The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
JEREMY JONES,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:22-cv-00231-AAS
OFFICER DAVID CEINSKI, JR.,
in his individual capacity,
Defendant,
____________________________________/
ORDER
Defendant Officer David Ceinski, Jr. moves to reopen discovery. (Doc.
66). Plaintiff Jeremy Jones opposes the motion. (Doc. 67).
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from an August 8, 2020 traffic stop and Officer Ceinski’s
alleged use of excessive force on Mr. Jones. On January 22, 2022, Mr. Jones
filed his complaint against Officer Ceinski, in his individual capacity, under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Mr. Jones effectuated service of process on February 7,
2022, and Officer Ceinski responded to the complaint on February 28, 2022.
(Doc. 9). On April 19, 2022, this Court entered a Case Management and
Scheduling Order with a discovery deadline of January 17, 2023. (Doc. 16, p.
2). The order advised that the case management deadlines “will be strictly
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enforced.” (Id., p. 1).
On March 30, 2023, Officer Ceinski moved for summary judgment,
arguing Mr. Jones’s claims were barred. (Doc. 40). Mr. Jones responded in
opposition to Officer Ceinski’s motion, and Officer Ceinski replied to Mr.
Jones’s response. (Docs. 51, 52). On May 30, 2023, this court granted summary
judgment for Officer Ceinski based on qualified immunity and judgment was
entered in his favor. (Docs. 53, 54). On June 29, 2023, Mr. Jones appealed. (Doc.
55). On May 8, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit reversed judgment for Officer
Ceinski and remanded this action for further proceedings. (Doc. 62).
On June 3, 2025, Attorneys Catherine Carson-Freymann and Todd
Murgo substituted as counsel for Officer Ceinski. (Doc. 61). On June 26, 2025,
the parties appeared for a videoconference to discuss scheduling trial dates and
deadlines. (Doc. 65). At the videoconference, the parties stated they could be
available for trial in August or November 2025. (Doc. 64). Officer Ceinski now
moves to reopen discovery. (Doc. 66). Mr. Jones opposes the motion. (Doc. 67).
II. ANALYSIS
“A party seeking the extension of an already-expired scheduling order
deadline must show both good cause and excusable neglect.” Payne v. C.R.
Bard, Inc., 606 F. App’x 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)
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and Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4)). To establish “good cause,” the party moving to
reopen discovery must show that the court’s already-expired scheduling order
deadline could not be met despite the party’s “diligence.” See Id. A moving
party cannot establish the diligence necessary to show good cause if it had full
knowledge of the information before the scheduling deadline passed or if the
party failed to seek the needed information before the deadline. See Williams
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., No. 3:09-cv-225, 2010 WL 3419720, at
*1 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 2010).
The “excusable neglect” standard is “more rigorous” than the “good
cause” standard. See Hughley v. Lee County, Ala., No. 3:15-CV-126, 2015 WL
4094461, at *1 (M.D. Ala. June 9, 2015). In determining whether a party has
shown excusable neglect, courts consider “(1) the danger of prejudice to the
nonmovant; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial
proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the
reasonable control of the movant; and (4) whether the movant acted in good
faith.” EarthCam, Inc. v. OxBlue Corp., 703 F. App’x 803, 813 (11th Cir. 2017)
(citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380,
395 (1993)). Primary importance is given to the lack of prejudice to the
nonmoving party and the interest of efficient judicial administration. See
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Ashmore v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Transp., 503 F. App’x 683, 685 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing
Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848, 850 (11th Cir. 1996)).
The Eleventh Circuit has “often held that a district court has not abused its
discretion by holding the litigants to the clear terms of its scheduling order.”
See Ashmore, 503 F. App’x at 685.
The record does not establish the requisite diligence to warrant
reopening discovery. For example, on May 11, 2022, Mr. Jones disclosed his
fact witnesses and his medical facilities. (Doc. 67, Ex. A). On August 9, 2022,
Mr. Jones’s counsel offered the week of October 24, 2022 to schedule
depositions, but counsel for Officer Ceinski made no further attempts to
schedule those depositions. (Doc. 67, Ex. B). On October 13, 2022, Mr. Jones
disclosed his expert witnesses. (Doc. 67, Ex. C). Counsel for Officer Ceinski
made no efforts to depose Mr. Jones’s experts nor provide defense experts.
Officer Ceinski also did not propound written discovery on Mr. Jones. Although
Officer Ceinski twice requested modifications of the scheduling order, he did
not request an extension of the discovery deadline. (See Docs. 24, 37).
Officer Ceinski argues prior counsel’s strategy was tailored toward the
qualified immunity defense. (Doc. 66, p. 4). However, Officer Ceinski’s answer
contains six affirmative defenses: (1) failure to state a cause of action, (2)
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sovereign immunity, (3) damage limitations in Florida Statutes, (4) failure to
mitigate, (5) arrest made on probable cause, and (6) qualified immunity. (Doc.
9). Officer Ceinski had nine months to focus discovery efforts on his other five
affirmative defenses. Now, Officer Ceinski requests to re-open discovery for
unspecified written discovery and to take depositions of Mr. Jones and five
other individuals who were disclosed months before the discovery deadline. In
addition, these individuals were also included on Officer Ceinski’s initial
disclosures dated June 6, 2022. (Doc. 67, Ex. E). See Sweet v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., No. 1:08-CV-2094-WBH-SSC, 2009 WL 10664952, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug.
21, 2009) (denying motion to reopen discovery where movant did not dispute
they “had the opportunity to take the depositions . . . during the [ ] discovery
period but chose not to do so”).
Finally, discovery closed on January 17, 2023, and Officer Ceinski filed
his motion for summary judgment on March 30, 2023. (Doc. 40). The court can
find no case law supporting Officer Ceinski’s claim that a reversal on appeal
provides good cause to re-open discovery. See In re 3M Combat Arms Earplug
Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 3:19-MD-2885, 2021 WL 6327368, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug.
19, 2021) (holding the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by the costs and burdens
of preparing for and taking a deposition out of time in the middle of preparing
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for trial, and “[t]his alone is a sufficient basis to deny Defendants’ motion”).
II. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
(1) Officer Ceinski’s motion to reopen discovery (Doc. 66) is DENIED.
(2) By July 25, 2025, the parties must confer and file a notice advising
the court of their selected trial week.!
ENTERED in Tampa, Florida, on July 22, 2025.
Aranda. Arno Sasone_
AMANDA ARNOLD SANSONE
United States Magistrate Judge
1 As advised at the videoconference on June 26, 2025, the available trial weeks are
August 25, 2025, November 3, 2025, and November 10, 2025. (See Doc. 64).