Hopps v. City of Tampa

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

TONY HOPPS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-2806-VMC-AEP

CITY OF TAMPA, ET AL.,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant

Detective Gene Strickland’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 53),

filed on June 5, 2025. Plaintiff Tony Hopps responded on June

26, 2025. (Doc. # 56). For the reasons that follow, the Motion

is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

Plaintiff Tony Hopps was convicted of the burglary and

robbery of Ruby and Dunbar Dyches. (Doc. # 48 at 2). Over

three decades later, his conviction was vacated and the

charges were dismissed. (Id.). The robbery occurred on

January 25, 1990, when the Dycheses returned to their hotel

room in Tampa, Florida. (Id. at 5). At around 3:15 p.m., two

men robbed the Dycheses at gunpoint. (Id.). “The robbery was

very brief, and the Dycheses had extremely limited

opportunities to view the two perpetrators, making a

legitimate identification impossible.” (Id.).

At the time of the robbery, Mr. Hopps was outside his

home across town with his neighbor. (Id. at 6). At about 3:49

p.m. that day, Mr. Hopps was detained by Officer Mark Scott

regarding an unrelated investigation. (Id.). At that time,

Defendant Detective Gene Strickland also spoke to Mr. Hopps

and took a photo of Mr. Hopps, in which he has a beard. (Id.).

The Dycheses were unable to describe one of the two

robbers. (Id.). As to the second robber, Mr. Dyches thought

he was between 5’8” and 5’10” tall, but Mrs. Dyches thought

he was between 5’4” and 5’5” tall. (Id. at 7). They each

agreed that he had a mustache but no beard, was muscular, and

was wearing camouflage pants with a cap. (Id.). At the time

he was arrested, Mr. Hopps had a beard, was not muscular, and

was not wearing camouflage pants or a hat. (Id.).

The next day, police apprehended a stolen vehicle,

inside of which were Mrs. Dyches’s stolen items. (Id. at 7).

Four men were seen running from the scene, while at the same

time, Mr. Hopps was detained in jail due to his arrest from

the previous day. (Id.).

Mr. Hopps alleges that he had a “history” with Defendant

Detective George McNamara, such that Detective McNamara

“decided to pin the Dyches robbery” on Mr. Hopps, even though

he knew that Mr. Hopps could not have committed the robbery.

(Id. at 7-8).

The officers provided a photo array to the Dycheses in

the hope that they could identify the robbers. (Id.). The

photo array contained six persons “based solely on the fact

that they either had been arrested or were suspects in other

robberies. There was no legitimate evidence that they were

suspects in the Dyches robbery.” (Id.). A photo of Mr. Hopps

was included in the array, but it was an old picture in which

he did not have a beard. (Id. at 9). The Dycheses lived in

Georgia, such that the officers mailed them the photo array,

but Defendant Detective J.D. O’Nolan told them over the phone

that the suspect’s photo was in the array. (Id. at 9-10).

Upon viewing the array, the Dycheses selected Mr. Hopps.

(Id. at 11). However, they discussed their selections with

each other, as they had not been instructed otherwise by the

officers. (Id. at 10). Detectives Strickland and O’Nolan both

interviewed Mr. Hopps, who denied any involvement with the

Dyches robbery. (Id. at 11). Prior to the interview, Detective

Strickland reviewed the police reports regarding the Dyches

robbery, such that he learned of the Dycheses’ description of

the suspects, the photo array and correspondences between

Detective O’Nolan and the Dycheses, and the reports about

their stolen items being found in a car while Mr. Hopps was

detained in jail. (Id.).

Mr. Hopps claims that he was then prosecuted for the

Dyches robbery “based solely on the Dycheses’ fabricated

identifications.” (Id. at 12). At trial, Mr. Hopps called

Detective Strickland “to confirm that he could not have

committed the crime because he was across town speaking with

him shortly thereafter.” (Id. at 13). However, Detective

Strickland testified that he “did not know the date and time

that he detained Plaintiff on January 25 even though the

dispatch records, which he possessed, demonstrated when [he]

spoke to Plaintiff and took his picture.” (Id.). On June 26,

1990, Mr. Hopps was found guilty of the Dyches robbery and

burglary and was sentenced to concurrent life sentences.

(Id.).

Decades later, the Conviction Review Unit (“CRU”) of the

Thirteenth Judicial Circuit State’s Attorney’s Office

reviewed and reinvestigated the case. (Id. at 13-14). The CRU

made the following findings: the photo array was improper due

to the way it was administered; Mr. Hopps did not match the

description that the Dycheses gave the officers; and Mr. Hopps

could not have committed the robbery as he was at his home

and subsequently detained by Detective Strickland at around

the same time as the robbery. (Id.). After this report, Mr.

Hopps’s conviction was overturned and the charges against him

were dismissed. (Id.).

Mr. Hopps initiated this lawsuit on December 5, 2024.

(Doc. # 1), and he filed an amended complaint on December 23,

2024. (Doc. # 25). Detective Strickland moved to dismiss Mr.

Hopps’s amended complaint (Doc. # 40), which the Court granted

with leave for Mr. Hopps to amend. (Doc. # 44).

Mr. Hopps filed his second amended complaint on May 12,

2025, which is the operative complaint. (Doc. # 48). The

complaint lists the following defendants: the City of Tampa,

Detective Strickland, Detective O’Nolan, Detective McNamara,

and as-of-yet unknown employees of the City of Tampa. (Id. at

1). Five counts are alleged against Detective Strickland,

each under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: a due process violation (Count

One); illegal detention and prosecution under the Fourth

Amendment (Count Two); illegal detention and prosecution

under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count Three); failure to

intervene (Count Four); and conspiracy to deprive

constitutional rights (Count Five). (Id.).

Detective Strickland filed his Motion to dismiss the

claims against him in the second amended complaint on June 5,

2025. (Doc. # 53). Mr. Hopps responded on June 26, 2025 (Doc.

# 56), and the Motion is ripe for review.

II. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this

Court accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint

and construes them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,

1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, the Court favors the plaintiff

with all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the

complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901

F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990). But,

[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide

the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal

citations omitted). Courts are not “bound to accept as true

a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan

v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The Court must limit its

consideration to well-pleaded factual allegations, documents

central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters

judicially noticed. La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358

F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).

III. Analysis

Detective Strickland moves to dismiss all five Counts

that are pled against him. (Doc. # 53). He argues that he is

entitled to qualified immunity on each Count and that each

Count fails to state a claim against him. (Id.). He also

argues that each Count is barred by the statute of

limitations.

The Court can quickly dispense with Detective

Strickland’s argument that Mr. Hopps’s claims are barred by

the statute of limitations. Detective Strickland is correct

that “Florida's four-year statute of limitations applies to

such claims of deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983.”

Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003). But

Detective Strickland fails to acknowledge that “a § 1983 cause

of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional

conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction

or sentence has been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477, 489-490 (1994). As Mr. Hopps’s conviction was vacated on

August 23, 2021, and this lawsuit was initiated on December

5, 2024, this lawsuit was filed within the four-year statute

of limitations. Thus, the Court will analyze Detective

Strickland’s other arguments for dismissal.

“In assessing qualified immunity at the motion to

dismiss stage, ‘the qualified immunity inquiry and the Rule

12(b)(6) standard become intertwined.’” Aguirre-Jarquin v.

Hemmert, No. 6:20-cv-25-RBD, 2020 WL 13664132, at *6 (M.D.

Fla. Aug. 28, 2020) (quoting Keating v. City of Miami, 598

F.3d 753, 760 (11th Cir. 2010)). Thus, the Court does not

need to separately analyze whether the Counts fail to state

a claim apart from its analysis of whether qualified immunity

should apply.

Notably, the parties do not dispute that Detective

Strickland was acting pursuant to his discretionary authority

when the alleged constitutional violations occurred. See

Hinson v. Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1116 (11th Cir. 2019) (“To

invoke qualified immunity, a public official must first

demonstrate that he was acting within the scope of his or her

discretionary authority. The term ‘discretionary authority’

covers all actions of a governmental official that (1) were

undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties, and (2)

were within the scope of his authority.” (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted)).

“An official performing discretionary functions enjoys

qualified immunity unless: (1) the plaintiff alleges facts

establishing that the defendant’s conduct violated a

constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the violated right

was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged

misconduct.” Wilson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 54 F.4th 652,

660 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations omitted). Courts

are “free to consider these elements in either sequence and

to decide the case on the basis of either element that is not

demonstrated.” Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 562 (11th

Cir. 2010).

A right is clearly established when it is “sufficiently

clear that every reasonable official would have understood

that what he is doing violates that right.” Johnson v. City

of Miami Beach, 18 F.4th 1267, 1273 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). “The usual way of

establishing that a constitutional violation was clearly

established law is by pointing to a case, in existence at the

time, in which the Supreme Court or [the Eleventh Circuit]

found a violation based on materially similar facts.” Id.

(citation omitted).

A “plaintiff can also show that a broader, clearly

established principle should control the novel facts of a

particular case.” Waldron v. Spicher, 954 F.3d 1297, 1305

(11th Cir. 2020). “[T]he principle must be established with

obvious clarity by the case law so that every objectively

reasonable government official facing the circumstances would

know that the official’s conduct did violate federal law when

the official acted.” Id. (citation omitted). That is, “in the

light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness must be

apparent.” Id. (citation omitted). “Third, a plaintiff could

show that the case ‘fits within the exception of conduct which

so obviously violates [the] Constitution that prior case law

is unnecessary.’” Id. (citation omitted). “This third test is

a narrow category encompassing those situations where ‘the

official’s conduct lies so very obviously at the very core of

what the [relevant constitutional provision] prohibits that

the unlawfulness of the conduct was readily apparent to the

official, notwithstanding lack of case law.’” Id. (citation

omitted).

A. Count One

Detective Strickland argues that he is entitled to

qualified immunity on Count One (Doc. # 53 at 5-9), which

alleges that he, and Detectives O’Nolan and McNamara,

deprived Mr. Hopps of “his constitutional right to due process

and his right to a fair trial.” (Doc. # 48 at 15). Mr. Hopps

does not oppose Detective Strickland’s Motion as to Count

One. (Doc. # 56 at 1 n.1). Accordingly, the Court grants the

Motion as to Count One and dismisses with prejudice Count One

as against Detective Strickland.

B. Counts Two and Three

Detective Strickland argues that he is entitled to

qualified immunity on Counts Two and Three. (Doc. # 53 at 13-

14, 16-21). The Court disagrees.

Counts Two and Three are almost identical. (Doc. # 48 at

17-19). They each contain allegations of illegal detention

and prosecution under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

respectively. (Id.). Their allegations are identical, except

that Count Two references the Fourth Amendment while Count

Three references the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id.). As the

Counts allege the same substantive claim, the Court analyzes

the Counts together.

The Eleventh Circuit recognized prior to the events of

this case that “[t]he law is ‘clearly established’ that an

arrest without a warrant or probable cause to believe a crime

has been committed violates the fourth amendment.” Herren v.

Bowyer, 850 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1988). Similarly, the

Supreme Court had already recognized that the Fourteenth

Amendment dictates that an “arrest be made only on probable

cause.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979). But the

Supreme Court clarified “that it is inevitable that law

enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but

mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and [the

Supreme Court has] indicated that in such cases those

officials . . . should not be held personally liable.”

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). “Although

the law does not require ‘that every conceivable step be

taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of

convicting an innocent person,’ due process does require that

some steps be taken to eliminate doubts concerning identity

that exist prior to obtaining the warrant and to

arrest.” Tillman v. Coley, 886 F.2d 317, 321 (11th Cir. 1989)

(quoting Baker, 443 U.S. at 145).

The Court finds that Mr. Hopps has alleged sufficient

facts that, if true, establish that Detective Strickland

violated these clearly established rights. Mr. Hopps alleges

that Detective Strickland was present when Mr. Hopps was

arrested (for an unrelated crime) across town at around the

same time the armed robbery of the Dycheses occurred. (Doc.

# 48 at 6). He asserts that after the arrest on the unrelated

crime but prior to the interrogation of Mr. Hopps, Detective

Strickland reviewed the police reports of the Dyches robbery.

(Id. at 11). Mr. Hopps claims that from this review Detective

Strickland should have recognized that Mr. Hopps was across

town at the time of the Dyches robbery, that the Dycheses’

identification of Mr. Hopps was flawed, and that the Dycheses’

stolen belongings were recovered during the apprehension of

a stolen vehicle when Mr. Hopps was detained at that time.

(Id.). By learning each of these facts from the police report,

an officer in Detective Strickland’s shoes should reasonably

have known that Mr. Hopps could not have committed the Dyches

robbery. See Stephens, 901 F.2d at 1573 (directing courts to

favor the plaintiff with all reasonable inferences from the

allegations in the complaint).

When accepting the allegations in the complaint, Mr.

Hopps has adequately alleged that Detective Strickland

arrested Mr. Hopps even though he lacked probable cause. See

Herren, 850 F.2d at 1547 (“[A]n arrest without a warrant or

probable cause to believe a crime has been committed violates

the fourth amendment.”). Thus, Mr. Hopps has alleged that

Detective Strickland violated a clearly established right.

See Id. (holding that it is a “clearly established right”

that a person cannot be arrested without probable cause).

Detective Strickland is not entitled to qualified immunity on

Counts Two and Three, and his Motion is denied as to Counts

Two and Three. Detective Strickland may raise his qualified

immunity defense again at the summary judgment stage when the

parties have had the benefit of discovery.

C. Count Four

Detective Strickland argues that he is entitled to

qualified immunity on Count Four. (Doc. # 53 at 19-20). The

Court agrees.

Count Four asserts a claim for failure to intervene.

(Doc. # 48 at 19-20). At the time of the arrest and

prosecution in 1990, both the Supreme Court and Eleventh

Circuit had not yet recognized a § 1983 claim for a failure

to intervene in circumstances similar to this case. Just four

years before then, the Eleventh Circuit had recognized that

“[i]f a police officer, whether supervisory or not, fails or

refuses to intervene when a constitutional violation such as

an unprovoked beating takes place in his presence, the officer

is directly liable under Section 1983.” Byrd v. Clark, 783

F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir. 1986). However, the Eleventh

Circuit held in Jones, issued in 1999, that:

While officers have been subject to liability for

failing to intervene when another officer uses

excessive force, there is no previous decision from

the Supreme Court or this Circuit holding that an

officer has a duty to intervene and is therefore

liable under the circumstances presented here.

There is no controlling authority clearly

establishing that once a police officer knows

another officer has fabricated a confession in a

police report for a warrantless arrest, that police

officer has a constitutional duty to intervene to

stop the other officer’s conduct.

Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999)

(internal citations omitted).

Here, Mr. Hopps alleges that Detective Strickland, by

reviewing the police reports before participating in the

interrogation of Mr. Hopps, should have recognized that Mr.

Hopps was innocent but failed to intervene. (Doc. # 48 at

11). But at that time, the duty to intervene was focused upon

a situation in which another officer uses excessive force,

and did not extend to situations where an officer knows that

another officer engaged in other forms of malfeasance to

obtain an arrest. Jones, 174 F.3d at 1286; see also Lewis v.

Blue, No. 2:09-cv-862-WKW, 2010 WL 730210, at *6 (M.D. Ala.

Mar. 3, 2010) (“[C]ase law seems to indicate that failure to

intervene claims are cognizable only when related to

excessive force violations.”); McGuire v. City of Montgomery,

No. 2:11-cv-1027-WKW, 2013 WL 1336882, at *14 (M.D. Ala. Mar.

29, 2013)(“[I]t is unclear whether the duty to intervene

exists for constitutional deprivations other than excessive

force.”), order clarified sub nom. McGuire v. Murphy, No.

2:11-cv-1027-WKW, 2013 WL 12304218 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 9, 2013).

Accordingly, a failure to intervene in this context was not

a “clearly established” constitutional violation in 1990. See

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (“For a

constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours

must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.”

(internal quotation and citation omitted)).

Therefore, Detective Strickland is entitled to qualified

immunity on Count Four. See Wilson, 54 F. 4th at 660 (“[I]t

is not necessary to decide both prongs [of the qualified

immunity analysis] where it is plain that the right is not

clearly established.”). The Court dismisses Count Four as it

is pled against Detective Strickland and will not grant leave

for Mr. Hopps to amend the Count because amendment would be

futile. See Boyd v. Warden, Holman Corr. Facility, 856 F.3d

853, 864 (11th Cir. 2017) (“An amendment is considered futile

when the claim, as amended, would still be subject to

dismissal.”). The Motion is granted in part accordingly.

D. Count Five

Finally, Detective Strickland argues that he is entitled

to qualified immunity for Count Five (Doc. # 40 at 14-20),

which alleges that Detective Strickland partook in a

conspiracy with Detectives McNamara and O’Nolan to deprive

Mr. Hopps of his constitutional rights. (Doc. # 48 at 20-21).

The Court agrees that Count Five fails to establish that a

constitutional right was violated.

Detective Strickland first argues that Mr. Hopps fails

to allege a constitutional violation because Count Five is

barred by the “intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.” (Doc. #

40). “[T]he intracorporate conspiracy doctrine holds that

acts of corporate agents are attributed to the corporation

itself . . . . Under the doctrine, a corporation cannot

conspire with its employees, and its employees, when acting

in the scope of their employment, cannot conspire among

themselves.” Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240,

1261 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citations

omitted). “The doctrine applies to public entities such as

the City and its personnel.” Denney v. City of Albany, 247

F.3d 1172, 1190 (11th Cir. 2001). However, there is a “long-

established conclusion that the intracorporate conspiracy

doctrine does not apply to criminal conspiracies.” McAndrew

v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031, 1035 (11th Cir.

2000). “The criminal conspiracy exception applies not only in

criminal cases, but also in civil cases where a criminal

conspiracy is alleged.” Battiste v. Jenne, No. 1:05-cv-22970-

PCH, 2006 WL 3665420, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2006).

The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply

here because Mr. Hopps has alleged a criminal conspiracy. He

alleges that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to “deprive

him of his constitutional rights.” (Doc. # 48 at 20). It is

a federal crime when “two or more persons conspire to injure,

oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person . . . in the free

exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to

him by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 18

U.S.C. § 241. Accordingly, Mr. Hopps’s allegation within

Count Five is not subject to the intracorporate conspiracy

doctrine. See Battiste, 2006 WL 3665420, at *2 (“Plaintiffs

allege that the [] Defendants conspired with each other to

deprive them of their Constitutional rights. Such conduct is

not only civilly actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but also

criminal under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and/or 242. Therefore, the

intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply in this

case.”); Aque v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d

1336, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (“[A] claim brought under a civil

statute . . . which alleges conduct that qualifies as a crime

under 18 U.S.C. § 241, suffices to exempt the claimed

conspiracy from the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.”);

Lozman v. City of N. Bay Vill., No. 1:07-cv-23357-CMA, 2008

WL 11411196, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 2008) (“[T]he

intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not bar [plaintiff]’s

Section 1983 conspiracy claim in this case.”).

Therefore, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does

not apply. The Court must analyze whether Detective

Strickland is entitled to qualified immunity on Count Five.

In 1988, the Eleventh Circuit noted that “[t]he Supreme

Court and this court’s predecessor have recognized that a

conspiracy to violate constitutional rights states a claim

under § 1983.” Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 425 (11th

Cir. 1988), overruled in part on other grounds by Whiting v.

Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 584 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1996); see also

Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984)

(recognizing that conspiracy actions may be brought under

Section 1983). Thus, it was clearly established in 1990 that

a conspiracy to violate civil rights could be a constitutional

violation.

But still, “[t]o state a claim for conspiracy under §

1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendants reached

an understanding or agreement that they would deny the

plaintiff one of his constitutional rights; and (2) the

conspiracy resulted in an actual denial of one of his

constitutional rights.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s

Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1327 (11th Cir. 2015). The plaintiff

“has the burden to show an actual denial of his constitutional

rights underlying the cover-up conspiracy. It is not our job

to divine a constitutional violation to support [the

plaintiff]'s conspiracy claim. We are left completely in the

dark about the constitutional basis for the claim.” Hadley v.

Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2008).

Mr. Hopps claims that Defendants “reached an agreement

among themselves to frame Plaintiff for the Dyches robbery,

regardless of Plaintiff’s guilt or innocence, and thereby to

deprive him of his constitutional rights.” (Doc. # 48 at 20).

However, he never identifies which constitutional rights were

violated. (Id.) Without identifying a constitutional right,

the Court cannot determine whether the civil rights

conspiracy in question was a clearly established law.

In addition, Mr. Hopps must do more than merely allege

that the conspiracy existed. See Albra v. City of Fort

Lauderdale, 232 F. App’x 885, 890-91 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The

plaintiff does not have to produce a smoking gun to establish

the understanding or willful participation required to show

a conspiracy, but must show some evidence of agreement between

the defendants. To allege a conspiracy, a plaintiff must make

particularized allegations that are more than vague or

conclusory.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).

The Court finds that Mr. Hopps’s vague and conclusory

allegations, which do not include any particularized claims

about the machinations of the alleged conspiracy, are

insufficient to establish a claim for civil rights

conspiracy. See Diaz-Martinez v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 1:07-

cv-20914-JAL, 2009 WL 2970468, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10,

2009) (“Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that the police

defendants agreed among themselves and with other individuals

to act in concert in order to deprive Plaintiff of his clearly

established Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights is simply

insufficient to satisfy Plaintiff’s burden.” (internal

citations and quotations omitted)).

As Mr. Hopps’s allegations both fail to identify a

constitutional violation and lack the necessary specificity,

the Court concludes that Count Five, as pled, does not state

a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the Court grants the

Motion in so far as it seeks the dismissal of Count Five as

against Detective Strickland. However, the Court dismisses

the Count without prejudice and grants leave for Mr. Hopps to

amend his complaint. See Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367

F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Ordinarily, if the

underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff

may be a proper subject of relief, leave to amend ‘should be

freely given.’” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)) (internal

citations and quotations omitted)); see also Chen ex rel.

V.D. v. Lester, 364 F. App'x 531, 538 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting

that leave to amend may be granted if it is possible that

plaintiff can defeat defendants’ qualified immunity claims).

In doing so, Mr. Hopps should, if possible, identify the

constitutional right or rights that Defendants conspired to

violate, and provide particularized details about the

conspiracy.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

1) Defendant Detective Gene Strickland’s Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. # 53) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

2) Counts One and Four are DISMISSED with prejudice as

against Detective Strickland.

3) Count Five, as pled against Detective Strickland, is

DISMISSED with leave to amend.

4) Plaintiff Tony Hopps may file his third amended

complaint within fourteen days of the date of this Order.

Defendants should file their answers to the third

amended complaint fourteen days thereafter.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida,

this 24th day of July, 2025.

VIR IA M. HERNANDEZ’*COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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