Stroud v. Mitchell (CONSENT)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JAMES MICHAEL STROUD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:25-cv-40-JTA

) (WO)

LOGAN MITCHELL, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is Defendant Logan Mitchell’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 4.)

Defendant moves to dismiss counts one through four of Plaintiff James Michael Stroud’s

amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

The parties consented to jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. No. 8.)

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is due to be denied

in part and granted in part.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff brings a claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant. Nonetheless, Defendant maintains the Court does not

have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims because the Alabama

Constitution entitles him to immunity.

Venue is proper because Plaintiff filed his complaint in the Circuit Court of Coosa

County, Alabama (Doc. No. 1-4 at 117), which is within the Middle District of Alabama,

Northern Division.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND ALLEGATIONS

On December 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in state court against

Defendant. (Doc. No. 1-4 at 117.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant, who was a deputy of the

Coosa County Sheriff’s Office, ran a stop sign and collided with another vehicle while

transporting Plaintiff in his police vehicle. (Id. at 120–121.) Plaintiff alleges he was not

properly secured in the back seat of Defendant’s police vehicle. (Id. at 121.) From these

allegations, Plaintiff brings five counts against Defendant: (1) negligence, (2) negligence

per se, (3) wantonness, (4) fictious defendant liability, and (5) violation of 42 U.S.C. §

1983. (Id. at 122–25.)

Because the amended complaint added the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, Defendant

removed the case to federal court on January 8, 2025. (Doc. No. 1.) On January 13, 2025,

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 4.) Plaintiff filed a timely response opposing

the motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 14), and Defendant filed a reply (Doc. No. 16).

This matter is ripe for review.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear a class of

cases, which is conferred by statute. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503, 513

(2006); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (conferring federal question jurisdiction over “all civil

actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”) and 1332

(conferring diversity jurisdiction). “[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a

court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.” United States v. Cotton,

535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). “The burden for establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction

rests with the party bringing the claim.” Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 839

F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “[W]hen a federal court concludes that

it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety.”

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514.

Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) bring either “facial attacks” or “factual attacks.” Lawrence v. Dunbar,

919 F.2d 1525, 1528–29 (11th Cir. 1990). 1

Facial attacks challenge subject matter jurisdiction based on the

allegations in the complaint, and the district court takes the allegations as

true in deciding whether to grant the motion. Id. at 1529. Factual attacks

challenge subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings.

Id. In resolving a factual attack, the district court may consider extrinsic

evidence such as testimony and affidavits. Id.

Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), the court takes the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construes them in

1 This case involves a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction.

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1321–

22 (11th Cir. 2012). To avoid dismissal, the complaint must “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is

facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is, “[f]actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues counts one through three of Plaintiff’s amended complaint should

be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because he is entitled to

Alabama State immunity as a sheriff’s deputy.2 (Doc. No. 5 at 2–3.) Defendant further

argues count four of Plaintiff’s amended complaint is due to be dismissed under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because fictious party pleading is not permissible in

federal court. (Id. at 15.) The Court addresses each argument in turn.

A. Alabama State Immunity

Under the Alabama Constitution, sheriffs and their deputies are generally immune

“from actions against them in their individual capacities for acts they performed in the line

2 The Alabama Supreme Court typically denotes this type of immunity as “State immunity.” See

Ex parte Pinkard, 373 So. 3d 192, 198 n.3 (Ala. 2022); Reynolds v. Calhoun, 650 F. Supp. 3d

1272, 1274 n. 1 (M.D. Ala. 2023). Accordingly, the Court uses this nomenclature throughout this

Opinion.

and scope of their employment.” Ex parte Donaldson, 80 So. 3d 895, 897 (Ala. 2011). The

Alabama Supreme Court considers this a jurisdictional bar under Alabama Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1). See Ex parte Burnell, 90 So. 3d 708, 710 (Ala. 2012).

As a threshold issue, the Court must determine whether Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) is the procedurally proper method to assert the defense of Alabama

State immunity. While some of our sister courts have analyzed the applicability of Alabama

State immunity under Federal Rule 12(b)(1), others have declined to do so. Contrast Brown

v. Smith, No. 6:24-cv-1001-GWB, 2025 WL 439820, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 7, 2025)

(analyzing the applicability of Alabama State immunity under the Federal Rule 12(b)(1)

standard) with King v. Moon, No. 2:21-cv-01568-ACA, 2023 WL 9419674, at *1 (N.D.

Ala. Mar. 30, 2023) (denying a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss because Alabama State

immunity does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction); see also Turner-Pugh

v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., No. 1:23-00294-TFM-N, 2024 WL 4469209, at *6 (S.D.

Ala. Aug. 16, 2024) (“in federal courts, state-law immunities from suit are not jurisdictional

matters, but are simply defenses that the proponent is required to raise and prove”).

While the Eleventh Circuit has never specifically held that Alabama State immunity

does not strip federal courts of jurisdiction, it has stated in dicta that “state-law immunity

from suit . . . would not be jurisdictional.” Green v. Graham, 906 F.3d 955, 964 (11th Cir.

2018). In Green, the defendants belatedly proposed a theory of Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity that included immunity under the Alabama Constitution. Id. at 963.

The Eleventh Circuit held the defendants waived this argument because they raised it for

the first time at oral argument. Id. at 963–64. Nonetheless, the Circuit noted that a “defense

rooted in state law cannot define the jurisdiction of the federal courts, which derives from

the Constitution and Acts of Congress.” Id. at 964 (citing U.S. Const. Art III, § 1-2; Sheldon

v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 448–49 (1850)).

Because this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is derived from the Constitution and

the Acts of Congress, Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss on the basis of Alabama

State immunity is due to be denied.3

B. Fictitious Party Pleading

“As a general matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court.”

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Williams v. DeKalb

Cnty. Jail, 638 F. App’x 976 (11th Cir. 2016). There is a limited exception to this rule when

“the plaintiff’s description of the defendant is so specific as to be ‘at the worst,

3 In a one-sentence footnote, Defendant states he alternatively moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) on the grounds of Alabama State immunity. (Doc. No. 5 at 3 n. 1) (“In the alternative,

Defendant seeks dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.”). The footnote lacks any

supporting argument or legal authority. “Where a defendant seeking dismissal of a complaint under

Rule 12(b)(6) does not provide legal authority in support of its arguments, it has failed to satisfy

its burden of establishing its entitlement to dismissal.” Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Schrader, 693 F. Supp.

3d 1255, 1265 (S.D. Ala. 2023) (quoting Spring Sols., Inc. v. Fils-Amie, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1228

(S.D. Fla. 2014)). The motion is due to be denied on this basis alone. See NLRB v. McClain of

Georgia, Inc., 138 F.3d 1418, 1422 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Issues raised in a perfunctory manner,

without supporting arguments and citation to authorities, are generally deemed to be waived.”);

Sappupo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We have long held

that an appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it

in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.”); Singh v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,

561 F.3d 1275, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that simply stating an issue exists, without

further argument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of that issue).

Further, Defendant made it clear in his reply that he is asserting Alabama State immunity

under his Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 16 at 1 (“Deputy Mitchell’s Motion to

Dismiss [on the basis of State immunity] was filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P.,

challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court over the state-law claims against him.”)).

surplusage.’” Johnson, 598 F.3d at 738 (quoting Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215-16

(11th Cir. 1992)).

Here, count four of Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not meet the exception to

the general rule that fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court. Plaintiff’s

amended complaint does not contain a specific description of a fictitious defendant, but

rather states “Fictitious Defendants Nos. | through 80, whose names and identities are

unknown to Plaintiff Stroud at this time, will be more correctly named when their identities

are ascertained by the Plaintiff.” (Doc. No. 1-4 at 124.) Because Plaintiff’s amended

complaint does not contain a specific description of a fictitious party, count four of

Plaintiff’s amended complaint is due to be dismissed.

Vv. CONCLUSION

Because state-law immunity does not strip a federal court of jurisdiction,

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is due to be denied. In addition,

Defendant’s unsupported Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) concerning state-law

immunity is due to be denied. Finally, because fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in

federal court, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6) is due to be granted. A

separate order shall issue.

DONE this 23rd day of July, 2025.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE