The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KRAIG PAYNE,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 25-cv-848-NJR
JEREMIAH BROWN,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Kraig Payne, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who is
currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center, brings this action for
deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Payne’s original
Complaint (Doc. 1) alleging that Warden Jeremiah Brown failed to protect him was
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim (Doc. 11). He was granted leave
to file an amended pleading. His amended pleading was due July 7, 2025 (Id.).
On July 22, 2025, the Court dismissed Payne’s case with prejudice due to his failure
to file an amended pleading by the deadline (Docs. 12, 13). That same date, Payne filed
his Amended Complaint (Doc. 14). Payne dated his Amended Complaint as being filed
on June 14, 2025. Although it is not entirely clear from the pleading when he submitted
the pleading for filing, the Court will consider it timely submitted. Thus, the dismissal
Order (Doc. 12) and Judgment (Doc. 13) are VACATED.
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Amended
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to
screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law
is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The Amended Complaint
Payne alleges that as Chief Administrative Officer, Jeremiah Brown’s name is on
every grievance that Payne submitted about his various issues at Lawrence (Doc. 14, p. 6).
Payne alleges that Brown fails to properly investigate the grievances and refuses to fire,
suspend without pay, or do anything to his staff (Id.). Payne was supposed to go to the
law library to discuss his grievances, but his housing unit was never called. He alleges
that Brown violated his rights from May 16, 2024, through June 2025 by failing to resolve
his grievances or discipline his staff (Id. at pp. 6-7). Brown also allegedly failed to protect
Payne by denying a grievance that contained a Prisoner Rape Elimination Act claim and
reported contaminated food (Id.). Payne alleges that Brown simply refused to discipline
any staff after he submitted serious grievances (Id.).
Discussion
Payne once against fails to state a claim. He alleges only that Warden Jeremiah
Brown failed to protect him by denying all of his grievances and failing to punish his staff
for actions they took against Payne. Payne fails to identify those alleged actions by staff.
He vaguely refers to the Prison Rape Elimination Act but fails to allege how or when he
was sexually harassed and/or assaulted. He also notes that all of the alleged violations
are set forth in his grievances, but he fails to attach any grievances or explain the subject
of those grievances.
Payne merely alleges that Brown is liable because he fails to discipline his
employees or properly resolve Payne’s grievances. But as the Court noted in dismissing
the original complaint, Brown cannot be liable for his employees’ actions because the
doctrine of respondeat superior (or supervisory liability) does not apply to Section 1983
claims. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001). Nor can he be liable for
simply denying grievances. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). In order to
be liable, Brown must be personally involved in the constitutional violations. Vance v.
Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203 (7th Cir. 2012). There are simply no allegations suggesting that
Brown was involved in any constitutional violations. Payne fails to even set forth those
constitutional violations, and he only alleges that Brown was involved after the fact, by
denying grievances and failing to discipline his staff. That is not enough to state a claim
against Warden Brown.
Thus, Payne fails to state a claim. This is Payne’s second attempt at stating a viable
claim, and he has been unable to do so. The Court finds that further amendment would
be futile.
Disposition
For the reasons stated above, Payne’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with
prejudice for failure to state a claim. The dismissal counts as one of Payne’s three allotted
“strikes” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Payne is further ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this action
was incurred at the time the action was filed. Therefore, the filing fee remains due and
payable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
If Payne wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court
within 30 days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Payne does choose
to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome
of the appeal. See FED. R. App. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d
724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien, 133
F.3d at 467. He must list each of the issues he intends to appeal in the notice of appeal,
and a motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must set forth the issues he plans to
present on appeal. See FED. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be
nonmeritorious, Payne may also incur another “strike.” A proper and timely motion filed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline.
Feb. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more than 28 days after the
entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment
accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 25, 2025 Tl
wefofmteg!
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge