The opinion
Opinion issued July 22, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-23-00751-CR
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MICHAEL ADEOLA OWONIFARI, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 432nd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas1
Trial Court Case No. 1788688
1
Pursuant to its docket equalization authority, the Supreme Court of Texas
transferred this appeal from the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas
to this Court. See Misc. Docket No. 23–9079, Transfer of Cases from Courts of
Appeals (Tex. Sept. 26, 2023); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001 (authorizing
transfer of cases). We are unaware of any conflict between precedent of that court
and that of this Court on any relevant issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found Michael Adeola Owonifari guilty of three counts of aggravated
sexual assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021. The jury sentenced him to 33
years’ imprisonment on each count, and the trial court ordered the sentences to run
concurrently. On appeal, he asserts that the State did not meet its burden to
establish that venue is proper in Tarrant County. We disagree and affirm.
Background
Owonifari sexually assaulted a disabled person, D.L., by penetrating her
vagina, anus, and mouth with his penis. The jury heard testimony that D.L., who
was 38 years old at the time, has moderate intellectual disabilities and bipolar
disorder. Among other details, the jury heard that D.L. attempts to befriend anyone
and struggles to tell people “No.” She compulsively spends money and requires
assistance managing her bills and budgeting. She cannot read, write, or count. The
jury heard that D.L. receives services and a case worker from My Health My
Resources Tarrant County, an organization that helps individuals with intellectual
and developmental disabilities. D.L. lived in an apartment off Brown Boulevard in
Arlington, Texas with her 60-year-old cousin.
The jury heard that when D.L. was walking down Brown Boulevard, a man
named “Charles,” who was a stranger to D.L., asked her if she needed a ride home.
D.L. got in his car. Rather than driving her home, Charles, who was later identified
2
in court as the appellant, drove D.L. to his apartment. D.L. testified that the
apartment was in a brown building off Brown Boulevard. They exchanged
telephone numbers, and the appellant took D.L. home. Sometime later, the
appellant called D.L. around 1:00 a.m. to meet for “dinner.” When he picked her
up, the appellant gave D.L. his phone to watch pornography so she could learn
about sex. Once inside the apartment, the appellant forced D.L. to engage in anal,
vaginal, and oral intercourse. He also penetrated D.L. anally with a vibrator. When
D.L. screamed for him to stop, the appellant squeezed D.L.’s neck with his hands,
and she had trouble breathing. The appellant hit D.L. on her head and ribs and in
her mouth, causing her to bleed. He threatened to kill D.L. when she tried to call
for help.
When the appellant brought D.L. back to her apartment, she told her family
about the sexual assault. A cousin called to report the sexual assault, and an
Arlington police officer responded. D.L. told the police officer what had happened
to her, and the officer escorted her to the hospital. D.L. underwent a sexual assault
examination and described the assault to the nurse who conducted the exam.
A detective identified the appellant as Michael Owonifari using the phone
number the appellant had given D.L. The detective prepared a photo lineup, and
D.L. identified the appellant in the lineup as the person who sexually assaulted her.
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The detective located an address for the appellant and testified that it was an
apartment in a brown building located off Brown Boulevard in Arlington, Texas.
DNA testing found with a high degree of confidence that the appellant was
the source of male DNA found on swabs from D.L.’s vagina and underwear.
The jury found the appellant guilty, and he appealed.
Venue
In a single issue, the appellant asserts that the State did not adduce sufficient
evidence to prove that venue was proper in Tarrant County. He asserts that the
totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to support the determination that
the acts of sexual assault occurred in Tarrant County. We disagree.
Despite labeling his venue complaint as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, venue is not an element of any criminal offense, and the State’s failure to
prove it does not implicate sufficiency of the evidence concerns or require that an
acquittal be ordered under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (1979). See Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
Instead, when a party raises a venue challenge on appeal, the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure require appellate courts to presume that venue was proven
unless it is “disputed in the trial court” or “the record affirmatively shows the
contrary.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(c)(1); See Schmutz, 440 S.W.3d at 35. Venue need
only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
4
13.17 (former)2; Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d 771, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel.
Op.] 1981). Further, venue may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence,
and the factfinder may make reasonable inferences from the evidence. Cox v. State,
497 S.W.3d 42, 56 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref’d).
Appellant did not contest or object in the trial court to Tarrant County being
the proper venue. We therefore presume that venue was proven in the trial court
unless the record affirmatively shows otherwise. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(c)(1).
The venue statute for sexual assault at the time of the offense states that
venue lies in the county in which the sexual assault was committed, the county in
which the sexual-assault victim was abducted, or in any county “through or into
which” the victim was transported during the abduction or assault. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 13.15. (former).3
2
See Act of May 24, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 399, § 2(C), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws
885, 978, repealed by Act of May 19, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 765, § 3.001(5)
(current version at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 13A.002(b)) (“An allegation of
venue under this article may be sustained if the attorney representing the [S]tate
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that, based on the facts in the case, the
county in which the prosecution is conducted has venue.”).
3
Act of May 23, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 399, §2(C), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 15,
978, amended by Act of May 12, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 262, § 1, 1977 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1, 692, amended by Act of June 1, 1981, 67th Leg., R.S., ch. 707,
§ 4(17), 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 2167, 2636, amended by Act of May 29, 1983, 68th
Leg., R.S., ch.977, § 7, 1983 Tex. Gen Laws 5311, 5318, repealed by Act of May
19, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 765, § 3.001(6), 2023 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1825,
1976.
5
The record reflects that D.L. lived off Brown Boulevard in Arlington, Texas.
She testified that the sexual assaults occurred in the appellant’s apartment, which
was brown in color and located off Brown Boulevard. D.L. identified the appellant
in a lineup as “Charles.” A detective testified that he ascertained the appellant’s
full name by searching a database with the phone number the appellant gave D.L.
The detective obtained a photograph of the appellant, and D.L. identified the
appellant in a photo lineup. The detective testified that an address associated with
the appellant was an apartment, which was brown in color, on Misty Glen Trail in
Arlington, Texas. Using a map, the detective testified that one of the ways to
access the apartment was from Brown Boulevard. The record establishes that the
assaults occurred in Arlington, Texas.4
To the extent that the appellant argues that the record does not contain
testimony that Arlington is in Tarrant County, we may take judicial notice of an
adjudicative fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute if it can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned.
TEX. R. EVID. 201(b)(2); see Barton v. State, 948 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (per curiam) (appellate courts may take judicial notice of
4
The detective took D.L. in his car to attempt to locate the apartment. He testified
that during the car ride, D.L. changed her mind about turning one way or another.
Eventually, D.L. led him to a dead-end street next to the apartment. D.L. then
instructed him to turn left, and the apartment was immediately to the right. The
detective testified that if D.L. had known left and right and told him to go right, he
potentially would have found the exact offense location with D.L.
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geographical facts because they are “easily ascertainable and capable of verifiable
certainty”). We may do so sua sponte or if a party requests it; we may also do so
for the first time on appeal. TEX. R. EVID. 201(c); Granados v. State, 843 S.W.2d
736, 738 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1992, no pet.). In this regard, we
take judicial notice that the City of Arlington, Texas is in Tarrant County, Texas.
Appellant has also failed to show that the record affirmatively negates the
State’s proof of venue or establishes that proper venue for the prosecution exists in
a county other than Tarrant County. We thus presume that the State sufficiently
proved that Tarrant County is the county of proper venue for this prosecution. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(c)(1).
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s only issue on appeal.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court court’s judgment.
Susanna Dokupil
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Dokupil.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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