stating that “[t]he production of a defendant pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum does not affect the jurisdiction of the sovereign with primary custody over a defendant”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[t]he production of a defendant pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum does not affect the jurisdiction of the sovereign with primary custody over a defendant”
- explaining that with the enactment of § 3585(b), “Congress made it clear that a defendant could not receive a double credit for his detention time.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERIE DIVISION
)
RAHEEM BROWN, 1:23-CV-00247-RAL
)
) RICHARD A. LANZILLO
Petitioner ) Chief United States Magistrate Judge
)
V. )
) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, etal...) ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF
) HABEAS CORPUS
) .
Respondents ) ECFNo. 1
)
I. Introduction
Presently pending is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by pro se Petitioner Raheem
Brown (Petitioner) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Petitioner contends that the Bureau
of Prisons (BOP), the agency responsible for implementing and applying federal law concerning
the computation of federal sentences, erred in computing his sentence. For the following reasons,
Petitioner’s § 2241 petition will be dismissed."
II. Background
On August 17, 2012, while on parole from a prior state sentence at Docket Number 8717-
2011, Petitioner was arrested in Allegheny County and charged with drug and weapon crimes at
Docket Number 11666-2012. ECF No. 2 at p. 1; ECF No. 9-1 75. The following day, state
probation authorities lodged a detainer against Petitioner for violating his parole in 8717-2011.
! The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all
proceedings in this case, including the entry of final judgment, as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 636.
ECF No. 9-1 99 5, 14. The drug and firearm charges stemming from the August 17 arrest were
ultimately nolle prossed in favor of federal prosecution, but Petitioner remained in state custody
due to the parole violation. Jd. 4 5.
While he was in state custody, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania (the sentencing court) issued an indictment in Case Number 2:12-cr-272 (W.D. Pa.
2012) charging Petitioner with being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession of heroin
with intent to sell. Jd. 95; ECF No. 9-3 at p. 3. On November 29, 2012, Petitioner was temporarily
removed from state custody by the United States Marshal Service (USMS) pursuant to a federal
writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. ECF No. 9-1 95; ECF No. 9-3 at p. 3. Following a guilty
plea, the sentencing court sentenced Petitioner to a 180-month term of imprisonment for violations
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (a)(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)G). ECF No. 9-1 9 6. The
USMS returned Petitioner to state authorities to complete the term of his state parole violation on
May 29, 2014. ECF No. 9-3 at p. 3.
On June 9, 2014, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas sentenced Petitioner to
650 days of time served (covering August 17, 2012, to May 29, 2014) for violating his probation
in 8717-2011. ECF No. 9-1 § 7. Two days later, on June 11, 2024, Allegheny County released
Petitioner to exclusive federal custody. Jd. J 8. At that time, the BOP prepared Petitioner’s
sentence computation based on a 180-month term of imprisonment commencing on June 11, 2024,
the date he was released from his Allegheny County parole revocation term. Id. 49. The BOP
awarded Petitioner twelve days of prior custody credit for the time between May 30, 2014, the day
after his county term expired, and June 10, 2024, the day before he was released into federal
custody. Id. The BOP did not award Petitioner credit for the time between August 17, 2012, and
May 29, 2014, because he received credit in state court towards his parole violation for that entire
time. Jd. Based on those computations, Petitioner is scheduled for release from BOP custody via
Good Conduct Time Release on May 18, 2027. ECF No. 9-2 at p. 2.
The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus,’ filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
challenges the BOP’s calculation of his federal release date. Petitioner contends that the BOP
failed to award him prior credit for the time that he spent in state custody between August 17,
2012, and May 29, 2014. See ECF No. 1. This matter is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.
Ill. Analysis
For federal prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers habeas jurisdiction over an inmate’s
challenge to the execution — as opposed to the validity — of his sentence. Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681
F.3d 533,535 (3d Cir. 2012). Two types of claims may ordinarily be litigated in a § 2241
proceeding. First, a prisoner may challenge conduct undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(the “BOP”) that affects the duration of his custody. For example, a prisoner can challenge the
BOP’s computation of his federal sentence, see, e.g., Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79
(3d Cir. 1990), or the constitutionality of a BOP disciplinary action that resulted in the loss of good
conduct sentencing credits, Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008). Secondly, a
prisoner can challenge BOP conduct that “conflict[s] with express statements in the applicable
sentencing judgment.” Cardona, 681 F.3d at 536; Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243. Because the
allegations in the instant habeas action challenge the BOP’s computation of Petitioner’s federal
sentence, this Court has jurisdiction under § 2241 to consider Petitioner’s claim.
To determine whether the BOP correctly computed an inmate’s federal sentence, a
reviewing court must separately determine: (1) the date on which Petitioner’s federal sentence
2 Under § 2241, district courts have authority to grant habeas corpus “within their respective jurisdictions.”
Petitioner is confined at FCI McKean, which is located within the territorial boundaries of the Western District of
Pennsylvania.
commenced, and (2) whether Petitioner was entitled to credit for time spent in custody prior to the
commencement of his sentence. Each of these determinations is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585.
With respect to the commencement date, 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) provides that a federal
sentence “commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to,
or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which
the sentence is to be served.” When an inmate is only facing service of a federal sentence, the
application of § 3585(a) is straightforward: the BOP will simply designate the inmate to a federal
detention facility and calculate the federal sentence to have commenced on the date it was imposed.
Where a defendant faces prosecution by both state and federal authorities, however, courts apply
the “primary custody” doctrine to determine where and how the defendant will serve any resulting
sentence of incarceration. See Taccetta v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 606 Fed. Appx. 661, 663
(3d Cir. 2015). Under that doctrine, the sovereign that first arrests an individual has “primary
custody” over the defendant and is entitled to have the defendant serve its sentence before that of
any other jurisdiction. See id. (citing Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d 1145, 1153 (3d Cir. 1982)).
Primary custody remains vested in that sovereign until the defendant completes that sovereign’s
sentence or the sovereign relinquishes primary custody by releasing the defendant on bail,
dismissing the charges, or granting parole. See id. Notably, a temporary transfer of a prisoner on
a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum does not constitute a relinquishment. See id.; see also
Holloman vy. Warden Fairton FCI, 635 Fed. Appx. 12, 14 (d Cir. 2015) (stating that “[t]he
production of a defendant pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum does not affect
the jurisdiction of the sovereign with primary custody over a defendant”).
In the instant case, Petitioner remained in the primary custody of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania from August 17, 2012, when he was arrested by state authorities, until June 11, 2014,
when the state released Petitioner to the exclusive custody of federal authorities. See 18 U.S.C. §
3585(a) (“A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received
in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at,
the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.”). There is no dispute that the
BOP awarded Petitioner twelve days of prior custody credit for the time between the completion
of his state sentence on May 29, 2014, and his release to a federal facility on June 11, 2014. Thus,
the lone question presented is whether Petitioner received the appropriate amount of credit for the
time that he spent in custody prior to May 29, 2014.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), a defendant is entitled to receive credit for time served
“(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or (2) as a result of any other
charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the
sentence was imposed; that has not been credited against another sentence.” Jd. (emphasis added).
The intent of the last clause of § 3585(b) is to prohibit an inmate from receiving double credit for
his prior time in detention. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337 (1992) (explaining that
with the enactment of § 3585(b), “Congress made it clear that a defendant could not receive a
double credit for his detention time.”). Thus, the BOP may not grant prior custody credit under §
3585(b) for time that has been credited against another sentence. See, e.g., Vega v. United States,
493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).
In the instant case, Petitioner received credit against his state parole sentence for the time
that he spent in state custody between his arrest on August 17, 2012, and his release to federal
authorities on June 11, 2014. Because he received credit against his state sentence for that time,
the BOP appropriately and correctly determined that he was not entitled to a credit against his
federal sentence under § 3585(b).? Vega, 493 F.3d at 314. His challenge to the BOP’s calculation
of his sentence will be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.4 An
appropriate order will follow.
Dated this 29" day of July, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
RICHARD A. □□
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
3 Petitioner’s argument that his federal sentence should have run concurrent with his state sentence is unavailing.
When a defendant is in the primary custody of a state at the time a federal sentence is imposed, the BOP must only
designate the sentences to run concurrently if the federal sentencing court “expressly indicated an intention to have
its sentence run concurrently with the non-Federal sentence.” Harris v. Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Federal, 787
F.Supp.2d 350, 356 (W.D. Pa. 2011). The sentencing court made no such designation in the instance case, stating
only that Petitioner should be “granted credit for time served in presentence custody, to the extent that [he is]
eligible for same.” ECF No. 2-1 at p. 3. The sentencing court’s silence as to whether Petitioner’s federal sentence
should run concurrently with the prior state sentence must be “construed as an intent to impose a consecutive
sentence.” Jd. And, in any event, because a federal sentence cannot commence “earlier than the date on which it
was imposed,” even if “made concurrent with a sentence already being served,” Petitioner’s 180-month federal
sentence could not have commenced prior to May 29, 2014, the date on which he was sentenced.
4 Because “[fJederal prisoner appeals from the denial of a habeas corpus proceeding are not governed by the
certificate of appealability requirement,” the Court need not make a certificate of appealability determination in this
matter. Williams v. McKean, 2019 WL 1118057, at *5 n. 6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2019) (citing United States v.
Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134
(2012)); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). -