BROWN v. MCDONOUGH

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

HONORABLE KAREN M. WILLIAMS

PRINCESS L. BROWN,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action

v. No. 1:24-cv-08196-KMW-AMD

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

VETERANS AFFAIRS, Opinion

Defendant.

Princess L. Brown Kevin J. Maggio, Esq.

DOJ-USAO, DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Plaintiff, pro se 401 Market Street

P.O. Box 2098

Camden, NJ 08101

Counsel for the Secretary of the U.S.

Department of Veterans Affairs

WILLIAMS, District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Princess L. Brown (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this action against her

former employer, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (the “VA”), alleging violations of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), and the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). Specifically, Plaintiff

claims that she was subjected to reprisals and a hostile work environment, which she asserts were

in retaliation for certain past complaints of retaliation and discrimination.

Presently before the Court is the VA’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which Plaintiff has opposed. For the reasons set forth

below, the VA’s Motion is granted.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff previously worked for the VA as a legal administrative specialist. In this role, she

worked remotely from home, assisting veterans and their families over the telephone with benefits-

related questions. Plaintiff alleges that prior to her retirement in February 2023, she was subjected

to a persistent campaign of harassment, which she maintains was in retaliation for her “prior EEO

activity,” including a “civil lawsuit” she had previously pursued against the VA. (ECF No. 1 at 3.)

Although not entirely clear from the pleadings, Plaintiff appears to have pursued at least

nine EEO complaints against the VA since 2014. (ECF Nos. 1 at 8; 1-7 at 1.) The Complaint does

not disclose the exact nature or timing of these complaints. However, concerning the “civil

lawsuit” Plaintiff references, the Court observes that this was a civil action she initiated in this

District against the VA in February 2021.1 The Court further observes that her complaint there

asserted claims for, among other things, retaliation for her prior EEO activity, as well as

discrimination on the basis of race and age. That case was subsequently transferred to the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania on January 4, 2022, where it was ultimately dismissed by stipulation on

July 1, 2022.2

1 See Brown v. Department of Veterans Affairs, No. 1:21-cv-02732-KMW-AMD (D.N.J.).

2 See Brown v. Department of Veterans Affairs, No. 2:22-cv-00007-AB (E.D. Pa.).

A. Relevant Facts

Plaintiff first alleges a sustained campaign of electronic harassment. Specifically, she avers

that “[a]fter [her] first EEOC case in [January] 2020,” she began receiving a high volume of what

she describes as harassing or unusually demanding calls routed to her through the VA’s national

call center. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) During these calls, Plaintiff was required to needlessly and repeatedly

access “many systems” and “records,” causing her to develop carpal tunnel syndrome, cubital

tunnel syndrome, and trigger thumb. (Id. at 3–4.) However, Plaintiff also appears to allege that

everything from the transferred callers to the records were “fake,” and that they all were part of an

orchestrated scheme by “management” that caused or exacerbated these conditions. (Id. at 3–4, 6–

7.)

This campaign allegedly escalated in October or November of 2022, when someone at the

VA hacked her home internet network and caused the “whole military record and VA file” of her

son (a veteran) to be displayed on her computer. (Id. at 6.) Those records also contained certain

sensitive information regarding her grandchildren and her husband (also a veteran). (Id.) Plaintiff

further alleges that shortly after reporting the incident to the FBI, she received an email from the

VA’s human resources department emphasizing the importance of securing personal data and

privacy. (Id.) Plaintiff interprets the email––which included the statement, “behind every piece of

information or data we secure is a human being who has a right to the protection and privacy of

their data”––as a veiled threat (i.e., that the VA “had [her] family’s information” and that she

“should keep it safe.”). (Id.)

Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that on June 22, 2022, she was denied a within-grade pay increase.

(Id. at 7.) According to a memorandum from her supervisor, the denial was based on her failure to

meet the required standard for the “Talk Time” performance metric, which measured the average

length of customer calls. (ECF No. 1-4.) The memo states that Plaintiff’s average talk time for the

rating period (October 1, 2021, through June 17, 2022) was 9 minutes and 35 seconds—exceeding

the maximum allowable time of 8 minutes and 30 seconds. (Id.)

B. Procedural History

Approximately two weeks before her retirement, Plaintiff raised the foregoing issues with

a VA EEO counselor. (ECF No. 1-7.) Informal counseling concluded when, according to the VA,

it emailed Plaintiff a Notice of Right to File a Discrimination Complaint (“NRTF”) on March 15,

2023. (Id.) Under applicable EEOC regulations, Plaintiff was required to file a formal complaint

with the VA within 15 days of receipt of the NRTF. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(d).

Plaintiff filed a formal EEO complaint with the VA on August 16, 2023. (ECF No. 19-3.)

Apparently anticipating a timeliness challenge, Plaintiff acknowledged that––although the NRTF

was dated March 15––she had not actually received it until earlier that same day. (ECF No. 19-4.)

The VA ultimately dismissed her complaint as untimely, presuming receipt on March 15. (ECF

No. 1-7.) The EEOC later affirmed that dismissal, finding no reason to question the presumption

of timely delivery. (ECF No. 1-15.)

Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on July 29, 2024, invoking Title VII and the ADEA.

(ECF No. 1.) She seeks: (1) punitive damages; (2) two-years’ salary; (3) reversal of the VA’s

denial of her within-grade increase; (4) reimbursement for two months’ salary for the period in

which she was purportedly on medical leave without pay recovering from two surgeries; (5)

compensation for “Lifelock services” to protect her and her family’s personal information; (6)

reimbursement of all legal expenses; and (7) that the Court “admonish the [VA] in order bring to

[its] attention that [this] is a criminally serious matter within a federal agency.” (Id. at 4–5, 7–8.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a

district court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all

reasonable inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips

v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A

complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must

contain “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it

provides only “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Bell

Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)).

Complaints subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) are generally analyzed under the

pleading standard set forth in Rule 8(a), which demands that a complaint set forth “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that provides facts “merely consistent with” the

defendant’s liability “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility” and will not

survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at 557).

Where, like here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, her pleading is liberally construed and,

“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even

so, pro se litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala

v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

IV. DISCUSSION

Liberally construing the Complaint, the Court gleans two claims under Title VII and the

ADEA for (1) retaliatory hostile work environment based on the alleged harassment; and (2)

retaliation in connection with the denial of a pay increase.3 In the instant Motion, the VA seeks

dismissal of the Complaint based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies or, alternatively,

for failure to state a claim. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Before a federal employee can sue her employer in court for violations of Title VII, she

must first exhaust her administrative remedies. See, e.g., Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 552

(2016); see also Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1020 (3d Cir. 1997). “The ADEA likewise

requires a plaintiff to exhaust all available remedies when she elects to proceed administratively.”

Slingland v. Donahoe, 542 F. App’x 189, 191 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Purtill v. Harris, 658 F.2d

3 While Title VII and the ADEA generally prohibit discrimination in the federal sector, neither statute contains a

distinct antiretaliation provision applicable to government employees. Even so, each statute’s antidiscrimination

provision has been interpreted to allow federal employees to bring claims for retaliation and retaliatory hostile work

environment. See, e.g., Komis v. Sec’y of United States Dep’t of Lab., 918 F.3d 289, 294 (3d Cir. 2019); Gomez-Perez

v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 479 (2008). The reasoning follows that where a federal employee experiences retaliation for

complaining about discrimination, she is effectively suffering a form of discrimination. See Kocher v. Sec’y United

States Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No. 23-1108, 2023 WL 8469762, at *2 (3d Cir. Dec. 7, 2023) (citing Babb v. Wilkie,

589 U.S. 399, 402 (2020)); see also Gomez-Perez, 553 U.S. at 488.

134, 138–39 (3d Cir.1981)).4 To exhaust those remedies, the employee must pursue her claims

through the administrative process prescribed by the EEOC. See Green, 578 U.S. at 553.

The relevant process here first required Plaintiff to make a report to a VA EEO counselor

within 45 days of the allegedly unlawful acts. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). As the matter could

not be resolved through informal counseling, the EEO counselor was required to send written

notice to Plaintiff advising her of her right to file a formal complaint “within 15 days of receipt of

the [NRTF].” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(d). Federal agencies are required to dismiss any untimely

complaint filed beyond this 15-day period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(2). So too are federal

courts required to dismiss such complaints, absent exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Haines v.

Adm’r, U.S. Fed. Transit Admin., 579 F. App’x 63, 65 (3d Cir. 2014) (observing that the failure to

file EEO complaint within 15-day period constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies);

see also Winder v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 528 F. App’x 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2013) (observing that

the failure to comply with EEO limitations periods generally constitutes a failure to exhaust

administrative remedies and bars relief).

The “burden of pleading and proving that [a] plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative

remedies” lies with the defendant. Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997).

Procedurally speaking, this is an affirmative defense generally raised by the defendant in an answer

to a complaint. However, in this Circuit, defendants are permitted to raise it on a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion––provided that the failure to exhaust “is apparent from the face” of the pleadings. Clarkson

v. SEPTA, 700 F. App’x 111, 114 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Thomas v. Brinich, 579 F. App’x 60, 62

4 Unlike Title VII, the ADEA provides two options for pursuing claims. First, the plaintiff may elect to forego

administrative action entirely and file suit in federal district court after giving the EEOC thirty days’ notice of intent

to sue. See 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d). Alternatively, she may file a complaint with the EEOC and commence suit following

its determination should she be dissatisfied with the EEOC disposition. See id. §§ 633a(b)–(c); see also Slingland v.

Donahoe, 542 F. App’x 189, 193 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing 29 U.S.C. §§ 633a(b)–(d)).

(3d Cir. 2014). Consistent with this exception is the Court’s obligation to constrain its review to

the complaint and documents attached thereto. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (prohibiting reliance on

“matters outside the pleadings” when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).

Here, the VA contends that Plaintiff received the NRTF on March 15, 2023, but did not

file her formal complaint until August 16—well beyond the 15-day deadline. The problem,

however, is that Plaintiff’s receipt of the NRTF is not “apparent from the face” of the pleadings.

Clarkson, 700 F. App’x at 114.

As a starting point, the Complaint affirmatively alleges that Plaintiff received the NRTF

for the first time on August 16, 2023––not on March 15, as the VA contends. (ECF No. 1 at 7.)

Absent some other proof within the pleadings demonstrating a different date of receipt, the Court

must accept this allegation as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (discussing presumption of truth at

the pleadings stage); see also Goldenberg v. Indel, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624 (D.N.J. 2010)

(recognizing that presumption of truth does not apply to factual allegations contradicted by

documents attached to the complaint). The pleadings here, however, contain no such proof. Indeed,

the Court has yet to even see the NRTF or the email to which it was allegedly attached. The only

“proof” of receipt the VA identifies in the pleadings comes from its own written dismissal of

Plaintiff’s complaint and the EEOC’s subsequent decision affirming that dismissal. (ECF Nos. 1-

7, 1-15.) While those documents recite and embrace the VA’s position, neither constitute evidence

of actual receipt.

To be clear, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has successfully exhausted her

administrative remedies. It may very well be the case that Plaintiff did receive the NRTF as the

VA contends. But finding as much on the pleadings here would require the Court to either take the

VA for its word or adopt the EEOC’s determination wholesale; neither is appropriate. See Simko

v. United States Steel Corp, 992 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[W]hen a district court considers

whether a plaintiff has exhausted [her] administrative remedies, ‘[n]o deference may be accorded

the EEOC or the complaint investigator’s finding with respect to the plaintiff’s compliance.’”);

see also Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 846 (1976) (recognizing that federal employees

have right to trial de novo following administrative process).

For these reasons, the Court denies the VA’s Motion, but does so without prejudice to its

right to raise and prove its affirmative defense in the future.5

B. Failure to State a Claim

Alternatively, the VA submits that the Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff

has failed to allege sufficient facts to support a plausible claim for retaliation. Specifically, the VA

argues that she has failed to allege that any of the adverse employment actions she describes were

plausibly motivated by her prior EEO complaints. The Court agrees.

To state a retaliation claim under Title VII and the ADEA, a plaintiff must plead “sufficient

factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the

following elements: (1) she engaged in conduct protected by [the statutes]; (2) the employer took

adverse action against her; and (3) a causal link exists between her protected conduct and the

employer’s adverse action.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016);

see also Rizas v. DeJoy, No. 21-cv-20396, 2023 WL 4295834, at *5 (D.N.J. June 30, 2023).

The “causal link” referenced in the third prong embodies a plaintiff’s burden to plead, and

ultimately prove, that an adverse employment action was based on an unlawful retaliatory animus;

5 The Court acknowledges that the VA has also moved to dismiss the Complaint on exhaustion grounds insofar

as it attempts to assert claims for race or age discrimination––claims that were never raised during the administrative

proceedings. This challenge is undoubtedly occasioned by Plaintiff’s interchangeable use of the terms “retaliation”

and “discrimination” which, although imprecise and perhaps confusing, is not entirely wrong. See supra note 3.

Regardless, the Court need not address the VA’s argument because it has already construed the Complaint as asserting

claims for retaliation and retaliatory hostile work environment.

that is, the “engagement in a protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse employment

action.” Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis

in original). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s allegations must be sufficient to raise a

“reasonable inference of a causal connection” between her protected activity and the retaliatory

conduct. Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 793 (3d Cir. 2016). This standard also

applies to claims of retaliatory hostile work environment. See Komis v. Secretary of the United

States Department of Labor, 918 F.3d 289, 293 (3d Cir. 2019) (requiring plaintiff to show that

hostile work environment was “because of her protected activity”).6

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations center on a sustained campaign of electronic harassment. But

beyond merely asserting that this alleged harassment was in retaliation for her prior EEO activity,

the Complaint offers virtually no facts to reasonably infer the same. The only relevant allegation

Plaintiff offers is that the harassment began, at some unspecified time, “[a]fter [her] first EEOC

case in [January] 2020.” (ECF No. 1 at 6.) This allegation is deficient in two key respects. First,

Plaintiff does not clearly identify any protected activity––is she referring to the initial filing of an

EEOC complaint or simply the conclusion of an EEOC matter? Second, she does not describe,

even in approximate terms, when that alleged harassment began; rather, she only indicates that it

occurred “after” some protected activity. The mere fact that the harassment occurred “after” some

EEO activity does not imply a retaliatory animus. See, e.g., Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia,

776 F.3d 181, 196 (3d Cir. 2015) (observing that causal connection can be inferred by “unusually

suggestive” temporal proximity between retaliatory act and protected activity).

6 For the sake of completeness, the Court notes that a claim for retaliatory hostile work environment consists of

five elements: (1) the plaintiff suffered intentional discrimination because of her protected activity; (2) the

discrimination was severe or pervasive; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected her; (4) it would have

detrimentally affected a reasonable person in like circumstances; and (5) a basis for employer liability is present. See

Komis, 918 F.3d 289 at 293; see also see also Watkins v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., No. 22-1426, 2023 WL

5925896, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 12, 2023).

Plaintiff also challenges the June 2022 denial of a pay increase. However, the Court is not

convinced that Plaintiff has pled a distinct retaliation claim. The Complaint acknowledges that this

denial was based on Plaintiff’s failure to meet the required “Talk Time” metric, missing the

threshold by 1 minute and 5 seconds. Plaintiff does not dispute this explanation. Instead, she seems

to allege that the denial was unfair considering the strain imposed by the retaliatory phone calls.

That is, the calls made her overexert her hands, caused or exacerbated certain hand injuries, and

hindered her ability to hit a performance target––all of which led to the denial of a pay increase.

This is not the same as alleging that the denial itself was motivated by her prior protected activity.

What is more, Plaintiff does not allege that the supervisor who denied the increase was even aware

of her prior EEO activity, much less motivated by it. See Bishop v. United States Dep’t of Agric.,

725 F. App’x 165, 167 (3d Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of retaliation claims where plaintiff

failed to plausibly allege that relevant decisionmaker had knowledge of prior protected activity);

see also Giuseffi v. Sec’y United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 810 F. App’x 96, 97 (3d Cir.

2020) (“One cannot retaliate without first knowing that the target engaged in protected activity.”).

At most, Plaintiff’s allegations characterize the denial as a downstream effect of a broader hostile

work environment. While that may potentially be relevant for purposes of damages, it is not

independently actionable in the absence of facts suggestive of a retaliatory motive. See, e.g., Moore

v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that adverse employment

action is not actionable absent an intent to retaliate for prior protected activity).

In short, the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference of

causation with respect to any of the challenged conduct. It lacks the temporal specificity or factual

context necessary to link any adverse treatment to a specific activity protected by Title VII or the

ADEA. As such, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a claim for retaliation or retaliatory hostile

work environment.’

CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated above, the Court grants the VA’s Motion and dismisses the

Complaint without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted leave to replead her claims, consistent with the

Order accompanying this Opinion.

Date: July 29, 2025

EN M. WILLIAMS

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

The VA has also argued that, to the extent the Complaint attempts to assert other causes of action beyond those

discussed herein, they should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds because the Civil Service Reform Act restrains

Plaintiff's remedies. The VA’s argument appears to be directed toward a portion of the Complaint in which Plaintiff

“request[s] consideration of applicable Tort laws to be applied for the abuse of federal resources to cause physical

injury and causing [her] emotional grief over the illegal access of [her] family’s information.” (ECF No. | at 7.) In

this Court’s view, Plaintiff's “request” is far too vague to be construed as raising any distinct claim, much less one

under tort law. As such, it is unnecessary to address the VA’s argument at this time.

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