The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JANE DOE CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE NO. 22-00338-BAJ-SDJ
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA
SYSTEM, ET AL.
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated
Government's (“LCG”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 199). Plaintiff
opposes the Motion. (Doc. 206). LCG filed a Reply Brief. (Doc. 217). For the reasons
that follow, the Motion will be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are uncontested for present purposes, either because the
opposing party has admitted the fact or because the opposing party failed to
adequately contest it:!
A. Lafayette Parish Sexual Assault Response Team Memorandum of
Agreement. □
On March 14, 2014, the Lafayette Police Department signed a Memorandum
of Agreement titled “Lafayette Parish Sexual Assault Response Team (SART)”
(“Sexual Assault Response MOA”) (Doc. 199-5). Lafayette Parish created the Sexual
1 The Court detailed the lengthy facts of this case in its prior Ruling. (Doc. 313). Here, the
Dan 199 only the facts directly relevant to the arguments raised in LCG’s Motion.
Assault Response Team to “improve collaborative efforts in the local community
response to sexual assault.” (Doc. 199-5 at 1).
The Sexual Assault Response MOA provides: “This working agreement is
recognized as a cooperative, collaborative commitment between each agency listed
below, and proof of commitment is acknowledged by the signature of each agency’s
representative.” (Doc. 199-5 at 1). The signatories to the Sexual Assault Response
MOA included the following entities: (1) the Acadiana Crime Lab;
(2) the Lafayette Police Department; (8) the Broussard Police Department;
(4) Hearts of | Hope; (5) 15 = =Judicial District; (6) Faith House;
(7) Lafayette Parish Sheriffs Office; (8) Lafayette Parish Correctional Center; and
(8) University of Louisiana Lafayette (“ULL”). (Doc. 199-5).
B. The Campus Accountability and Safety Act Memorandum of
Understanding.
On January 17, 2017, the Lafayette Police Department signed the Campus and
Accountability and Safety Act Memorandum of Understanding (“Campus Safety
MOU”). (Doc. 199-2 § 2; Doc. 206. { 2). Under the heading “Purpose,” the Campus
Safety MOU states:
The Campus Accountability and Safety Act, La. R.S. 17:3399.11.
provides that all public institutions of higher education shall enter into
a memorandum of agreement with local law enforcement and criminal
justice agencies to clearly delineate the responsibilities and share
information, in accordance with applicable state and federal
confidentiality laws, regarding sexually-oriented criminal offenses,
including trends about sexually-oriented criminal offenses against
students of the institution.
This Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) is entered into by and
among the Parties for the purpose of delineating responsibilities and
sharing information specific to such offenses including University of
Louisiana at Lafayette students as required by the [Campus
Accountability and Safety] Act. This MOU is intended to memorialize
the Parties commitment to continued cooperation in the prevention of
and response to such criminal offenses involving members of the
University of Louisiana at Lafayette and Lafayette Parish community.
(Doc. 199-6).
In the Campus Safety MOU, the Lafayette Police Department agreed to
“[nJotify UL[L]’s Title IX Coordinator, to the extent we are able with respect to any
confidentiality requirements, of any report of a sexually oriented criminal offense
that may have occurred on its campus or involved a student as a victim or an
accused.” (Doc. 199-2 § 4; Doc. 206 § 4). In the same MOU, ULL agreed to “maintain
communication and contact with ULPD [ULL Police Department] and law
enforcement agencies.” (Doc. 199-2 J 5; Doc. 206 { 5).
Although the Campus Safety MOU provided that reports of sexually oriented
criminal conduct were to be shared with the ULL Title IX Coordinator, investigations
of sexual assault or sexual harassment at ULL would have been taken up by the
department of Student Rights and Responsibilities rather than Title IX before 2021.
(Doc. 199-2 § 18; Doc. 206 § 13). Teressa LeDay became the ULL Title IX Coordinator
on August 7, 2018. At no point was LeDay designated as liaison or assigned any
responsibilities relating to the Campus Safety MOU. (Doc. 199-2 § 16; Doc. 206 § 16).
C. Silva.
After the Lafayette Police Department agreed to the Campus Safety MOU, two
reports were made against Silva. (Doc. 199-2 4 6; Doc. 206 § 6).
Il. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed suit on May 25, 2022. (Doc. 1). She asserts one claim against
LCG: Count IV, negligence under Louisiana state law. (Doc. 1 at 162-170).
Plaintiff alleges that LCG owed a duty to Plaintiff and other students to report
students who were accused of criminal sexual assault to ULL in a reasonably prudent
manner to protect students from sexual assault. 7d. at § 163). Plaintiff contends that
by entering into the Campus Safety MOU, LCG voluntarily assumed the duty to
share reports with ULL’s Title IX Coordinator that students like Silva were accused
of committing a sexually oriented criminal offense. (/d. 1 at § 164). Plaintiff alleges
that LCG owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in carrying out these
responsibilities, and that ULL relied on LCG to exercise reasonable care in executing
its responsibilities under the Campus Safety MOU. (id. at 165-166).
Plaintiff alleges that LCG was negligent by:
a. Failing to inform UL Lafayette of three reports that Silva engaged in
criminal sexual activities against female students (Students 3, 4, and 5);
b. Failing to comply with the Executive Order and Act 172;
c. Violating its Memorandum of Understanding with UL Lafayette by
not reporting allegations of Silva’s criminal misconduct to the
university;
d. Failing to take reasonable care to undertake its responsibilities under
the Memorandum of Understanding; and
e. Failing to take meaningful measures to prevent Silva from sexually
assaulting other female students.
Ud. at {| 167).
Plaintiff further alleges that it was entirely foreseeable that LCG’s breaches
would result in Silva’s sexual assault of yet another female student—Plaintiff. (Id. at
168). Finally, Plaintiff contends that as a direct and proximate result of LCG’s
negligent actions and inaction, Ms. Doe was raped by Silva and endured great
physical, emotional, and mental suffering, for which she is entitled to be
compensated. (/d. at § 170).
LCG previously moved to dismiss, asserting, in part, that Plaintiffs claim
against it was time-barred. (Doc. 22). The Court denied LCG’s Motion, finding in
relevant part that “Plaintiffs Complaint establishes a plausible basis for tolling
under the contra non valent/e/m discovery rule, until she read the USA Today article
and learned that Silva was previously a UL Lafayette student, where he was reported
to LPD three times for sexual assault.” (Doc. 52).
LCG now moves for summary judgment, asserting that discovery has borne out
that Plaintiff's negligence claim against it is time-barred. (Doc. 199). LCG argues that
if the Court finds that Plaintiffs claim is not time-barred, Plaintiffs negligence claim
still fails as a matter of law. (/d.). For the following reasons, LCG’s Motion will be
GRANTED.
TW. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56(a) provides that the Court may
grant summary judgment only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court must
view the evidence through the prism of the substantive evidentiary
burden. All justifiable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion. If the record, viewed in this light, could not lead a rational trier
of fact to find for the nonmovant, summary judgment is proper. On the
other hand, if the factfinder could reasonably find in the nonmovant’s
favor, then summary judgment is improper.
Finally, even if the standards of Rule 56 are met, a court has discretion
to deny a motion for summary judgment if it believes that a better course
would be to proceed to a full trial.
Kunin v. Feofanov, 69 F.3d 59, 61-62 (5th Cir. 1995) (quotation marks, alterations,
and citations omitted); see also Firman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 684 F.3d 533, 538
(Sth Cir. 2012) (same); accord Black v. JI. Case Co., 22 F.8d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 1994)
(“The Supreme Court has recognized that, even in the absence of a factual dispute, a
district court has the power to ‘deny summary judgment in a case where there is
reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.””) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
Importantly, when conducting the summary judgment analysis, the Court is
prohibited from evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, weighing the evidence, or
resolving factual disputes. Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157, 160 (5th
Cir. 2021). Put differently, the Court may not credit certain witness testimony over
other evidence: “By choosing which testimony to credit and which to discard, a court
improperly weighs the evidence and resolves disputed issues in favor of the moving
party. Doing so is tantamount to making a credibility determination, and—at this
summary judgment stage—a court may make no credibility determinations.”
Heinsohn v. Carabin & Shaw, P.C., 832 F.3d 224, 245 (5th Cir. 2016) (quotation
marks, alterations, and citations omitted).
IV. ANALYSIS
LCG argues that Plaintiffs negligence claim is prescribed, and if not, Plaintiffs
claim still fails as a matter of law because LCG did not owe Plaintiff a duty, an
essential element of her negligence claim. (Doc. 199). The Court has already analyzed
the issue of prescription at length and need not do so again here. (Doc. 313). Thus,
the Court turns to whether LCG owed Plaintiff a duty.
LCG argues that neither the Campus Safety MOU nor the Campus
Accountability and Safety Act created a specialized duty between LCG and Plaintiff.
(Doc. 199-1 at 48). Plaintiff responds with a two-paragraph Opposition brief, arguing
that the Campus Safety MOU was intended for the benefit of third-party students
like Plaintiff, forming a “stipulation pour autrui’ between Plaintiff and LCG.
(Doc. 206 at 2).
Relevant to this issue, the Court emphasized the following at the Motion to
Dismiss phase:
The parties have not briefed whether the Lafayette MOU created a
stipulation pour autrui in Plaintiffs favor, and the Court does not decide
that issue here. Certainly, the standard for a stipulation pour autroi is
high. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Traillour Oil Co., 987 F.2d 1138, 1147
(5th Cir. 1993). Nonetheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
long-recognized stipulations pour autroi “in favor of the general public,”
Oliff v. City of Shreveport, 52 La.Ann. 1208, 27 So. 688, 697 (La. 1900);
Lawson v. Shreveport Waterworks Co., 111 La. 78, 35 So. 890, 392 (1908),
and the fact that Plaintiff may yet prove a stipulation pour autrot under
the Lafayette MOU reinforces the Court’s determination that Plaintiff
has plausibly alleged that LPD owed a duty to share reports of Silva’s
sexual assaults with UL Lafayette.
Doe v. Bd. of Supervisors of Univ. of La. Sys., 650 F. Supp. 3d 452, 480
(M.D. La. 2023). Now that the issue is properly before the Court, the Court will
address whether the Campus Safety MOU is a stipulation pour autrui in favor of
Plaintiff.
Because Plaintiff's negligence claim arises out of state law, the Court applies
the substantive law of the forum state. First Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford,
555 F.3d 177, 181 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
78-79 (1938)). “To determine Louisiana law, [the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit] look[s] to the final decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court.”
Bradley v. Alistate Ins. Co., 620 F.3d 509, 516 n. 2 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal citations
omitted); see also Price v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 453 F. App’x 446, 450 n.4
(5th Cir. 2011).
Under Louisiana law, a contract that designates a benefit for a third party is
called a stipulation pour autrut. La. Civ. Code art. 1978. Louisiana Civil Code article
1978 provides:
A contracting party may stipulate a benefit for a third person called a
third party beneficiary.
Once the third party has manifested his intention to avail himself of the
benefit, the parties may not dissolve the contract by mutual consent
without the beneficiary’s agreement.
La. Civ. Code art. 1978.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has identified three criteria for determining
whether contracting parties have provided a benefit for a third party:
(1) the stipulation for a third party is “manifestly clear,” (2) there must be “certainty
as to the benefit provided the third party,” and (8) the benefit must not be “a mere
incident of the contract between the promisor and the promisee.” Joseph v.
Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2 of Par. of St. Mary, 2005-2364 (La. 10/15/06), 939 So. 2d 1206,
1212; see also Butler v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., No. CV 18-871-BAJ-EWD,
2019 WL 1714231, at *2 (M.D. La. Apr. 17, 2019) (Jackson, J.) (relying on these
criteria to determine whether a contract created a stipulation pour autrui in
plaintiffs’ favor). The Fifth Circuit, applying Louisiana law, has relied on the same
three criteria. Williams v. Integon Natl Ins. Co., 1382 F.4th 801, 805-06
(5th Cir. 2025).
According to the Louisiana Supreme Court, “[e]ach contract must be evaluated
on its own terms and conditions” and “[t]he party claiming the benefit bears the
burden of proof.” Williams, 182 F.4th at 806 (citing Joseph, 939 So. 2d at 1212). “A
stipulation pour autrui is never presumed.” Id. Thus, Plaintiff bears the burden of
proving a stipulation pour awtruit here. The Court turns to each of the three criteria
necessary to establish a stipulation pour autrui under Louisiana law.
First, “[t]he most basic requirement of a stipulation pour autrui is that the
contract manifest a clear intention to benefit the third party.” Williams,
132 F.4th at 806 (citing Lee v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., No. 08-1100, 2008 WL 2622997,
at *4 (H.D. La. July 2, 2008); Joseph, 939 So. 2d at 1212). The Court has held that
“absent such a clear manifestation, a party claiming to be a third[-]party beneficiary
cannot meet [her] burden of proof.” Cedar Lodge Plantation, LLC v. CSHV Fairway
View I, LLC, No. CV 13-00129-BAJ-EWD, 2016 WL 7411131, at *6 n6
(M.D. La. Dec. 21, 2016), affdsub nom. Cedar Lodge Plantation, L.L.C. v.
CSHV Fairway View I, L.L.C., 753 F. App’x 191 (5th Cir. 2018) (Jackson, J.) (citing
Joseph, 939 So. 2d at 1212).
The Court turns to the terms of the Campus Safety MOU to determine whether
it manifested a clear intention to benefit Plaintiff, the purported third-party
beneficiary. Although Plaintiff bears the burden of proof, the only argument Plaintiff
makes to satisfy her burden is as follows: “It is clear the MOU between ULL and LPD
was for the benefit of third-party students like Ms. Doe.” (Doc. 206 at 2).
LCG responds that it is far from clear, much less manifestly clear, that
Plaintiff, a Tech student, was an intended third-party beneficiary to the Campus
Safety MOU. (Doc. 217 at 5). LCG points to the “Collaborative Efforts” Section of the
Campus Safety MOU, which states that the MOU is intended to “supplement and
enhance cooperation between UL Lafayette and the Lafayette Parish criminal justice
and law enforcement agencies involving UL Lafayette students consistent with the
Campus Accountability and Safety Act.” (Doc. 199-6 at 2 (emphasis added)). LCG
argues that although ULL students are highlighted by the Campus Safety MOU,
Tech Students like Plaintiff are not mentioned.
Although perhaps Plaintiff could have established that the MOU was intended
to benefit students generally, not solely ULL students, Plaintiff has made no effort to
do so. (See Doc. 206). Without more, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet
her burden of establishing that the Campus Safety MOU manifested a clear intention
to benefit Plaintiff, a Tech student.
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Second, Plaintiff must show that there is certainty as to the benefit the
Campus Safety MOU provided to Plaintiff. Joseph v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2 of Par.
of St. Mary, 2005-2364 (La. 10/15/06), 939 So. 2d 1206, 1212. Plaintiff has not offered
any argument or evidence to establish this criterion. LCG argues that the Campus
Safety MOU was intended to benefit the safety of the local community of Lafayette,
to which Plaintiff had no connection as a Tech student in Ruston, Louisiana. Without
more from Plaintiff, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has met her burden to show
the requisite certainty.
Finally, Plaintiff must show that the benefit is not a mere incident of the
Campus Safety MOU. Joseph, 939 So. 2d at 1212. Again, Plaintiff has not offered any
argument or evidence in support of this prong of the analysis. LCG again argues that
the Campus Safety MOU explicitly states that its purpose is to prevent and respond
to criminal offenses involving members of the ULL and Lafayette Parish community,
and that Plaintiff has no connection to Lafayette Parish. Without more from Plaintiff,
the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has satisfied her burden of establishing the third
criterion.
Because Plaintiffs only argument in opposition to LCG’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is that the Campus Safety MOU created a stipulation pour autrui in favor
of Plaintiff, the Court must grant LCG’s Motion.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
It is ordered that Defendant Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 199) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs negligence
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claim against LCG is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, ieee day of July, 2025
A. IH
JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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