Escamilla v. Halloran

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

NICK ESCAMILLA,

Plaintiff

No. 24 CV 11090

v.

Judge Jeremy C. Daniel

JOHN HALLORAN, et al.,

Defendants

ORDER

The City defendants’ motion to dismiss Count I and to “strike any allegation that

plaintiff was coerced” [41] is denied. The ASA defendants’ motion to dismiss [44] is

denied as to Count I and granted as to Counts VI and XI. All defendants must answer

the remaining allegations in the complaint by August 15, 2025.

STATEMENT

This matter is before the Court on two motions to dismiss: the first is brought by

defendants John Halloran, Kenneth Boudreau, James O’Brien, Bernard Ryan,

Gerald Carroll,1 Ellyn Weiss, and the City of Chicago (the “City”) (collectively, the

“City defendants”), (R. 41),2 and the second is brought by former Assistant State’s

Attorneys (“ASAs”) defendants Paul Sabin and Sherry Bieder (collectively, the “ASA

defendants), (R. 44). The plaintiff, Nick Escamilla, sued these defendants, alleging

various federal and state law claims. (R. 1.) Relevant here are Counts I (Coerced

Confession under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments), VI (Failure to Intervene),

and XI (State Law Claim for Willful and Wanton Conduct). (Id. ¶¶ 114–22; 156–61;

201–04.)

The following description of events underlying these claims is drawn from the

complaint and presumed true for the purpose of resolving these motions. Vinich v.

Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 2011). On February 2, 1993, Hector Olague was

shot and killed in Chicago, Illinois. (R. 1 ¶ 18.) At the time, Escamilla was home with

his pregnant wife and daughter. (Id.) Nonetheless, Escamilla was implicated in the

murder by John Willer, who named Escamilla after a lengthy interrogation involving

physical and verbal coercive tactics. (See id. ¶¶ 24–38.) On February 10, 1993,

1 According to the City defendants, Carroll was incorrectly sued as “Gerry Carroll.” (R. 41 at 1.)

2 For ECF filings, the Court cites to the page number(s) set forth in the document’s ECF header

unless citing to a particular paragraph or other page designation is more appropriate.

Escamilla was “arrested . . . without explanation.” (Id. ¶ 39.) Over the course of

eighteen hours, Escamilla was interrogated by several of the City defendants,

including Halloran, Boudreau, O’Brien, and Ryan. (Id. ¶ 44.) According to the

complaint, these defendants screamed at Escamilla, called him a liar, threatened

him, and attempted to coerce a statement from him regarding the murder. (Id.)

Further, it is alleged that Boudreau and Halloran resorted to physical violence,

including punching and slapping Escamilla in the head and face, and striking him in

the stomach. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 45.) When Escamilla asked for a phone call or lawyer,

Halloran, Boudreau, and O’Brien intensified their beating of Escamilla. (Id.) The ASA

defendants, who were felony review prosecutors at the time, were present during at

least the “latter portion” of the interrogation and could hear “the [d]efendant [o]fficers

striking [Escamilla].” (Id. ¶ 51.) “After [eighteen] hours of brutal interrogation,

[Escamilla] eventually agreed to adopt the false narrative” fed to him by the

defendants. (Id. ¶ 50.) The ASA defendants and the City defendants “coached”

Escamilla on his statement, which was eventually dictated to a court reporter. (Id.

¶¶ 52–53.)

Escamilla was charged with and convicted of Olague’s murder. (Id. ¶¶ 59, 64.) After

his conviction, Escamilla sought relief through post-conviction petitions, (id. ¶ 66),

including a habeas petition that was heard by the Seventh Circuit, Escamilla v.

Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2005). Though his habeas petition was denied, see

id., Escamilla’s “actual innocence claims were investigated by the Office of the Cook

County State’s Attorney,” which ultimately recommended that the conviction be

vacated. (R. 1 ¶¶ 66–67.) Escamilla obtained a Certificate of Innocence on June 12,

2024. (Id. ¶ 68.) This lawsuit was filed on October 28, 2024. (R. 1.)

Now, the defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically,

the City and ASA defendants move to dismiss Count I and to strike any allegation

made by Escamilla that his statements were coerced. (R. 41; R. 44 at 6.) The ASA

defendants also move to dismiss Counts VI and XI. “To survive a motion to dismiss,

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Calderon-Ramirez v. McCarment, 877 F.3d 272,

275 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The Court

“draw[s] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor.” Chaidez v. Ford Motor

Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). “The purpose of a motion

to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not decide the merits.” Triad

Assocs. Inc. v. Chi. Housing Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 1989). That said, the

Court will not accept legal conclusions or conclusory allegations. McCauley v. City of

Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).

Coerced Confession (Count I) – All Defendants

All defendants move to dismiss Count I of the complaint. (R. 41; R. 44 at 6.) According

to the defendants, when the Seventh Circuit heard Escamilla’s habeas petition, it also

“found [that the p]laintiff should be bound to his trial court testimony.” (R. 41 at 2.)3

As a result, the defendants argue, Escamilla should not be permitted to deviate from

his trial court testimony where he “admitted to his involvement in the crime and did

not dispute his confession or claim he had been coerced.” (Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted).)

But the defendants read too much into the Seventh Circuit’s opinion. For one, the

opinion makes no explicit finding about whether Escamilla committed perjury, nor

whether such testimony was binding; indeed, the dicta posits the supposed perjury in

hypothetical form: “if Escamilla told the truth . . . .” Escamilla, 462 F.3d at 869

(emphasis added). Moreover, the Seventh Circuit’s denial of habeas relief was based

on the timeliness of Escamilla’s petition. Id. The Court declines the defendants’

invitation to, as a matter of law, conclude that Escamilla should be bound by trial

testimony—which no party provided to the Court—from a completely separate

proceeding, where such a finding was never expressly made, and where the conviction

stemming from that trial was ultimately vacated. (R. 1 ¶ 8.) Therefore, the City

defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied in its entirety, as is the ASA defendants’

motion to dismiss Count I. The Court will likewise not strike any allegations

regarding Escamilla’s purported coercion.

Failure to Intervene (Count VI) – As Against the ASA Defendants

The ASA defendants also move to dismiss Escamilla’s failure to intervene claim

based on qualified immunity. (R. 44 at 4.) “Qualified immunity shields a government

official from suit for damages under § 1983 ‘when she makes a decision that, even if

constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the

circumstances she confronted.’” Sabo v. Erickson, 128 F.4th 836, 843 (7th Cir. 2025)

(quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)). Typically, dismissing a

motion on qualified immunity grounds is “premature”; that said, “qualified immunity

issues should be resolved as soon as possible, which is sometimes at the pleading

stage.” Serrano v. Guevara, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1034 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (citing Doe v.

Vill. of Arlington Heights, 782 F.3d 911, 915–16 (7th Cir. 2015)). It is Escamilla’s

burden to show that the ASA defendants are not entitled to immunity. To do this,

Escamilla must demonstrate “‘(1) that the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the

challenged conduct.’” Sabo, 128 F.4th at 843 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.

731, 741 (2011)). A clearly established right is one where the “law is ‘sufficiently clear’

that every ‘reasonable official would understand that what he is doing’ is unlawful.”

Id. at 844 (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018)). “[T]he

plaintiff must demonstrate either that a court has upheld the purported right in a

case factually similar to the one under review, or that the alleged misconduct

constituted an obvious violation of a constitutional right.” Lunini v. Grayeb, 395 F.3d

761, 769 (7th Cir. 2005).

3 Though the complaint does not include details of Escamilla’s purported trial testimony, he

implicitly acknowledges testifying at trial through his response to the City defendants’ motion. (See

R. 63 at 5–6.)

According to the ASA defendants, they are entitled to qualified immunity on the

failure to intervene claim “because there was no clearly established duty for

prosecutors to intervene in the misconduct of police officers under the circumstances

alleged in the complaint in 1993.” (R. 44 at 4.) Escamilla counters that under Whitlock

v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2012), “prosecutors who act as investigators

are subject to the same rules that apply to police investigators.” (R. 59 at 8.) This is

true. See Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 580 (“The only question is whether a prosecutor who

is acting in an investigatory capacity is subject to rules that are any different. We

think not.”). Therefore, Escamilla asserts, “felony review prosecutors acting in an

investigatory capacity can be liable for failing to intervene to stop police misconduct.”

(R. 59 at 8.)

The problem with Escamilla’s position is that “[c]ourts in this district have routinely

held that no investigative prosecutorial duty to intervene existed before Whitlock in

2012.” Reyna v. City of Chicago, No. 24 C 10815, 2025 WL 1651255, at *2 (N.D. Ill.

June 10, 2025) (collecting cases). In other words, before 2012, a prosecutor’s duty to

intervene was not “clearly established.” Escamilla argues that the duty to intervene

“was obvious” to the defendants, “even without an on-point precedent.” (R. 59 at 8.)

In support, Escamilla avers that one would expect that ASAs understand that

investigations should be “conducted in compliance with constitutional requirements,”

and that they should “decline charges that would be based on coerced and fabricated

evidence.” (R. 59 at 8–9.) The Court agrees that ASAs should have this basic

understanding of how to do their jobs. But that is not the same as demonstrating that

there is a clearly established duty for prosecutors to intervene in police misconduct

at the time of the events here. As such, Count VI as against the ASA defendants is

dismissed.

Willful and Wanton Conduct (Count XI) – As Against the ASA Defendants

Finally, the ASA defendants move to dismiss Count XI, which is a state law claim for

“willful and wanton conduct.” (R. 1 ¶¶ 201–04; R. 44 at 5–6.) “There is no separate

and independent tort of willful and wanton conduct.” Krywin v. Chi. Transit Auth.,

938 N.E. 2d 440, 452 (Ill. 2010). Rather, “[i]t is regarded as an aggravated form of

negligence.” Id. Therefore, “[t]o recover damages based upon a defendant’s alleged

negligence involving willful and wanton conduct, [Escamilla] must allege . . . that the

defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that the defendant breached the duty, and

that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.” Id. Escamilla also

must allege “either a deliberate intention to harm or a conscious disregard for the

plaintiff’s welfare.” Jane Doe-3 v. McLean Cnty. Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dirs., 973

N.E.2d 880, 887 (Ill. 2012).

Escamilla’s claim for willful and wanton conduct, as pled, is too vague. (See R. 1 ¶¶

202–04); see also Fletcher v. Bogucki, No. 20 C 04768, 2021 WL 4477968, at *8 (N.D.

Ill. Sept. 30, 2021) (finding that alleging a “duty to refrain from willful and wanton

conduct” was “too vague to support a negligence claim’). Escamilla attempts to

salvage this negligence claim by pointing to his allegations of a “comprehensive

scheme by [the d]efendants to violate his rights.” (R. 59 at 10.) But aside from a long

recitation of the Illinois Supreme Court’s explanation of the duty analysis, Escamilla

does not explain how this “comprehensive scheme” actually pleads the existence of a

duty, (id. at 10-12 (citing throughout Jane Doe-3, 973 N.E.2d at 888—90)), let alone

breach and cause. See Fletcher, 2021 WL 4477968 at *8 (“But he must also plead duty,

breach, and cause, and [Escamilla] has not explained why his allegations support

such a claim.”). Therefore, Count XI as against the ASA defendants is dismissed.

L$

Date: July 25, 2025

JEREMY C. DANIEL

United States District Judge