Heis v. Hamilton County Government

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

MARGARET HEIS, Case No. 1:25-cv-478

Plaintiff, Hopkins, J.

Bowman, M.J.

v.

HAMILTON COUNTY GOVERNMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

By separate Order issued this date, Plaintiff Margaret Heis has been granted leave

to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The complaint is now before

the Court for a sua sponte review to determine whether the complaint, or any portion of

it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned

recommends that the complaint be dismissed.

I. General Screening Authority

Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint

if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31

(1992); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous

when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or

law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898

F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the

defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which

clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis

when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly

incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept

as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a complaint for

frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 328).

Congress has also authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints which fail to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii).

Although a plaintiff's pro se complaint must be “liberally construed” and “held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” the complaint must “give

the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007) (internal citation and quotation omitted)). The complaint “must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010)(“dismissal standard

articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept

all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual

allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading

that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders

“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557.

II. The Allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff has tendered her complaint on a standard form used by pro se litigants to

allege civil rights violations. As defendants, she names the Hamilton County Government,

William Heis (whom she identifies as her ex-husband), and Andrew Stovffer (address

unknown). Plaintiff alleges subject matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)

based on violations of her civil rights. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1-1, PageID

5). In a preliminary statement, Plaintiff alleges that she suffers from PTSD and is disabled,

and that her PTSD “did not allow me to defend myself in Hamilton County Court.” (Doc.

1-1, PageID 4.)

In a more complete handwritten “Statement of Claim,” Plaintiff first states that she

has “no idea who the plaintiff is or what their problem is,” before alleging as follows:

I have been [sic] my disability was decided by jury that Hamilton County

Court was found guilty of [exacerbating] my disability of post-traumatic

stress disorder. Federal Judge Carl Rubin issued a decision that people

with mental disabilities could not be held to time limits such as statues [sic]

of limitations, etc. Because our brains cannot process time correctly

[illegible] gave me the right to sue in federal court overturning the EEOC

denial.

Stress is a killer.

(Doc. 1-1, PageID 6.) Plaintiff concludes with a lengthy list of what are presumed to be

her medical diagnoses. (Id., PageID 6-7.)

In a section concerning prior lawsuits filed in this Court, Plaintiff lists No. 95-cv-10,

an employment discrimination case in which she is listed as one of three plaintiffs who

filed suit against Hamilton County, Ohio, the Hamilton County Building Commissioner,

and two other individual defendants. The undersigned takes judicial notice that one or

both of Plaintiff’s co-plaintiffs in the 1995 case appear to be the same individuals that

Plaintiff has now named as defendants: William J. Heis and Andrea J. Stoeffer.1 After

identifying her 1995 case as previously litigated in this Court, Plaintiff writes “Much not

included in final because my life being threateded [sic] by a DRVO Mob & very high up

politicians (H.C.) in business with them.” (Doc. 1-1, PageID 7.)

Under the “Relief” section of the instant complaint form, wherein litigants are asked

to state “exactly what you want the court to do for you,” Plaintiff has written the following2:

After my divorce & my ex’s quitclaim deed I wanted to release him from the

mortgage. Being a single female owning a construction co. startup a new

loan was hard to get until a man named Rob Malone overheard my plight ^

said he was with Starpoint Mortgage & the mortgage was with Countrywide

originally started my “Steve Mnueschen & George Souros” [sic] predatory

loan. I bought my home July 1986. Pres. Obama had Bank America give

me a home loan waiver added a 40 loan [sic] loan on top of the remain of

my origina[al] 30 year loan with the final payment being 7/2051. Hard to do

This [illegible] murder VA July 6, 1991.

(Doc. 1-1, PageID 7 (emphasis original).)

1Plaintiff’s handwriting is quite difficult to decipher. Although the docketing clerk interpreted the second

defendant’s name in the instant case as “Andrew Stovffer,” close examination suggests that Plaintiff may

have written “Andrea. [N or D] Stouffer,” a name that differs only in its middle initial to the name of the

second co-plaintiff in her 1995 lawsuit.

2The undersigned has deciphered Plaintiff’s handwriting to the best of her ability.

III. Analysis

Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for failure to state any plausible claim. To

the extent that Plaintiff’s new pro se case relates to her thirty-year-old case against

Hamilton County, it is time-barred as well as barred by the application of res judicata or

claim preclusion. Through retained counsel, plaintiff and two co-plaintiffs previously

litigated No. 95-cv-10 as an employment discrimination case before U.S. District Judge

Susan J. Dlott. Following discovery, Judge Dlott presided over a seven-day trial that

culminated in a jury verdict on October 29, 1996 in favor of Ms. Heis on her discrimination

claims. (Id., Doc. 66.) Following that verdict, the parties entered into a settlement and

agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice. (Id., Doc. 81.) Plaintiff cannot reopen No. 95-

cv-10 at this point in time, and is barred from reasserting any previously litigated claims.

To the extent that Plaintiff is not seeking to reassert claims in No. 95-cv-10 but is

instead seeking to file a new civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, her complaint

also should be dismissed. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Plaintiff

generally alleges that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)

based on alleged violations of her civil rights. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But to

establish a federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must show: (1) that

she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States,

and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Moore

v. City of Paducah, 890 F.2d 831, 833-34 (6th Cir.1989).

Plaintiff asserts no particular facts against Hamilton County other than that the

County was previously found guilty of exacerbating her PTSD. Plaintiff fails to include any

facts that plausibly allege any violation of federal law or of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights

by Hamilton County. In addition, Plaintiff does not allege that any County “policy or

custom” was the “moving force” behind any alleged violation of her constitutional rights.

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978). “It is

firmly established that a municipality, or ... a county, cannot be held liable under § 1983

for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Gregory v. Shelby County, Tenn.,

220 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).

Plaintiff fails to state any plausible § 1983 claim against the two individual

defendants for similar reasons. Neither Plaintiff’s ex-husband nor Andrew Stovffer3

appear to be state actors. In addition, there are no allegations at all that refer to Defendant

Stovffer (or to Defendant Stouffer, if the name is misspelled). To the extent that Plaintiff

is complaining about some form of “predatory loan” on her home, she does not tie the

allegations to any of the named Defendants. In short, Plaintiff’s allegations consist of

implausible accusations that do not withstand analysis under the minimal pleading

standards established by Iqbal and Twombly. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state any viable

claim under federal law. Because the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, it should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B).

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for

failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted;

2. The Court should certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the foregoing

reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation

3As previously stated, it is not clear whether the second individual defendant’s name is “Andrew Stovffer”

or “Andrea Stouffer.”

would not be taken in good faith and therefore should deny Plaintiff leave to

appeal in forma pauperis.

s/Stephanie K. Bowman ____

Stephanie K. Bowman

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

MARGARET HEIS, Case No. 1:25-cv-478

Plaintiff, Hopkins, J.

Bowman, M.J.

v.

HAMILTON COUNTY GOVERNMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written

objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of

the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely

motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s)

of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support

of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN

(14) DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections

in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474

U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).