Baldwin v. Cole

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

ANTHONY BALDWIN, Case No. 1:25-cv-482

Plaintiff, Hopkins, J.

Bowman, M.J.

v.

JOHNNY COLE, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On July 11, 2025, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed an application seeking to

proceed in forma pauperis, together with a complaint that alleges employment

discrimination against three individual defendants who appear to be associated with his

former employer. Plaintiff has attached a copy of his EEOC Notice of his Right to Sue

together with his complaint, which generally alleges disability discrimination.

I. General Screening Authority

By separate Order issued this date, Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in

forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. As a result, the complaint is now before the

Court for a sua sponte review to determine whether the complaint, or any portion of it,

should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint

if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31

(1992); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous

when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d

1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is

immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does

not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

Congress has also authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints which fail to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Although a plaintiff’s pro se complaint must be “liberally construed” and “held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” the complaint must “give

the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 106 (1976), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(internal citation and quotation omitted)). The complaint “must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and

Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

1915A(b)(1)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept

all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual

allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading

that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders

“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557.

II. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a plausible employment

discrimination claim.

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff’s complaint begins by alleging that he was “compel[led] to walk off the job

from my former employment” in September 2022 based on disability discrimination. (Doc.

1-1, PageID 5.) Plaintiff next alleges that on various dates in September and October

2022 as well as on January 11, 2023:

[M]y worker’s comp neck physician – Mr. John Ruch D.C. at Westbourne

Dr., Cincinnati, Ohio 45248 Because of his deliberate unethical negligence

on the above dates, by failing to equip me with the crucial and accurate

handwritten documental [sic] reports this had severely compromised my

claim and enable my former employers …. to impose disability

discrimination aggressively at work and during my worker’s comp

proceedings.

(Id., PageID 5-6.) The undersigned construes this portion of the complaint as alleging that

Plaintiff’s chiropractor failed to provide Plaintiff with sufficient documentation of Plaintiff’s

worker’s comp and/or disability limitations on the referenced dates. The referenced

chiropractor is not a named defendant.

In a two-page handwritten attachment to the complaint form, Plaintiff includes the

following additional allegations:

On 10-5-2022 and 11-1-2022 my worker’s comp attorney … because of his

deliberate malpractice judgments prior to and during my worker’s comp

proceedings on 11-1-2022 were so extremely egregious that he had

severely sabotage[d] my claim and enable[d] my former employer’s [sic]…to

perpetrate disability discrimination throughout my entire worker’s comp

dilemma.

On 11-20-2022, VI-Cas Chief Administrator Mrs. Pon Insyxiengmay, Plant

Manager Jr. Johnny Cole and Senior Office Supervisor Mr. Robert Wagner

Jr. purposely submitted a 90% deceitfully false and misleading 2 page

employer’s position statement to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity

Commissions and Ohio Industrial Commission.

On 3-29-2023 VI-Cas….[Defendants Insyxiengmay, Cole and Wagner]

discharged my employment because of my disability….

On 1-11-2023 my new worker’s comp attorney Mr. Thomas M. Farrell Jr.

during 2 of my worker’s comp hearing on 12-14-2022 and 1-11-2023

because of his unethical misconduct and ineffectiveness of counsel …

severely compromised my claim and enable[d] my former employer’s [sic]

… to continue to impose disability discrimination upon me.

On 1-11-2023 before me and the VI-Cas Plant Manager …enter the

Worker’s Comp hearing room he had solicited me with an [undeniable] and

lucrative financial proposition which to me (implied we are waiting for you to

come back to work A.S.A.P.) Before, the hearing had concluded the plant

manager had transparent foreknowledge that my intentions were to be

rehired at VI-Cas….

On 1-12-2023 I was [reassured] that I would be rehired at VI-Cas… by the

VI-Cas Senior Office Supervisor [Wagner]… after he had thoroughly

examined my new reentry to work status report that I physically handed him

on the (above) date.

On 1-11-2023 up until 3-27-2023 I [made] over 10 genuine attempt

occurrences (by means of) to regain my employment at VI-Cas… and was

still denied because of my disability deficiency.

On 2-28-2025 I phoned the Chief Administrator [Insyxiengmay] … at VI-

Cas… regarding my stock/shares distribution which was suppose[d] to be

process[ed] by the end of 2024. During that conversation she said that

checks will be mailed on 3-31-2025. On 3-25-2025 I received a e-mail from

her stating that she had no control when my check will be paid. I sincerely

believe her refusal to pay my stock distribution is retaliatory/retribution for

the filing a lawsuit on 9-23-2023, with the [EEOC].

(Doc. 1-1, PageID 8-9.)

In addition to the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff has included a copy of a

September 27, 2023 EEOC Charge filed against his former employer, VI-Cas

Manufacturing Co., Inc. (Doc. 1-1, PageID 12.) In that Charge, plaintiff alleges that he

was wrongfully terminated on March 30, 2023 because of his disability, despite having

previously been assured that his disability would not disqualify him from returning to work.

The EEOC issued a Notice of the Right to Sue on April 16, 2025, and Plaintiff

initiated this lawsuit on July 11, 2025. In addition to the copy of his Notice of Right to Sue,

Plaintiff has included email from the EEOC Investigator that states in relevant part as

follows:

We have completed a review of the information provided by you and

Respondent [employer]. Respondent believes that the Injection Mold

Operator position met your restrictions. The Ohio Industrial Commission

hearing officer responsible for adjudicating your worker’s compensation

claim agreed that the work was made available that fit your physical

capabilities. Respondent discharged you after not working for over six

months with no expected return.

I am recommending that we discontinue the investigation and issue you the

“Notice of Right to Sue” [which]….gives you the ability to file a lawsuit in

federal court….

(Doc. 1-1, PageID 10.)

Based on the above allegations including but not limited to the documentary

exhibits included with the complaint, the undersigned reasonably construes Plaintiff as

alleging the following two claims: (1) disability discrimination in violation of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) based on the refusal to rehire Plaintiff following a Worker’s

Compensation hearing in January 2023, and/or his subsequent termination from

employment in March 2023; (2) a retaliatory refusal to pay Plaintiff a stock distribution in

March 2025 based on Plaintiff’s filing of an EEOC Charge in September 2023.

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations Fail to State a Plausible Discrimination Claim

In order to state a plausible claim of employment discrimination, Plaintiff need not

plead every element of his prima facie case or satisfy the McDonnell Douglas1 burden-

shifting standard. See generally Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 122 S.Ct. 992, 999, 534

U.S. 506, 510-511 (2002). But a plaintiff's complaint still must comply with Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)’s requirement to make “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 512 (holding that an employment

discrimination complaint satisfies Rule 8 when it alleges wrongful termination and

contains sufficient details to provide the defendant employer with fair notice of what the

claims are “and the grounds upon which they rest); Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605,

610 (6th Cir. 2012) (an employment discrimination complaint must allege “sufficient

‘factual content’ from which a court can ‘draw the reasonable inference’ that the employer

‘discriminate[d] against [Keys] with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of [her] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’”)

(additional citation omitted).

The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employment discrimination against

individuals with either an actual disability that limits one or more major life activities or is

perceived as so impaired. See Southall v. Ford Motor Company, 645 F.Supp.3d 826, 834

(S.D. Ohio, 2022). In the case presented, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet the Rule 8

1See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),

standard because it contains only conclusory allegations that lack the type of basic

“factual content” from which this Court can reasonably infer that any of the named

Defendants can be held liable for employment discrimination under the ADA.

1. Only an Employer is Liable for Discrimination

One of the most obvious deficiencies of the complaint is its identity of the

defendants.2 The ADA imposes liability only upon an “employer.” Although Plaintiff

properly identifies his former employer in his EEOC Charge, he has not named that

employer in this lawsuit. Instead, Plaintiff seeks to impose liability upon three individual

supervisory employees of his former employer: (1) the Plant Manager; (2) the Chief

Administrator; and (3) the Senior Office Supervisor.

Individual liability in not available under the ADA against other employees of a

covered employer. See Ford v. Frame, 3 Fed. Appx. 316, 318 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations

omitted); see also Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 808 n.1 (6th Cir. 1999)

(“[I]ndividual supervisors who do not independently qualify under the statutory definition

of employers may not be held personally liable in ADA cases.”); Wathen v. Gen. Elec.

Co., 115 F.3d 400, 404-05 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that individual liability is prohibited

under Title VII and similar statutory schemes, such as the ADEA and the ADA) (collecting

cases); see also Primm v. Department of Human Services, No. 16-6837, 2017 WL

10646487, at *4 (6th Cir. Aug. 17, 2017) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of employment

discrimination complaint filed against individuals). Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to

state a federal ADA claim against any of the named Defendants.

2Some of Plaintiff’s allegations are against the attorneys who previously represented him in worker’s

compensation proceedings. Plaintiff accuses the first attorney who represented him of “deliberate

malpractice,” and the second attorney of “unethical misconduct and ineffectiveness of counsel.” (Doc. 1-1,

PageID 8.) But neither attorney is named as a part to this lawsuit.

2. Plaintiff Fails to Plead a Plausible Discrimination Claim

To state a claim of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff “must plead facts that

make plausible the inference that (1) [he] is disabled, (2) [he] is qualified to perform [his]

job requirements with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) [he] would not have

been discharged but for the disability.” Darby v. Childvine, Inc., 964 F.3d 440, 444 (6th

Cir. 2020) (additional citations omitted). Plaintiff need not plead each element of a prima

facia ADA claim to survive the initial screen but is still required to satisfy Rule 8 pleading

standards. Fedder v. CEMS of Ohio, Inc., No. 24-3028, 2024 WL 5319224, at *4 (6th Cir.

Nov. 6, 2024). Here, Plaintiff’s allegation that he was either not rehired or was wrongfully

terminated satisfies the third element – that he suffered an “adverse action.” Southall, 645

F.Supp.3d at 835. Plaintiff’s minimal allegations, however, fall short of plausibly alleging

either of the first two elements of his claim.

Consider the element of disability. The undersigned infers that at some point prior

to 2023, Plaintiff suffered a work-related physical injury that led to a worker’s

compensation claim. Plaintiff refers to his injury as a “disability deficiency.” But Plaintiff

never identifies the nature of his injury or “disability” other than a brief reference to the

alleged negligence of his “neck physician,” identified as a chiropractor. In other words,

the complaint does not reasonably include any facts that would indicate whether the

alleged injury “substantially limits one or more major life activities” within the meaning of

the Americans with Disabilities Act for a sufficient period of time so as to qualify as a

disability. Cf. Bedford v. Michigan, 722 Fed. Appx. 515, 518 (6th Cir. 2018); 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(g) (defining “disability” as “[a] physical or mental impairment that substantially

limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual”).

But even if the Court were to accept at face value that Plaintiff has some type of

unspecified “disability,” his complaint falls short of plausibly alleging the second element

of an ADA claim – that he was qualified to perform some new position with his former

employer, or that he was wrongfully terminated because he continued to be able to

perform his former position with or without reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff never

identifies the position from which he was terminated. He also does not identify any

position to which he applied to regain new employment. The only reference to any position

at all is contained in the attached email to Plaintiff from an EEOC investigator, advising

Plaintiff of the closure of the EEOC investigation. In the email, the investigator refers to

an “Injection Mold Operator position” that (per the Investigator) Plaintiff’s employer

apparently believed “met your restrictions.” The email does not specify whether that

position was a new position for which plaintiff was applying or his old position, or what

“restrictions” the position accommodated.

As best as the undersigned can determine, Plaintiff alleges an ADA claim based

on his former employer’s failure to recognize that he was qualified to perform some

unspecified position of employment. But Plaintiff’s failure to identify what position that

was, or whether he needed any reasonable accommodation in order to perform the duties

of the position, amounts to a failure to provide the Defendants with sufficient notice of his

claim. See, e.g., Randolph v. Bath & Body Works, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-284-MHW, 2025 WL

1700906, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 18, 2025) (dismissing for failure to state a disability claim

at screening stage where plaintiff failed to identify his employment position, “let alone

allege any of the fundamental job duties of the position,” or “what reasonable

accommodation he requested or that he could perform the essential functions of the job

with said reasonable accommodation.”); Clark v. Kidz Planet, No. 2:23-cv-4207-ALM-

KAJ, 2024 WL 5036964, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 25, 2024) (report and recommendation

recommending dismissal of disability and retaliation claims at screening stage).

C. Plaintiff Fails to Plead a Plausible Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff’s allegations also are insufficient to state a retaliation claim as a matter of

law. Plaintiff alleges that on February 28, 2025, he had a telephone call with the Chief

Administrator for his former company:

regarding my stock/shares distribution which was suppose[d] to be

process[ed] by the end of 2024. During that conversation she said that

checks will be mailed on 3-31-2025. On 3-25-2025 I received [an] e-mail

from her stating that she had no control when my check will be paid. I

sincerely believe her refusal to pay my stock distribution is

retaliatory/retribution for the filing a lawsuit on 9-23-2023, with the [EEOC].

(Doc. 1-1, PageID 9.)

Plaintiff offers no factual allegations to support his asserted belief that the Chief

Administrator’s “refusal to pay my stock distribution is retaliatory/retribution” for Plaintiff’s

filing of an EEOC Charge in September 2023. “[T]emporal proximity, standing alone, is

not enough to establish a causal connection for a retaliation claim.” Spengler v.

Worthington Cylinders, 615 F.3d 481, 494 (6th Cir.2010)) (additional citation omitted).

The alleged temporal span of eighteen months between the date the Charge was filed

and the date of the Administrator’s email in this case is not particularly short. In the

absence of any allegations through which this Court can infer a causal connection,

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is overly conclusory. Along the same lines, Plaintiff’s suggestion

that the email constitutes some sort of adverse retaliatory action is unsupported, because

the only fact he has alleged is that the Administrator advised him that “she had no control”

over when his check would issue – not that she was refusing or even delaying his any

payment that is owed.

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim. Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED

THAT Plaintiff's claims be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED

THAT dismissal be without prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to file an amended complaint

within thirty (30) days of the date of this Report and Recommendation. If Plaintiff tenders

an amended complaint, his claims may once again be screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1915(e)(2)(B). Otherwise, the case should be dismissed in its entirety and closed.

s/Stephanie K. Bowman

Stephanie K. Bowman

United States Chief Magistrate Judge