Opinion

Jasmil Rivas v. Board of Review

Court
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Filed
Jul 28, 2025
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 38.3%

The opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1423-23

JASMIL RIVAS,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW,

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

and NN ACQUISITION, LLC,

Respondents.

__________________________

Submitted June 4, 2025 – Decided July 28, 2025

Before Judges Currier and Marczyk.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of

Labor and Workforce Development, Division of

Unemployment Insurance, Docket No. 251936.

Legal Services of New Jersey, attorneys for appellant

(Sarah Hymowitz, on the briefs).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for

respondent Board of Review (Janet Greenberg Cohen,

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Gina

Labrecque, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff appeals from the Board of Review, Department of Labor's

(Board) November 29, 2023 decision: (1) disqualifying plaintiff for regular

unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), because she left work

voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work; and (2) finding plaintiff

ineligible for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) benefits under the

Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), 15 U.S.C.

§§ 9001-9141. We affirm.

I.

Plaintiff was employed in the admissions office of Lincoln Technical

Institute of New Jersey (Lincoln Tech).1 For several months at the beginning of

the COVID-19 pandemic, Lincoln Tech held classes remotely but resumed in-

person instruction in July 2020.

Plaintiff resigned from her position in November 2020, stating in her

resignation letter: "I have been part of the Lincoln Tech Team since October

4[], 2016. I've worked with amazing people throughout my time here. It is with

heavy heart that I decided to resign, but my mental health and sanity are being

1

The employer on the Board documents and case caption is NN Acquisition,

LLC. The record seems to indicate NN Acquisition, LLC owns Lincoln Tech.

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2

affected." Her last day of work was November 19, 2020. Plaintiff applied for

unemployment benefits on November 22.

In January 2021, the Deputy of the Division of Unemployment Insurance

determined that plaintiff was disqualified from receiving benefits because she

left work voluntarily as she felt the work was adversely affecting her health.

Plaintiff also did not meet any of the qualifying reasons for PUA benefits under

the CARES Act.

Plaintiff filed an appeal on March 19, 2021. The Appeal Tribunal

(Tribunal) dismissed plaintiff's appeal as untimely without good cause under

N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(b)(1) (appeal must be filed within ten days of the mailing of

the determination or within seven days of the receipt of the determination). The

Board affirmed and dismissed the appeal.

After plaintiff appealed to this court, the Board moved for a remand to

reconsider the timeliness of the appeal. We granted the motion. Thereafter, the

Board set aside its prior decision and remanded to the Tribunal for additional

testimony regarding the timeliness of plaintiff's appeal.

During the course of several telephonic hearings, plaintiff testified that

she was aware of the deadline to file an appeal. However, plaintiff stated her

delay in filing was because she was "going through [a] pregnancy miscarriage.

A-1423-23

3

So [she] . . . didn't tend to the letter in that specific moment . . . [but did] when

[she] was mentally . . . able to focus on the unemployment issue." Specifically,

plaintiff had two miscarriages, the first in mid-January 2021 and another in late

February 2021. She testified this rendered her unable "to take care of [her]

regular day to day functioning as [she] had [done] before."

Plaintiff further testified that although she previously stated she was able

to work during the time-period from when she filed her initial claim until she

filed her appeal, she actually was not able to work until "after the pregnancy

miscarriage[s]" when she became more "stable" around March of 2021.

Plaintiff presented the following additional testimony: (1) during the time

she was going through the miscarriages and prior to March 2021, she was not

"certifying [the required timesheets] for [her] weekly benefits;" (2) she was

working with people at Lincoln Tech who tested positive for COVID-19, but

were allowed to return to work after a few days, although she had no proof to

substantiate this claim; (3) she was not advised by any medical professional that

she should leave her job because of concerns about COVID-19; (4) she did not

provide Lincoln Tech with any medical documentation that the job caused or

aggravated any medical condition; (5) Lincoln Tech had a policy that if someone

tested positive for COVID-19 in the building, that person was required to

A-1423-23

4

quarantine for ten to fourteen days and show a negative test result before return,

and that everyone would evacuate the building so a cleaning crew could clean

the entire building, but those policies were never enforced; (6) she identified

another employee who was told by Lincoln Tech to return to work after ten days

even though she still had a positive test; (7) her job required her to check whether

students returning to the school after testing positive for COVID-19 had a fever;

(8) some of the students she interacted with told her that within a few days after

they tested positive for COVID-19 they were informed by a Lincoln Tech

director to come back to school because the students needed "hands on time" in

the classroom; (9) she complained to her supervisor about the COVID -19

conditions but her complaints were never addressed; (10) she left work because

her employer failed to adhere to quarantine requirements and she worried she

would contract COVID-19 and her pregnancy would be affected; (11) shortly

after she left her job, she tested positive for COVID-19 and later had a

miscarriage; (12) none of the students she tested had a high temperature or fever,

including those who had tested positive for COVID-19; and (13) she believed

the students were lying when they filled out forms stating they did not have

COVID-19 or symptoms associated with it.

A-1423-23

5

On August 2, 2023, the Tribunal found that plaintiff had not established

good cause for the late filing of the appeal and, therefore, the Tribunal did not

have jurisdiction to rule on its merits. The Tribunal stated

while the Tribunal is sympathetic to the reasons . . .

[plaintiff] did not file the appeal within the limits of

N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(b)(l), . . . [plaintiff's] reasons are not

considered good cause for filing a late appeal because

the fact[s] before the Tribunal show[] that she [was]

able to address other aspect[s] of her life during the

period before filing the appeal on [March 19, 2021]. As

such, the appeal is late without good cause and the

Tribunal has no jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the

appeal.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal regarding plaintiff's voluntarily leaving work

and her disqualification of benefits from November 15, 2020, as well as

plaintiff's ineligibility for PUA benefits through January 21, 2021. However,

the Tribunal found it "ha[d] jurisdiction over . . . [plaintiff's] eligibility for . . .

[PUA] benefits from [January 24, 2021]" to September 4, 2021 (when the

program ended).

The Tribunal found plaintiff was ineligible for PUA benefits during the

period from January 24, 2021, through September 4, 2021, as she was not

unemployed due to one of the COVID-19 related reasons identified in Section

2102(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I) of the CARES Act. The Tribunal reasoned:

A-1423-23

6

[Plaintiff] contends a myriad of reasons why her mental

health and sanity were being affected due to the

employer not following the [Centers for Disease

Control] C[OVID]-19 protocols in the workplace and

she was concerned about C[OVID]-19 due to her

pregnancy. Here, while the Tribunal is sympathetic to

. . . [plaintiff's] contentions as to her concerns about

C[OVID]-19, it does not negate the fact that she was

not advised by any medical professional to leave her job

due to her concerns about C[OVID]-19 at the time she

left the job. Although . . . [plaintiff] tested positive for

C[OVID]-19 after leaving the job and was negative for

C[OVID]-19 prior to the date of the mailing of the

determination of the Deputy, the Appeal Tribunal only

has jurisdiction over the claimant's eligibility for

benefits and [PUA] from [January 24, 2021]. Hence,

. . . [plaintiff] is ineligible for . . . [PUA] benefits . . .

from [January 24, 2021] through [September 4, 2021],

as . . . [plaintiff] was not unemployed due to one of the

COVID-19 related reasons identified in Section 2102

(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I) of the CARES Act.

Plaintiff appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Board. On November 29,

2023, the Board modified the Tribunal's decision, finding that plaintiff's stated

reasons for filing her appeal late did constitute good cause. The Board reasoned:

Under sworn oath, . . . [plaintiff] testified that she was

unable to deal with . . . day to day tasks until she

appealed on March 19, 2021[,] due to the nature of her

condition. Since this was not within her control, we

consider her appeal as late with good cause under

N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(b)(1).

Therefore, the Board considered the merits of plaintiff's appeal.

A-1423-23

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The Board found plaintiff was disqualified for regular unemployment

benefits as of November 15, 2020, because she left work voluntarily without

good cause attributable to the work. The Board cited to Wojcik v Board of

Review, 58 N.J. 341, 344 (1971), where the Supreme Court held that an

individual must show medical proof that their health condition was attributable

to or aggravated by their work. The Board explained:

In this case, no medical proof showing that . . .

[plaintiff's] health condition was directly attributable to

the work or was aggravated by the work itself was

submitted. This was further supported by . . .

[plaintiff's] own testimony that a medical doctor did not

advise her to leave the job for her mental health.

Additionally, there was no attempt made by . . .

[plaintiff] to preserve her employment prior to

submitting her resignation in order for the employer to

acco[m]modate her. Since . . . [plaintiff] has not met

the burden to demonstrate that the working conditions

were so abnormal or adversely affected her health, she

is disqualified for unemployment benefits as of

November 15, 2020 for leaving work voluntarily

without good cause attributable to the work under

N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).

Additionally, the Board found plaintiff was ineligible for PUA benefits

from November 22, 2020, through December 5, 2020, and January 3, 2021,

through September 4, 2021. The Board determined plaintiff did not satisfy any

of the criteria for PUA benefits under Section 2102(a)(3)(A)(ii)(I) of the CARES

A-1423-23

8

Act. The Board explained that a fear of being exposed to COVID-19 is

insufficient to qualify for PUA benefits.

However, the Board found that plaintiff did qualify for PUA benefits from

December 6, 2020, through January 2, 2021, as she provided evidence that she

tested positive for COVID-19 on December 8, 2020, and negative for the virus

on January 1, 2021.

II.

On appeal, plaintiff contends the Board erred in denying her

unemployment and the additional PUA benefits.

Our review of quasi-judicial agency determinations is limited. Allstars

Auto. Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (citing

Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)). We

"review[] agency decisions under an arbitrary and capricious standard."

Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm'n, 237 N.J. 465, 475 (2019).

The party challenging the administrative action bears the burden of making that

showing. Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014).

On appeal, the judicial role in reviewing all administrative actions is

generally limited to three inquiries:

A-1423-23

9

(1) whether the agency's action violates express or

implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency

follow the law;

(2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to

support the findings on which the agency based its

action; and

(3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the

facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion

that could not reasonably have been made on a showing

of the relevant factors.

[Allstars Auto. Grp., 234 N.J. at 157 (quoting In re

Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).]

We begin by considering plaintiff's contentions regarding the Board's

denial of unemployment benefits. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) provides that an

individual is disqualified for benefits "[f]or the week in which the individual has

left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each

week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed." "Good cause" means

"cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the

employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed." Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 152

N.J. 197, 214 (1997). See also N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b) (defining good cause).

If a claimant leaves their job for "good cause attributable to [the] work,"

they are eligible for benefits, but if the claimant left for personal reasons,

A-1423-23

10

however compelling, they are disqualified under the statute. Utley v. Bd. of

Rev., Dep't of Lab., 194 N.J. 534, 543 (2008) (alteration in original).

Plaintiff's argument that the Board misstated some facts is unavailing. In

plaintiff's letter to Lincoln Tech providing two weeks' notice of her decision to

leave her job, she stated she was doing so because her "mental health and sanity

[we]re being affected." There is no mention of any concerns regarding Lincoln

Tech's handling of COVID-19 in its workplace. She did not provide any

documentation or testimony that a medical professional advised her to leave her

job. Instead, it appears she left for personal reasons.

As plaintiff has not met her burden in showing that the Board 's decision

was arbitrary or capricious or that its determination was unsupported by

sufficient credible evidence in the record, we discern no reason to overturn its

decision regarding unemployment benefits.

We turn then to plaintiff's assertion that she was entitled to additional PUA

benefits than awarded.

"The CARES Act expanded eligibility, under the PUA program, for

payment of benefits for certain categories of individuals." Sullivan v. Bd. of

Rev., Dep't of Lab., 471 N.J. Super. 147, 153 (App. Div. 2022).

A-1423-23

11

A "covered individual" is defined under the CARES Act, in pertinent part,

as an individual who:

(i) is not eligible for regular compensation or extended

benefits under State or Federal law or pandemic

emergency unemployment compensation under. . . [15

U.S.C. § 9025], including an individual who has

exhausted all rights to regular unemployment or

extended benefits under State or Federal law or

pandemic emergency unemployment compensation

under . . . [15 U.S.C. § 9025];

(ii) provides self-certification that the individual—

(I) is otherwise able to work and available

for work within the meaning of applicable

State law, except the individual is

unemployed, partially unemployed, or

unable or unavailable to work because—

(aa) the individual has been

diagnosed with COVID-19 or is

experiencing symptoms of COVID-

19 and seeking a medical diagnosis;

(bb) a member of the individual's

household has been diagnosed with

COVID-19;

(cc) the individual is providing care

for a family member or a member of

the individual's household who has

been diagnosed with COVID-19;

(dd) a child or other person in the

household for which the individual

has primary caregiving

A-1423-23

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responsibility is unable to attend

school or another facility that is

closed as a direct result of the

COVID-19 public health emergency

and such school or facility care is

required for the individual to work;

(ee) the individual is unable to reach

the place of employment because of

a quarantine imposed as a direct

result of the COVID-19 public health

emergency;

(ff) the individual is unable to reach

the place of employment because the

individual has been advised by a

health care provider to self-

quarantine due to concerns related to

COVID-19;

(gg) the individual was scheduled to

commence employment and does not

have a job or is unable to reach the

job as a direct result of the COVID-

19 public health emergency;

(hh) the individual has become the

breadwinner or major support for a

household because the head of the

household has died as a direct result

of COVID-19;

(ii) the individual has to quit his or

her job as a direct result of COVID-

19;

(jj) the individual's place of

employment is closed as a direct

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result of the COVID-19 public health

emergency; or

(kk) the individual meets any

additional criteria established by the

Secretary for unemployment

assistance under this section . . . .

[15 U.S.C. § 9021(a)(3)(A).]

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to support qualification for

benefits under the Act other than her positive COVID-19 test in December 2020,

that occurred several weeks after she left work. In its November 2023 decision,

the Board found plaintiff was eligible for PUA benefits from the date of her

positive test to the date of her negative test—December 6, 2020 to January 2,

2021. Prior to the positive test and after the negative test, plaintiff did not fall

within any of the enumerated statutory categories as her decision to stop working

was not one of the COVID-19 related reasons delineated under the CARES Act.

Her fear of being exposed to COVID-19 does not qualify her for PUA benefits.

The record supports the Board's determination that plaintiff was ineligible for

CARES Act benefits other than the delineated dates. Therefore, the Board's

decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

Affirmed.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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