The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
TIMOTHY HUCK CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-cv-1796
VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY
CITY OF SHREVEPORT ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Introduction
Timothy Huck (“Plaintiff”) filed suit in state court against a Shreveport Police
Officer Marcus Hines, the Shreveport Police Department, and the City of Shreveport.
Plaintiff’s petition relied largely on state tort law but also invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants removed the case based on federal question and filed a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff responded by asking to amend his complaint to clarify his claims and plead them
in accordance with the rules applicable in the new federal forum.
The court granted Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint and noted that he
could elect to delete all federal claims, which would require a remand to state court. Royal
Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 145 S.Ct. 41 (2025). Plaintiff filed an
amended complaint (Doc. 20) that listed six counts, all but one of which are based on state
law. The only federal count in the amended complaint is Count Five that alleges Plaintiff
was “falsely arrested, detained, searched, and imprisoned by Defendants without probable
cause” in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The count also alleges
that the Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his civil rights.
Before the court is a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) in which Defendants attack all of
the federal and state law claims asserted in the complaint. The motion was noticed for
briefing, but Plaintiff did not file any opposition. For the reasons that follow, it is
recommended that the court (1) grant the motion to dismiss by dismissing all federal claims
for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, (2) decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, and (3) remand this case to state court.
Rule 12(b)(6)
Defendants invoke Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) and challenge the amended complaint
for failure to plead a claim on which relief may be granted. In assessing such a motion to
dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the amended complaint and
view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In re Katrina Canal Breaches
Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). Those facts must state a claim that rises
above the speculative level and is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007); Amacker v. Renaissance Asset Mgmt., LLC, 657 F.3d
252, 254 (5th Cir. 2011).
The Amended Complaint
Plaintiff is the owner/manager of The Phoenix 2.0 nightclub in downtown
Shreveport. He made numerous noise complaints against Haze on Texas, another nightclub
located down the street. Huge parties had spilled out of Haze, and the club encouraged the
street parties by placing speakers that projected music into the streets. Plaintiff complained
that this violated Shreveport ordinances, but Shreveport Police Officer Marcus Hines
refused to act on the complaints because he was a friend of Haze’s owner. Plaintiff then
made multiple public complaints against Hines. First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 20-22.
Plaintiff and music promoter Tommy Willis had a dispute regarding payment of an
artist. Willis threatened that he was not leaving until he was paid, and he began reaching
in his bag as if he had a weapon. ¶ 11. Plaintiff ordered Willis to leave, pulled a pistol
from his waistband, and pointed the pistol at the floor. Plaintiff did not point his gun at
Willis or threaten him, and there were at least six witnesses who viewed the entire
interaction that have verified Plaintiff’s account of the event. Plaintiff states that he feared
that Willis was armed and prepared to act on his threat of not leaving until he was paid.
Plaintiff states that this fear was later found to be substantiated when it was discovered that
Willis or his staff brought several weapons to Shreveport for the performance. ¶¶ 12-13.
Plaintiff makes no allegation that Willis brandished a firearm during the encounter or that
the later-discovered weapons were present in the club at the time of the dispute.
Willis contacted the Shreveport Police Department, and Officer P. Williams (not a
defendant) was one of the first officers to arrive. The office took statements from Willis
and Plaintiff. Willis accused Plaintiff “of pointing a pistol at Willis and threatening to
shoot him.” Plaintiff said that it was Willis that threatened Plaintiff, and Plaintiff denied
that he ever pointed his gun at Willis or threatened him with a weapon. ¶ 14. Based on the
conflicting statements, Officer Williams did not feel there was probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff. Williams informed defendant Hines of everything that he had learned and turned
the matter over to Hines. ¶ 15. Plaintiff and Willis told Hines that there were at least six
witnesses present during the dispute, Plaintiff provided their names and phone numbers,
and the witnesses were still present at the scene and capable of being interviewed. Plaintiff
asked that Hines interview the witnesses. ¶ 16.
Hines refused to interview any additional witnesses. Instead, he called a detective
and reported that he had multiple witnesses that supported Willis’ allegations. Hines also
told the detective that Plaintiff “likely deleted any security video that showed the incident.”
¶ 17. Plaintiff states that Hines’ statements to the detective were false and misleading
because Hines did not interview any of the witnesses, and all of them have since sworn
affidavits that corroborate Plaintiff’s version of events. Plaintiff made available security
video that Hines “did not attempt to review prior to making his decision to arrest Plaintiff.”
¶ 18. Plaintiff asserts that Hines’ actions to arrest Plaintiff were personally motivated
because of the history between the two men. ¶ 19. Plaintiff asserts that Hines falsely
reported that he had interviewed witnesses and failed to view security video, which led to
false statements to a detective in an effort to get approval to arrest Plaintiff. ¶ 23.
“Plaintiff was arrested and spent the evening in jail as a direct result of Hines’
actions.” ¶ 24. Before Plaintiff was released, the news broadcast the version of events told
by Hines, which included false information about witnesses backing up the victim’s
statement. Hines, who was formerly the information officer responsible for providing
information to the media on behalf of the police department, is accused of leaking the story
to the media to defame Plaintiff. After the district attorney reviewed the file, no charges
were filed against Plaintiff. ¶ 27.
Plaintiff alleges that the news stories resulted in the cancellation of a business deal
that would have resulted in him opening several locations of a fried chicken franchise in
the Dallas/Ft. Worth area. It also resulted in economic damage to his existing local
businesses, caused him embarrassment and emotional distress, and caused his children to
be teased at school. ¶¶ 28-29.
False Arrest
Plaintiff’s amended complaint lists six counts: (1) state law false arrest and
conspiracy, (2) state law false imprisonment and conspiracy, (3) state law battery and
conspiracy, (4) negligence and gross negligence, (5) violation of civil rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983/conspiracy, and (6) defamation. The sole federal claim is asserted in Count
Five, which alleges that Defendants falsely arrested, detained, searched, and imprisoned
Plaintiff without probable cause in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.
To prevail on a Section 1983 false arrest claim, Plaintiff must show that the arresting
officer did not have probable cause to make the arrest. Haggerty v. Texas Southern
University, 391 F.3d 653, 655 (5th Cir. 2004). On the other hand, “a warrantless arrest by
a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to
believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 125
S.Ct. 588, 593 (2004). “Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists when the totality of
the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are
sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was
committing an offense.” U.S. v. Watson, 273 F.3d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 2001).
Hines challenges the false arrest claim and asserts qualified immunity. Even if an
officer arrests someone without probable cause, qualified immunity immunizes the officer
from suit unless the officer had fair notice that his conduct was unlawful. Loftin v. City of
Prentiss, Mississippi, 33 F.4th 774, 781 (5th Cir. 2022). “Fair notice requires clearly
established law.” Nerio v. Evans, 974 F.3d 571, 575 (5th Cir. 2020). “The onus is on the
plaintiff to show that the law is so clearly established that ‘every reasonable official’ in the
defendant-official’s shoes would know not to engage in the complained-of conduct.”
Loftin, 33 F.4th at 781, quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018).
To meet that burden here, Plaintiff would have to “identify a case where an officer
acting under similar circumstances … was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment”
by arresting someone without probable cause. Loftin, 33 F.4th at 781. Plaintiff did not
respond to the motion to dismiss, so he has not shouldered that burden.
Furthermore, decisions have recognized that it is immaterial to the probable cause
determination whether a plaintiff actually committed the crime. “The Constitution does
not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested.” Baker v. McCollan, 99 S.Ct. 2689,
2695 (1979). The determinative issue in a false arrest/detention cases is whether the totality
of facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are
sufficient to establish probable cause. Cooper v. City of La Porte Police Dep’t, 608 Fed.
Appx. 195, 200 (5th Cir. 2015). An officer is also entitled to credit eyewitness statements
and disbelieve a suspect’s denial of those statements. Id. Put another way, “an arresting
officer is entitled to credit some evidence, while disbelieving the arrestee’s version of
events.” Loftin v. City of Prentiss, Mississippi, 2021 WL 3179309, *2 (S.D. Miss.
2021) (collecting cases with conflicting witness statements where probable cause was
found).
“There must not even arguably be probable cause for the … arrest for immunity to
be lost.” Haggerty, 391 F.3d at 656. Officer Hines had at least an arguable basis for
probable cause in the form of a statement by Willis, the victim/eyewitness, that Plaintiff
pointed a gun at Willis and threatened him. There may have been conflicting evidence
available to the officer, but Plaintiff has not pointed to clearly established law that required
those conflicts be resolved in his favor at the arrest stage in these circumstances. It must
also be remembered that probable cause is not a high bar and requires only a probability or
substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity. Loftin, 33
F.4th at 780.
Plaintiff argues that the arrest was motivated by his complaints about noise coming
from Haze on Texas and Hines’ lack of enforcement of the law against that club. But the
probable cause “test is objective, not subjective.” Sam v. Richard, 887 F.3d 710, 715 (5th
Cir. 2018). “Accordingly, the officer’s ‘subjective reason for making the arrest need not
be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.’” Id., quoting
Devenpeck, 125 S.Ct. at 594. “An arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts
that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.” Devenpeck, 125 S.Ct. at
593. Hines is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the false arrest and related
Fourth Amendment claims that are all based on an alleged lack of probable cause.
Conspiracy
Count Five of the amended complaint also asserts that Defendants are jointly liable
for depriving Plaintiff of his civil rights in violation of Section 1983 “because they
conspired with each other and acted jointly and in concert” to violate those rights. The
only defendants are the City of Shreveport, Shreveport Police Officer Marcus Hines, and
the Shreveport Police Department (which is not a separate legal entity with the capacity to
be sued).1 A conspiracy requires two or more persons or entities. Courts in the Fifth Circuit
apply the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine, which provides that the acts of the agents are
the acts of the corporation, and a corporation cannot conspire with itself or its agents.
Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994). This doctrine applies to civil rights
conspiracy claims where the defendants are a municipality and its police officer employees.
Young v. City of Irving, 2025 WL 888430, *10 (N.D. Tex. 2025); Davis v. City of
McLendon-Chisholm, 2025 WL 848474, *5-6 (N.D. Tex. 2025). The City of Shreveport
is a single legal entity, and its employees cannot conspire with the City. Accordingly, the
Section 1983 conspiracy claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.
Municipal Liability
Plaintiff’s only other asserted basis for liability of the City is the assertion of
respondeat superior. That doctrine may render the City liable for state law torts committed
by its employees, but “[i]t is well established that a [municipality] is not liable under §
1983 on the theory of respondeat superior.” Anderson v. Harris Cnty., 98 F.4th 641, 644
(5th Cir. 2024), quoting Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2010).
1 Hicks v. Page, 2010 WL 2243584, *2 (W.D. La. 2010); Martin v. Davis, 2007 WL 763653 (E.D.
La. 2007) (“Under Louisiana law, police departments are not juridical entities capable of suing or
being sued.”)
Accordingly, the amended complaint does not assert any plausible federal claim against
the City of Shreveport or the Shreveport Police Department.
State Law Claims
Plaintiff’s complaint is based primarily on state law claims such as defamation,
negligence, and battery. There is no indication that there is a basis to exercise diversity
jurisdiction, and the notice of removal invoked only federal question jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the only basis for this court to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims is
supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1367. That supplemental jurisdiction
depends upon the presence of the federal claims over which the court has original
jurisdiction.
Once the federal claims are dismissed, Section 1367(c)(3) provides that the court
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. It
is recommended that all federal claims be dismissed, which would give the court discretion
to then remand the remaining state law claims to state court. That is the general approach
when all federal claims have been dismissed, especially when the dismissal happens early
in the proceedings. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585
(5th Cir. 1992); Engstrom v. First National Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1465 (5th
Cir. 1995). The federal claims are only a small part of this case, and it is recommended
that they be dismissed at this early stage of the case, only about six months after it was
removed and prior to the entry of a scheduling order. A similar remand of assault and
slander claims was affirmed in Phelan v. Norville, 460 Fed. Appx. 376, 382 (5th Cir. 2012)
after all federal claims were dismissed six months after removal. Under these
circumstances, the best exercise of the court’s discretion is to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction and remand all state law claims.
Accordingly,
It is recommended that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) be granted in part
by dismissing all federal claims against all defendants. It is further recommended that the
court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all state law claims and remand
this civil action to the First Judicial District Court, Caddo Parish, Louisiana.
Objections
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), parties
aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and
recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an
extension of time is granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). A party may respond to another
party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof.
Counsel are directed to furnish a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the
District Judge at the time of filing.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and
recommendation set forth above, within 14 days after being served with a copy, shall bar
that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to
proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See
Douglass v. U.S.A.A., 79 F.3d 1415 (Sth Cir. 1996) (en banc).
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 25th day of June, 2025.
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