holding that social security disability benefits paid to dependents of an injured wage earner are required to be subtracted
How later courts described this case
- holding that social security disability benefits paid to dependents of an injured wage earner are required to be subtracted
- holding that social security survivors’ benefits are required to be subtracted
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TORIANO HUDSON, FOR PUBLICATION
July 29, 2025
Plaintiff-Appellant, 10:28 AM
v No. 367902
Wayne Circuit Court
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, LC No. 22-007764-CD
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: MALDONADO, P.J., and GADOLA, C.J., and SWARTZLE, CAMERON, REDFORD, FEENEY,
AND YOUNG, JJ.
FEENEY, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
Although I acknowledge that “[a] published opinion of the Court of Appeals has
precedential effect under the rule of stare decisis,” MCR 7.215(C)(2), I disagree that “our only
task is to analyze whether the panel deciding Landin[1] was bound by this Court’s decision in
Flamont.”2 Hudson v Dep’t of Corrections, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025)
(Docket No. 367902); slip op at 6 (Hudson II). A “special panel must limit its review to resolving
the conflict that would have been created but for the provisions of [MCR 2.15(J)(1), which explains
the precedential effect of binding decisions,] and applying its decision to the case at bar.” MCR
7.215(J)(5). Therefore, our job is not simply to determine which case—Flamont or Landin—was
first decided by this Court, and therefore binding on the other case. Instead, I propose that our task
is to analyze which case—Flamont or Landin—was correctly decided in light of the Michigan
1
Landin v Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket
No. 367356).
2
Flamont v Dep’t of Corrections, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367863).
-1-
Supreme Court’s ruling in Christie.3 To that question, I submit that Flamont’s retroactivity
analysis is incorrect, and Landin’s retroactivity analysis is sound.
Concerning the question of whether the rule in Christie created a new rule of law, Flamont
stated that it was
evident from the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Christie that the Court’s decision
was based on construing the plain and unambiguous language of MCL 600.6431 to
reach a determination that was further supported by the operation of the [Court of
Claims Act] as a limited waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity. [Flamont v
Dep’t of Corrections, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket
No. 367863); slip op at 5-6.]
But given the fact that we are analyzing numerous opinions that have considered the language of
MCL 600.6431(1) and reached different conclusions regarding the need to file the written notice
of claim with the Court of Claims clerk’s office if the action is filed in circuit court, the “plain and
unambiguous language” of the statute appears to be called into question.
Additionally, in Flamont, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6, this Court stated as follows:
Our Supreme Court has explained that it does not announce a new rule of law when
it overrules a decision of the Court of Appeals that misinterpreted a statute contrary
to the statute’s plain language, legislative intent, and existing precedent because in
that situation, the Supreme Court has “reaffirmed the existing law that was
misinterpreted by the Court of Appeals.” Mich Ed Employees Mut Ins Co[ v
Morris], 460 Mich [180, 196-197; 596 NW2d 142 (1999)].
But I propose that Mich Ed Employees does not support the conclusion that Christie merely
corrected a misinterpretation of MCL 600.6431 in Tyrrell.4
In Mich Ed Employees, 460 Mich at 184-185, 191-192, our Supreme Court made it clear
that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred when they relied on the decision in Profit I,5 and
ruled that social security should not be withheld from personal protection insurance work-loss
benefits due and owing to the defendant’s sister who was disabled in an auto accident. Notably,
two years after Profit I was decided, it was overruled by Profit II, which held that social security
disability benefits shall be subtracted from work loss benefits otherwise payable for an automobile
injury. Profit v Citizens Ins Co of America, 444 Mich 281, 288; 506 NW2d 514 (1993) (Profit II).
Our Supreme Court in Mich Ed Employees, 460 Mich at 184-185, 196-197, ruled that Profit I
3
Christie v Wayne State Univ, 511 Mich 39; 993 NW2d 203 (2023).
4
Tyrrell v Univ of Mich, 335 Mich App 254; 966 NW2d 219 (2020).
5
Profit v Citizens Ins Co of America, 187 Mich App 55; 466 NW2d 354 (1991) (Profit I).
-2-
ignored: (1) the clear language of MCL 500.3109(1);6 as well as (2) two previously published
Michigan Supreme Court opinions, which held that social security benefits had to be subtracted
from PIP work loss benefits. See Thompson v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 418 Mich 610; 344
NW2d 764 (1984) (holding that social security disability benefits paid to dependents of an injured
wage earner are required to be subtracted); O’Donnell v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 404 Mich
524; 273 NW2d 829 (1979) (holding that social security survivors’ benefits are required to be
subtracted). Accordingly, the Court concluded that because Profit II did not constitute a new rule
of law, but merely “reaffirmed the existing law that was misinterpreted by the Court of Appeals”
in Profit I, Profit II was to be given full retroactive effect. Mich Ed Employees, 460 Mich at 197.
Therefore, Mich Ed Employees does not clearly stand for the proposition that Flamont
suggests. In Mich Ed Employees, 460 Mich at 197, the Supreme Court ruled that Profit II did not
constitute a new rule of law because it: (1) relied on the clear language of MCL 500.3109(1) and
two previously published Michigan Supreme Court opinions, and (2) merely “reaffirmed the
existing law that was misinterpreted by the Court of Appeals.” Conversely, in this case, there were
no published opinions by the Court of Appeals or the Michigan Supreme Court that interpreted
MCL 600.6431 before Tyrrell. Accordingly, I believe that Flamont was incorrect and went too
far by determining that Christie did not constitute a new law merely on the basis of the “plain and
unambiguous language” of the statute. See Flamont, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5-6.
Furthermore, I believe that Landin’s assessment of Tyrrell and Christie’s impact makes
more sense than Flamont’s assessment. In Landin v Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, ___ Mich
App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367356); slip op at 5-6, this Court concluded as
follows:
[T]he holding in Christie that a party suing the state must comply with MCL
600.6431(1) even if the action is pursued in circuit court constituted a new rule or
principle of law as to those cases filed when the holding in Tyrrell constituted
binding precedent. It is clear that Christie overruled precedent established in
Tyrrell, and although our Supreme Court in Christie, 511 Mich at 57, expressed
that it was giving effect to the intent of the Legislature as inferred from the text of
MCL 600.6431(1), the correction of the erroneous interpretation by the panel in
Tyrrell effectively announced a new rule of law as to those cases to which Tyrrell
applied. See League of Women Voters [of Mich v Secretary of State], 508 Mich
[520, 566; 975 NW2d 840 (2022)]; Pohutski [v Allen Park], 465 Mich [675, 696-
697; 641 NW2d 219 (2002)]. The precedent set by Tyrrell was clear and
unambiguous, i.e., there is no need to comply with MCL 600.6431(1) in a circuit
court action against the state, and the ruling in Christie was just as clear and
unambiguous, i.e., compliance with MCL 600.6431(1) is required regardless of the
judicial forum. The distinction between these two holdings was not vague, hazy,
6
MCL 500.3109(1) provides as follows: “Benefits provided or required to be provided under the
laws of any state or the federal government shall be subtracted from the personal protection
insurance benefits otherwise payable for the injury under this chapter.”
-3-
or indefinite; rather, Christie reflected a 180-degree change in the law, in relation
to the governing law defined in Tyrrell.6
6
Since Christie clarified the intent of the Legislature that passed MCL 600.6431
many years ago, it can be said to have determined that it was “always” the law that
notice has to be provided in circuit court cases. However, we do not require nor
permit parties to disregard binding authority even if it is incorrect–until and unless
that authority is overruled. What constitutes the rule of law applicable to a party is,
by definition, what the most recent binding precedent says it is. Simply put, parties
must rely on the law as the binding precedent has defined it. What makes a rule
“new” for purposes of retroactivity analysis does not concern the soundness of the
rule enunciated in a decision on which the party relied; rather the test is whether
the rule, even if misguided, was set forth in binding precedent. While legal theorists
may debate whether an overruled decision was ever “the law” in some ultimate or
platonic sense, the reality of litigation is that the applicable rule of law is defined
by the binding precedent in effect at the relevant time.
Accordingly, this Court determined that upon weighing the three pertinent factors discussed in
League of Women Voters, 508 Mich at 565-566, the factors “weigh[ed] against applying Christie
retroactively to cases in which plaintiffs reasonably relied on Tyrrell in making the decision not to
provide the notice in MCL 600.6431(1).”7 I concur that the plaintiffs who relied on Tyrell—such
as the plaintiffs in Landin, Hudson I, and Walton8—should not be barred from relief simply
because they relied on the only published caselaw on this issue at that time.
7
Notably, as the majority stated, the decision in Landin was not unanimous. In his dissenting
opinion, Judge Yates stated as follows:
Balanced against that need for caution [when construing the waiver of sovereign
immunity], however, is the ineluctable conclusion that many plaintiffs relied on
Tyrrell as binding authority that excused them from filing a notice prescribed by
MCL 600.6431(1) when asserting claims in circuit court. The plaintiff in Flamont
did not fall into that category. Here, in contrast, plaintiff very well may have relied
on Tyrrell, which was issued before plaintiff filed the suit that is now before us.
For that reason, my colleagues correctly identify this case as an instance where
reliance interests counsel against applying MCL 600.6431(1) to bar plaintiff’s
claim based on retroactive application of Christie. I share their concerns, but I
believe the appropriate avenue for addressing those concerns flowing from the
retroactive application of Christie is review by our Supreme Court.” [Landin, ___
Mich App at ___ (YATES, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); slip op at 2-
3.]
8
Walton v Mich Dep’t of Corrections, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,
issued December 3, 2024 (Docket No. 367975).
-4-
Therefore, I would hold that Flamont’s retroactivity analysis is incorrect, and Landin’s
retroactivity analysis is sound.
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
-5-