S.S. v. MOORE COUNTY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

S.S. by and through her guardian

Rumina Slazas, J.S. by and through

his guardian Rumina Slazas, and

RUMINA SLAZAS,

Plaintiffs,

v. 1:24cv658

MOORE COUNTY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This case is before the court on Defendant’s motion to

dismiss. (Doc. 29.) The motion was heard in open court on

June 12, 2025, and the court granted it in part, denied it in

part, and reserved ruling on Plaintiffs’ claim under Olmstead

v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999), as to which the

court permitted supplemental briefing by the parties. (Doc.

47.)

The parties have submitted their supplemental briefing.

(Docs. 48, 49.) Having considered the arguments, the court is

not persuaded that Defendant Moore County has demonstrated

that Plaintiffs have failed to allege a plausible Olmstead

claim. For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ Olmstead claim will be denied.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a

pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is

meant to “test[] the sufficiency of a complaint” and not to

“resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a

claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of

N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). To survive

such a motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must

accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the

complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per

curiam) (citations omitted), and all reasonable inferences

must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Ibarra v.

United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). To survive

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff

must “allege facts to satisfy the elements of a cause of

action” created by the statute. McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep't

of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015); accord Woods v.

City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 648 (4th Cir. 2017). But a

plaintiff need not plead facts sufficient to establish a prima

facie case. McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585.

Here, Plaintiffs proceed under Title II of the American

with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, which “can

be combined for analytical purposes because the analysis is

substantially the same.” Wicomico Nursing Home v. Padilla,

910 F.3d 739, 750 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Seremeth v. Bd. of City. Comm'rs Frederick

Cnty., 673 F.3d 333, 336 n.1 (4th Cir. 2012)). To bring a

claim under either statute, a plaintiff must establish: “(1)

they have a disability; (2) they are otherwise qualified to

receive the benefits of a public service, program, or

activity; and (3) they were denied the benefits of such

service, program, or activity, or otherwise discriminated

against, on the basis of their disability.” Id. (quoting

Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Lamone, 813 F.3d 494, 503 (4th

Cir. 2016)).

Moore County does not challenge the first two elements.

(See generally Doc. 49.) It is the third element - whether

Plaintiffs were “denied the benefits of such service, program,

or activity, or otherwise discriminated against, on the basis

of [his or her] disability,” that is at issue. Lamone, 813

F.3d at 503.

To make out a claim, “a plaintiff must show that she was

excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, a

program or service offered by a public entity, or subjected to

discrimination by that entity.” Constantine v. Rectors &

Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 499 (4th Cir.

2005) (emphasis removed). Title II of the ADA and § 504 of

the Rehabilitation Act protect individuals with disabilities

from “unjustified institutional isolation,” Pashby v. Delia,

709 F.3d 307, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (abrogated on other grounds

by Stinnie v. Holcomb, 37 F.4th 977 (4th Cir. 2022))

(quoting Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600), requiring that services

be provided in integrated, community-based settings where

appropriate, Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607 (plurality op.). Under

Olmstead, the “proscription of discrimination” contained in

Title II of the ADA requires placement of persons with mental

disabilities in community settings rather than in institutions

when “[(1)] the State's treatment professionals determine that

such placement is appropriate, [(2)] the affected persons do

not oppose such treatment, and [(3)] the placement can be

reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources

available to the State and the needs of others with mental

disabilities.” 527 U.S. at 587, 607. The “unjustified

institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a form

of discrimination.” Id. at 600.

Here, Moore County challenges Olmstead’s third prong.

(Doc. 30 at 20.) The county contends that Plaintiffs must

allege not only that viable placement options were available

in the community but must identify a specific option and

allege that such an option was willing to accept the

placements. (Doc. 49 at 1 (contending that Plaintiffs have

failed to allege that “a viable placement existed in the

community where the Plaintiff Children could have been

accommodated”) (emphasis removed); id. at 4-6 (citing Z.S. v.

Durham Cnty, No. 1:21CV663, 2022 WL 673649, at * 3 (M.D.N.C.

Mar. 7, 2022)).) Plaintiffs contend, however, that the

complaint makes out a plausible claim.

The complaint alleges that both minors, S.S. and J.S.,

could reasonably be accommodated in the community. (Doc. 1

¶¶ 57, 106.) As to S.S., Plaintiffs allege she had been in a

“temporary placement at the home of one of her teachers” and

had been approved for an emergency slot for the Innovations

Waiver to permit her to live “in a home-like environment”;

that her former special education teacher and husband were

“approved” for her placement; that she was approved for

potential placement in a group home as well; but that rather

than pursue such options, Moore County elected to place her

unnecessarily in a psychiatric facility and directed a

provider (Sandhills) not to continue to look for a placement

for her. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 65, 77, 78, 81, 82, 84-85.) Plaintiffs

also allege that Sandhills advised Moore County that it would

search for an Alternative Family Living placement for S.S.,

which care staff at UNC Health (where S.S. was placed) also

supported, but that Moore County refused to consider it. (Id.

¶¶ 86-89.) Plaintiffs allege that Moore County had “an array

of non-institutional services that were available and were

able to meet Plaintiff children’s needs.” (Id. ¶ 116) They

claim that the services provided to S.S. in the institutional

setting were “also available in the community in a non-

institutional setting.” (Id. ¶ 117.)

Plaintiffs allege that the services J.S. received in his

institutional setting were “also available in the community in

a non-institutional setting.” (Id. ¶ 118.) Plaintiffs charge

that Moore County “had been told by Sandhills of other,

community-based placement options for J.S.[,] but that [Moore

County] maintained his placement in an [institution].” (Id.

¶ 121.) Plaintiffs conclude that the county exercised

“consistent placement of Plaintiff children in an institution

when home and community-based placements and services were

available, especially after Ms. Slazas fully recovered from

cancer and requested return of Plaintiff children to her

custody and home.” (Id. ¶ 155.)

Though these allegations are far from robust, the court

finds that Moore County has not demonstrated that they fail to

make out a plausible claim, assuming (without deciding) that

Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that such options were

available. Though the County makes a credible argument that

identifying a specific, available option would discourage

unmerited litigation, it has not provided any case law that

clearly sets out such a requirement at this early pleading

stage. Therefore, the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Olmstead

claim will be denied.

For these reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Moore County’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ Olmstead claim (Doc. 29) is DENIED.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder

United States District Judge

July 23, 2025