Brown 640704 v. Mann

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

______

DEMETRIUS JAMAL BROWN,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-759

v. Honorable Sally J. Berens

UNKNOWN MANN et al.,

Defendants.

____________________________/

OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court

will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action

under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.)

This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation

Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial

review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131,

1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).

Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining

a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a

defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a

court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S.

344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is

fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a

party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or

other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and

defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the

summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate

in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by

requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a

circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district

court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir.

2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it

without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the

plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).

Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all

proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent

of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all

proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . ..” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the

named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently

parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under

the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this

opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a

consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties

to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1

Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal

law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,

or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),

1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they

are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying

these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim against

Defendants Jensen, Macauley, and Brooke. The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim,

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment medical care claim against remaining Defendant Mann. Plaintiff’s

First Amendment retaliation and Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendant

Mann remain in the case.

Discussion

I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)

at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. The

events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility

1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)

(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a

United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the

United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a

screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));

Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for

the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207

n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning

in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).

(IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County. Plaintiff sues the following IBC staff: Correctional Officers

Unknown Mann and Unknown Jensen, Warden Matt Macauley, and Grievance Coordinator

Unknown Brooke.

Plaintiff alleges that, on January 29, 2025, Plaintiff was being escorted back to his cell

from court by Defendants Mann and Jensen. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Defendant Mann

squeezed Plaintiff’s handcuffs “very tight” and told Plaintiff, “Stop f***ing moving,” and that

Plaintiff was “not to lead the way.” (Id. (asterisks added)). Plaintiff “yelled out” to Defendant

Mann to stop squeezing the handcuffs because Defendant Mann was hurting Plaintiff’s wrists. (Id.)

Defendant Mann then put his foot behind Plaintiff and pushed Plaintiff to the ground. (Id.) Plaintiff

struck his head and neck on a metal food cart and hit his back on the ground. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges

that he was unable to breathe and lost consciousness. (Id.) Defendant Mann laughed while

Defendant Jensen “just watched.” (Id.)

Defendants Mann and Jensen helped Plaintiff to his feet and escorted Plaintiff to his cell.

(Id.) When Plaintiff returned to his cell, Plaintiff requested medical attention for deep cuts to his

arm and wrist from Defendant Mann squeezing the handcuffs; however, an unidentified non-party

sergeant denied Plaintiff medical attention. (Id.) Plaintiff submitted a grievance regarding the

events of January 29, 2025, which was denied by Defendants Macauley and Brooke. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he continues to suffer from neck, back, and hip pain because of the

incident, and continues to request medical attention. (Id.) He also alleges, “Bellamy Creek starved

me for days and denied me showers plus writing me false tickets to retaliate against me for

speaking out to have justice be served.” (Id.)

As relief for the events described in the complaint, Plaintiff “want[s] to sue for [his]

injuries” and for “Bellamy Creek to be held accountable.” (Id., PageID.4.)

II. Failure to State a Claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint

need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels

and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The

court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility

standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71

(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of

prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by

a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.

Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because Section 1983 is a method for vindicating

federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under Section 1983

is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,

271 (1994).

A. Defendants Macauley and Brooke

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Macauley and Brook serve as the IBC Warden and

Grievance Coordinator, respectively, and that they denied Plaintiff’s grievance regarding the

events of January 29, 2025. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) These allegations do not state a claim

under Section 1983.

Government officials, such as Defendants Macauley and Brooke, may not be held liable

for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or

vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional

violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567,

575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s

subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act.

Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir.

2004). Moreover, Section 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied

an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See

Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the

Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.

The Sixth Circuit has summarized the minimum required to constitute active conduct by a

supervisory official:

“[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending

individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific

incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee,

199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have

interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that

the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in

the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”

Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300,

and citing Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008)); see also Copeland v.

Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375–76 (1976),

and Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)); Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891

F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that plausibly would suggest that Defendants Macauley

and Brooke authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in any unconstitutional conduct.

Indeed, there is nothing to indicate that either Defendant played an active role in the events of

January 29, 2025, in denying Plaintiff medical care, meals, or showers, or in issuing Plaintiff “false

tickets.” Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants Macauley and Brooke and

his claims against them will be dismissed

B. First Amendment Retaliation Claims

Plaintiff alleges that “Bellamy Creek” has retaliated against him for “speaking out.”

(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Therefore, the Court has construed Plaintiff’s complaint as raising

claims of First Amendment retaliation.

Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the

Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). To set forth

a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) he was engaged

in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of

ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least

in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to show that the exercise

of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s alleged retaliatory

conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mount Healthy City

Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).

Here, Plaintiff mentions two or more instances of potentially protected conduct. First, on

January 29, 2025, Plaintiff told Defendant Mann to stop squeezing the handcuffs because

Defendant Mann was hurting Plaintiff’s wrists. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Second, Plaintiff

mentions filing a grievance and “speaking out to have justice be served.” (Id.) It is well-established

that an inmate has a right to submit “non-frivolous” grievances against prison officials on his own

behalf, whether written or oral. Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 265 (6th Cir. 2018). Therefore,

for purposes of screening the Court will assume that Plaintiff has satisfied the first element of a

First Amendment retaliation claim.

As to the second element of a retaliation claim, Plaintiff alleges that, after Plaintiff told

Defendant Mann that Defendant Mann was hurting Plaintiff’s wrists, Defendant Mann pushed

Plaintiff onto the ground and into a metal cart, injuring Plaintiffs head, neck, and back. Taking

these allegations as true, the Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed with his First Amendment

retaliation claim against Defendant Mann.

However, Plaintiff’s allegations against “Bellamy Creek” generally, including Plaintiff’s

claims that he was starved for days, denied showers, and issued “false tickets,” do not state a claim

against any named Defendant. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual

allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–61 (holding that, to state a

claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim).

“Summary reference to a single, five-headed ‘Defendants’ [or officers or staff] does not support a

reasonable inference that each Defendant is liable . . . .” Boxill v. O’Grady, 935 F.3d 510, 518 (6th

Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring First

Amendment retaliation claims against the named Defendants premised upon these incidents, his

claims will be dismissed.

C. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force and Failure to Intervene Claims

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mann used excessive force against him by squeezing his

handcuffs so tightly that they cut into his wrists and by pushing him to the ground, injuring his

head, neck, and back. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Jensen

stood by and watched, failing to intervene to prevent the use of excessive force. (Id.)

As relevant to excessive force claims, the Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of

confinement which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428

U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are

“totally without penological justification.” Id. However, not every shove or restraint gives rise to

a constitutional violation. Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “On occasion, ‘[t]he maintenance of prison security and

discipline may require that inmates be subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under

common law.’” Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Combs v.

Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2002)). Prison officials nonetheless violate the Eighth

Amendment when their “offending conduct reflects an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”

Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034,

1037 (6th Cir. 1995)); Bailey v. Golladay, 421 F. App’x 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, an

officer is liable for another officer’s use of excessive force where the defendant “‘observed or had

reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used’ and ‘had both the opportunity

and the means to prevent the harm from occurring.’” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 475 (6th

Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original) (quoting Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997));

accord Alexander v. Carter ex rel. Byrd, 733 F. App’x 256, 265 (6th Cir. 2018); Partin v. Parris,

No. 17-6172, 2018 WL 1631663, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2018).

There is an objective component and a subjective component to this type of Eighth

Amendment claim. Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Comstock v.

McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001)). First, “[t]he subjective component focuses on the

state of mind of the prison officials.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383. Courts ask “whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Second, “[t]he objective component requires the pain inflicted

to be ‘sufficiently serious.’” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,

298 (1991)). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments

necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided

that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Hudson, 503 U.S.

at 9–10 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). The objective component requires

a “contextual” investigation that is “responsive to ‘contemporary standards of decency.’” Id. at 8

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). Although the extent of a prisoner’s injury

may help determine the amount of force used by the prison official, it is not dispositive of whether

an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). “When

prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of

decency always are violated . . . [w]hether or not significant injury is evident.” Hudson, 503 U.S.

at 9.

Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Mann as true and drawing all

reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed with his Eighth

Amendment claim of excessive force against Defendant Mann.

However, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Jensen for failing to intervene

to prevent Defendant Mann’s use of force. Plaintiff’s complaint does not provide the Court with

sufficient facts to plausibly suggest that Defendant Jensen was aware that Defendant Mann was

using or was planning to use excessive force against Plaintiff and that Defendant Jensen had the

opportunity to stop the use of force from occurring as needed to state an Eighth Amendment claim

for failure to intervene. Plaintiff describes that he yelled out that Defendant Mann was hurting

Plaintiff’s wrists and that Defendant Mann then put his foot behind Plaintiff and pushed Plaintiff

to the ground. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff does not suggest that Defendant Mann

provided any warning that he would push Plaintiff to the ground such that the Court could infer

that Defendant Jensen could have had an opportunity to intervene. Accordingly, the Court will

dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Jensen for failing to intervene.

D. Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claims

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied medical care for his injuries. (Compl., ECF No. 1,

PageID.3.) The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to

the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273

F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001). A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care under the

Eighth Amendment has an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical

need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated

under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The objective component of the

adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[ ] for medical

care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir.

2004); see also Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008).

Obviousness, however, is not strictly limited to what is detectable to the eye. Even if the

layman cannot see the medical need, a condition may be obviously medically serious where a

layman, if informed of the true medical situation, would deem the need for medical attention clear.

See, e.g., Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty., 749 F.3d 437, 446–51 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that a prisoner

who died from a perforated duodenum exhibited an “objectively serious need for medical

treatment,” even though his symptoms appeared to the medical staff at the time to be consistent

with alcohol withdrawal); Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that

prisoner’s severed tendon was a “quite obvious” medical need, since “any lay person would realize

to be serious,” even though the condition was not visually obvious). If the plaintiff’s claim,

however, is based on “the prison’s failure to treat a condition adequately, or where the prisoner’s

affliction is seemingly minor or non-obvious,” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898, the plaintiff must

“place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in

medical treatment,” Napier v. Madison Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation

marks omitted), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Lawler as next friend of Lawler v.

Hardeman Cnty., Tenn., 93 F.4th 919 (6th Cir. 2024).

The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a

sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867

(6th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can

be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with

knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “[T]he official must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. To prove a defendant’s subjective knowledge, “[a]

plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence. . . : A jury is entitled to ‘conclude that a prison

official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.’” Rhinehart v. Scutt,

894 F.3d 721, 738 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he had cuts on his arms and wrists from the handcuffs and that

he later requested medical attention from a non-party sergeant. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)

Plaintiff also alleges that he has been denied medical treatment for his injuries “[t]ill [sic] this

day.” (Id.)

First, Plaintiff’s complaint does not suggest that Plaintiff requested medical attention from

Defendants Mann and Jensen or that these Defendants personally observed any visible injury to

Plaintiff following Defendant Mann’s use of force. Moreover, even if Defendants Mann and Jensen

were aware of cuts to Plaintiff’s wrists from tight handcuffing, these injuries are not sufficiently

serious to establish the objective component of his Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate

medical care. See Lockett v. Suardini, 526 F.3d 866, 877 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Blackmore v.

Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004)) (injuries such as minor cuts, minor

lacerations, and swollen wrists from tight handcuffs are not a sufficiently serious condition for

purposes of an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim).

More to the point, Plaintiff cannot hold the named Defendants liable for his continued

denial of medical treatment by a non-party sergeant and others. As discussed above, “each

[g]overnment official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own

misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any facts that would

suggest that Defendants Mann and Jensen were involved in any further medical care provided to

Plaintiff or the lack thereof. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against

Defendants for inadequate medical care.

Conclusion

The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Having conducted the

review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Defendants Jensen, Macauley, and Brooke

will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment medical care claim against remaining Defendant Mann. Plaintiff’s First Amendment

retaliation and Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendant Mann remain in the

case.

An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: July 23, 2023 /s/ Sally J. Berens

SALLY J. BERENS

United States Magistrate Judge