(PC)Owens v. Schultz

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 MARVIN LAMARR OWENS, Case No.: 1:24-cv-00820-SKO

12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DISMISS ACTION FOR A FAILURE TO

13 v. STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF

CAN BE GRANTED FOLLOWING

14 J. SCHULTZ, et al., SCREENING OF THE FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT

15 Defendants.

(Doc. 12)

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14-DAY OBJECTION DEADLINE

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Clerk of the Court to Assign District Judge

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19 Plaintiff Marvin LaMarr Owens is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil

20 rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

21 I. INTRODUCTION

22 The Court issued its First Screening Order on September 24, 2024. (Doc. 11.) Plaintiff

23 was directed to file a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in the order, or a

24 notice of voluntary dismissal, within 21 days. (Id. at 7.)

25 On October 21, 2024,1 Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint. (Doc. 12.)

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1 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

3 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

4 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous or malicious,

5 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

6 who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if

7 it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal

8 theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

9 III. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

10 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

11 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

12 exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain

13 “a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

14 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the

15 plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal

16 quotation marks & citation omitted).

17 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a

18 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

19 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must

20 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’”

21 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal

22 conclusions are not. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

23 The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of

24 any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the

25 liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal

26 theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation

27 of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially

1 quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted

2 inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation

3 marks & citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not

4 sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s

5 liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted).

6 B. Linkage and Causation

7 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal

8 rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under

9 section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the

10 defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode,

11 423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the

12 deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative

13 act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legal required

14 to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

15 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).

16 IV. DISCUSSION

17 A. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

18 Plaintiff names Agnes Hadraki, a correctional counsel at Wasco State Prison, as the sole

19 defendant in this action. (Doc. 12 at 1-2.) He seeks $25,000 and $100 per day “for every day

20 since [he’s] asked for this injustice to be corrected until it is.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff also seeks

21 restoration of “time … because of the extra 6 months” he was held on a Level III yard because “6

22 points” were added to his c-file. (Id.)

23 B. The Factual Allegations

24 Plaintiff alleges that in 2016, while he was incarcerated at Wasco State Prison’s reception

25 center, Correctional Counselor II Hadraki “placed a STG II with 6 points” in his c-file. (Doc. 12

26 at 3.) He states the “’Mansfield Bloods’” are “a fictitious gang … stemming only from a question

27 asked by a police officer in a police report” and that there is “[absolutely] no other evidence of

1 Plaintiff contends his due process rights were violated because “there was no investigation

2 at any level” and “Title 15 there was no three items to support this claim.” (Doc. 12 at 4.) Plaintiff

3 contends he was not “given a chrono” indicating the gang designation was in his c-file and that

4 Hadraki “profiled [him] as a gang member because of [his] ethnicity.” (Id.)

5 C. Plaintiff’s Claims

6 Plaintiff asserts two claims alleging his “due process” and “civil rights” were violated.

7 (Doc. 12 at 4-5.)

8 Applicable Legal Standards

9 As Plaintiff was previously advised, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

10 Amendment protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due process of law. Wolff v.

11 McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). To state a cause of action for deprivation of due process, a

12 plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought.

13 “States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due

14 Process Clause.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by

15 state law are generally limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant

16 hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484.

17 An inmate has no constitutional right to a particular security classification or housing.

18 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224–25 (1976) (no liberty interest protected by the Due Process

19 Clause is implicated in a prison's reclassification and transfer decisions); see Hernandez v.

20 Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9

21 (1976) (rejecting a claim that “prisoner classification and eligibility for rehabilitative programs in

22 the federal system” invoked due process protections)). Thus, in general, prison officials’ housing

23 and classification decisions do not give rise to federal constitutional claims encompassed by the

24 protection of liberty and property guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See

25 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); see also Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716,

26 718 (9th Cir. 2007) (classification at a Level IV prison rather than at a Level III prison did not

27 subject Myron to an atypical and significant hardship).

1 unconstitutional reasons, e.g., done in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights, or

2 done for religious, political, or racial discriminatory reasons. Decisions regarding an inmate's

3 classification level or where to house inmates are at the core of prison administrators’ expertise.

4 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225); see also Frost v.

5 Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998).

6 The validation of prison gang members and gang affiliates is an administrative measure

7 rather than a disciplinary measure, and as a result, prisoners are entitled only to minimal

8 procedural protections of adequate notice and an opportunity to present their views prior to gang

9 validation. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003). Evaluation of a prisoner's due

10 process challenge to his gang validation and related housing first requires identification of the

11 “prison official [who] was the critical decisionmaker,” and a determination whether the prisoner

12 “had an opportunity to present his views to that official.” Castro v. Terhune, 712 F.3d 1304, 1308

13 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Castro v. Terhune, 29 Fed. App'x 463, 465 (9th Cir. 2002) (“due process

14 ... require[s] ... a meaningful opportunity to present his views to the critical decisionmakers”);

15 Castro v. Terhune, 237 Fed. App'x 153, 155 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining the necessity of

16 identifying “actual decisionmaker” as compared to an official acting as an “assistant” or “rubber

17 stamp”).

18 In addition, due process requires that a prison's determination to validate a prisoner as a

19 gang associate be supported by “some evidence,” which is a “minimally stringent” standard.

20 Castro, 712 F.3d at 1314. “Some evidence” means “any evidence in the record that could support

21 the conclusion.” Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287. This standard “does not require evidence that logically

22 precludes any conclusion but the one reached.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill,

23 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985).

24 Analysis

25 Liberally construing the first amended complaint and accepting all facts as true, Plaintiff

26 fails to state a claim against Defendant Hadraki. Although Plaintiff has identified Hadraki as a

27 critical decisionmaker who Plaintiff contends has labeled him an STG II or gang member due to

1 present his views to Hadraki. Castro, 712 F.3d at 1308; Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287. Moreover,

2 Plaintiff was specifically advised in this Court’s First Screening Order that “[i]f Plaintiff files an

3 amended complaint identifying the critical decisionmaker, Plaintiff must describe in more detail

4 how his due process rights were violated. Plaintiff must describe how he was denied the right to

5 meaningfully present his views to the critical decisionmaker and why the decision validating him

6 as a gang member was not supported by some evidence.” (Doc. 11 at 6, italics added.) Plaintiff

7 fails to “describe how he was denied the right to meaningfully present his views” to Hadraki. To

8 the extent Plaintiff alleges no investigation by Hadraki occurred, an investigation is not required.

9 Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287 (prisoners are entitled only to minimal procedural protections of

10 adequate notice and an opportunity to present their views prior to gang validation).

11 Further, as noted above, validating a prisoner as a gang member or associate involves only

12 “some evidence” and is a “minimally stringent” standard. Here, Plaintiff’s first amended

13 complaint states he was identified as a member of the “fictitious gang ‘Mansfield Bloods’

14 stemming only from a question asked by a police officer in a police report.” Applying the

15 minimally stringent standard to the alleged facts, the Court finds a police officer’s reference to the

16 Mansfield Bloods gang in a police report as “some evidence” that could support Hadraki’s

17 conclusion. See Castro, 712 F.3d at 1314; Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287; see also Hill, 472 U.S. at 457;

18 Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186-87 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding “some evidence” standard

19 may be satisfied with information obtained from a reliable and credible informant).

20 Because Plaintiff has failed to remedy the deficiencies identified in the First Screening

21 Order, Plaintiff cannot cure his pleadings and leave to amend would be futile. See Hartman v.

22 CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of first amended complaint

23 and finding leave to amend futile where complaint’s allegations belied plaintiff’s entitlement to

24 relief).

25 In sum, the Court will recommend dismissal for a failure to state a claim upon which relief

26 can be granted.

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1 V. ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION

2 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to assign a

3 district judge to this action.

4 Further, for the reasons stated above, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS this action

5 be DISMISSED for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

6 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

7 Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

8 after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written

9 objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, “Objections to

10 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages

11 without leave of Court and good cause shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to

12 the Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference

13 the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise

14 reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the fifteen (15) page limitation

15 may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations

16 under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C). A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time

17 may result in the waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839

18 (9th Cir. 2014).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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21 Dated: July 28, 2025 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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