Harrison v. Wexford Health Sources Inc

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

URBANA DIVISION

JOSEPH E. HARRISON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:25-cv-02188-JEH

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES,

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Merit Review Order

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging violations of his constitutional rights at Lawrence Correctional Center

(“Lawrence”) and Danville Correctional Center (“Danville”). (Doc. 1). This case is

before the Court for a merit review of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss any legally

insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. § 1915A. A claim is legally

insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the

factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the Plaintiff’s favor. Turley

v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and

labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief

that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir.

2013) (citation omitted).

I

Plaintiff files suit against Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Carissa Luking

(Nurse Practitioner at Lawrence), Lorie Cunningham (Healthcare Unit

Administrator at Lawrence), Dr. Jonathan Ek (Medical Director at Danville),

Felicia Adkins (Warden at Danville), Darcy Henchman (Healthcare Unit

Administrator at Danville), Ashley Denur (Director of Nurses at Danville), the

Illinois Department of Corrections, Jane Moskus (Transfer Coordinator), and

John/Jane Does 1-12 (Nurses at Lawrence and Danville).

Plaintiff alleges he injured his right knee playing basketball at Lawrence on

September 15, 2023. Plaintiff was transported to the Healthcare Unit (“HCU”) and

examined by Defendant Nurse Practitioner Luking, who noticed his knee was

swollen and bulging on the right side due to fluid build-up. Defendant Luking

informed Plaintiff that he could have a torn ligament or tendon, referred him for

an MRI, and gave him crutches and an ice permit. Nurse Brown wrapped

Plaintiff’s knee.

On October 10, 2023, Plaintiff underwent an MRI at Carle Richmond

Hospital in Olney, Illinois. During a follow-up appointment with Defendant

Luking on October 12, 2023, she informed Plaintiff the MRI revealed numerous

issues, including cartilage and ligament tears, chondromalacia, and a cyst.

Defendant Luking referred Plaintiff to an orthopedic specialist.

During an appointment with Defendant Luking on October 24, 2023, she

informed Plaintiff he would be transferred to Danville the next day. Plaintiff asked

Defendant Luking if his transfer would delay his referral to an orthopedic

specialist and appointments with his rheumatologist, urologist, and GI specialist.

Defendant Luking allegedly stated there would be no delays. Plaintiff was

transferred to Danville on October 25, 2023.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Cunningham, the Healthcare Unit Administrator

(“HCUA”) at Lawrence, was responsible for ensuring follow-up appointments,

referrals, scheduled procedures, and medical holds were in place. Plaintiff alleges

Defendant Cunningham “chose to disregard her job duties by not stopping [his]

transfer to Danville.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Luking, Cunningham,

Wexford, and IDOC ignored policies and procedures by transferring him even

though he was on a medical hold. Plaintiff alleges the transfer delayed medical

treatment for his knee injury and his other medical conditions, including

ankylosing spondylitis, scleritis, chronic GERD, and irritable bowel syndrome.

On November 1, 2023, Plaintiff saw Defendant Dr. Ek, the Medical Director

at Danville. Plaintiff inquired about his medical appointments and the referral to

an orthopedic specialist. Defendant Ek allegedly told Plaintiff he would check on

the referral. Defendant Ek issued Plaintiff a cane, knee sleeve, and low gallery and

bottom bunk permits.

On December 5 and 20, 2023, Plaintiff submitted grievances regarding his

right knee injury. Defendant Warden Adkins deemed them emergencies.

On January 11, 2024, Plaintiff sent a request slip to Defendant Denur, the

Director of Nurses at Danville, stating that he had not seen his rheumatologist, GI

specialist, urologist, or an orthopedic specialist for his right knee. Defendant

Denur did not respond. Plaintiff sent another request slip to Defendant Denur

asking if an appointment with an orthopedic specialist had been scheduled. Four

days later, Defendant Denur responded, “Rheumatology scheduled. I have auths.

for GI [and] urology and removal of a nail plate. These would be scheduled. Don’t

see anything for orthopedic surgery.” Id. at p. 18. After receiving Defendant

Denur’s response, Plaintiff filed another grievance regarding his knee injury.

Defendant Adkins deemed his grievance an emergency on February 6, 2024.

On February 8, 2024, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Rasheed, a

rheumatologist at Carle Clinic in Champaign, Illinois, to address his ankylosing

spondylitis. Plaintiff informed Dr. Rasheed that he requested to see an orthopedic

specialist about his right knee injury.

During a follow-up appointment with Defendant Ek on March 5, 2024,

Defendant Ek informed Plaintiff that he would submit a referral request for

Plaintiff to see an orthopedic specialist, as requested by Dr. Rasheed.

On March 28, 2024, Plaintiff was called to the HCU to see Defendant Ek for

a follow-up visit after seeing a GI specialist. Plaintiff inquired about the status of

his referral to an orthopedic specialist. Defendant Ek informed Plaintiff that he

would not refer him to an orthopedic specialist because Plaintiff only needed to

see an orthopedic specialist if he needed surgery. Plaintiff responded that he

needed to see an orthopedic specialist to determine if surgery necessary.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Ek followed Wexford’s policy and/or procedure

that states: “Consideration in deciding treatment is given to wheather [sic] or not

the Department of Corrections has the responsibility to provide a treatment. The

mere existence of a condition DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A RESPONSIBILITY for

repair!” Id. at p. 21 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Wexford’s

policy delayed medical treatment for his knee injury.

Plaintiff sent another request slip to Defendant Denur asking for an

appointment with an orthopedic specialist. On April 16, 2024, Defendant Denur

responded, “I do not have a referral for orthopedics.” Id. Plaintiff submitted

another grievance on April 11, 2024. Defendant Adkins determined his grievance

was an emergency on April 16, 2024.

On August 8, 2024, Plaintiff saw Dr. Rasheed regarding his ankylosing

spondylitis. Dr. Rasheed told Plaintiff he would recommend seeing an orthopedic

specialist regarding whether surgery was needed to correct his knee injury.

On August 29, 2024, Plaintiff sent a request to the HCU explaining that his

right knee still hurt. On September 8, 2024, Plaintiff saw Nurse A. Beasley in the

sick call line and complained that his right knee still hurt, felt stiff, and popped

when he turned it. Nurse Beasley submitted a request for Plaintiff to see Defendant

Ek. On December 9, 2024, Plaintiff saw Defendant Ek and informed him that his

right knee “gave out” a few days ago and that he was still in pain. Defendant Ek

referred Plaintiff for an x-ray, which Plaintiff claimed was ineffective because an

x-ray would not show tissue damage or tears.

Even though Defendant Adkins had deemed his grievances emergencies,

Plaintiff alleges he did not receive a response from Grievance Officer Andrew

Smart and Defendant HCUA Henchman until September 18, 2024. Plaintiff alleges

that the IDOC’s grievance policy requires prison administrators to respond to

emergency grievances within two months. In her response to Plaintiff’s

grievances, Defendant Henchman stated: “…Harrison has been sent to

Rheumatology. A referral to orthopedics has not been sent. If the individual in

custody is still experiencing knee pain, it is advised to sign up for nurse sick call.”

Id. at p. 15. On September 23, 2024, Defendant Adkins concurred with the

recommendation to deny his grievances. Plaintiff submitted an appeal to the

Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) on October 9, 2024.

On December 30, 2024, Plaintiff sent another request slip to Defendant

HCUA Henchman complaining that he was still experiencing right knee pain. He

also stated that Defendant Luking and Dr. Rasheed recommended a referral to an

orthopedic specialist.

On February 11, 2025, Plaintiff saw Dr. Rasheed regarding his ankylosing

spondylitis. Dr. Rasheed inquired about his knee and noted that Plaintiff’s knee

still hurt. On February 17, 2025, Plaintiff had a follow-up appointment with

Defendant Ek. Plaintiff states he tried to tell Defendant Ek that his right knee still

hurt, but Defendant Ek allegedly ignored him and sent him back to cell.

II

It is well established that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is

actionable as a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516,

522 (7th Cir. 2008). A claim of deliberate indifference contains both an objective

and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy

the objective component, a prisoner must demonstrate that his medical condition

is “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Id. An objectively serious medical condition

is one that “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that

is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s

attention.” Hayes, 546 F.3d at 522. To satisfy the subjective component, the inmate

must demonstrate that the prison official acted with a “sufficiently culpable state

of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The official must know of and disregard an

excessive risk to the inmate’s health; “the official must both be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. The prisoner must show that the

defendant engaged in more than negligence and that the defendant’s conduct

approached intentional wrongdoing or criminal recklessness. Holloway v. Delaware

Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

“Within the universe of deliberate indifference cases is a narrower category

where a prisoner alleges not that his condition was ignored entirely, but that he

received constitutionally deficient treatment for the condition.” Lockett v. Bonson,

937 F.3d 1016, 1023 (7th Cir. 2019). “[T]hese cases are better framed ‘not [as]

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need,’ but as a challenge to ‘a

deliberate decision by a doctor to treat a medical need in a particular manner.’” Id.

(citing Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 1996)). In such cases, courts defer

to a medical professional’s treatment decisions “unless ‘no minimally competent

professional would have so responded under those circumstances.’” Pyles, 771

F.3d at 409 (quoting Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2008)). A

disagreement between the prisoner and his medical provider “about the proper

course of treatment generally is insufficient, by itself, to establish an Eighth

Amendment violation.” Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409 (citing Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d

1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006)).

Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants Nurse Practitioner Luking and HCUA

Cunningham acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs by not

stopping his transfer to Danville is insufficient to allege an Eighth Amendment

violation, absent allegations that medical officials had any control over the transfer

itself or that they knew of the risk that his recommended referral to an orthopedic

specialist would be interrupted by a transfer to another facility. See Baisi v. Burke,

359 F. Supp. 3d 592, 596 (N.D. Ill. 2019). There is no basis for inferring that

Defendants Luking and Cunningham had any control over the transfer, knew his

treatment would be delayed, or acted with deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs. In fact, Plaintiff states that Defendant Luking examined him

shortly after his injury occurred, referred him for an MRI, gave him crutches and

an ice permit, and had a nurse wrap his knee. Therefore, Defendants Luking and

Cunningham are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant IDOC was deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs by transferring him to Danville when he was on a medical hold.

The Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s claim for damages against the IDOC, as

the IDOC is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. See Wynn v. Southward,

251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001); Veal v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., No. 18-CV-0621-MJR,

2018 WL 3009265, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June 15, 2018). Therefore, Defendant IDOC is

dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Dr. Ek, the Medical Director at Danville, was

deliberately indifferent to his knee injury and pain and failed to refer him to an

orthopedic specialist. On November 1, 2023, Plaintiff allegedly informed

Defendant Ek about his right knee injury and Defendant Luking’s referral request.

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges Dr. Rasheed recommended that Plaintiff be referred

to an orthopedic specialist to determine if surgery was needed. Plaintiff also

alleges he frequently complained about knee pain. Nevertheless, Defendant Ek

allegedly refused to refer him to an orthopedic specialist. The Court finds that

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to proceed on an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim against Defendant Ek.

Plaintiff alleges his treatment was delayed due to Defendant Wexford’s

unconstitutional policy and/or procedure. Private corporations, such as Wexford,

have potential liability if they perform a governmental function and, in doing so,

injure plaintiff through an unconstitutional policy or practice. Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Iskander v. Vill. of Forest

Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982). Since there is no respondeat superior liability

under § 1983, Wexford cannot be liable for the alleged misdeeds of Defendant Ek,

as employees are responsible individually. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645,

656 (7th Cir. 2007). However, Defendant Wexford has potential liability if it had

an unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom which caused the constitutional

deprivation. Salcedo-Vazquez v. Nwaobasi, No. 13- 606, 2015 WL 7177231, at *7 (S.D.

Ill. Nov. 16, 2015) (citing Shields v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014),

cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1024 (2015)). “Liability may be based on (1) an express policy

that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice

that, although not authorized by written law or express policy, is so permanent

and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; or (3) a

constitutional injury caused by a person with final policy making

authority.” Taylor v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No.15-5190, 2016 WL 3227310, at

*4 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2016) (citing McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324

(7th Cir. 2000)).

Here, Plaintiff asserts Defendant Wexford had an express policy that stated:

“Consideration in deciding treatment is given to wheather [sic] or not the

Department of Corrections has the responsibility to provide a treatment. The mere

existence of a condition DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A RESPONSIBILITY for

repair!” (Doc. 1 at p. 21) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff cannot prevail on such a

claim unless he is able to establish that the policy was applied in such a way as to

cause him injury. See Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 651 (7th

Cir. 2021); McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Wexford’s policy delayed the medical treatment for his

knee injury and his referral to an orthopedic specialist. Based on his allegations,

the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible Monell claim against Defendant

Wexford for deliberate indifference to his right knee injury.

Plaintiff alleges he sent Defendant Denur, the Director of Nurses at Danville,

multiple request slips for medical care for his knee injury and a referral to an

orthopedic specialist. Despite her knowledge of his condition and need for care,

she allegedly disregarded his requests. The Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a

plausible Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant

Denur.

Plaintiff also filed numerous grievances regarding the lack of medical care

for his knee injury. Defendant Warden Adkins deemed his grievances as

emergencies; however, Defendant HCUA Henchman failed to respond to his

emergency grievances for several months, in violation of IDOC policy requiring a

response to emergency grievances within two months. Defendant Henchman

allegedly denied his emergency grievances on September 18, 2024, and failed to

ensure he received appropriate medical treatment for his knee injury. The Court

finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendant Henchman was

deliberately indifferent to his knee injury in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Warden Adkins concurred with the

recommendation to deny his grievances, even though Plaintiff had not been

referred to an orthopedic specialist as recommended and continued to experience

knee pain. Despite her knowledge of the lack of medical care for his knee injury,

Defendant Adkins allegedly failed take action. Plaintiff’s allegations raise a

plausible inference that Defendant Adkins knew about, yet turned a blind eye to,

Plaintiff’s knee injury in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Chavez v. Illinois State

Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The supervisors must know about the

conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what

they might see.”) (quotations omitted). Plaintiff may proceed on an Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Adkins.

Plaintiff also names Jane Moskus and John/Jane Does 1-12 as Defendants,

but he did not include any specific allegations about them in his Complaint.

Therefore, these Defendants are dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) According to the Court's Merit Review of Plaintiff's Complaint

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this case shall proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim

against Defendants Jonathan Ek, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Ashley Denur,

Darcy Henchman, and Felicia Adkins based on their alleged deliberate

indifference to his right knee injury and the failure to refer him to an orthopedic

specialist. Additional claims shall not be included in the case above, except in

the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2) Defendants Carissa Luking, Lorie Cunningham, Jane Moskus, and

John/Jane Does 1-12 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to

state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.

The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE these Defendants.

3) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises

Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any

motions to give Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those

motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will

generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the

Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.

4) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver

of service. If Defendants fail to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk

within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to

effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on Defendants and will

require Defendants to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

5) Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk

sends the waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer

should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer

and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order.

In general, an answer sets forth Defendants’ positions. The Court does not rule

on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendants file a motion.

Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If

Defendants have not filed an answer or appeared through counsel within 90

days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status

of service. After Defendants have been served, the Court will enter a scheduling

order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

6) If Defendants no longer work at the address Plaintiff provided, the

entity for whom Defendants worked while at that address shall submit to the

Clerk Defendants’ current work address, or, if not known, Defendants’

forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating

service. Documentation of Defendants’ forwarding address shall be retained

only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed

by the Clerk.

7) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after

Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will

automatically receive electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by

Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to Defendants’ counsel

copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk.

However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery

requests and responses are not filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his

discovery requests and responses directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery

requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are

attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin

until Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance and the Court has entered a

scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process in more detail.

8) Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff

at Plaintiff’s place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants shall arrange the

time for the deposition.

9) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any

change in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to

notify the Court of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in

dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice.

10) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records

upon request.

11) Within 10 days of receiving from defense counsel an authorization

to release medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the

authorization to defense counsel. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard

qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act.

12) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from

the entry of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter

scheduling deadlines.

It is so ordered.

Entered: July 29, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge