MANLEY v. WETZEL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LEVON MANLEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs ) Civil Action No. 2:24-1040

) Magistrate Judge Dodge

JOHN WETZEL, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Levon Manley (“Manley”), a prisoner who is incarcerated in the State

Correctional Institution at Fayette, Pennsylvania (“SCI Fayette”), brings this pro se civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against former Department of Corrections Secretaries John

Wetzel and George Little, SCI Fayette Superintendent Eric Armel, Deputy Superintendents Tina

Walker and Joseph Trempus and numerous1 officers at the institution. The Complaint describes

multiple incidents occurring between October 13, 2021, when Manley arrived at SCI Fayette,

and January 21, 2023. These incidents primarily involved being moved from one cell to another

and searches of him and his cell, actions which he alleges were undertaken for retaliatory

reasons. He also cites one incident in which he was called a racial slur and occasions on which

officers delayed letting him out of his cell.

Manley purports to raise claims under the First, Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. He also raises a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (“RLUIPA”).

1 The caption of the case names twenty-eight Defendants, but the list of Defendants in the

Complaint contains twenty-seven names and the two sets of names are not identical. Some

individuals appear in one place but not the other.

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss. For the reasons discussed

below, their motion will be granted and the claims will be dismissed with prejudice and without

leave to amend because amendment would be futile, except for the First Amendment retaliation

claims, which will be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.

I. Procedural History

Manley initiated this case by submitting a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The

motion was granted and the Complaint was docketed on October 18, 2024 (ECF No. 7). On

January 31, 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss (ECF No. 22), which has been fully briefed

(ECF Nos. 23, 34).2

II. Facts Alleged in Complaint

The Complaint recites many incidents involving various defendants that are alleged to

have occurred between 2021 and 2023.

Manley alleges that his property (a box containing his legal documents and a TV antenna)

was lost or destroyed during his transfer from SCI Greene to SCI Fayette. On October 13, 2021,

he filed grievances alleging that his property was damaged or destroyed by Defendants Tyner,

Rankin and Dongili in retaliation for his exercise of freedom of speech. (Compl. ¶¶ 36-54.)

On February 4, 2022, Manley complained to Superintendent Armel about being belatedly

released from his cell or not released at all for scheduled recreation time and that COVID

protocols were not being followed. Armel told him to report it to Trempus. On February 6, a

trainee was non-compliant with COVID protocols and Manley filed a grievance about it. (Id.

¶¶ 58-64.)

2 In his response, Manley agrees to withdraw his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims and

concedes that he cannot identify the individual involvement of Defendants Little, Trempus and

Lacey. (ECF No. 34 at 10, 13, 14.)

Manley alleges that Defendant Sloan found him in possession of pens while in the yard

on or about March 16, 2022. He filed grievances alleging he was retaliated against for his

exercise of freedom of speech and that Major Hawkinberry told him he could be moved at any

time. (Id. ¶¶ 65-75.) On or about April 1, 2022, Manley alleges that Defendant Shreve interfered

with his attempt to eat his meal before commencing the fast for Ramadan. He filed a grievance

alleging that Shreve was persecuting him for exercising freedom of speech and religion. (Id.

¶¶ 76-77.)

In mid-April, 2022, Manley complained to Defendant Walker about being moved and she

told him to write a request to staff. However, he received no response when he did so. (Id. ¶¶ 80-

88.) Sloan vigorously patted him down on May 24, and Manley asked for a video of the incident

but it was not preserved. (Id. ¶¶ 89-90.)

On May 27, 2022, Manley noticed Maloberti and Burnsworth watching him in the

shower and they called him a “snitch” for having filed grievances about inmates being charged

with rape and molestation. (Id. ¶¶ 91-93.) On June 1, Correctional Officer Trainee (“COT”)

Angelo did not open his cell when he buzzed to be released for law library time and he missed 15

minutes of scheduled time. (Id. ¶¶ 94-95.) Maloberti and Galterio3 failed to stop an inmate fight

and OC spray was deployed, causing Manley pain and causing him to miss law library time

because the prison was locked down. (Id. ¶¶ 96-97.) Maloberti did not let him out of his cell and

he missed day room time. (Id. ¶¶ 98-99.) Both events occurred in June 2022.

Corrections Classification Program Manager (“CCPM”) Hawkinberry told Muslims

(including Manley) on June 17, 2022, that they exceeded the maximum of 55 inmates allowed in

the chapel, but Manley observed another group was not held to this limit. When he tried to

3 Galterio is not named as a defendant.

inform CCPM Hawkinberry that the prison schedule was causing Muslims to miss three weeks

of services in a row, she threatened to send him to the RHU. (Id. ¶¶ 100-05.) On June 24, COT

Angelo failed to let Manley out of his cell and there was no “cap” on it. (Id. ¶¶ 108-10.) Datiz

did the same thing several days later. (Id. ¶¶ 111-13.)

On or about July 25, 2022, Manley alleges that he was held in his cell because of an

inmate fight and the prison was in lockdown. As a result, he missed his scheduled law library

time. He filed grievances based on this incident, for which he alleges he was retaliated against by

Defendants Erickson, Hollowood, Harbough and Wood. (Id. ¶¶ 114-22.) On or about December

2, 2022, Manley alleges that Brunst opened his door while he was asleep and told SCI Fayette

staff that he was asleep. As a result, he did not receive a meal and Brunst intentionally skipped

him. (Id. ¶¶ 136-38.) He filed grievances for this incident, for which he alleges he was retaliated

against by Defendants Brunst, McGowan, Erickson and Armel. (Id. ¶¶ 138-41.)

Manley alleges that Defendant Datiz directed a racial slur toward him on or about

January 18, 2023, and he filed a grievance. (Id. ¶¶ 126-30.) In response to this grievance, Manley

alleges he was retaliated against by Defendants Datiz, Erickson, Brunst and McGowan by being

moved out of his cell. (Id. ¶¶ 126-30.)

As relief, Manley seeks compensatory damages of millions of dollars against assorted

groups of defendants, as well as a declaratory judgment that Defendants violated his rights, and

injunctions directing Defendants not to use various of methods of retaliating against him,

including urinalysis, pat downs, opening his cell door without cause, and moving him throughout

the prison. (Compl. at 46-51.)

III. Standard of Review

“Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-

pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v.

Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555-56 (2007)). “This requires a plaintiff to plead “sufficient factual matter to show that the

claim is facially plausible,” thus enabling “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d

203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)). While the complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations ... a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)).

As noted by the Third Circuit in Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011), a

12(b)(6) inquiry includes identifying the elements of a claim, disregarding any allegations that

are no more than conclusions and then reviewing the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint to

evaluate whether the elements of the claim are sufficiently alleged. When dismissing a civil

rights case for failure to state a claim, a court typically must allow a plaintiff to amend a

deficient complaint, irrespective of whether it is requested, unless doing so would be

“inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247,

251 (3d Cir. 2007). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint would not survive a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Alston v.

Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000).

“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted); see also Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The obligation to

liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings is well-established.”).

IV. Discussion

Manley brings his constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the

United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting

under color of state law.” Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but provides remedies

for rights established elsewhere. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To

establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendants, acting under color of state

law, are persons who deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution.

Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995).

Defendants contend that based on Manley’s allegations, they discern eight distinct

claims. (ECF No. 23 at 5.) In his response, Manley organizes them into fourteen claims. (ECF

No. 34 at 6-7.) No matter how they are organized, however, Manley’s claims fall into several

categories: First and Fourteenth Amendment retaliation claims; Fourth Amendment claims

arising out of searches of his person and cell; Eighth Amendment claims of cruel and unusual

punishment that he asserts are based on harassing searches of him and his cell; and a RLUIPA

claim based on three distinct incidents that he claims affected his religious practice.

Defendants assert that based on their immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, all

claims against them in their official capacities must be dismissed. They also contend that Manley

fails to state a claim for relief under either the First or Eighth Amendments or under RLUIPA.4

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

As the Supreme Court has stated, under the Eleventh Amendment, “federal jurisdiction

over suits against unconsenting states was not contemplated by the Constitution when

establishing the judicial power of the United States.” Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517

U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (internal citation omitted). The immunity applies not only to the state itself,

but also to state agents and state instrumentalities. Thus, courts must examine the essential nature

and effect of the proceeding, the nature of the entity created by state law or whether a money

judgment against the instrumentality would be enforceable against the state to determine whether

the instrumentality should be treated “as an arm of the state.” Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v.

Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-30 (1997).

In their official capacity, the Corrections Defendants are state agents who are entitled to

Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to damage claims. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 166 (1985). See also Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 & n.10 (1989)

(unless sued for injunctive relief, state officials in their official capacities are not “persons” for

purposes of § 1983).

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that Eleventh Amendment immunity

is subject to three primary exceptions: (1) congressional abrogation, (2) waiver by the state, and

4 Defendants also contend that the Complaint “recount[s] the incidents of everyday prison life

without any coherent narrative.” (ECF No. 23 at 7.) They argue that it should be dismissed for

failing to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a “short

and plain statement of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that “each allegation must be

simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). The Complaint consists of 51 pages and 204

numbered paragraphs, which, although lengthy, is not unduly burdensome, and as Defendants

acknowledge, addresses several incidents and causes of action. Moreover, Defendants have

responded to the Complaint on the merits and the Court is able to resolve their motion on the

merits. Therefore, it will not be dismissed under Rule 8.

(3) suits against individual state officers for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief to end

an ongoing violation of federal law, that is, the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.

Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed.714 (1908). Pennsylvania Federation of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297

F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

None of these exceptions apply here. Section 1983 does not abrogate states’ sovereign

immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 339-46 (1979). In addition, Pennsylvania has not

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to being sued in federal court. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8521(b);

Chittister v. Dep’t of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 2000).

As for the Ex parte Young exception, “a court need only conduct a straightforward

inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief

properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535

U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (citation omitted). As relevant here, Manley requests a declaration that his

rights have been violated and injunctive relief that relates to allegations of past conduct. He is

not entitled to retroactive injunctive relief regarding events that have already occurred.

Moreover, it would be inappropriate and contrary to the purpose of prospective injunctive relief

to issue a blanket injunction that permanently bars correctional officials from searching his cell,

conducting pat downs, opening his cell door or moving him within a correctional facility, or one

that precludes corrections officials from requiring urinalyses. All of these functions fall within

the purview of prison officials and would interfere with and potentially impede the operations

and security functions of the correctional facility. Thus, the Ex parte Young exception does not

apply.

Manley argues that the DOC’s receipt of federal funding waives the Eleventh

Amendment immunity of prisons such as SCI Fayette. He cites Yeskey v. Commonwealth of Pa.

Department of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1997), aff’d, 524 U.S. 206 (1998). In that case,

the Court of Appeals—and subsequently the Supreme Court—held that Title II of the Americans

With Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits the exclusion of disabled persons from

government programs, applies to state prisons. Unlike the ADA, however, § 1983 does not apply

to organizations receiving federal funding, only to persons “acting under color of state law.” And

as explained above, case law clearly rejects the notion that state officials acting in their official

capacity are subject to liability under § 1983. See also Best v. Merakey USA, 2020 WL

12740398, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2020) (“Unlike § 1983 claims, where federal jurisdiction

exists only over actions taken by persons under color of state law, the Rehabilitation Act and the

ADA’s protections extend to activities of organizations receiving federal funding.”)

Thus, Defendants are entitled to immunity with respect to all official capacity claims. As

a result, these claims will be dismissed with prejudice.

B. Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Manley asserts a claim under the Fourth Amendment for the searches of his cell and

person and seizure of property. As Defendants point out, however, the Supreme Court has held

that “the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within

the confines of the prison cell.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984).

He also asserts a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment of violation of his right to

substantive due process arising out of acts of retaliation for his filing of grievances. However, the

Supreme Court has held that “if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional

provision . . . the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific

provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process [of the Fourteenth Amendment].”

United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997). Because Manley has asserted a retaliation

claim under the First Amendment, he does not have another claim based on the Fourteenth

Amendment arising out of the same set of facts.

Because both claims are insufficient, they will be dismissed.5 In addition, it would be

futile to allow amendment of them, so they will be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to

amend.

C. First Amendment Claims

1. Failure to state a claim

Manley alleges claims of retaliation under the First Amendment. He contends that after

he filed grievances, various prison officials retaliated against him by searching his cell and his

person for no reason, transferring him to other cells at random and engaging in acts such as

delaying responding to his requests to be let out of his cell for scheduled law library time.

A retaliation claim requires allegations that (1) the plaintiff engaged in a constitutionally

protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse action by a state actor that was sufficient to deter a

person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the protected

activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the state actor’s decision to take adverse action.

See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).

Since Manley is bringing his retaliation claim under § 1983, he must also plead each

defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged retaliation. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845

F.2d 1195, 1207 (1988). That is because, as stated in the text of § 1983 itself, only a person who

“subjects, or causes to be subjected” another person to a civil rights violation can be held liable

under § 1983. Thus, each defendant can be held liable only for his or her own conduct. See, e.g.,

id.; see also Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Barkes v. First Correctional

5 As noted above, Manley has agreed to withdraw these claims.

Med., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds sub. nom. Taylor v. Barkes, 575

U.S. 822 (2015); C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (“To impose

liability on the individual defendants, Plaintiffs must show that each one individually

participated in the alleged constitutional violation or approved of it.”) (citing C.H. v. Oliva, 226

F.3d 198, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

The Corrections Defendants do not dispute that Manley meets the first element of a First

Amendment claim. See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (filing grievances is

conduct protected by the First Amendment). See also Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 423 (3d

Cir. 2016) (retaliation against prisoner who requested form to file a grievance was similarly

prohibited).6 They contend, however, that because Manley fails to connect his grievances to any

alleged retaliation, such as being moved or having his cell searched, he has failed to allege that

his protected activities were a substantial or motivating factor in a defendant’s decision to take

adverse action. They argue that the alleged retaliatory events are, in large measure, routine prison

activities and Manley has failed to plead that the individuals who acted knew about his specific

grievances.

Inmates have no right to be housed in a particular area of a facility, Mays v. Kosinski, 86

A.3d 945, 949 (Pa. Commw. 2014), and cell and prisoner searches are frequent activities within a

prison. “Retaliation may be actionable, however, even when the retaliatory action does not

involve a liberty interest.” Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Rauser

v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the relevant question in a retaliation case

is not whether the prisoner had a “protected liberty interest in the privileges he was denied, but

6 Defendants have not discussed the second element, but the Court will assume for purposes of

this opinion that if repeated harassing searches of his person and his cell occurred as alleged, this

would be sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional

rights.

whether he was denied those privileges in retaliation for exercising a constitutional right.”);

McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that alleged retaliatory conduct need

only be more than de minimis); Dippolito v. United States, 2015 WL 9308238, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec.

21, 2015) (prisoner who filed grievances and was retaliated against by being improperly denied a

bottom bunk stated a claim), aff’d, 704 F. App’x 199 (3d Cir. 2017).

Manley alleges throughout the Complaint that the alleged wrongful conduct of various

Defendants was retaliatory, but he must do more than assert threadbare allegations that

defendants’ conduct was because of his grievances or was part of a “pattern of retaliation,” since

such allegations are mere legal conclusions that do not satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule

8 and do not support the requisite elements of a retaliation claim. The Complaint fails to

plausibly plead a First Amendment claim because it does not establish a causal connection

between the various grievances Manley asserted against a specific correctional officer or officers

and any alleged retaliatory acts by other officers. See Wilson v. Kerestes, 2015 WL 631085, at *3

(M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2015) (plaintiff alleged that defendants retaliated against him for filing

grievances but did not allege that he filed grievances against them.) Thus, the Complaint fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Nor does it specify the personal involvement of

each individual Defendant.

In addition, several of the alleged incidents involve insults or verbal threats that were not

carried out. See Compl. ¶¶ 45-46 (Tyner and Rankin threatened to use OC spray on him when he

refused to sign a receipt because some of his property was missing); ¶¶ 76-77 (Shreve threatened

to put him in the RHU for asking about religious pre-dawn meal during Ramadan); ¶¶ 103-04

(CCPM Hawkinberry threatened to send him to the RHU for announcing that under the existing

schedule inmates were missing three weeks of services in a row); ¶¶ 126-27 (Datiz called him a

racial slur).

“It is well established that verbal harassment or threats of the sort detailed above will not,

without some reinforcing act accompanying them, state a constitutional claim.” Maclean v.

Secor, 876 F. Supp. 695, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (citations omitted). See also Prisoners’ Legal

Ass’n v. Roberson, 822 F. Supp. 185, 189 (D.N.J. 1993) (“verbal harassment does not give rise to

a constitutional violation enforceable under § 1983.”)

2. Applicability of Fed. R. Civ. P. 20

The Complaint does not comply with Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 20(a)(2) permits defendants to be joined in a single action when plaintiff’s right to relief

arises out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences, and there

is a question of law or fact common to all defendants. While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1

commands that pleadings be liberally construed to do justice with a minimum of delay and

expense, neither Rule 1 nor Rule 20 is a license to join unrelated claims and defendants in one

lawsuit. See, e.g., Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill, 252 F. App’x 436, 438 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming

dismissal of a complaint asserting constitutional violations that arose out of different transactions

and occurrences and in many instances failed to specify the party that allegedly committed the

violation).

Whether a complaint satisfies Rule 20’s joinder requirements is a matter for a court to

decide within its discretion. See Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir. 2009). In this case,

Manley has cobbled together a series of unrelated events by claiming that they are all examples

of retaliation against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. The problem with this

theory is that the actions he cites—cell searches, searches of his person, moving him from one

cell to another within the prison—are ordinary incidents of prison life. Plaintiff has failed to

plead any factual basis upon which to base a claim that various subsets of all twenty-eight

individuals named in the Complaint participated in these actions because of a desire to retaliate

against Manley for grievances filed against other individuals named in the Complaint.

For all of these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the First Amendment

and the First Amendment claims against all Defendants will be dismissed.7

D. Eighth Amendment Claim

The Eighth Amendment “prohibits any punishment which violates civilized standards and

concepts of humanity and decency.” Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1992),

superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir.

2000) (citations omitted).

Defendants argue that “prisoners have no constitutional right to be assigned to a

particular institution, facility or rehabilitative program.” Podhorn v. Grondolsky, 350 F. App’x

618, 620 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Moreover, “the Constitution does not mandate

7 Manley’s Complaint includes claims against Defendants Wetzel, Little and Kimmel, all of

whom held supervisory positions. Manley has already conceded that he cannot identify any

personal involvement by Little. Since he has failed to state a claim against their subordinates, the

claims against them fail as well. Even if Manley had stated a claim against any of the other

Defendants, however, his claim against these supervisory Defendants would fail. There are only

three ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by

subordinates: if the supervisor: (1) directed the subordinate to take the action in question; (2)

had “knowledge of and acquiesced” in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct, meaning the

supervisor knew that his or her subordinate was violating the plaintiff’s rights but failed to stop

the subordinate from doing so; or (3) with deliberate indifference to the consequences,

established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the violation. See,

e.g., A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)

(citation omitted); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208. Manley has not adequately pleaded that any of these

Defendants directed their subordinates to engage in wrongful conduct or maintained a policy,

custom or practice which directly caused a constitutional violation. He only provides a bald

conclusion, without any supporting facts, that they had knowledge of the grievances and

retaliation and acquiesced in their violation of Manley’s rights. This is insufficient to plausibly

state a claim against them.

comfortable prisons, and prisons . . . which house persons convicted of serious crimes, cannot be

free of discomfort.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). “To the extent that such

conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay

for their offenses against society.” Id. at 347.

To prevail against prison officials on a claim that an inmate’s conditions of confinement

violated the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must meet two requirements: (1) the deprivation

alleged must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious,” and (2) the “prison official must have a

sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). The first element is satisfied when an inmate is deprived

of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299

(1991). Courts have found that “life’s basic necessities” include “food, clothing, shelter, medical

care, and reasonable safety.” Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir.

2000). The second element is satisfied when an inmate shows that prison officials acted with

deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety or conditions of confinement that violated

the inmate’s constitutional rights. Wilson at 302-03.

Defendants argue that being deprived of a meal two times does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation. See Ball v. Struthers, 2012 WL 2946785, at *13 (M.D. Pa. July 19,

2012) (“purported deprivation of a single meal is not of such magnitude as to rise to the level of

a constitutional violation” (citing Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983)). See also

Frazier v. Daniels, 2010 WL 2040763, at *11 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2010) (being denied a meal one

time is not an “adverse action” for purposes of a retaliation claim).

Manley responds that he is not basing his Eighth Amendment claims on two meals being

withheld, but on the harassing cell searches to which he was subjected. He contends that the

Supreme Court has held that a prisoner can state a claim under the Eighth Amendment when cell

searches rise to the level of being “calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs.” Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984).

Nevertheless, courts have recognized this claim only when an inmate points to

“numerous searches conducted within a short period of time.” Williams v. Southwoods State

Prison, 2007 WL 1752088, at *3 (D.N.J. June 13, 2007) (three searches within three days,

accompanied by disciplinary filings against prisoner, were sufficient to state a claim); Scher v.

Engelke, 943 F.2d 921, 923-24 (8th Cir. 1991) (ten searches of an inmate’s cell within a

nineteen-day period constituted “cruel and unusual punishment”); Blanks v. Smith, 790 F. Supp.

192, 193–94 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (daily body cavity and cell searches for two weeks).

In this case, Manley contends in his response that he has listed five searches over two

years. This is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Banks v. Beard, 2006 WL

2192015, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2006) (“less than a handful of searches over the period of

several months” failed to state a claim.)

Therefore, the Eighth Amendment claim will be dismissed.

E. RLUIPA Claim

Manley alleges that his religious practice was substantially burdened when Defendants

prevented him from having a meal before fasting on Ramadan one time, when he was told to

leave the chapel after an interaction with prison staff on another occasion, and when he was

prevented from attending services during a lockdown on a third occasion. Defendants move to

dismiss this claim as well.

RLUIPA provides that:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this

title, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the

government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person--

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). “Religious exercise” is defined to include “any exercise of religion,

whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-

5(7)(A). Thus, “RLUIPA does not permit a court to determine whether the belief or practice in

question is ‘compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.’” Washington v. Klem, 497

F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

Under RLUIPA, Manley bears the initial burden of proving that the DOC’s policy

imposes a substantial burden on his religious exercise. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 360

(2015). Then the burden shifts to the DOC to show that policy: “(1) [was] in furtherance of a

compelling governmental interest; and (2) [was] the least restrictive means of furthering that

compelling governmental interest.” Id. at 362.

“For the purposes of RLUIPA, a substantial burden exists where: 1) a follower is forced

to choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise

generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in

order to receive a benefit; OR 2) the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to

substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d at

280 (footnote omitted).

Manley does not point to any prison “policy” that conflicted with his religious practice.8

Rather, he cites three unrelated instances during which he was not able to fully engage in his

religious exercise because of a specific circumstance that occurred. However, he has not

plausibly pleaded that he was substantially burdened in his religious exercise based on the

isolated incidents referenced in the Complaint. See Saunders v. Hill, 2019 WL 5558961, at *5

(E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2019) (“Mr. Saunders has failed to state a plausible claim that Defendants

substantially burdened his free exercise rights by preventing him from attending Jumu’ah prayer

services on a single isolated date, Friday, August 9, 2019, while his Unit was on lockdown.”);

Alamiin v. Miller, 2010 WL 3603150, at *21 (W.D. Okla. June 28, 2010), report and

recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3604660 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 9, 2010) (“Plaintiff here has

only shown two instances where Jumu’ah was canceled, and that some aspects of Ramadaan

were modified in 2008 due to a lock down. . . . “[N]either of these isolated incidents substantially

burdened his religious exercise.”); Jones v. Malin, 2017 WL 985943, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13,

2017) (“As a matter of law, missing one religious service does not constitute a substantial burden

on an inmate’s right to the free exercise of his religion.”) (citation omitted).

Based on the three isolated incidents cited in the Complaint, Manley has not pleaded facts

that could support a claim that he was substantially burdened in his religious exercise. Therefore,

he has not asserted a claim under RLUIPA, requiring its dismissal.

V. Amendment

Manley concedes that he cannot identify the individual involvement of Defendants Little,

Trempus and Lacey. Therefore, claims against Little, Trempus and Lacey will be dismissed.

8 See Holt, 574 U.S. at 356 (prison grooming policy interfered with Muslim inmate’s religious

exercise of growing a beard); Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d at 274 (DOC policy allowing only

ten books in an inmate’s cell interfered with inmate’s religious practice of reading four different

Afro-centric books per day).

The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal

for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment

would be inequitable or futile. Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2017). In this case,

amendment of certain claims would be futile.

Because the Eleventh Amendment immunity bars the claims against Defendants in their

official capacity, all such claims should be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend.

In addition, Manley cannot state a claim under the Fourth Amendment because it does

not apply in prisons and he cannot state a claim for retaliation under the Fourteenth Amendment

because he already has a claim under the First Amendment. Further, the allegedly harassing cell

and personal searches are insufficient as a matter of law to establish an Eighth Amendment claim

and Manley cannot base a RLUIPA claim on three isolated instances during which he was unable

to fully exercise his religion because of specific circumstances at the prison. Therefore, all of

these claims should be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend as well.

As it relates to the First Amendment claims, they will also be dismissed. Because the

Court cannot conclude that amendment would be futile, however, the First Amendment claims

will be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. An Amended Complaint must

comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires, among other things, that a

complaint assert a short and plain statement of the claim. Any amendment must also comply with

Rule 20, which limits the joinder of defendants in one action to circumstances in which the claim

arises out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences. As

discussed in this opinion, the Complaint filed by Manley does not comply with Rule 20 as it

relies on unrelated occurrences involving many defendants.

VI. Conclusion

For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 22) will be granted and

Plaintiff’s claims will be dismissed.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: July 24, 2025 s/Patricia L. Dodge

PATRICIA L. DODGE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

cc: LEVON MANLEY

HN-8396

SCI FAYETTE

50 Overlook Drive

LaBelle, PA 15450