be prejudicial to

the Defendants. Exercising its discretion, the Court finds that further amendment is

unwarranted and denies Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his complaint.173

167 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e), (f); 42 U.S.C. § 12117.

168 R. Doc. 33, at p. 15.

169 Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014).

170 Nolan v. M/V SANTE FE, 25 F.3d 1043 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 203

(5th Cir. 1981)).

171 Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 872-73 (5th Cir. 2000).

172 R. Doc. 9; R. Doc. 25.

173 R. Doc. 33, at p. 15.

IX. The Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's

state law claims.

Finally, Defendants argue that, if the Court dismisses all of Plaintiffs federal

claims, the Court should refrain from exercising supplemental jurisdiction and remand

the case to state court.!74 The Court has dismissed the Plaintiffs federal law claims and

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims.175 Because

this action was filed in this Court,176 the case cannot be remanded to state court.

Accordingly;

CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss’ is GRANTED as to all of

Plaintiffs federal law claims.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will not exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims.178

New Orleans, Louisiana, on this 29th day of July, 2025.

SUSIE soap

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Doc. 27-1, p. 17.

178 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 558 (2005) (Section 1367(a) “is a broad grant

of supplemental jurisdiction over other claims within the same case or controversy, as long as the action is

one in which the district courts would have original jurisdiction.”)).

176 R, Doc. 1.

177 R, Doc. 27.

178 Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims, the

Court will not address the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs defamation claim. R. Doc. 27-1, at p. 12.

Additionally, Defendants filed a motion to stay discovery in this matter on May 22, 2025. See R. Doc. 28.

Pursuant to this Order, the Court is dismissing all of Plaintiffs federal law claims and declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to stay

discovery is DENIED AS MOOT. R. Doc. 28.

25

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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