The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
RONALD WOODRUM, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 24-cv-3176
)
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF )
TRANSPORTATION, OMER )
OSMAN, BECKY KOEHLER, )
JEFFREY MYERS, TALIA DEAN, )
NICOLE ALEMAN-HUGHES, AND )
UNKNOWN OTHERS, )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Illinois
Department of Transportation, Omer Osman, Becky Koehler, Jeffrey
Myers, Talia Dean, Nicole Aleman-Hughes, and Unknown Others’
(“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (d/e 8). Plaintiff Ronald
Woodrum’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint (d/e 1) states a claim upon which
relief can be granted, so Defendants’ Motion (d/e 8) is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint (d/e 1)
and are accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage. Bible v.
United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2015).
On or about September 15, 2014, the Illinois Department of
Transportation (“IDOT”) employed Plaintiff as a Highway
Maintainer. d/e 1, p. 3. At all times relevant to this proceeding,
Plaintiff was employed by the State of Illinois, and his employment
was governed by both the Illinois Personnel Code and certain
collective bargaining agreements. Id.
Plaintiff initially worked for IDOT in a temporary, seasonal
capacity, in that he worked during the winter months and returned
to work the following fall. Id. Effective June 1, 2021, IDOT
appointed Plaintiff to a permanent position as a Highway
Maintainer. Id. On December 1, 2021, Plaintiff became a certified
employee, at which point his employment could not be terminated
without cause such that he had a property interest in his position
as an IDOT Highway Maintainer. Id. at pp. 3-4. As of May 1, 2022,
Plaintiff was an “eligible employee” of IDOT under the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 29 C.F.R. § 825.102 (“FMLA”), as he had worked
there for more than twelve months and had worked more than
1,250 hours in the preceding twelve months. Id. at p. 5.
On May 5, 2022, Plaintiff was injured at work and notified
IDOT that he needed to be away from work because of a serious
personal health condition. Id. at pp. 4-5. His injuries—which
Plaintiff does not name or describe—required hospitalization and a
continuing course of care, such that his injuries were a serious
health condition as defined by the FMLA. Id.
On May 6, 2022, Plaintiff was released from the hospital. Id.
On May 16, 2022, Plaintiff was given medical clearance to return to
work. Id. When Plaintiff returned to work on May 16, 2022, he took
another medical leave stemming from the injury. Id. Plaintiff does
not state the reason for this leave nor his doctor’s position on it.
Plaintiff was not medically able to return to work until July 15,
2022. Id. Plaintiff attempted to return to work on July 15, 2022, but
he was not allowed to do so by the Defendants working for IDOT:
Secretary Omer Osman, Director of Personnel Management Becky
Koehler, Region 4 Engineer Jeffrey Myers, Employee Assistance
Specialist Talia Dean, District 6 Personnel Manager Nicole Aleman-
Hughes, and others. Id. at pp. 2-4. Defendant Osman approved the
decision not to allow Plaintiff to work after July 15, 2022. Id. at p.
7. Defendants Koehler, Myers, Dean, and Aleman-Hughes were “all
involved in the decision,” though Plaintiff does not specify how they
were involved. Id. at pp. 7-8.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants classified their refusal to allow
him to work as an unpaid leave of absence, that the refusal was
done against Plaintiff’s will, and that the refusal had the same effect
as a suspension because Plaintiff was denied the income associated
with his employment. Id. at p. 7.
Plaintiff asked to return to work on multiple occasions. Id.
Defendants ignored Plaintiff’s requests without affording him any
pre-deprivation opportunity to be heard before, nor any meaningful
post-deprivation opportunity to be heard after, his unpaid leave of
absence began on July 15, 2022. Id. at pp. 7-8.
Plaintiff was ultimately not returned to his position until May
9, 2023. Id. at p. 4. IDOT had no medical or disciplinary basis for
preventing him from returning to work after July 15, 2022. Id.
On July 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed a two-count Complaint (d/e 1)
against Defendants. Id. at p. 1. Plaintiff alleges in Count I of the
Complaint that IDOT “violated the regulations implementing the
FMLA and its substantive provisions” as well as Plaintiff’s
“substantive rights under the FMLA” by refusing to return him to
work. Id. at p. 6. Plaintiff alleges in Count II of the Complaint that
Defendants violated his substantive rights to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to allow him “to work as of July
15, 2022, without affording him an opportunity to be heard” and
“after July 15, 2022, and not providing him with a meaningful post-
deprivation hearing.” Id. at pp. 7-8.
On November 15, 2024, Defendants moved to dismiss all
counts for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(d/e 8). On December 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed his Response (d/e
10), stating in relevant part that Count II “alleg[es] a violation of his
rights to procedural due process.” Id. at p. 6.
II. JURISDICTION
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff’s
claims arise under the FMLA, which is a federal statute, and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1331 (AThe district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States@). Venue is
proper because Defendant IDOT is headquartered in the Central
District of Illinois and because a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in the Central
District of Illinois. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1391(b).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) challenges the complaint’s sufficiency. Christensen v.
Cnty. of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). A complaint
must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief” that puts the defendant on
notice of the allegations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), see also Higgs v.
Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002). The Court accepts all
well-pled facts alleged and draws all possible inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th
Cir. 2008).
The complaint must put forth plausible grounds to
demonstrate a claim for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007). A plausible claim is one from which the court can
draw reasonable inferences that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Additionally, the complaint must raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556. A complaint merely reciting a cause of action or conclusory
legal statements is insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff Sufficiently Pleads an FMLA Claim.
Plaintiff alleges in Count I of his Complaint that by refusing to
return him to work, IDOT “violated the regulations implementing
the FMLA and its substantive provisions” as well as Plaintiff’s
“substantive rights under the FMLA.” Id. at p. 6.
The FMLA creates a cause of action for employees whose
employers “interfere with, restrain, or deny” the employee’s right to
FMLA leave. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1), 2617(a). To prevail on an
FMLA interference claim, an employee must show that: (1) he was
FMLA-eligible; (2) his employer was covered by the FMLA; (3) he was
entitled to FMLA leave; (4) he provided sufficient notice of his intent
to take FMLA leave; and (5) his employer denied his FMLA benefits
to which he was entitled. See Hickey v. Protective Life Corp., 988
F.3d 380, 387 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d
471, 477 (7th Cir. 2006)).
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss asserts that Plaintiff does not
plead the necessary fifth element of an FMLA interference claim
because he “fails to allege sufficient well-pleaded facts which, if
true, would support a claim that his employer denied him FMLA
benefits to which he was entitled.” d/e 8, p. 3. Defendants argue
that Plaintiff “pleads no support for his vague and conclusory claim
that he was purportedly ‘able’ to return to work” on July 15, 2022,
noting that Plaintiff “already had one ‘false start’ at resuming work
as a Highway Maintainer after being (supposedly) medically
cleared.” Id. at p. 4. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff “demurs
from pleading that his purported ability to return to work on July
15, 2022, was without requested modification.” Id.
Plaintiff responds that “nothing in the complaint…supports
the argument” that he was unable to return to work in July, and
that it could not “possibly be drawn from the complaint” that he
“sought to return to work with restrictions.” d/e 10, p. 6.
The pleading requirement at the motion to dismiss stage is a
short and plain statement of the claim, not a comprehensive
statement of any and all information supporting the claim. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), see also Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th
Cir. 2002). Plaintiff pleads that he was able to return to work in
July, that Defendant refused to allow him to return to work, and
that Plaintiff was thus “denied his FMLA benefits to which he was
entitled.” See Hickey v. Protective Life Corp., 988 F.3d 380, 387 (7th
Cir. 2021) (citing Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir.
2006)). Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a violation of his
FMLA rights, so Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (d/e 8) is DENIED
as to Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint (d/e 1).
B. Plaintiff Sufficiently Pleads a Procedural Due Process
Claim.
Plaintiff alleges in Count II of the Complaint that Defendants
violated his substantive rights to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment by refusing to allow him “to work as of July 15, 2022,
without affording him an opportunity to be heard” and “after July
15, 2022, and not providing him with a meaningful post-deprivation
hearing.” d/e 1, pp. 7-8. Plaintiff clarifies in his Response to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss that Count II “alleg[es] a violation of
his rights to procedural due process.” d/e 10, p. 6.
The Court notes that “[i]t is well-settled that new arguments
cannot be made for the first time in reply.” Gold v. Wolpert, 876
F.2d 1327, 1331 n.6 (7th Cir. 1989). Nonetheless, this Court,
instead of directing Plaintiff to re-file his Complaint to properly
reflect his procedural due process claim, will address the Complaint
as presented to best serve judicial economy.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
a state from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “An
essential component of a procedural due process claim is a
protected property or liberty interest.” Minch v. City of Chi., 486
F.3d 294, 302 (7th Cir. 2007). “To demonstrate a procedural due
process violation of a property right, the plaintiff must establish
that there is ‘(1) a cognizable property interest; (2) a deprivation of
that property interest; and (3) a denial of due process.’” Khan v.
Bland, 630 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hudson v. City of
Chi., 374 F.3d 554, 559 (7th Cir. 2004)).
1. Plaintiff Establishes a Cognizable Property Interest.
Plaintiff must establish a cognizable property interest, which
“can be created in one of two ways, ‘1) by an independent source
such as state law securing certain benefits; or 2) by a clearly
implied promise of continued employment.’” Phelan v. City of Chi.,
347 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Shlay v. Montgomery, 802
F.2d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1986). “In order to give rise to a
constitutionally protected property interest, a statute or ordinance
must go beyond mere procedural guarantees to provide some
substantive criteria limiting the state's discretion—as can be found,
for example, in a requirement that employees be fired only ‘for
cause.’” Cain v. Larson, 879 F.2d 1424, 1426 (7th Cir. 1989).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s pleading lacks “the pertinent
terms of a contract or other source of his claim to the protected
interest.” d/e 8, p. 8. Defendants cite Palka v. Shelton, 623 F.3d
447, 452 (7th Cir. 2010), in which the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found that “[w]hen a plaintiff alleges that the due-process
entitlement arises from a collective-bargaining agreement, he must
identify specific terms of the agreement that contained a promise of
continued employment.” See d/e 8, p. 8. Defendants also cite Shell
v. Chicago Housing Authority, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10198 (N.D.
Ill. 1995) at p. 11, for the proposition that the “absence of [a]
manual and/or allegations setting forth its terms [is] fatal to
employee’s § 1983 due process claim regarding 30-day suspension.”
See d/e 8, p. 8.
Plaintiff alleges that his employment “was governed by both
the Illinois Personnel Code and certain collective bargaining
agreements” and “could not be terminated without cause.” d/e 1,
pp. 3-4. The Illinois Personnel Code states, in relevant part, that:
No officer or employee under jurisdiction B, relating to
merit and fitness, who has been appointed under the rules
and after examination, shall be removed discharged or
demoted, or be suspended for a period of more than 30
days, in any 12 month period, except for cause, upon
written charges approved by the Director of Central
Management Services, and after an opportunity to be
heard in his own defense if he makes written request to
the [Civil Service] Commission within 15 days after the
serving of the written charges upon him.
20 ILCS 415/11. Jurisdiction B is the Illinois Personnel Code
section pertaining “to selection and tenure on the basis of merit and
fitness,” and only exempts IDOT’s “technical and engineering
staffs.” 20 ILCS 415/8b; 20 ILCS 415/4c (12).
In Palka, the plaintiff pled that he was a collective-bargaining
unit member, but did not identify a relevant provision in the
collective-bargaining agreement for his due process entitlement. See
Palka v. Shelton, 623 F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 2010). In Shell, the
plaintiff referenced the Chicago Housing Authority’s Administrative
Manual in his complaint, but he did not attach it to his pleadings.
See Shell v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 94 C 7632, 1995 WL 431255,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 1995). Conversely, the plaintiff in Phelan
based his property interest claim on sections of the Illinois
Municipal Code. See Phelan v. City of Chi., 347 F.3d 679, 681-82
(7th Cir. 2003). While the Seventh Circuit found that other
Municipal Code sections contradicted the plaintiff’s alleged property
interest, the judges did not take issue with the plaintiff basing his
property interest claim on such code provisions. See id.
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint cited the Illinois Personnel Code, a
publicly available law containing a promise of continued
employment absent cause—analogous to “a requirement that
employees be fired only ‘for cause.’” Cain v. Larson, 879 F.2d 1424,
1426 (7th Cir. 1989). Therefore, Plaintiff establishes a cognizable
property interest through the independent source of state law. See
Phelan, 347 F.3d at 681; see also Khan v. Bland, 630 F.3d 519, 527
(7th Cir. 2010).
2. Plaintiff Establishes a Deprivation of His Cognizable
Property Interest.
Plaintiff must also establish a deprivation of his cognizable
property interest. See Khan, 630 F.3d at 527.
Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s allegations fail to establish
that any of the individual Defendants deprived him of a
constitutionally protected property interest to which he was
legitimately entitled by allegedly delaying his return to work.” d/e 8,
p. 8. Defendants argue that “Plaintiff does not allege that he was
terminated” or suffered “a new deprivation, but rather describes his
employer maintaining the status quo as of July 15, 2022 – that
being Plaintiff not being back at work (yet) after suffering an injury
which resulted in a serious health condition.” Id.
Plaintiff claims that his employment “could not be terminated
without cause.” d/e 1, pp. 3-4. He cites to the Illinois Personnel
Code, which states that covered employees can not be “suspended
for a period of more than 30 days, in any 12 month period, except
for cause.” Id.; see also 20 ILCS 415/11.
--- ----
Plaintiff claims that Defendants refused to allow him to work
as of July 15, 2022 and “classified [the refusal decision] as a leave
of absence” that was “unpaid.” d/e 1, p. 7. Plaintiff argues the
refusal decision “was done against his will and had the same effect
as a suspension would have had. In this sense, he was denied the
income associated with his employment.” Id. Plaintiff pleads that
IDOT had no medical or disciplinary basis for preventing him from
returning to work after July 15, 2022, yet he “was ultimately not
allowed to return to his position until May 9, 2023.” Id. at p. 4.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Koehler, Myers, Dean, and Aleman-
Hughes “were all involved in the decision not to allow [Plaintiff] to
work and to deprive him of his opportunity to earn income,” while
Defendant “Osman approved the decision not to allow [Plaintiff] to
work after July 15, 2022.” Id. at p. 7.
Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, IDOT placed him on an unpaid
leave of absence akin to a suspension for approximately 298 days
without a medical or disciplinary basis. Therefore, Plaintiff
establishes a deprivation of his cognizable property interest in the
form of a suspension of over 30 days without cause. See Khan v.
Bland, 630 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 2010).
3. Plaintiff Establishes a Denial of Due Process.
Lastly, Plaintiff must establish a denial of due process. See
Khan, 630 F.3d at 527. “A claim based on random and
unauthorized acts by state employees only requires a meaningful
post-deprivation remedy, while a claim based on established state
procedures requires the state to provide a pre-deprivation hearing,
too.” Calderone v. City of Chicago, 979 F.3d 1156, 1165 (7th Cir.
2020).
While Plaintiff references the Illinois Personnel Code and its
employment protections afforded him, he challenges not the Code
itself but the individual Defendants’ “refus[al] to allow [him] to work
as of July 15, 2022.” d/e 1, p. 8. Since Plaintiff’s Complaint does
not challenge any established state procedures, this Court
interprets the Complaint to assert denial of due process from the
“random and unauthorized acts by state employees,” which “only
requires a meaningful post-deprivation remedy.” Calderone, 979
F.3d at 1165. “In this instance, [Plaintiff] must avail [him]self of ...
post-deprivation remedies or demonstrate that the available
remedies are inadequate.” Id. at 1166 (quoting Cannici v. Vill. of
Melrose Park, 885 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2018)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Defendants argue that “Plaintiff fails to sufficiently articulate
the purported inadequacy of post-deprivation remedies and likewise
fails to sufficiently address his pursual or non-pursual thereof.” d/e
8, p. 10. Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that “[o]n multiple
occasions, [he] requested to return to work, and his requests were
ignored without affording any meaningful opportunity to be heard.”
d/e 1, p. 7. In other words, Plaintiff alleges that he pursued the
post-deprivation remedy of a hearing, but that Defendants barred
him from it. Therefore, Plaintiff establishes a denial of due process
when Defendants denied him a hearing after refusing to allow him
to return to work. See Khan v. Bland, 630 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir.
2010).
In sum, Plaintiff establishes all three requirements “to
demonstrate a procedural due process violation of a property right”:
a cognizable property interest through the independent source of
state law, a deprivation of that property interest in the form of a
suspension of over 30 days without cause, and a denial of due
process when Defendants denied him a hearing after refusing to
allow him to return to work. See Khan, 630 F.3d at 527. Therefore,
Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a procedural due process claim.
C. Plaintiff’s Allegations as to Individual Defendants are
Sufficient to State a Claim.
Plaintiff in Count II names Defendants Osman, Koehler,
Myers, Dean, and Aleman-Hughes in their individual capacities and
seeks various monetary awards. d/e 1, pp. 2-3, 8. Defendants
argue that “Plaintiff does not plead any related facts” indicating that
Defendants’ acts are both the cause-in-fact and proximate cause of
Plaintiff’s injury and that Plaintiff “thus fails to state a claim against
the individual Defendants.” d/e 8, pp. 11-12. Defendants cite
another case previously before this Court, Williams v. Illinois State
Police, No. 19-cv-03164, 2020 WL 6050567 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2020).
As referenced in Williams, in determining the proper party who
may be held liable for a procedural due process claim, “the crucial
issue is personal (or departmental) responsibility.” Hoffman v.
Knoebel, 894 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2018). Liability may be
imposed only when an official causes the deprivation of liberty. Id.
(citing Kuhn v. Goodlow, 678 F.3d 552, 555–56 (7th Cir. 2012))
(noting that Ҥ 1983 liability is premised on the wrongdoer's
personal responsibility”)). In sum, “the official's act must both be
the cause-in-fact of the injury and its proximate cause.” Id.
In Williams, the plaintiff argued that the defendant, Illinois
State Police Director Brendan F. Kelly, was “responsible for all
actions of the Illinois State Police,” which this Court found “failed to
allege facts that Defendant Kelly was personally involved in violating
any of Plaintiff's rights.” Williams v. Illinois State Police, 2020 WL
6050567, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2020).
Conversely, Plaintiff alleges here that when he “attempted to
return to work on July 15, 2022, [he] was not allowed to do so by”
Defendants Osman, Koehler, Myers, Dean, and Aleman-Hughes,
who “refus[ed] to allow [Plaintiff] to work as of July 15, 2022.” d/e
1, pp. 4, 8. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant “Osman
approved the decision not to allow [Plaintiff] to work after July 15,
2022.” Id. at p. 7.
Plaintiff alleges facts beyond blanket responsibility for all
departmental action as in Williams. Since Plaintiff pleads facts
indicating that Defendants’ acts—“refusing to allow [Plaintiff] to
work as of July 15, 2022” and “approv[ing] the decision”—are both
the cause-in-fact and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injury, his
delayed reinstatement after July 15, 2022. Therefore, Plaintiff
sufficiently states a claim as to the individual Defendants.
D. Plaintiff’s Request For Equitable Relief Against
Defendants Osman, Koehler, and Myers in Their Official
Capacities Is Not Available Under a § 1983 Claim and Is
Thus Denied.
Plaintiff in Count II also requests “[e]quitable relief” and names
Defendants Osman, Koehler, and Myers, “for the limited purpose of
implementing equitable relief, in [their] official capacit[ies].” d/e 1,
pp. 2-3, 8. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request “for unspecified
equitable relief [is] insufficient to state a claim for equitable relief
against Defendants Omer Osman, Becky Koehler, and Jeffrey Myers
in their official capacities.” d/e 8, pp. 12-13 (internal citations
omitted).
The Eleventh Amendment typically bars a state’s citizens from
suing their own state. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
But in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court
held that a state official enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional, and
therefore void, state law “comes into conflict with the superior
authority of [the] Constitution” and is thus “stripped of his official
or representative character and is subjected in his person to the
consequences of his individual conduct.” Id. at 159-160. “In
determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an
Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a
‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly
characterized as prospective.’” Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (internal citations
omitted).
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim alleges that Defendants Osman,
Koehler, and Myers “refus[ed] to allow [Plaintiff] to work as of July
15, 2022” and that Defendant Osman “approved the decision.” d/e
1, pp. 7-8. Plaintiff admits, however, that he was “allowed to return
to his position [on] May 9, 2023,” and he does not allege that
Defendants have resumed refusing to allow him to work. Id. at p. 4.
As such, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim does not allege an “ongoing
violation of federal law,” nor does his claim seek “relief properly
characterized as prospective.” Verizon Maryland, Inc., 535 U.S. at
645. Therefore, while Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants in
their individual capacities may proceed, Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (d/e 18) is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against
Defendants in their official capacities and his request for equitable
relief in Count II of his Complaint (d/e 1).
E. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Individuals Are Not Really and
Substantially Against the State.
Defendants argue that because each individually-named
Defendant was an employee of IDOT, an arm of the State protected
by sovereign immunity, and none are individual parties to the
Illinois Personnel Code or collective bargaining agreements
governing Plaintiff’s employment, Plaintiff improperly seeks “to force
the State to pay Plaintiff his lost wages associated with his
employment with IDOT.” d/e 8, p. 14. Defendants cite two Seventh
Circuit cases in support. Id. at pp. 13-14.
In Luder v. Endicott, 253 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 2001), 145
plaintiffs brought suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act before
the Seventh Circuit, which noted that “when a suit is against a
public officer in his or her individual capacity, the court is obliged
to consider whether it may really and substantially be against the
state.” Id. at 1023. The 145 plaintiffs’ damages “amount sought
[was] unclear (indeed cannot be determined exactly until the
judgment is entered), but it obviously exceed[ed] the ability of these
four defendants to pay.” Id. at 1024. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit
directed the lower court to dismiss the 145 plaintiffs’ suit because
they sought “to accomplish exactly what they would accomplish
were they allowed to maintain this suit against the state and did so
successfully: they are seeking to force the state to accede to their
view of the [Fair Labor Standards] Act and to pay them accordingly.”
Id.
Defendants also cite Omosegbon v. Wells, 335 F.3d 668 (7th
Cir. 2003), in which the Seventh Circuit found that a plaintiff suing
his state official employers in their individual capacities for money
damages could not proceed:
[The plaintiff]'s claims against the individuals allegedly in
their individual capacity present a slightly more complex
question, but because he seeks backpay and other forms
of monetary compensation based on an employment
contract, we think it so inescapable that any resulting
judgment will be paid by the state rather than the
individual defendants that this bears no resemblance to a
bona fide individual capacity suit. (The individuals, after
all, were not even parties to the contract in their individual
capacity.) Accordingly, he has no § 1983 claim against
these defendants either.
Id. at 673.
Although Plaintiff seeks “[e]conomic damages,” “[e]motional
distress damages,” and “[t]he legal fees and costs associated with
bringing this claim,” d/e 1, p. 8, Plaintiff’s Complaint is
distinguishable from Luder and Omosegbon. Plaintiff’s Complaint
does not allege that Defendants breached an employment contract,
as in Omosegbon, but a state statute. See Omosegbon, 335 F.3d at
673. And unlike the 145 plaintiffs and four defendants involved in
Luder, Plaintiff alone seeks damages against the five individual
Defendants. See Luder, 253 F.3d at 1024. It is not “so inescapable
that any resulting judgment will be paid by the state rather than
the individual defendants,” especially at the motion to dismiss
stage. See Omosegbon, 335 F.3d at 673.
Therefore, after considering whether Plaintiff’s suit against the
individual Defendants, all public officers, in their individual
capacities, the Court has “consider[ed] whether it may really and
substantially be against the state,” and finds that it is not. Luder,
253 F.3d at 1023.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint (d/e 8) is GRANTED only as to Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims against the individual Defendants in their official
capacities and Plaintiff’s request for equitable relief. Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (d/e 8) is otherwise
DENIED.
ENTERED: July 24, 2025.
FOR THE COURT:
/s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE