The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
ROSALEE ZARROW, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) NO. 3:25-CV-00361
v. )
) JUDGE CAMPBELL
ROBERTSON COUNTY SHERIFF’S ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE HOLMES
DEPARTMENT, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Rosalee Zarrow, a resident of Ardmore, Pennsylvania, filed this pro se action against the
Robertson County Sheriff’s Department, Officer Kameron Barbee, Deputy Nate Miller, and
Forensic Scientist Melissa Kingamen, alleging violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights. (Doc. No. 1).
The Court must first resolve the matter of the filing fee.
I. FILING FEE
The Court may authorize a person to file a civil suit without paying the filing fee. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a). Section 1915 is intended to insure that indigent persons have equal access to the judicial
system by allowing them to proceed without having to advance the fees and costs associated with
litigation. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989); Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948). Pauper status does not require absolute destitution. Adkins, 335
U.S. at 339; Foster v. Cuyahoga Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 21 F. App’x 239, 240 (6th
Cir. 2001). Rather, the relevant question is “whether the court costs can be paid without undue
hardship.” Foster, 21 F. App’x at 240. Proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege, not a right, and
“[t]he decision whether to permit a litigant to proceed [in forma pauperis] is within the Court’s
discretion.” Id.
By Order entered on May 30, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff Rosalee Zarrow’s
Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”) without prejudice. (Doc.
No. 8). Plaintiff subsequently filed two revised IFP Applications, one apparently before she began
her new job (Doc. No. 9) and another after she began that job. (Doc. No. 12). In any event, both
IFP Applications demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot afford to pay the civil filing fee in this case
without undue hardship. Accordingly, her request for pauper status is GRANTED.1
II. SCREENING OF THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS AMENDED COMPLAINT
The Court must dismiss any action filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In doing so, the Court applies the
same standard as under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630
F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court therefore accepts “all well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint as true, [and] ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they
plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)). An assumption of truth does not, however,
extend to allegations that consist of legal conclusions or “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
557 (2007)). A pro se pleading must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
1 The Clerk shall GRANT the more-recently filed IFP Application (Doc. No. 12) and DENY AS
MOOT the earlier-filed IFP Application (Doc. No. 9).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that, on August 24, 2022, and again August 26, 2022, she was pulled
over in Robertson County, Tennessee, and charged with driving under the influence. She alleges
that she was not under the influence on either date; therefore, Defendants unlawfully arrested her
and denied her access to her lab results. She also alleges that a forensic scientist refused to give
Plaintiff “her blood lab work so that [she] can verify to Uber/Lyft Companies that [her] blood lab
came back negative to keep working.” (Doc. No. 1 at 4).
Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “There are two elements to a [Section]
1983 claim. First, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant acted under color of state law. Second, a
plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured under
federal law.” Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 695 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing
Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010)).
The statute of limitations for a Section 1983 action is the “state statute of limitations
applicable to personal injury actions under the law of the state in which the § 1983 claims arise.”
Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007). The limitations
period for Section 1983 actions arising in Tennessee is the one-year limitations provisions found
in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a). Porter v. Brown, 289 Fed. Appx. 114, 116 (6th Cir.
2008). “[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not
resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Claims accrue and
the statute of limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason “to know of
the injury which is the basis of his action.” Roberson v. Tenn., 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005).
This inquiry is objective, and courts look “to what event should have alerted the typical layperson
to protect his or her rights.” Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 548 (6th Cir. 2000). It is
the Court’s responsibility to “determine whether the alleged precipitating event or events occurred
more than a year before [the plaintiff] filed the complaint.” Standridge v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s
Servs., No. 3:08-CV-133, 2009 WL 348782, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 10, 2009).
Here, Plaintiff filed her complaint on April 1, 2025. (See Doc. No. 1 at 7). The claims set
forth in the complaint arise from incidents that occurred, by Plaintiff's own admission, in August
of 2022. (/d. at 4). There is nothing in the complaint suggesting that Plaintiff would not have
known or did not have reason to know of the claimed injuries which are the basis of her action
well before April 1, 2025. Thus, Plaintiffs claims are barred by the governing one-year statute of
limitations for Section 1983 claims in Tennessee.
Ill. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs Section 1983 claims (the sole claims brought in the complaint) were filed outside
of the governing one-year statute of limitations and are therefore DISMISSED.
Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default (Doc. No. 10) is DENIED AS MOOT.
Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an
appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).
It is so ORDERED. Up = C Mp
WILLIAM L. CAMP ELLY. :
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE