THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR v. DANT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:25CV634

)

TAYLOR MORGAN DANT, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to

Proceed Forward In Forma Pauperis (the “IFP Motion”) (Docket Entry

2), filed in conjunction with Defendant’s Notice of Removal (Docket

Entry 1). The Court will grant the IFP Motion for the sole purpose

of entering an order remanding this case to state court for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.1

LEGAL BACKGROUND

“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892

[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee

that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts ‘solely

because his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure

1 For reasons stated in William E. Smith Trucking, Inc. v.

Rush Trucking Ctrs. of N.C., Inc., No. 1:11CV887, 2012 WL 214155,

at *2-6 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 24, 2012) (unpublished), the undersigned

United States Magistrate Judge opts to enter an order rather than

a recommendation regarding remand. Accord, e.g., Abercrombie v.

Carolina Speech & Hearing, Inc., No. 1:24CV242, 2024 WL 4800191, at

*1 n.1 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 15, 2024) (unpublished).

the costs.’” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953

(4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (italics omitted) (quoting Adkins v. E.I.

DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948)). “Dispensing

with filing fees, however, [is] not without its problems. ... In

particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis d[o] not need to

balance the prospects of successfully obtaining relief against the

administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v. Federal Med. Ctr.

Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To address this

concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides, inter alia, that

“the [C]ourt shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt

determines that . . . the action... is frivolous ... .” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2).

“The word ‘frivolous’ is inherently elastic and not

susceptible to categorical definition. . . . The term’s

capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis,

in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all factors

bearing upon the frivolity of a claim.” Nagy, 376 F.3d at 256-57

(some internal quotation marks omitted). In considering such

matters, this Court may “apply common sense.” Nasim, 64 F.3d at

954. Courts regularly remand removal cases at the required initial

review of in forma pauperis applications based on frivolousness due

to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wake Cnty. Hum.

Servs. v. Davis, No. 5:12CV413, 2012 WL 7856618 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 24,

2012) (unpublished), recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 7856619

(E.D.N.C. Dec. 12, 2012) (unpublished), aff’d, 530 F. App’x 272

(4th Cir. 2013); Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Bryson, No.

1:09CV246, 2009 WL 2151052 (W.D.N.C. July 15, 2009)

(unpublished); Fuller _v. Evans, No. 1:05CV13, 2005 WL 1743955

(M.D.N.C. Mar. 24, 2005) (unpublished) (Bullock, J.). Put another

way, because the Court possesses “an independent obligation to

determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists,” Hertz Corp.

v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010), “[a]ls part of thle] frivolity

review under § 1915(e) (2), the Court may consider whether it has

subject matter jurisdiction,” Gateway Plaza Greensboro, LLC v.

Spigner, No. 1:22CV1047, 2022 WL 22839643, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 29,

2022) (unpublished) (Peake, M.J.), recommendation adopted, slip op.

(M.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2023) (Eagles, J.}); accord, e.g., Glenn v.

Glenn, No. 1:21CV510, 2021 WL 12157701, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 16,

2021) (unpublished) (Webster, M.J.), recommendation adopted, 2022

WL 21828633 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 11, 2022) (unpublished) (Biggs, J.).

Importantly, “[{t]he burden of demonstrating jurisdiction

resides with the party seeking removal.” Dixon v. Coburg Dairy,

Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In assessing whether a defendant has

carried that burden, the Court must “construe removal jurisdiction

strictly because of the significant federalism concerns implicated.

Therefore, if federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand to state

court is necessary.” Id. (internal brackets, citation, and

quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

The Notice of Removal asserts that Defendant “[r]emoved [this

action] from[ the] Superior Court[ of] North Carolina [in] Wake

County.” (Docket Entry 1 at 1; accord id. at 25; see also id. at

10 (“[O]n April 4, 2025, purportedly, the North Carolina Bar . . .

filed a ‘Complaint’ in the State of North Carolina, General Court

of Justice, Wake County, North Carolina, Superior Court

Division.”); Docket Entry 1-1 (“Case Summary” for “Case No.

25CV011675-910” between above-captioned parties in “Wake Superior

Court” (bold font omitted)).) According to the Notice of Removal,

“Defendant is a licensed attorney in the State of North Carolina”

(Docket Entry 1 at 1), “Plaintiffs [sic] are the North Carolina

State Bar, an agency of the State of North Carolina” (id. at 2),

and (via this removed action) Plaintiff has “attempt[ed] to declare

Defendant double-mentally-ill” (id. at 10; see also id. at 12

(alleging that Plaintiff “filed for and drafted an [o]rder

enjoining Defendant from the practice of law,” subsequently entered

by the Wake County Superior Court, which “requires Defendant to

. . . withdraw from her clients’ cases” (emphasis omitted)), 13

(indicating that, due to entry of that order, Defendant now “can be

charged for committing a crime of ‘Unauthorized Practice of Law’ at

4

any time”), 19 (alleging that “Wake County [Superior Court] . . .

ordered [Defendant] into involuntary servitude”)).

As an initial matter, Defendant did not comply with the

requirement that “[a] defendant . . . desiring to remove any civil

action from a State court shall file in the district court of the

United States for the district . . . within which such action is

pending a notice of removal . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (emphasis

added); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) (“Except as otherwise

expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in

a State court of which the district courts of the United States

have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . .

to the district court of the United States for the district . . .

embracing the place where such action is pending.” (emphasis

added)), 1442(a) (authorizing removal only “to the district court

of the United States for the district . . . embracing the place

wherein [the state court action] is pending” (emphasis added)),

1443 (same). Per the allegations of (and attachment to) the Notice

of Removal (as documented above), at the time Defendant filed the

Notice of Removal, this action “[wa]s pending,” 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1441(a), 1442(a), 1443, 1446(a), in Wake County, North Carolina,

which lies in the Eastern District of North Carolina, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 113(a); see also Americredit Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Pinnix, No.

5:19CV213, 2019 WL 4593579, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 23, 2019)

(unpublished) (Childs, J.) (“Wake County is in the Eastern District

5

of North Carolina.”). “Therefore, the Eastern District of North

Carolina is the only appropriate district for removal of this

action . . . .” Americredit Fin., 2019 WL 4593579, at *2.

“Removal to an improper district is a substantial defect in

removal procedure.” Butler v. North Carolina Dep’t of Transp., 154

F. Supp. 3d 252, 254 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (Schroeder, J.) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “However, case law is not settled as to

whether removal of a state court action to the wrong district court

creates a procedural or jurisdictional defect.” Americredit Fin.,

2019 WL 4593579, at *2; see also Butler, 154 F. Supp. 3d at 254

(“The removal statute does not create jurisdiction, but merely

provides a procedural mechanism that ‘enables federal courts to

hear cases that are already within their original jurisdiction.’”

(internal brackets omitted) (quoting Lontz v. Tharp, 413 F.3d 435,

444 (4th Cir. 2005))). Regardless, the Court must remand this

action “[b]ecause jurisdiction is established based on the

allegations of [ P]laintiff’s complaint filed in state court

. . . [and] the aforementioned claim [against Defendant in this

action] does not provide subject matter jurisdiction.” Americredit

Fin., 2019 WL 4593579, at *3 (internal brackets and quotation marks

omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before

6

final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”)

To that end, the Notice of Removal states that Defendant

removed this action “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1441, 1442,

1443, 1446, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and this Court’s Local Rules... .”

(Docket Entry 1 at 1; see also id. at 25 (“Defendant respectfully

gives notice that th[is] civil action .. . is hereby removed to

this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1441, 1442, 1443,

1446.”).) For starters, the Court’s Local Rules do not address

removal. See M.D.N.C. LR 1.1 - 83.12. Moving on to the federal

statutes cited by Defendant, the Court notes first that a “review

of the statutory construction of § 1446,” Richardson v. Halcyon

Real Est. Servs., LLC, No. 2:18CV2389, 2018 WL 4629245, at *2

(D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2018) (unpublished), confirms that, although its

“procedural requirements . . . impact the outcome of removal,” id.

(internal brackets and quotation marks omitted), “these

requirements do not determine whether a basis for federal

jurisdiction exists in the first instance,” id. (emphasis added)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brum v. County of

Wood, No. 6:07CV405, 2008 WL 3094586, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 4,

* Given the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court

also need not consider whether Defendant complied with the time

limit for filing a removal notice, see 28 U.S.C. §$ 1446(b) (1).

2008) (unpublished) (observing that “Section 1446 involves

procedural aspects” and “do[es] not provide a basis for removal”).

By contrast, Section 1441 does address removal jurisdiction,

by declaring that, in general, “any civil action brought in a State

court of which the district courts of the United States have

original jurisdiction[] may be removed by the defendant ... .”

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (emphasis added). Following that line,

Defendant has asserted that, “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343, this

Court has original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by

law to be commenced by any person.” (Docket Entry 1 at 21.) In

fact, Section 1343 does not sweep that broadly, but instead makes

this more limited grant of jurisdiction:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of

any Civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any

person:

(1) To recover damages for injury to his person or

property, or because of the deprivation of any right or

privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act

done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in

section 1985 of Title 42;

(2) To recover damages from any person who fails to

prevent or to aid in preventing any wrongs mentioned in

section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge were

about to occur and power to prevent;

(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State

law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of

any right, privilege or immunity secured by the

Constitution of the United States or by any Act of

Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all

persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;

(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other

relief under any Act of Congress providing for the

protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (emphasis added).3

In an effort to shoehorn this case into that more restrictive

jurisdictional grant, the Notice of Removal alleges as follows:

1) “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(1)[ and] 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985(1)[, Plaintiff and two North Carolina State Bar Counselors]

conspired to prevent by force, intimidation and threat Defendant

from holding any trust or place of confidence in th[is ] Court

. . . and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit” (Docket Entry 1 at 21 (space added); see also id. (stating

that “Defendant has been forced to leave her cases in the Middle

District[] and Fourth Circuit” (internal brackets omitted)));

2) “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(1) and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985(2)[, Plaintiff and two North Carolina State Bar Counselors]

. . . conspired to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat,

Defendant and her clients in any court of the United States from

attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending

3 The general federal-question jurisdiction statute also

covers all the ground covered by Section 1343(a). See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of

all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties

of the United States.”); see also Winstead v. J.C. Penney Co.,

Inc., 933 F.2d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he elimination of the

minimum amount in controversy from [S]ection 1331 made of the

numerous special federal jurisdictional statutes that required no

minimum amount in controversy (28 U.S.C. §§ 1337, 1340, and 1343

and many others) so many beached whales . . . .”).

9

therein” (id. at 22), “to injure such party or witness in their

person or property on account of her having so attended or

testified” (id. (internal brackets omitted)), and/or “to influence

the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror

in any such court” (id.; see also id. (appearing to allege that

Plaintiff and two North Carolina State Bar Counselors “conspir[ed]

for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating

. . . the due course of justice in North Carolina, the Middle

District and the Fourth Circuit with intent to deny Defendant and

her clients the equal protection of the laws, and to injure her or

her property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the

right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection

of the laws” (internal brackets omitted)));

3) “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(1)[ and] 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985(3)[, Plaintiff], through [two North Carolina State Bar

Counselors], conspired to serve Defendant in clients [sic] she did

not represent by travelling [sic] from Raleigh to Davidson County,

and attempting to serve Defendant” (id. (space added); see also id.

(appearing to allege that conspiracy also involved “travelling

[sic] to the Middle District to watch [a] hearing for the purposes

of depriving Defendant [of] equal protection of the law,” as well

as “remaining silent in the lack of service, lack of complaint, and

lack of law regarding [this and related] actions”));

10

4) “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (3), [Defendant seeks] to

redress the deprivation, under color of North Carolina [s]tate law,

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage . : - of

Defendant[’s rights under the] First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,

Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution” (id. at 23; see also id. (alleging that “this action

includes a claim arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties

of the United States”)); and

5) “[p]lursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (4) [, Defendant seeks] to

recover damages or secure equitable or other relief under any Act

of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights” (id.).

By invoking Section 1985 (see id. at 21-22), federal

constitutional amendments (see id. at 23), and “Act[s] of Congress

providing for the protection of civil rights” (id.), Defendant

evidently “contends that she properly removed this action to this

[C]ourt because the disciplinary proceeding involves a right

arising out of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States,” North Carolina State Bar v. Crump, No. 5:22CV371, 2022 WL

17176839, at *2 (BE.D.N.C. Nov. 23, 2022) (unpublished) (internal

quotation marks omitted). That contention falls short, as “[t]he

practice of law is not a right or privilege granted by the

Constitution and laws of the United States.” West Virginia State

Bar v. Bostic, 351 F. Supp. 1118, 1121 (S.D. W. Va. 1972). “{[I]t

is rather a privilege, the supervision and regulation of which

11

naturally and logically belongs to the judicial department of the

state government.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see

also State Bar of Nevada v. Allen, No. 2:22CV1014, 2023 WL 319822,

at *1 (D. Nev. Jan. 19, 2023) (unpublished) (“[R]egulating the

conduct of the attorneys [a state] licenses ... is the purview of

state courts.”).* As a result, “[s]tate disciplinary actions

against [attorneys] do not arise under the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States.” Ligon v. Bloodman, No. 4:18CV325,

2018 WL 10667260, at *2 (E.D. Ark. June 4, 2018) (unpublished),

aff’d, 788 F. App’x 412 (8th Cir. 2019).

In other words, the “attempted invocation of the [C]lourt’s

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 fails under the well-pleaded-

complaint rule, which requires that ‘the federal question must be

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint

to confer jurisdiction.’” Harr v. WRAL-5 News, No. 5:20CV362, 2021

WL 141697, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 14, 2021) (unpublished) (internal

brackets omitted) (quoting Owen v. Carpenters’ Dist. Council, 161

“Consistent with the above-quoted principle, under North

Carolina law, “[u]pon application by the North Carolina State Bar,

misconduct by an attorney .. . may be restrained or enjoined where

the necessity for promot action exists regardless of whether a

disciplinary proceeding in the matter of the conduct is pending.”

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-28(f); see also id. (“The application shall be

filed in the Superior Court of Wake County ... .”). This case

involves such an application. See North Carolina State Bar v.

Dant, No. 25CV011675-910, slip op. at 6 (N.C. Super. Ct., Wake

Cnty. Apr. 22, 2025) (“This matter is properly before the Wake

County Superior Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-28(f£).7).

12

F.3d 767, 772 (4th Cir. 1998)), aff’d, 853 F. App’x 859 (4th Cir.

2021). “Moreover, a federal law issue raised by a defendant’s

defense or counterclaim is not a proper foundation for removal of

a case from state to federal court.” Manchanda _v. Attorney

Grievance Comm. for First Jud. Dep’t, No. 23CV3356, 2023 WL

3091787, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2023) (unpublished) (ruling that

attorney could not remove state action based on “references to

federal constitutional provisions . . . that [he] has apparently

asserted or intends to assert in response to the [g]rievance

[c]lommittee’s efforts to suspend his law license”); accord, e.g.,

State Bar of Nevada, 2023 WL 319822, at *1; North Carolina State

Bar, 2022 WL 17176839, at *2; State Bar of Cal. v. Everett, No.

17CV1716, 2017 WL 6021651, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2017)

(unpublished), recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 6017772 (N.D. Cal.

May 2, 2017) (unpublished); see also North Carolina State Bar v.

McDaniel, No. 5:24CV321, 2024 WL 3996032, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 29,

2024) (unpublished) (“Even if the court construes [the defendant’s]

arguments to mean that [she] intends to present a federal defense

to the State Bar’s claims, a federal defense provides no basis for

removal. . .. Moreover, [the defendant’s] counterclaims cannot

create federal question subject-matter jurisdiction for this

court.”), appeal dismissed, No. 24-1840, 2025 WL 586072 (4th Cir.

Feb. 24, 2025) (unpublished).

13

Simply put, “[a] proceeding in which a state [bar] . . . seeks

to suspend an individual’s license to practice law in the state

based on state law could not have been originally filed in the

federal court.” Manchanda, 2023 WL 3091787, at *3. “Indeed,

multiple courts have held that state bar disciplinary hearings are

not removable to federal court under the federal removal statutes.”

Id. (collecting cases); accord, e.g., Everett v. State Bar of Cal.,

No. 2:21CV9688, 2021 WL 6052144, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2021)

(unpublished).

Nor does Defendant’s reliance on Sections 1442 and 1443

warrant a different result here. As to the former statute, the

Notice of Removal asserts that the Court possesses original

jurisdiction over this action,

[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) [and] (3)[,] as

Defendant is an officer of the Federal Courts, and filed

into the Fourth Circuit, in her individual capacity,

relating to, the apprehension or punishment of criminals

under Federal Law on account of the violation of her

rights against forced labor and involuntary servitude.

(Docket Entry 1 at 23 (emphasis added) (stray comma omitted).) The

two statutory provisions cited by Defendant state as follows:

A civil action or criminal prosecution that is commenced

in a State court and that is against or directed to any

of the following may be removed by them to the district

court of the United States for the district and division

embracing the place wherein it is pending:

(1) The United States or any agency thereof or any

officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the

United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or

individual capacity, for or relating to any act under

14

color of such office or on account of any right, title or

authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the

apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection

of the revenue.

. . . .

(3) Any officer of the courts of the United States, for

or relating to any act under color of office or in the

performance of his duties[.]

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (emphasis added).

Like at least one other attorney before her, Defendant sought

to remove a state court action brought by a state bar regarding her

ability to practice law “under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and on the ground

that [s]he is an officer of the courts of the United States and

that the state court action is based on an act done by h[er] under

color of h[er] office or in performance of h[er] duties.” State of

Fla. v. Shimek, 356 F. Supp. 687, 687 (N.D. Fla. 1973). This Court

rejects that proffered basis for removal for the reasons well-

expressed by the court which previously considered it:

That lawyers admitted to practice before a court are

considered officers of that court does not mean that the

lawyer is an officer within the meaning of the statute

here involved and under the circumstances here presented.

. . . .

Congress, in enacting the statute here involved, intended

the act to apply in those cases where federal officers,

and indeed the federal government itself, require a

federal forum.

Clearly the Congress did not intend that a lawyer

admitted to practice before this [C]ourt might use this

statute as a vehicle to remove to this [C]ourt

15

disciplinary proceedings pending against h[er] in a state

court.

Id. at 687-88 (internal citations omitted); see also Cammer v.

United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1956) (“It has been stated many

times that lawyers are officers of the court. . . . The [Supreme]

Court [has] pointed out [before], however, that an attorney was not

an ‘officer’ within the ordinary meaning of that term. Certainly

nothing that was said in . . . case[s] decided by th[e Supreme]

Court places attorneys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs,

court clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is engaged

in a private profession, important though it be to our system of

justice. . . . The word ‘officer’ as it has always been applied to

lawyers conveys quite a different meaning from the word ‘officer’

as applied to people serving as officers within the conventional

meaning of that term.” (some internal quotation marks omitted)).

Finally, the Notice of Removal purports to remove this action

(A) under Section 1443(1) by asserting that Defendant “has been

denied, and can not enforce in the [c]ourts of the State of North

Carolina her First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Thirteenth and

Fourteenth Amendment [r]ights to the United States Constitution”

(Docket Entry 1 at 23-24), and (B) under Section 1443(2) by

asserting that she “refuses to abandon her clients’ constitutional

rights, refuses to commit [the] crime of withdrawing from her

clients [sic] cases, and[/]or [ refuses to] violate the current

16

Wake County Order which is also a criminal offense” (id. at 24).

“The exception for removal . . . under § 1443 is narrow,” Ligon,

2018 WL 10667260, at *2, as its two provisions permit removal to

federal court of only “the following civil actions .. . commenced

in a State court,” 28 U.S.C. § 1443:

(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in

the courts of such State a right under any law providing

for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United

States, or of all persons within the Jurisdiction

thereof;

(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any

law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any

act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such

law.

Id.

Taking those two provisions in reverse order, “the second

subsection of [Section] 1443 confers a privilege of removal only

upon federal officers or agents and those authorized to act with or

for them in affirmatively executing duties under any federal law

providing for equal civil rights.” City of Greenwood v. Peacock,

384 U.S. 808, 824 (1966) (emphasis added). For reasons just

discussed, Defendant does not qualify as a federal officer for

purposes of the removal statutes. See Shimek, 356 F. Supp. at 687-

88; see also Cammer, 350 U.S. at 405 (“The word ‘officer’ as it has

always been applied to lawyers conveys guite a different meaning

from the word ‘officer’ as applied to people serving as officers

within the conventional meaning of that term.”). Similarly, by

17

practicing law, Defendant did not become an “agent[ or other

person] authorized to act with or for [federal officers] in

affirmatively executing duties under any federal law providing for

equal civil rights,” City of Greenwood, 384 U.S. at 824. See State

Bar of Cal., 2017 WL 6021651, at *2 (concluding that Section

1443(2) did not apply to attorney’s removal of disciplinary

action); West Virginia State Bar, 351 F. Supp. at 1122 (same).

The foregoing analysis leaves only Section 1443(1). “Two

broad restrictions upon removal under [Section] 1443(1) appear on

the face of that statute.” Bar Ass’n of Balt. City v. Posner, 391

F. Supp. 76, 79 (D. Md. 1975); see also, e.g., State Bar of Cal.,

2017 WL 6021651, at *2 (“Under [Slection 1443(1), [a dlefendant

must satisfy a two-part test to sustain removal ... .”). “First,

removal is limited to cases involving ‘a right under any law

providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United

States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof’ ....”

Bar Ass'n of Balt., 391 F. Supp. at 79 (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 1443(1)). The Supreme Court has explained that this statutory

language “applies only to laws providing for specific civil rights

stated in terms of racial equality and not to the whole gamut of

constitutional rights.” West Virginia State Bar, 351 F. Supp. at

1121-22 (emphasis in original) (citing Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S.

780 (1966)); see also, e.g., Bar Ass’n of Balt., 391 F. Supp. at 79

(noting that language of Section 1443(1) “has been strictly

18

construed” and “‘must be construed to mean any law providing for

specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality’”

(emphasis omitted) (quoting Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792)), 80

(“[J]urisdiction has been held to be absent under § 1443(1) where

denial of equal civil rights was alleged, but along nonracial

lines” (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Here, Defendant justifies removal under Section 1443(1) by

alleging or forecasting denial of “her First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,

Seventh, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment [r]ights to the United

States Constitution.” (Docket Entry 1 at 23-24.) “[T]he majority

of [those] cited laws do not meet the requirement that the laws

themselves be stated in terms of racial equality,” Ligon, 2018 WL

10667260, at *3, and Defendant has not alleged that the Wake County

Superior Court has subjected (or will subject) her to “a denial of

racial equality,” Bar Ass’n of Balt., 391 F. Supp. at 82 (emphasis

omitted). As concerns Defendant’s above-quoted, reference to the

Fourteenth Amendment (which, in part, prohibits race-based, state

action), her allegations (at most) “raise only a general question

of equal protection,” id., i.e., “[t]hey are not couched in racial

terms and thus cannot be the basis for § 1443(1) removal,” id.

In any event, Defendant has not satisfied Section 1443(1)’s

second restriction, which requires her to “show that [s]he ‘is

denied or cannot enforce [her equal civil rights] in the courts of

[the] State,’” id. at 79 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1)). “Th[is]

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second limitation upon removal under § 1443(1) . . . has also been

strictly construed.” Id. at 80. More specifically:

[U]nder § 1443(1), the vindication of [a] defendant’s

federal rights is left to the state courts except in the

rare situations where it can be clearly predicted by

reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state

or federal law that those rights will inevitably be

denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial

in the state court.

Ligon, 2018 WL 10667260, at *3; accord, e.g., Bar Ass’n of Balt.,

391 F. Supp. at 83; West Virginia State Bar, 351 F. Supp. at 1122.

This restriction precludes removal under Section 1443(1) in this

case, because “[Defendant] has not shown that there is a state law

preventing her from raising her federal claims in state court, nor

has she shown the basis for an equally firm prediction that she

will be unable to protect her federal rights in state court.”

Ligon, 2018 WL 10667260, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted);

see also id. (“A defendant’s contention that she will be denied a

fair trial in state court is not a sufficient ground for

removal.”); West Virginia State Bar, 351 F. Supp. at 1122

(rejecting removal under Section 1443(1) due to lack of “indication

“that [the defendant’s] constitutional and federal rights and

claims will not be protected or enforced within the state court”).

In sum, Defendant removed this case without a proper basis for

this Court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction.

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CONCLUSION

This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action

and Defendant’s attempted removal thus cannot stand.5

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s IFP Motion (Docket

Entry 2) is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING ENTRY OF AN

ORDER REMANDING THIS CASE TO STATE COURT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the

Superior Court in Wake County, North Carolina, effective August 13,

2025, unless Defendant has filed an objection, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), by

August 12, 2025.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand

(Docket Entry 3) is TERMINATED AS MOOT.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

July 29, 2025

5 Defendant has not invoked the jurisdiction of this Court

based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (see

Docket Entry 1) and any such effort would fail (see id. at 2

(describing Plaintiff as “agency of the State of North Carolina”);

Docket Entry 2-2 at 6 (listing “state of [Defendant’s] legal

residence” as “North Carolina” (italics omitted))).

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