Brown v. Trump

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SHARON LESLIE BROWN,

Plaintiff,

24-CV-7909 (LLS)

-against-

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

DONALD TRUMP; KAMALA HARRIS;

BARACK OBAMA; CORNELL WEST,

Defendants.

LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court’s federal question

jurisdiction and diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated her rights.

By order dated July 14, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. The Court dismisses the complaint for the reasons

set forth below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

(emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted),

has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the complaint.1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

All ran for president when they were ineligible or West ran because I was going to

run since 1990s when old enough. They have tried to thwart my campaign by

using my campaign ideas to raise funds and get the voter base excited and

interested because they have been successful raising money by using my

campaign ideas the money should revert to my campaign because the voters liked

my ideas not their plagiarism. They are using my ideas and are being hailed for it

even though my posts show I came up with the ideas. They are time date stamped

and Cornell West came to my church with other people to steal my idea to run. He

may be ineligible as a non natural born citizen or because he interfered with

election by trying to cause harm to me to stop me from running my campaign has

suffered because of plagiarism.

(ECF 1 at 5.)

Plaintiff alleges that “the first time” she ran for president in 2012 she was “harassed,

assaulted, lied on, abused, etc.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff seeks money damages and to “stop election

interference” and plagiarism. (Id.)

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous

Under the IFP statute, a court must dismiss an action if it determines that the action is

frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i). “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is

appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). A complaint is “‘factually frivolous’ if the

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation

are as in the original unless noted otherwise.

sufficiently well-pleaded facts are ‘clearly baseless’ − that is, if they are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ or

‘delusional.’” Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Denton, 504 U.S. at

32-33) (finding as frivolous and baseless allegations that set forth a fantastical alternative history

of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25

(1989) (A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”);

Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437(“[A]n action is ‘frivolous’ when either: (1) the factual contentions

are clearly baseless . . . ; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Moreover, a court has “no obligation to

entertain pure speculation and conjecture.” Gallop, 642 F.3d at 368.

Plaintiff’s complaint is premised upon her belief that since 2012, Defendants have

attempted to thwart her presidential campaigns, committed plagiarism, and are responsible for

her having been assaulted and harassed. However, a “[p]laintiff’s beliefs − however strongly she

may hold them − are not facts.” Morren v. New York Univ., No. 20-CV-10802 (JPO) (OTW),

2022 WL 1666918, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2022) (citation omitted), report and

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 1665013 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2022). Plaintiff provides no

factual basis for her assertions that she was the victim of a decade-long conspiracy. See Lefkowitz

v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 13-CV-6414, 2014 WL 2619815, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2014)

(complaint must set forth facts showing basis for information and belief); Johnson v. Univ. of

Rochester Med. Ctr., 686 F. Supp. 2d 259, 266 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (even where necessary evidence

is in “exclusive control of the defendant, . . . plaintiff must still set forth the factual basis for that

belief”).

The Court finds that Plaintiff does not provide any plausible factual support for her

claims and that they rise to the level of the irrational. See Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437. Plaintiff

has provided the court with a narrative full of details of what she believes − that Defendants have

conspired to deprive her of her rights. Despite all of the details provided, Plaintiff has pleaded no

factual predicate in support of her assertions. Plaintiff’s allegations amount to conclusory claims

and suspicions that are not plausible and must be dismissed as frivolous. See Kraft v. City of New

York, 823 F. App’x 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that “the district court did not err in sua sponte

dismissing the complaint as frivolous,” based on the plaintiff’s allegations that he had “been the

subject of 24-hour, multi-jurisdictional surveillance by federal ‘fusion centers’ and the New York

State Intelligence Center, which put a ‘digital marker’ on him in order to collect his personal data

and harass him”); Khalil v. United States, No. 17-CV-2652, 2018 WL 443343, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.

Jan. 12, 2018) (dismissing complaint where “[p]laintiff allege[d] a broad conspiracy involving

surveillance of and interference with his life by the United States and various government actors”

because her allegations were “irrational and wholly incredible”).

B. Leave to amend denied

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to

cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

Plaintiff’s complaint does not suggest that she is in possession of facts that would cure the

identified deficiencies. See Gallop, 642 F.3d at 369 (district court did not err in dismissing claim

with prejudice in absence of any indication plaintiff could or would provide additional

allegations leading to different result); Fischman v. Mitsubishi Chem. Holdings Am., Inc., No. 18-

CV-8188, 2019 WL 3034866, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2019) (declining to grant leave to amend

as to certain claims in the absence of any suggestion that additional facts could remedy defects in

the plaintiff’s pleading). Because the defects in Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured with an

amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend and dismisses the action as

frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

C. Litigation history and warning

The Court notes that Plaintiff, under the name “Sharon Jeter,” is barred, under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g), from filing any federal civil action IFP while she is a prisoner, unless she is under

imminent danger of serious physical injury. See Jeter v. CNYPC, ECF 1:15-CV-6802, 6

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005) (lead action). Plaintiff is barred under Section 1915(g) from filing

actions while she is a prisoner because she previously filed three or more civil actions or appeals

in a federal court that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim on

which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

It seems that Plaintiff, now that she is no longer incarcerated, has continued to file

nonmeritorious civil actions in this court under the name “Sharon Brown,” “Sharon L. Brown,”

or “Sharon Leslie Brown.” See, e.g., Brown v. Ventura, No. 1:25-CV-3635 (LLS) (S.D.N.Y.

June 20, 2025) (dismissed as frivolous); Brown v. World Health Org., ECF 1:24-CV-7216, 11

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2025) (dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, notice of appeal filed

Mar. 28, 2025); Brown v. United Nations, ECF 1:24-CV-7061, 10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2025)

(same, notice of appeal filed Mar. 7, 2025). Accordingly, the Court warns Plaintiff that, if she

continues to file nonmeritorious litigation in this court, the court may issue an order barring her

from filing new civil actions in this court IFP without leave of the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651

CONCLUSION

The Court dismisses this action as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). All

pending matters are terminated.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status 1s denied for the purpose of an

appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment dismissing this action.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 21, 2025

New York, New York

Louis L. Stanton

U.S.D.J.