first quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (1983); and then quoting In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983)
How later courts described this case
- first quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (1983); and then quoting In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff, Case No. 3:24-cv-01220
v. Chief Judge William L. Campbell, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Alistair E. Newbern
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL (OIG)
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION et
al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This case arises out of discrimination complaints that pro se Plaintiff Jane Doe filed with
Defendants the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the EEOC Office of
Inspector General (OIG), and the United States Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Civil Rights and
Criminal Divisions addressing her former employment with Brooks Automation US LLC. (Doc.
No. 1.) For reasons including fear of retaliation, Doe has moved to proceed under a pseudonym
(Doc. No. 46) and asks the Court to keep that motion and its supporting documents under seal
(Doc. No. 45). For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny Doe’s motion to file her motion for
leave to proceed under a pseudonym and its supporting documents under seal (Doc. No. 45) and
deny Doe’s motion to expedite the Court’s ruling on her pending motion to amend the complaint
(Doc. No. 47).
I. Legal Standards Governing Filing Under Seal
There is “a ‘strong presumption in favor of openness’” in court records that is overcome
by “‘[o]nly the most compelling reasons . . . .’” Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016) (first quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (1983); and then quoting In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d
470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983)). This transparency prevents the “‘masking [of] impropriety, obscuring
incompetence, and concealing corruption’” that may result from a sealed docket and protects the
public’s right “to assess for itself the merits of judicial decisions.” Id. (quoting Brown &
Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179). Thus, “even where a party can show a compelling reason why
certain documents or portions thereof should be sealed, the seal itself must be narrowly tailored to
serve that reason.” Id. For these reasons, a party seeking to file a document under seal must
“analyze in detail, document by document, the propriety of secrecy, providing reasons and legal
citations.” Id. at 305–06 (quoting Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Lab’ys, 297 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir.
2002)).
This Court’s Local Rule 5.03 establishes a procedure for parties to use in asking the Court
to maintain a document under seal. M.D. Tenn. R. 5.03 (requests to seal documents or portions of
documents). Rule 5.03 directs parties to file a motion for leave to file a document under seal
without attaching the document in question, then separately file the subject document under seal.
M.D. Tenn. R. 5.03(b)(1)–(2) (procedures for filing motions to seal in CM/ECF). “Access to the
document will remain restricted until the Court rules on the motion to seal” and, if the motion to
seal is granted, the sealed document “will be electronically accessible only to the Court.” M.D.
Tenn. R. 5.03(b).
Because a sealed document is accessible only to the Court—and not to the other parties in
the litigation—filing a motion under seal frustrates the responsive briefing process that allows the
Court to consider all parties’ positions before granting or denying relief. Simply put, a party cannot
respond to a motion it cannot review. For this reason (and, again, to ensure the greatest possible
public access to a filing), Local Rule 5.03 requires that, “[i]f practicable, the party requesting that
some or all of a filing be sealed must also separately file a redacted version.” M.D. Tenn. R. 5.03(e)
(redacted filing). If filing a redacted version would be “impracticable, the motion to seal must
include an affirmative statement to that effect.” Id.
II. Analysis
Doe asks the Court for leave to file her motion to proceed under a pseudonym and its
supporting documents under seal because
her Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym and Seal Identifying Information
(Exhibit A), supporting Declaration (Exhibit B), and Memorandum of Law in
Support (Exhibit C) . . . contain sensitive identifying information, including [her]
name, address, phone, email, and details of prior retaliation by her former
employer[.]
(Doc. No. 45, PageID# 582.) Doe states that “[p]ublic disclosure” of this information “could
prompt potential adverse actions from [her] current employer, . . . jeopardizing her visa status and
risking deportation.” (Id.)
The Court has reviewed Doe’s sealed motion for leave to proceed under a pseudonym,
declaration, and supporting memorandum of law. (Doc. No. 46.) Contrary to Doe’s assertion, these
documents do not include her name, address, phone number, or email address. While the
documents do include allegations of retaliation by Brooks Automation LLC (id.), these allegations
largely mirror Doe’s allegations made in her public filings (Doc. No. 45). Doe therefore has not
“provide[d] compelling reasons to overcome the presumption that court records are open to the
public” with respect to her motion for leave to proceed under a pseudonym, supporting declaration,
and supporting memorandum of law. M.D. Tenn. R. 5.03(c) (contents of motion to seal). The Court
will deny Doe’s motion to seal and order that the motion to proceed under a pseudonym and its
supporting documents be unsealed on the docket.
The Court notes that Doe has filed six other motions (Doc. Nos. 2, 15, 22, 31, 38, 43) to
seal various filings, including the proposed amended complaint (Doc. No. 44-1) directed to be
filed by the Court’s April 28, 2025 order (Doc. No. 36). Because the reasons Doe seeks to maintain
these filings under seal overlap significantly with the reasons she asks to proceed under a
pseudonym, the Court will resolve the motion to proceed under a pseudonym issue before
addressing her remaining motions to seal. For this reason, Doe’s motion to expedite (Doc. No. 47)
the Court’s ruling on her motion to amend her complaint (Doc. No. 44)—which she has filed under
seal (id.) with an accompanying motion to seal the amended complaint once entered (Doc. No.
43)—will be denied.
III. Conclusion
Doe’s motion for leave to file her motion to proceed under a pseudonym, declaration, and
memorandum of law under seal (Doc. No. 45) is DENIED.
Doe may move to withdraw the motion to proceed under a pseudonym by no later than
August 5, 2025.
If Doe does not move to withdraw the motion by August 5, 2025, the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to UNSEAL docket entry 46, which includes Doe’s motion for leave to proceed under
a pseudonym, declaration, and supporting memorandum of law.
The defendants are ORDERED to file any responses in opposition to Doe’s motion for
leave to proceed under a pseudonym (Doc. No. 46) by no later than 14 days after the motion is
unsealed. Doe may file an optional reply in support of her motion for leave to proceed under a
pseudonym by no later than 7 days after the defendants file a response.
Doe’s motion to expedite the Court’s ruling on her motion to amend her complaint (Doc.
No. 47) is DENIED.
It is so ORDERED.
ALIST E. NEWBERN
United States Magistrate Judge