The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
OMARII MCCLEARY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 3:23-cv-385
v. )
) Judge Curtis L. Collier
QCHC OF TENNESSEE, PLLC, et al., ) Magistrate Judge Debra C. Poplin
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Before the Court is a motion to bifurcate trial by Plaintiff, Omarii McCleary, pursuant to
Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 108.) Plaintiff moves to bifurcate his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the Defendants QCHC of Tennessee, PLLC; QCHC Management
Services Company, Inc.; QCHC, Inc.; Monroe County, Tennessee; Ashley Brown; Holly Cantrell;
Johnny Edward Bates, M.D.; Donald Kern, M.D.; Ladonna Hubbard; Pamela Hollingshead; Sherry
Richesin; David Hannah; Josh Duncan; Colby Williams; Cody Harrill; Brent Plemons; Blaine
Kennedy; David Anthony; Jerron Henry; Jenna Webb; Owen Hooper; Noah Kelly; Patricia
Stephens; Riley Turpeinen; Tommy Reagan; Thomas Grindle; and Julie Johnston, PhD, from the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (“EMTALA”) claim
against Sweetwater Hospital Association (“SWHA”) at trial. (Id. at 1.) Defendant SWHA
(“Defendant”) responded in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to bifurcate trial. (Doc. 113.) The
matter is now ripe for review.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s decedent, Joshua S. McCleary (“Decedent”), was booked into the Monroe
County Jail on October 28, 2022. (Doc. 1 ¶ 28.) Plaintiff alleges that during booking and intake,
Decedent completed a medical questionnaire and indicated he had diabetic and hypertensive
symptoms for which he needed medication and a special diet. (Id.) According to the complaint,
Decedent did not receive medication, a special diet, or any medical care until October 31, 2022,
after he complained of “trouble breathing.” (Id. ¶ 44.) After Decedent’s complaint of difficulty
breathing, Decedent was transported to the SWHA emergency room. (Id. ¶ 45.) Decedent
experienced “significant delay” in the waiting room, and before he received medical attention, he
became unresponsive. (Id. ¶¶ 49, 53.) Decedent never regained consciousness and was declared
brain dead on November 3, 2022. (Id. ¶ 59.) An autopsy was performed, and Decedent’s cause of
death was determined to be complications of uncontrolled type one diabetes and diabetic
ketoacidosis. (Id. ¶ 60.)
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts civil-rights violations against the QCHC and
Monroe County Defendants for deliberate indifference to Decedent’s serious medical needs under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (id. ¶ 68), and a cause of action against SWHA for failure to admit and provide
medical care pursuant to EMTALA (id. ¶ 69). There is currently a trial set for October 14, 2025.
(Doc. 97 ¶ 8.) Plaintiff now seeks separate trials for the § 1983 claims and the EMTALA claim.
(Doc. 108.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Bifurcation is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), which states that, “[f]or
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial
of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 42(b). Under Rule 42(b), a court may choose between a bifurcated and a unified trial by
weighing “the potential prejudice to the parties, the possible confusion of the jurors, and the
resulting convenience and [judicial] economy.” Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 339 (6th Cir.
2007). The balance of those factors is left to the court’s discretion and is largely based on the
specific facts of each individual case. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 307 (6th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff, as the party seeking bifurcation, “has the burden of showing that concerns such as judicial
economy and prejudice weigh in favor of granting the motion.” Heeter v. Bowers, No. 2:20-cv-
6481, 2025 WL 1725770, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 20, 2025) (quoting Woods v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., No. 2:09-cv-482, 2010 WL 1032018, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2010)).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff primarily argues that a bifurcated trial is appropriate to prevent jury confusion and
to allow the jury to duly apportion fault in this case. (Doc. 108 at 4–5.) Plaintiff highlights that
“[n]one of the Defendants in either claim may legally assert comparative fault of causation
defenses involving the other group, nor can the actions of either Defendant group legally break the
chain of causation for the other.” (Id. at 2.) According to Plaintiff, attempting to instruct a single
jury on the theories of fault for the different defendants under different claims would cause “juror
confusion and risk prejudicially erroneous verdicts,” as the “jury could mistakenly assign blame
for the death itself rather than for the specific rights violations.” (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff also seeks to bifurcate the trial “due to the distinct and independent nature of the
claims asserted.” (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff suggests that the factual timelines of the two claims are
distinct because the § 1983 claims relate to Decedent’s incarceration, while the EMTALA claim
relates to Decedent’s visit to the SWHA emergency room. (Id. at 3.)
Defendant SWHA opposes the motion, arguing that bifurcation would be prejudicial and
inefficient. (Doc. 113 at 2–5.) Defendant first argues the “claims against all defendants share the
same time period, involve the same facts, include the same actors, and concern the same time
period,” and bifurcation would require “duplicative testimony, repeat examination of witnesses,
and redundant presentation of the same evidence—all of which would result in significant
inefficiency, waste of judicial resources, and increased burden on the Court, the jurors, and the
defendants.” (Id. at 3 (citing Dippin’ Dots, LLC v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of. Am., 322 F.R.D.
271, 271 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 23, 2017)).) Defendant next argues that “Plaintiff’s desire to insulate
his claims from complete defenses is not a valid reason to burden the Court and the defendants
with multiple trials.” (Id. at 4.) Defendant suggests, “Plaintiff clearly wishes to obtain two
separate juries to attempt to recover twice for the same injury.” (Id. at 5.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of proving that this case should be
tried in separate phases. The Court understands that a different legal standard applies to § 1983
claims than EMTALA claims. However, given that Plaintiff’s claims stem from a single,
uninterrupted sequence of events that resulted in the same alleged harm, there would likely be
confusion if the jury were to make its determinations in the first phase of trial in isolation and out
of context of the second phase of trial. The Court does not think the factual and legal issues
presented by this case are so complicated as to prevent the jury from diligently deciding the issues,
and the parties may request jury instructions to address and clarify the different claims and
defenses. Further, because separate trials would require duplicative litigation of identical evidence
and witnesses, judicial economy also weighs against bifurcation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to bifurcate the trial (Doc. 108).
SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
/s/__________________________________
CURTIS L. COLLIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE