Dixon v. Roberts

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

DARIUS SANTWANN DIXON PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 1:24-CV-01032-BAB

SHERIFF RICKY ROBERTS, Union County, Arkansas, DEFENDANT.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Darius Santwann Dixon, a prisoner,1 filed the above-captioned civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, generally alleging that Sheriff Ricky Roberts failed to protect him

from an altercation involving UCDC inmates and that he was denied constitutionally adequate

medical care for the injuries he sustained during that altercation. See (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff

proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See (ECF No. 3). All parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge to conduct all proceedings in this case and for

the entry of judgment. See (ECF No. 11).

This matter is currently before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

(ECF No. 18). Plaintiff has filed his response. (ECF No. 27). The Defendant has not filed a

reply, and none is necessary. This Motion is therefore ripe for the Court’s consideration. For

the reasons outlined below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and this

matter is therefore DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

1 Plaintiff was an inmate at the Union County Detention Center (“UCDC”) during the events giving

rise to his claims. (ECF No. 1). His current whereabouts are unknown. See (ECF No. 33).

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I. BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff claims that on or about April 8, 2024, he was a federal detainee at the UCDC and

was housed in the same unit as inmates being held on state charges when a fight broke out between

inmates. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff says that he was hit in the face with a lunch tray during this

fight, impairing his vision and injuring his Achilles, but jail officials did not transport him to the

hospital; rather, he was examined by a nurse on staff. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff names Sheriff

Roberts in his individual and official capacities as the sole defendant to this action, contending that

Sheriff Roberts oversees the jail and did not keep the federal prisoners separate from the state

prisoners, in violation of Arkansas jail standards. Id. Plaintiff requests a declarative judgment

and money damages. Id.

Because Plaintiff was a prisoner at the time he initiated this action and the events giving

rise to his claims concern the conditions of his imprisonment, his Complaint was subject to

preservice review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Upon that review, this Court ordered that

the Complaint be served on the Defendant. (ECF No. 6). After Defendant filed an Answer, this

Court ordered Defendant to either file a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether

Plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies before initiating this matter in accordance

with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) by September 13, 2024, or promptly file a notice with the Court

informing the parties that Defendant did not intend to rely on the defense of exhaustion at trial.

(ECF No. 10). This Court also ordered that discovery be stayed pending the outcome of the

exhaustion issue. Id.

2 This section does not endeavor to describe every docket entry, only those relevant to the Court’s

consideration of the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

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On July 31, 2024, upon receipt of the signed consent of all parties, United States District

Court Chief Judge Susan O. Hickey entered an Order of Reference, directing that in accordance

with their consent, this matter is to remain assigned to the undersigned magistrate judge for all

proceedings and for the entry of judgment. (ECF No. 11). Later, Defendant filed a notice saying

he did not intend to pursue an exhaustion defense at trial. (ECF No. 15). This Court then entered

an initial scheduling order governing discovery and directing that any motion for summary

judgment on the merits be filed by February 13, 2025. (ECF No. 16).

On February 13, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, a memorandum,

and a statement of facts, including eight exhibits, in support, arguing that Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendant Roberts in his individual capacity must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to

assert any facts suggesting that Defendant Roberts was personally involved in any of the events

giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims and that Plaintiff has failed to establish a plausible claim that some

unconstitutional Union County policy, unofficial custom, or failure to train caused the purported

constitutional violations. (ECF Nos. 18-20). The next day, this Court ordered Plaintiff to

respond to Defendant’s motion by March 7, 2025, and provided instructions on how to respond.

(ECF No. 21).

When Plaintiff did not respond within the timeframe provided, this Court ordered Plaintiff

to show cause why this matter should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to

comply with court orders. (ECF No. 23). The show cause response was due by April 3, 2025.

Id. On March 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for an extension of time to submit a response.

(ECF No. 24). The next day, this Court granted that motion and directed Plaintiff to submit a

response to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment by April 15, 2025, failing which this

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matter would be subject to dismissal. (ECF No. 25). But Plaintiff did not submit a response by

the April 15, 2025, deadline. In response, this Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause by May 12,

2025, why this matter should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with

court orders. (ECF No. 26). On April 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed his response to Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, asking to “continue on with everything,” and arguing that even

though Sheriff Roberts did not physically harm him, as sheriff, he has the authority to set policy

in the jail. (ECF No. 27). Plaintiff’s mail has since been returned as undeliverable, (ECF Nos.

28-29), and Plaintiff has not submitted any updated contact information with the Court.3

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury

to return a verdict for either party.” Ward v. Olson, 939 F. Supp. 2d 956, 961 (D. Minn. 2013)

(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). A fact is material only when

its resolution would affect the outcome of a case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

Further, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying “those portions of the

3 The Court Order granting Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP also directs him to submit updated

contact information to the court within thirty days of any such change. See (ECF No. 3).

Plaintiff has failed to comply with that order here, as more than thirty days have elapsed since

Plaintiff’s mail has been returned as undeliverable. See (ECF No. 28). Plaintiff’s failure to

comply with this Order provides an independent basis for dismissal of this action. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 41(b) (the district court has discretion to dismiss an action for “failure to prosecute, or to

comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any court order”); Henderson v. Renaissance

Grand Hotel, 267 F. App’x 496, 497 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Because Defendant Roberts’s

Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe, this Court nevertheless reaches the merits of Plaintiff’s

claims.

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record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Jackson v.

United Parcel Serv., Inc., 643 F.3d 1081, 1085 (8th Cir. 2001). In response, the non-moving party

“may not rest upon mere denials or allegations, but must instead set forth specific facts sufficient

to raise a genuine issue for trial.” Forrest v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 285 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2002).

In considering a summary judgment motion, the Court views all the evidence and inferences in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

III. FACTS

The following facts are undisputed:4 On April 6, 2024, Plaintiff was booked into the

UCDC on several state criminal charges and a federal “hold.” (ECF No. 20-2). He was placed

in A-pod along with inmates being held on state criminal charges. See (ECF No. 20-8). On April

8, 2024, another inmate accused Plaintiff of “snitching” on him during a previous incarceration at

the UCDC and invited Plaintiff to fight him. (ECF No. 20-8, p. 16). While Plaintiff initially

declined the invitation, this inmate then threatened to assault Plaintiff’s uncle, who was also

incarcerated at the UCDC at the time. Id. Following this threat, Plaintiff engaged in a physical

altercation with this inmate. Id. at 19. Plaintiff fought the inmate once, but then the inmate

wanted to continue to fight Plaintiff, and eventually the inmate’s friends “jumped” him. Id.

Although Plaintiff hit the panic button, no one responded to assist. Id. After the inmate and his

4 Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was neither sworn under

penalty of perjury nor notarized. (ECF No. 27). Accordingly, the Court considers Plaintiff’s

response as argument and looks to Plaintiff’s verified Complaint, (ECF No. 1), to determine

whether any material fact disputes preclude summary judgment. See Roberson v. Hayti Police

Dept., 241 F.3d 992, 994-95 (8th Cir. 2001) (“A plaintiff’s verified complaint is the equivalent of

an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment, [] and a complaint signed and dated as true under

penalty of perjury satisfies the requirements of a verified complaint, 28 U.S.C. § 1746.”) (internal

citation omitted).

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friends assaulted Plaintiff, they started fights with Plaintiff’s uncle and cousin. Id. at 22. All of

these fights were outside the view of UCDC surveillance cameras. Id. Plaintiff and his uncle

then went into the dayroom area of A-pod, where there are surveillance cameras. Id.

The surveillance video captures what happened next: Plaintiff, wearing a white tank top

and a short-sleeved orange jumpsuit unsnapped from the waist up, enters the dayroom, speaks

briefly with jail officials and then walks to the corner of the dayroom. See (ECF No. 20-6 at 0:30).

Plaintiff only has one sleeve of the jumpsuit on and is trying to maneuver his arm through the

second sleeve. Id. Another inmate, wearing only white shorts and identified as Christian Cook,

is shouting and pointing in the background, but not at Plaintiff. Id. at 0:30-1:00. Cook and

Plaintiff are in opposite sides of the dayroom, where Cook continues to yell and gesture. Id. at

1:00-1:20. Cook walks up to Plaintiff and slaps him in the face, and then turns and walks away.5

Id. Plaintiff runs up behind Cook and swings at him from behind, but Cook ducks, and Plaintiff

does not make contact with Cook. Id. During this altercation, it looks like one of the deputies

tried to use a taser or some other non-lethal force against Plaintiff and Cook but was unsuccessful.

Id. A second corrections official, identified by Defendant as Sergeant Philips, then walks up

between Plaintiff and Cook and separates them, at one point pulling Plaintiff to the ground to

prevent him from getting closer to Cook. Id. at 1:20-1:40; (ECF No. 20, p. 1). Other officers,

identified by Defendant as Deputy Steward and Deputy Rodgers, then assist in pulling Plaintiff

away from Cook, while Cook and other inmates are locked into a cell. Id.; (ECF No. 20, p. 1).

Sergeant Phillips then escorts Plaintiff to a different cell. Id. Plaintiff sits down next to the cell

5 It is unclear if Christian Cook is the same inmate who had earlier fought with Plaintiff and

Plaintiff’s uncle and cousin outside the view of the cameras.

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and talks to the deputies. Id. at 1:30-4:00. Eventually, Deputy Steward collects Plaintiff’s

mattress and escorts him into the cell. Id. at 4:00-5:00.

That same day, Plaintiff’s medical records reflect that medical staff treated him for “left

leg pain due to altercation.” (ECF No. 20-4, p. 2). Plaintiff described the medical complaint as

“a constant throbbing pain.” Id. The provider prescribed him ibuprofen for the pain and directed

him to “apply cold compresses/ice packs for 20 minutes every 3 hours while awake for 24 hours.”

Id. at 4. On April 15, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a medical grievance saying he required an x-ray.

(ECF No. 20-2 at 2-3). Nurse Sanford responded that same day saying that there was no order

for an x-ray in his file, that medical staff was unable to request an x-ray (or any other testing)

without an order from the provider, and that if he continued to experience problems with his leg,

he needed to place a new “sick call.” Id. On April 16, 2024, Nurse Sanford placed a patient note

in Plaintiff’s medical file explaining that she had provided this information to Plaintiff and that he

was encouraged to place a “new sick call” if he experienced any other medical issues. (ECF No.

20-4 at 5).

On May 3, 2024, Plaintiff requested medical attention for his “leg and eyes.” (ECF No.

20-3 at 1). The next day, medical responded saying that he was added to the “sick call list” and

that an officer would escort him to nursing when nursing staff was available. Id. On May 4,

2024, Plaintiff was examined by TurnKey Health staff for “eye irritation” and educated on

avoiding touching his eye. (ECF No. 20-4 at 6). That same day he was examined for “left ankle

and calf” pain and directed to apply “cold compress/ice packs for 20 minutes every three hours

while awake for 24 hours” on the affected areas and to rest and elevate his leg for 3 days. Id. at

7-8. On May 6, 2024, Plaintiff was examined again by medical professionals for “left ankle”

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pain. (ECF No. 20-4 at 10). Staff notes reflect that Plaintiff’s left heel at Achilles was examined

and that Plaintiff declined naproxen. Id. at 12. Those notes also indicate that medical staff

provided the following education to Plaintiff: “[a]void stressing Achilles as [Plaintiff] might have

partial tear but it isn’t acute and does not need acute surgical consultation.” Id. at 12-13.

On May 19, 2024, UCDC medical staff placed a patient note in Plaintiff’s medical file

saying that Plaintiff was complaining at “pm pill pass” that nothing was being done about his leg

pain and saying that he needed to go to the emergency room. Id. at 14. The note says that the

medical staff advised him that he could not be transported to the emergency room without orders,

that there were no such orders, and that needed to continue to submit “sick call” requests to obtain

medical attention. Id.

On May 24, 2024, Plaintiff was examined at the South Arkansas Regional Hospital and

diagnosed with “Achilles tendinitis, left leg; contusion of thorax.” (ECF No. 20-4 at 17). He

was prescribed Naprosyn 500 mg twice daily for 10 days. Id. at 17-19. That same day, he was

examined by UCDC medical staff for a “post off-site assessment” and instructed to request a

“follow-up sick call if no improvement.” Id. at 20-22. Plaintiff testified under oath at his

deposition that he basically “had to lie and say something else was going on for [him] to make

[his] way to the hospital to be seen.” (ECF No. 20-8 at 26).

UCDC policies and procedures provide that it is “the responsibility of any jailer assigned

a pod control post to monitor and maintain control of access to and from the area assignment.”

(ECF No. 20-7 at 1). Pursuant to those policies, “[a]ll pod doors are to remain locked at all times

unless an inmate is authorized to enter or leave the location.” Id. Federal inmates are subject to

“standard guidelines,” except to leave the facility, approval from the United States Marshal’s

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Office is required. Id. Further, UCDC policies provide that “[t]he nurse shall provide nursing

care to inmate patients, promote and/or improve the overall health utilizing the nursing process in

triage.” Id. at 3. “The nurse assigned to the jail is under the direct supervision of the jail

administrator.” Id.

IV. ANALYSIS

Recall that Plaintiff asserts two claims for relief against Defendant Sheriff Ricky Roberts:

(1) that his conditions of confinement violated his constitutional rights because he was housed

with state inmates; and (2) he was not transported to the hospital for medical attention immediately

following the physical altercation. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff identifies Sheriff Roberts as a

defendant in his individual and official capacities. The Court starts with the individual capacity

claims.

A. Individual Capacity Claims

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that

each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated

the Constitution.” Parrish v. Ball, 549 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)). Each government official, therefore, is only liable for his or her own

misconduct, his or her title notwithstanding. Id. (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 677). To this end,

courts have held that supervising officials such as Sheriff Roberts “can be liable for an inferior

officer’s constitutional violation ‘only if directly participated in the constitutional violation, or if

his failure to train or supervise the offending actor caused the deprivation.” Id. (quoting Otey v.

Marshall, 121 F.3d 1150, 1155 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal citation omitted)).

Furthermore, “a supervising officer will not be individually liable for an otherwise

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unlawful act if he is entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. “Qualified immunity shields

government officials from liability in their individual capacity so long as the official has not

violated ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.’” Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “To overcome the

defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show: ‘(1) the facts, viewed in the light most

favorable to plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the

right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation.’” Id. (quoting Howard v. Kansas City

Police Dep’t, 570 F.3d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2009)). In this case, Plaintiff’s individual capacity

claims against Sheriff Roberts do not pass step one.

There is no dispute that Defendant Roberts was not personally or directly involved in

Plaintiff’s medical care or the decisions about where he should be housed at the UCDC. See (ECF

No. 20-8 at 25-28); see also (ECF No. 27). Accordingly, Defendant Roberts’s alleged liability

cannot be based on his direct participation in a purported constitutional violation. Rather,

Plaintiff suggests that he is liable because of his role as sheriff. For Defendant Roberts to have

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights on a failure to “train or supervise” theory of liability,

Plaintiff must show that Defendant Roberts:

1. Received notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed

by subordinates;

2. Demonstrated deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of

the offensive acts;

3. Failed to take sufficient remedial action; and

4. That such failure proximately caused injury to [Plaintiff].

Id. at 1002 (quoting Jane Doe A v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis Cty., 901 F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir.

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1990)).

But here, again, Plaintiff’s individual capacity claim against Defendant Roberts does not

get past the first element: there are no facts—disputed or otherwise—establishing that Defendant

Roberts was aware of any of the circumstances giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims, let alone that he

was aware of a pattern of purportedly similar unconstitutional conduct committed by his

subordinates. Defendant Roberts, therefore, is entitled to qualified immunity on that basis alone.

That said, Plaintiff’s claims fail for an even more basic reason: the undisputed material

facts do not establish a violation of his constitutional rights.

1. Failure to Protect

Plaintiff claims that UCDC officials failed to protect him from physical harm because they

failed to separate the state inmates from the federal inmates. (ECF No. 1). As a threshold matter,

to the extent that Plaintiff contends that UCDC jail officials violated some Arkansas jail standards,

a violation of policy, by itself, is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See, e.g.,

Christiansen v. Eral, 52 F.4th 377, 379 (8th Cir. 2022) (“We’ve repeatedly explained that police

department guidelines and policies do not create rights that give rise to a § 1983 action.”) (citing

Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1993)).

Rather, “a jail official violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and

may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when he is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of

serious harm to a pre-trial detainee and fails to protect the detainee.” Glaze v. Byrd, 721 F.3d

528, 531 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “A failure-to-protect claim has two elements. First,

‘the inmate must show that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of

serious harm.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). “Second, the inmate

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must show that the official knew of and disregarded the risk to the inmate’s safety.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff does not claim that jail officials failed to protect him from Christian Cook,

or any of the other inmates who were purportedly involved in physical altercations with Plaintiff

on April 8, 2024. Instead, he claims that jail officials generally failed to protect him, a federal

inmate, from the state inmates. (ECF No. 1). But he does not assert any facts—disputed or

otherwise—establishing that simply being housed in the same pod as inmates being held on state

charges creates a substantial risk of serious harm to him, an inmate being held on federal charges.

And there are certainly no facts in the summary judgment record suggesting that jail officials were

aware of any risk of substantial harm to Plaintiff that was somehow inherent to being housed with

state inmates. Accordingly, Defendant Roberts is entitled to qualified immunity not only because

it is undisputed that he was neither present, nor involved in, nor aware of the assault on Plaintiff

on April 8, 2024, see Edwards, 750 F.3d at 733-34 (reversing denial of summary judgment against

sheriff who was not present at the jail on the day of the assault on plaintiff), but also because the

undisputed material facts do not establish that UCDC officials violated his constitutional rights

merely by housing him with inmates being held on state criminal charges.

2. Failure to Provide Constitutionally Adequate Medical Care

With respect to Plaintiff’s second claim, he asserts that he was not provided constitutionally

adequate medical care after the April 8, 2024, assault because he was not transported to the hospital

for medical care. (ECF No. 1 at p. 4).

Courts analyze medical claims brought by pretrial detainees and convicted inmates under

the same “deliberate indifference” standard. See Hott v. Hennepin Cty., Minn., 260 F.3d 901, 905

(8th Cir. 2001). This standard requires plaintiff to establish objective and subjective components.

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Jones v. Faulkner Cty., Ark., 131 F.4th 869, 874 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting Thompson v. King, 730

F.3d 742, 746 (8th Cir. 2013)). “‘The objective component requires a plaintiff to demonstrate an

objectively serious medical need,’ while ‘the subjective component requires a plaintiff to show

that the defendant actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, such need.” Id. (quoting

McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 2009)).

Even if Plaintiff’s ankle and eye injuries from the April 8, 2024, assault qualify as an

“objectively serious medical need,” the undisputed facts in the summary judgment record show

that jail officials did not deliberately disregard that need. Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that he was

seen by the jail nurse immediately following the assault. (ECF No. 1 at p. 4). Plaintiff’s jail

medical records, moreover, show that he was examined by medical staff on the day of the assault,

April 8, 2024, and several times in the days following the assault in response to Plaintiff’s requests

for medical attention. See generally (ECF No. 20-4). Rather, Plaintiff’s chief complaint, it

seems, is that he did not receive his preferred course of treatment—namely, to be seen by medical

professionals at the local hospital. But “mere disagreement with treatment decisions does not

give rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th

Cir. 2000). After Plaintiff mischaracterized his medical conditions so that UCDC staff would

transport him to the hospital to be examined, moreover, hospital staff treatment

recommendations—a prescription for an anti-inflammatory pain medication, Naprosyn—was no

different than the treatment he was receiving from UCDC medical staff. Compare (ECF No. 20-

4, pp. 17-19), with (ECF No. 20-3 & ECF No. 20-4, pp. 1-16). These undisputed facts therefore

fall short of establishing that the medical care Plaintiff received was “so inappropriate as to

evidence intentional maltreatment.” See Jolly, 205 F.3d at 1097 (quoting Smith v. Jenkins, 919

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F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish that he received

constitutionally deficient medical care following the April 8, 2024, assault, and Defendant Roberts

is entitled to qualified immunity for this reason, as well.

B. Official Capacity Claims

This leaves Plaintiff’s official capacity claims. “A suit against a government official in

his or her official capacity is another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer

is an agent.” Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Put differently, “the real party in interest in an official-

capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named official.” Baker, 501 F.3d at 925

(quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)).

In this case, therefore, Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against Defendant Roberts is a

claim against Union County. Section 1983 liability for a constitutional violation “may attach to

a municipality if the violation resulted from (1) an ‘official municipal policy,’ (2) an unofficial

‘custom,’ or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d

1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Corwin v. City of Independence, 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir.

2016)). But “absent a constitutional violation by a county employee, there can be no § 1983 or

Monell liability for the county.” Jones, 131 F.4th at 876 (quoting Whitney v. City of St. Louis,

887 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2018)).

For the reasons described above, with respect to Plaintiff’s claims, the undisputed material

facts show that UCDC jail officials did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Put differently,

jail officials’ failure to separate inmates pending state charges from inmates who, like himself, are

in custody pending federal charges does not give rise to a constitutional violation (claim one).

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Further, the undisputed facts show that jail officials’ decision to treat Plaintiff for his injuries

following the April 8, 2024, assault at the UCDC rather than transport him to the hospital does not

constitute deliberate indifference to an objectively serious medical condition (claim two).

Because Plaintiff has not established that a county employee violated his constitutional rights any

claim against the county therefore necessarily fails, as well. Accordingly, Defendant Roberts is

also entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s official capacity claims.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons and upon the authorities discussed above, Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED and that this case is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

DATED this 24th day of July 2025.

/s/ Barry A. Bryant

HON. BARRY A. BRYANT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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