Lyle v. Independent School District No. 14 of Jefferson County Oklahoma

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

B.L., a minor by and through BRANDON )

LYLE and SUSAN LYLE; ELYJAH )

PERKINS, individually; K.L., a minor by )

and through SAMANTHA COE; HUNTER )

STEPHENS, individually; KYLE SIMMONS, )

individually; KAEDON WADE, individually; )

CONNOR LONGEST, individually; )

H.R., a minor by and through )

CRAIG ROBERTS; and KARSON DANIEL, )

individually, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-24-00037-JD

)

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT )

NO. 14 OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, )

OKLAHOMA, also known as Ringling Public )

Schools, also known as Ringling School )

District; PHILIP KOONS, individually; )

KENT SOUTHWARD, individually; )

STERLING KOONS, individually; and )

COOPER KOONS, individually, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Philip Koons’s Emergency Motion to Stay

Deposition (“Motion”). [Doc. No. 73]. Koons requests that the Court stay the taking of

his deposition in this case until a parallel state criminal proceeding, State v. Koons, Case

No. CM-2023-00053 (Dist. Ct. Jefferson Cnty., Okla.), is resolved. That case is currently

set for trial beginning September 15, 2025. Motion at 2. Plaintiffs filed a response in

opposition (“Response”). [Doc. No. 75]. For the following reasons, the Court grants the

Motion in part.

BACKGROUND

On October 17, 2023, the State of Oklahoma charged Mr. Koons with one count of

outraging public decency. State v. Koons, Case No. CM-2023-00053 (Dist. Ct. Jefferson

Cnty., Okla.). On January 10, 2024, Plaintiffs—who “are young men and are current or

former students of Ringling Public Schools that played football for Philip Koons”—filed

this action, alleging that Koons “mentally, physically, verbally and sexually abused”

them, “hazed, bullied, humiliated and harassed” them, and violated their civil rights.

[Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 19–21]. According to Koons, his state criminal charge “arise[s] from

the same alleged facts” set forth in Plaintiffs’ complaint. Motion at 2. Plaintiffs later filed

an amended complaint, raising claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX of the

Education Amendments Act of 1972 against Defendant Independent School District No.

14 of Jefferson County, a/k/a Ringling Public Schools a/k/a Ringling School District.

[Doc. No. 20 ¶¶ 64–101]. Plaintiffs also bring claims of gross negligence and intentional

infliction of emotional distress against Defendants Philip Koons, Kent Southward,

Sterling Koons, and Cooper Koons. Id. ¶¶ 102–114.

Defendant Philip Koons originally pleaded no contest to the criminal charge

against him in state court, but he later withdrew his plea. State v. Koons, Case No. CM-

2023-00053 (Dist. Ct. Jefferson Cnty., Okla.). The case was set for jury trial to begin on

February 10, 2025, but it was continued to the trial docket beginning September 15, 2025.

Id. In the present action, there is a judicial settlement conference scheduled for

September 24, 2025, and the parties have until November 3, 2025, to complete discovery.

[Doc. No. 71 at 2; Doc. No. 72]. According to Plaintiffs, Koons’s deposition in this case

is scheduled for July 30, 2025. Response at 2.

Koons argues that the subject matter of this proceeding and the criminal

proceeding overlaps so completely that he would suffer significant prejudice if made to

sit for a deposition in this case before the criminal case against him is resolved. Motion at

5–7. Koons contends that he would face substantial prejudice “if forced to choose

between potentially making incriminating statements during the civil proceedings or

having an adverse inference drawn from the invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.”

Id. at 8. In contrast, Koons asserts that “a stay will not create any prejudice to the

Plaintiffs” because he only seeks to stay his own deposition, so “[d]iscovery[] can move

forward through other witnesses and parties.” Id. “Simply deferring this single deposition

will not present unnecessary delay of the progression of the matter as a whole,” and “the

public’s interest in these matters is being advanced in the matter filed in Jefferson

County, Oklahoma,” so Koons argues that a stay would not hinder the interests of the

Court or the public. Id. at 9.

Plaintiffs oppose Koons’s request for a stay. They argue that the Motion “is

improperly styled as an ‘emergency’ motion” because Koons “has known that Plaintiffs

wanted to take his deposition since at least June 17, 2025,” and he “waited until 48 hours

before his deposition to raise his ‘emergency’ with the Court.” Response at 2, 4. Further,

Plaintiffs argue that Koons is engaging in “gamesmanship” because he has deposed five

of the plaintiffs and listed their deposition transcripts as exhibits in his criminal case, but

“[n]ow that it is his turn to sit for a deposition” he “claims it is unfair.” Id. at 1. Plaintiffs

also argue that they are likely to be prejudiced by a stay because a stay could result in

further delays to the judicial settlement conference scheduled for September 24, 2025. Id.

at 7.

DISCUSSION

If “even a fair possibility” exists that a stay would damage another party, the party

moving for a stay must show “a clear case of hardship or inequity.” Creative Consumer

Concepts, Inc. v. Kreisler, 563 F.3d 1070, 1080 (10th Cir. 2009). “The Constitution does

not generally require a stay of civil proceedings pending the outcome of criminal

proceedings, absent substantial prejudice to a party’s rights.” Id. Indeed, “‘[a] defendant

has no absolute right not to be forced to choose between testifying in a civil matter and

asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege.’” Id. (quoting Keating v. Off. of Thrift

Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 326 (9th Cir. 1995)). A district court nevertheless “has broad

discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket.”

Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706–07 (1997) (citing Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S.

248, 254 (1936)). And that discretion may be exercised to stay civil proceedings in

deference to a parallel criminal prosecution when the interests of justice seem to require

such action. See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n.27 (1970); Creative Consumer

Concepts, 563 F.3d at 1080.

When a party requests a stay pending resolution of a parallel criminal proceeding,

a district court “must consider the extent to which a party’s Fifth Amendment rights are

implicated.” Id. Other considerations include the need “to prevent either party from

taking advantage of broader civil discovery rights or to prevent the exposure of the

criminal defense strategy to the prosecution.” Id. at 1080–81 (citing SEC v. Dresser

Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1375–76 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

In determining whether a stay is appropriate, courts often consider the following:

(1) The extent to which issues in the criminal case overlap with those

presented in the civil case;

(2) The status of the case, including whether the defendant has been

indicted;

(3) The private interests of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously versus

the prejudice to plaintiff caused by the delay;

(4) The private interests of, and burden on, the defendant;

(5) The interests of the Court; and

(6) The public’s interest.

In re CFS-Related Sec. Fraud Litig., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1236–37 (N.D. Okla. 2003).

Having considered each of these factors, the Court concludes that the interests of

justice require a temporary stay of the deposition of Philip Koons in this action. The first

factor weighs in favor of a stay, as there is substantial overlap between the criminal case

against Mr. Koons and this case. The same alleged conduct forms the foundation of

Plaintiffs’ claims in this case and the criminal charge in the state prosecution against Mr.

Koons.

Additionally, the status of this case and the criminal prosecution weigh in favor of

a stay. Mr. Koons’s criminal prosecution is ongoing, with a trial date set for September

15, 2025. Discovery in this case does not close until November 3, 2025, so the parties

should have time after the completion of the criminal trial to depose Mr. Koons and

pursue any additional discovery before the deadline runs. Thus, resolution of the criminal

case should occur in the near future, and the likelihood of significant delay in this case is

low. Although it is possible that Koons’s criminal prosecution (or related appeal) could

be delayed beyond September 15, 2025, that possibility can be addressed by considering

the need for a longer stay or alternative measures at a later date, if necessary.

The remaining factors speak to the interests of the parties, the Court, and the

public. In this case, the interests of the Court do not weigh strongly either for or against a

stay. Although the Court has a strong interest in the prompt resolution of civil cases, it

also has an interest in securing a just and inexpensive determination of every action. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. To that end, a stay pending resolution of the criminal case “may (1)

increase the possibility of settlement of the civil case, and (2) ‘may reduce the scope of

discovery in the civil case [as] the evidence gathered during the criminal prosecution[s]

can later be used in the civil action.’” Hilda M. v. Brown, Civil Action No. 10-cv-02495-

PAB-KMT, 2010 WL 5313755, at *6 (D. Colo. Dec. 20, 2010) (quoting Trustees of

Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc., 886 F. Supp.

1134, 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). The public also has an interest in the prompt resolution of

civil cases, but the Court finds that the ongoing criminal prosecution against Koons

adequately advances and protects the public’s interest in bringing him to account for any

wrongdoing. Thus, the public’s interest only marginally weighs against a stay.

Finally, while Plaintiffs plainly have a strong interest in the expeditious resolution

of their claims, the Court finds that this interest is outweighed by Koons’s interest in a

stay. On the one hand, the potential delay is relatively short and limited only to the

deposition of Mr. Koons. Thus, the risk is low that Plaintiffs will be prejudiced during a

stay as a result of fading memories or lost evidence. Conversely, the risk to Koons in

choosing between waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege and effectively forfeiting this

civil suit is considerable. See Volmar Distribs., Inc. v. New York Post Co., 152 F.R.D. 36,

39 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). “While the Court recognizes that ‘stays of the normal proceedings . .

. should be the exception rather than the rule’ even in the face of this constitutional

dilemma, the potential prejudice to [Koons] outweighs that to [Plaintiffs] at this time.”

Curry v. Gonzales, No. CIV 20-0116 RB/SCY, 2021 WL 1060770, at *3 (D.N.M. Mar.

18, 2021) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Hilda M., 2010 WL 5313755, at *3); see

also Trustees of Plumbers, 886 F. Supp. at 1140 (“This is particularly true where the

subject matter of both cases overlaps to a significant degree and the Criminal Case is

expected to be resolved by the end of this year.”). Under these circumstances—where

Koons’s risk of self-incrimination is high and the delay caused by the criminal

proceedings is potentially short—the Court finds that a temporary stay is warranted.

The Court acknowledges—and agrees with—Plaintiffs’ argument that the Motion

is not accurately styled as an “emergency” motion. Plaintiffs indicate that they formally

noticed Mr. Koons’s deposition on July 8, 2025, but he did not file the Motion until July

28, 2025, two days before the deposition scheduled for July 30, 2025. Mr. Koons

provides no justification for this delay in filing. While the Court does not look favorably

on this delay and strongly discourages similar delays in future filings, the interests of

justice nevertheless require a limited stay in these circumstances.

However, the Court declines to stay the taking of Mr. Koons’s deposition

indefinitely until his criminal case is resolved. Because his criminal trial is set to begin

September 15, the Court finds that a stay until October 1, 2025, is appropriate.

CONCLUSION

After balancing the competing interests at stake, the Court finds that a temporary

stay of Philip Koons’s deposition is appropriate. The Court therefore GRANTS the

Motion IN PART and AS MODIFIED.

IT IS ORDERED that Philip Koons’s deposition is STAYED until October 1,

2025.

The parties are directed to file, on or before October 1, 2025, a joint notice as to

the status of the criminal proceeding. If the criminal proceeding is finally resolved before

then or if the parties resolve this action before then, the parties are directed to advise the

Court immediately. If Mr. Koons seeks to extend the taking of his deposition past

October 1, 2025, he will need to file the requisite motion and address the six factors

outlined above. Koons will also need to indicate if Plaintiffs oppose a further stay.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 29th day of July 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE