Dan v. State of New York

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

____________________________________________

CHONG LEE DAN,

Plaintiff,

vs. 1:24-CV-1233

(MAD/PJE)

STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

Chong Lee Dan

Cairo, New York 12413

Plaintiff Pro Se

Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 8, 2024, Plaintiff Chong Lee Dan commenced this action, pro se, against the

State of New York, Greene County, the Town of Cairo, various state, county, and town actors,

and one private actor alleging violations of his rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and

1986.1 See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff also moved to proceed in forma pauperis. See Dkt. No. 2.2

1Plaintiff also alleges violations pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 and New

York State Penal Code. See Dkt. No. 1. The individual Defendants include the following:

Deputy Sheriff Ryan Schrader; Deputy Sherrif Kaitlyn Raynor; Sergeant Shawn Marriott;

Sergeant Scott Christman; Sheriff Peter Kusminksy; Commissioner of the New York State

Department of Motor Vehicles Mark J.F. Schroeder; County Administrator Shaun S. Groden;

Town Supervisor Jason Watts; Greene County Attorney Edward I. Kaplan; District Attorney

Joseph Stanzione; Assistant District Attorney Jennifer Sandleitner; Public Defender Angelo F.

Scaturro; and John Vandenburgh, owner of JR's Transmission. See id. at 3-6.

2 The Court notes that Plaintiff filed another action in this District on January 27, 2025. See Dan

v . Hochul, No. 1:25-CV-122, Dkt. No. 1 (N.D.N.Y.). The Court deemed that case related to the

On May 20, 2025, Magistrate Judge Paul J. Evangelista issued a Report-Recommendation

and Order granting Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and recommending that Plaintiff's

federal claims be dismissed on grounds of sovereign immunity and failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii), and that the Court

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. See Dkt. No. 6 at

28. On June 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed objections. See Dkt. No. 7.3

II. BACKGROUND

This case arises from events that took place on March 15, 2024, at approximately 3:20

p.m., when Plaintiff used his 2005 Chevrolet Astro to drive to Cairo Food Mart in the Town of

Cairo in Greene County, New York. See Dkt. No. 1 at 6. Defendant Ryan Schrader, Deputy

Sherriff with the Greene County Sheriff's Office, confronted Plaintiff because of an expired

Maryland tag on Plaintiff's vehicle and later learned that the vehicle had an out-of-date

registration and Plaintiff did not have a driver's license. See id. at 7, 8-9. Plaintiff recorded the

interaction with Defendant Schrader, wherein Plaintiff received two traffic citations, one for

unlicensed operation of a vehicle and another for lack of valid registration. See id. at 11. Plaintiff

contested these citations with Defendant Schrader on the belief that New York traffic law requires

a driver's license and registration only when "driving" a vehicle and not when "traveling" with a

present action as Plaintiff raises nearly identical claims against Governor Kathy Hochul arising

from the same events. A motion to dismiss was filed on April 14, 2025. See id., Dkt. No. 17. A

letter motion from Plaintiff requesting an adjournment to amend his complaint was filed on June

24, 2025, and denied on June 25, 2025. See id., Dkt. Nos. 21, 22.

3 Affording Plaintiff the special solicitude ordinarily given to pro se litigants, the Court notes that

although Plaintiff's fifty-three-page objections exceed the twenty-five-page limit pursuant to

Local Rule 72.1(c), the Court will consider them. See N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.1(c); see also Tracy v.

Freshwater, 623 F. 3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) ("It is well established that a court is ordinarily

obligated to afford a special solicitude to pro se litigants").

vehicle under 49 C.F.R. § 395.1(j)(1). Id. at 7, 12; see also 49 C.F.R. § 395.1(j)(1) ("When a

property-carrying commercial motor vehicle driver at the direction of the motor carrier is

traveling, but not driving or assuming any other responsibility to the carrier, such time must be

counted as on-duty time unless the driver is afforded at least 10 consecutive hours off duty when

arriving at destination, in which case he/she must be considered off duty for the entire period").

Plaintiff also argued to Defendant Schrader that the State's registration and driver's license

requirements only apply to "motor vehicles" which requires "commercial activity as an element"

and, therefore, would not implicate Plaintiff's 2005 Chevrolet Astro which he lived out of and

used as a means of travel. Id. at 7, 12; see also 18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(6) ("The term 'motor vehicle'

means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power

and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers

and property, or property or cargo"). Defendant Schrader told Plaintiff he witnessed Plaintiff

"behind the wheel on a public highway operating [a] vehicle," which constituted "driving." Id. at

8, 11. After receiving the citations, Plaintiff's vehicle was impounded and towed to JR's

Transmission owned by Defendant John Vandenburgh. See id. at 13. Plaintiff pleaded "not

guilty" to the citations at the Town of Cairo Municipal Court, and he "requested a supporting

deposition" and "filed a motion for dismissal, a copy of the public record that Deputy Schrader

received, . . . a notice on US attorney and an affidavit of sovereign status with the Cairo

Municipal Court clerk." Id. The municipal court case was later dismissed "for lack of a

supporting deposition." Id. at 14; see Dkt. No. 6 at 7.

In his complaint, Plaintiff raises fourteen causes of action and seeks over five million

dollars in compensatory damages along with injunctive and declaratory relief for the return of his

vehicle. See id. at 32. Additionally, Plaintiff wants the State of New York, County of Greene,

and Town of Cairo to adopt (1) the use of "motor vehicle" as Plaintiff claims it should be used

under 18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(6), and (2) the terms "driving" and "traveling" under 49 C.F.R. §

395.1(j)(1) into their policies, practices, and customs. See id.4

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

"[W]hen a party files 'general or conclusory objections or objections which merely recite

the same arguments [that he presented] to the magistrate judge,' the court reviews those

recommendations for clear error." Idlisan v. SUNY Upstate Med. Univ., No. 5:12-CV-1790, 2013

WL 486279, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2013) (quoting O'Diah v. Mawhir, No. 9:08-CV-322, 2011

WL 933846, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011)) (citations and footnote omitted). "[A] district court

will ordinarily refuse to consider argument that could have been, but was not, presented to the

magistrate judge in the first instance." Bryant v. Miller, No. 9:18-CV-0494, 2019 WL 4267376,

*2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2019) (citing Zhao v. State Univ. of N.Y., No. 04-CV-0210, 2011 WL

3610717, *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2011)).

"When a party files specific objections to a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the

district court makes a 'de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed

findings or recommendations to which objection is made.'" Idlisan, 2013 WL 486279, at *1

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). "To be 'specific,' the objection must, with particularity, 'identify

[1] the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which it has an objection

and [2] the basis for the objection.'" Boice v. M + W U.S., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 3d 677, 683

(N.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.1(c)). "After the appropriate review, 'the court may

4 A more complete recitation of the factual background is contained in Magistrate Judge

Evangelista's Report-Recommendation and Order. See Dkt. No. 6 at 4-14.

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate judge.'" Idlisan, 2013 WL 486279, at *1 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)).

When a plaintiff proceeds pro se, "the Court must review his complaint under a more

lenient standard." Gerken v. Gordon, No. 1:24-CV-435, 2024 WL 5001402, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Dec.

6, 2024) (citing Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2003)). Therefore, "[a]

document filed pro se is 'to be liberally construed,' . . . and 'a pro se complaint, however inartfully

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'"

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))

(internal citation omitted). "'Although the court has the duty to show liberality towards pro se

litigants, . . . there is a responsibility on the court to determine that a claim has some arguable

basis in law before permitting a plaintiff to proceed with an action in forma pauperis.'" Gerken,

2024 WL 5001402, at *1 (quoting Moreman v. Douglas, 848 F. Supp. 332, 333-34 (N.D.N.Y.

1994)). A complaint, ultimately, must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face[,]" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and assert

"more than sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009).

B. Sovereign Immunity

Magistrate Judge Evangelista first recommends that Plaintiff's claim for monetary

damages against the State of New York and Commissioner Mark J.F. Schroeder of the New York

State Department of Motor Vehicles, acting in his official capacity, be dismissed because of

sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Dkt. No. 6 at 14; see also Dkt. No. 1 at

3-4. The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Evangelista because, under the Eleventh

Amendment, "'state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their

Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh

Amendment immunity when acting pursuant to its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment.'" Yerdon v. Poitras, 120 F.4th 1150, 1153 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Gollomp v.

Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009)). Additionally, sovereign immunity extends to "suits

not only against the state itself but also against state officials when sued in their official

capacities." Id. (citing Ford v. Reynolds, 316 F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir. 2003)).

In Plaintiff's objections, he disputes the application of sovereign immunity, because

"[s]overeign immunity does not prevent individuals from suing government officials who attempt

to enforce laws that are unconstitutional or without constitutional constraints." Dkt. No. 7 at 50.

While a plaintiff can sue state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief,

Magistrate Judge Evangelista correctly concluded that Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages are

not permissible. See Dkt. No. 6 at 14. Therefore, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's

recommendation that the State of New York and Commissioner Schroeder are immune from suit

under the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 5.5

5 In Plaintiff's objections, he also references Ex Parte Young. See Dkt. No. 7 at 49-50. The Ex

Parte Young doctrine provides an exception to sovereign immunity. See Brown v. New York, 975

F. Supp. 2d 209, 225 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). However, it is only triggered when there is a properly

pled claim for injunctive relief. Id. To determine if the exception applies, "'a court need only

conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of

federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.'" Ford, 316 F.3d at 355

(quoting Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). Plaintiff seeks

"declaratory and injunctive relief against the State of New York, County of Greene, and Town of

Cairo enjoining policies, practices, and customs to encourage the operating of the term 'motor

vehicle' by no other definition than the definition give[n] by the United States Code[]" and wants

the State to "institute policies, procedures, and training for the law enforcement agencies of these

entities to bring them into compliance with constitutional standards." Dkt. No. 1 at 32. However,

Plaintiff's request for injunctive and declaratory relief, which seek to remove the state law

requirement of a driver's license and/or vehicle registration as unconstitutional, is retroactive.

Even if the requests were properly pled as prospective, they must be dismissed for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

C. Monell claims against the County and Town

Generally, the "[b]ar of Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts extends to states and

state officials . . . but does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt.

Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (citing Lincoln Cnty. v.

Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890)) (internal citations omitted); see also Holley v. Lavine, 605

F.2d 638, 644-45 (2d Cir. 1979) (concluding that a county employee defendant was not immune

from suit under the Eleventh Amendment). Here, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and

injunctive relief against Defendants Greene County, the Town of Cairo, and county and town

employees in their official and individual capacities—claims which Magistrate Judge Evangelista

recommends be dismissed. See Dkt. No. 6 at 14. Although sovereign immunity generally does

not bar suits against county and town defendants sued in their official capacities, these official

capacity claims against the individual town and county employees are deemed to be brought

against the municipalities themselves.

Plaintiff seeks to sue Greene County, the Town of Cairo, County Administrator Shaun

Groden, County Attorney Edward I. Kaplan, and Town Supervisor Jason Watts pursuant to

Monell for alleged deprivations of Plaintiff's substantive due process rights through "de facto

policies . . . , practices, and customs of civil rights violations and unconstitutional practices" by

"approv[ing], authoriz[ing], and acquiesc[ing] in the unlawful and unconstitutional conduct of

defining the term 'motor vehicle' by a definition other than the definition given by the United

States Code[.]" Dkt. No. 1 at 22.7 Plaintiff claims that these "policies" violated his constitutional

6 See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

7 Plaintiff additionally asserts that these "policies" violate the Administrative Procedure Act of

1946, 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq. Dkt. No. 1 at 16. The Court adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's

r ecommendation that this claim is without merit as the Administrative Procedure Act is only

rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 24.

To make out a Monell claim, Plaintiff must "'plead and prove three elements: (1) an

official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a

constitutional right.'" Chompupong v. City Schenectady, 511 F. Supp. 3d 228, 240 (N.D.N.Y.

2020) (quoting Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007)) (additional quotation

and quotation marks omitted). "Although 'official policy' often refers to formal rules or customs

that intentionally establish 'fixed plans of action' over a period of time, when a municipality

'chooses a course of action tailored to a particular situation,' this may also 'represent[ ] an act of

official government "policy[.]"'" Montero v. City of Yonkers, New York, 890 F.3d 386, 403 (2d

Cir. 2018) (quoting Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2004))

(additional quotation omitted). Additionally, "'mere allegations of a municipal custom, a practice

of tolerating official misconduct, or inadequate training and/or supervision are insufficient to

demonstrate the existence of such a custom unless supported by factual details.'" Hicks v. City of

Syracuse, No. 5:17-CV-0475, 2018 WL 6308653, *3 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2018) (quoting Tieman v.

City of Newburgh, No. 13-CV-4178, 2015 WL 1379652, *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015)). The

Court agrees with and adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation that Plaintiff's

applicable to federal agencies. See Dkt. No. 6 at 24; see also New York v. Atl. States Marine

Fisheries Comm'n, 609 F.3d 524, 534-35 (2d Cir. 2010) (declining to extend theory of status as a

quasi-federal agency to a state agency for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act).

8 The Court also adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation that Plaintiff's claim

under the Thirteenth Amendment be dismissed for failure to state a claim because Plaintiff's claim

is based upon the incorrect belief that state requirements for driver's licenses "amounts to 'forced

labor/involuntary servitude.'" Dkt. No. 6 at 24 (quoting Dkt. No. 1 at 21); see also Boyle v. Town

of Hammond, No. 7:08-CV-1065, 2008 WL 11416992, *5 (quoting United States v. Kozminski,

487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988)) ("The phrase 'involuntary servitude' was intended '"to cover those

forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery which in practical operation would tend to

p roduce like undesirable results"'") (additional citation omitted).

allegations of unconstitutional policies much be dismissed as against Defendants Greene County

and Town of Cairo because they are conclusory. See Dkt. No. 6 at 25.

As to the county and town employees, "in the absence of an official policy adopted by the

municipality itself, municipal liability attaches only where 'a deliberate choice to follow a course

of action is made . . . by the official responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the

subject matter in question.'" Flannery v. Cnty. of Niagara, 763 F. Supp. 3d 364, 396 (W.D.N.Y.

2025) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986)). "Whether an alleged

official may be considered as a final policy-maker on behalf of a municipal defendant depends on

whether applicable state law confers such status on the official and whether such status includes

policy-making authority over the subject area underlying a plaintiff's § 1983 claims." Id. at 397

(citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483). "It is ultimately the plaintiff's burden to establish, as a matter

of law, 'that [an] official had final policymaking authority in the particular area involved. . . .'"

Edrei v. City of New York, 254 F. Supp. 3d 565, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff'd sub nom., Edrei v.

Maguire, 892 F.3d 525 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2000)).

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Groden, Kaplan, and Watts hold final policymaking

authority concerning Plaintiff's challenges to New York State traffic laws. See Dkt. No. 1 at 22-

24. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Groden, Kaplan, and Watts are insufficient to

support Monell liability and must be dismissed. See Flannery, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 414.

D. Malicious Prosecution

1. Claims Against County Sherriff and Officers

Next, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation that Plaintiff's

claim for malicious prosecution against all Defendants for "caus[ing], instigat[ing], influenc[ing],

or participat[ing] in the decision to charge Plaintiff with New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law

violations without probable cause[]" be dismissed. Dkt. No. 1 at 19; see Dkt. No. 6 at 22.

"To prevail on a [§] 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, 'a plaintiff must show a

violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment . . . and must establish the elements of a

malicious prosecution claim under state law.'" Shabazz v. Johnson City Police Dep't, No. 3:18-

CV-570, 2019 WL 2617016, *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 26, 2019) (quoting Manganiello v. City of New

York, 612 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2010)). In New York, a plaintiff must allege "(1) the initiation

or continuation of a criminal proceeding against plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in

plaintiff's favor; (3) lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and (4) actual malice

as a motivation for defendant's actions." Russell v. Smith, 68 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing

Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 100 (2d Cir. 1991)). "Initiating a criminal proceeding against a

person without probable cause, coupled with a deprivation of liberty, is a Fourth Amendment

violation." Shabazz, 2019 WL 2617016, at *4 (citing Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 944-45 (2d

Cir. 1997)).

The Second Circuit has held that while generally police officers do not "'commence or

continue' criminal proceedings against defendants, a claim for malicious prosecution can still be

maintained against a police officer if the officer is found to 'play[ ] an active role in the

prosecution, such as giving advice and encouragement or importuning the authorities to act.'"

Bermudez v. City of New York, 790 F.3d 368, 377 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Manganiello v. City of

New York, 612 F.3d 149, 163 (2d Cir. 2010)). "As one court has observed, '[n]early all cases in

which law enforcement officers were found to have initiated or continued a prosecution for

purposes of a malicious prosecution claim involve officers who provided knowingly false and/or

fabricated evidence to unwitting prosecutors.'" Besedin v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 18-CV-00819,

2024 WL 4225956, *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2024) (quoting Joyner v. Cnty. of Cayuga, No. 5:20-

CV-60, 2020 WL 1904088, *8 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2020)); see also Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit

Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997). The Court adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's

recommendation that Plaintiff's claim must be dismissed because he has failed to allege

Defendants played an active role in a prosecution or provided false information to prosecutors.

See Dkt. No. 6 at 22-23.

In regard to Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants acted without probable cause, Plaintiff

has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Dkt. No. 1 at 19-20. As stated

by Magistrate Judge Evangelista, Plaintiff concedes in his complaint that he did not have a

driver's license or valid vehicle registration but contends that he was ticketed without probable

cause because he was not required to have either. See Dkt. No. 6 at 23. "'[T]he existence of

probable cause is a complete defense to a claim of malicious prosecution.'" Werkheiser, 655 F.

Supp. 3d at 104 (quoting Adams v. City of New York, 226 F. Supp. 3d 261, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)).

"'Probable cause, in the context of malicious prosecution, has . . . been described as such facts and

circumstances as would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe the plaintiff guilty.'" Id.

(citing Adams, 226 F. Supp. 3d at 269).

Under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law,

[e]xcept while operating a motor vehicle during the course of a road

test conducted pursuant to the provisions of this article, no person

shall operate or drive a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this

state or upon any sidewalk or to or from any lot adjacent to a public

garage, supermarket, shopping center or car washing establishment

or to or from or into a public garage or car washing establishment

unless he is duly licensed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.

N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 509 (emphasis added). Additionally, New York Vehicle and Traffic

Law provides that, "[n]o motor vehicle shall be operated or driven upon the public highways of

this state without first being registered in accordance with the provisions of this article, except as

otherwise expressly provided in this chapter." Id. § 401 (emphasis added).

Here, Plaintiff claims Defendants acted without probable cause when Defendant Schrader

ticketed Plaintiff for operating a vehicle without a driver's license or valid vehicle registration.

See Dkt. No. 1 at 19. However, Plaintiff admits in his complaint that he did not have a driver's

license or valid vehicle registration and told Defendant Schrader that he was not required to have

either. See Dkt. No. 1 at 8-9. The Court adopts the recommendation of Magistrate Judge

Evangelista that Plaintiff's allegations in his complaint establish probable cause for Plaintiff to be

ticketed in violation of N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 401 and § 509. See Dkt. No. 6 at 23. Therefore,

Plaintiff has failed to state a malicious prosecution claim against Defendants. See id.

2. Claims against Prosecutors

Magistrate Judge Evangelista recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's malicious prosecution

claims against Defendants Stanzione and Sandleitner based on a lack of sufficient explanation as

to how they, as prosecutors, were personally involved in any purported malicious prosecution.

See Dkt. No. 6 at 23. "'In this Circuit[,] personal involvement of [D]efendants in alleged

constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.'" Moffit v.

Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d

930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977)). Plaintiff must "allege a tangible connection between the acts of a

defendant and the injuries suffered." Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that after a "50-H hearing at the Greene County Office Building"

Defendants Stanzione and Sandleitner engaged "in a seditious conspiracy to overthrow the

Constitution and violate his God-given rights." Dkt. No. 1 at 15. Plaintiff bases his claims on

Defendants' failure to respond to his multiple attempts to contact them at their places of

employment to provide a supporting deposition. See id. Plaintiff alleges this created a "legal

problem" for Plaintiff and constituted a "continued [] deprivation of Plaintiff's rights to private

property and substantive and procedural due process." Id. The Court agrees with Magistrate

Judge Evangelista's recommendation that Plaintiff has failed to connect Defendant Stanzione or

Sandleitner's conduct to a malicious prosecution.

Magistrate Judge Evangelista also states, in a footnote, that Defendants Stanzione and

Sandleitner are likely immune from suit on grounds of prosecutorial immunity. See Dkt. No. 6 at

23 n.15. "The Second Circuit has made clear that 'prosecutors enjoy "absolute immunity from §

1983 liability for those prosecutorial activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the

criminal process."'" Werkheiser v. Cnty. of Broome, 655 F. Supp. 3d 88, 100 (N.D.N.Y. 2023)

(quoting Anilao v. Spota, 27 F.4th 855, 864 (2d Cir. 2022)) (additional quotation omitted). "For

example, a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity when determining which offenses to charge,

initiating a prosecution, presenting a case to a grand jury, and preparing for trial." Anilao, 27

F.4th at 864 (citing Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). Therefore, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge

Evangelista's recommendation that even if Plaintiff sufficiently alleged Defendant Stanzione and

Sandleitner's personal involvement in a prosecution, the claims against them are barred by

prosecutorial immunity and must be dismissed. See Dkt. No. 6 at 23 n.15.

E. Private Actor Liability

The Court also adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's conclusion that John Vandenburgh,

owner of JR's Transmission, cannot be held liable for the alleged constitutional violations because

Plaintiff's complaint does not plausibly suggest that Defendant Vandenburgh was acting under the

color of state law or in concert with state actors. See Dkt. No. 6 at 21. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Vandenburgh engaged in a conspiracy with the State to violate his constitutional rights

when an unidentified employee of JR's Transmission assisted with a tow truck removal of

Plaintiff's van after Plaintiff received the traffic citations. See Dkt. No. 1 at 17. "In order to state

a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was injured by either a state actor or a private

party acting under color of state law." Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir.

2002) (citing Spear v. Town of West Hartford, 954 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1992). "'To state a claim

against a private entity on a [§] 1983 conspiracy theory, the complaint must allege facts

demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an

unconstitutional act.'" Id. at 324 (quoting Spear, 954 F.2d at 68)). Plaintiff must show the private

actor "'is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.'" Id. (quoting Adickes v.

S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)). However, "[a] merely conclusory allegation that a

private entity acted in concert with a state actor does not suffice to state a § 1983 claim against the

private entity." Id. (citing Spear, 954 F.2d at 68).

Plaintiff's complaint contends Defendant Vandenburgh was "a willing participant" and

"act[ed] under color of New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law." Dkt. No. 1 at 17. However,

the complaint contains no factual basis to plausibly assert Defendant Vandenburgh conspired to

deprive the Plaintiff of his private property. Ciambrello, 292 F.3d at 324. It is not sufficient that

Plaintiff's vehicle was impounded at JR's Transmission to constitute state action as "courts have

rejected the notion that private towing companies operating pursuant to licenses, permits, or

contracts issued by the state are state actors." VW Credit Leasing LTD. v. Runway Towing Corp.,

757 F. Supp. 3d 271, 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) ("Companies that provide services to municipalities . .

. are not thereby transformed into state actors . . . where, as here, the function performed (towing

cars) has not been historically, traditionally and exclusively the prerogative of the state") (quoting

Calderon v. Burton, 457 F. Supp. 2d 480, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). For these reasons, the Court

adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation to dismiss the claims against Defendant

Vandenburgh. See Dkt. No. 6 at 21.

Additionally, the Court adopts the recommendation of Magistrate Judge Evangelista that

Defendant Vandenburgh cannot be liable for conspiracy. See Dkt. No. 6 at 21-22. "A valid claim

of conspiracy under § 1983 to violate a complainant's constitutional rights must contain

allegations of (1) a conspiracy itself, plus (2) actual deprivation of constitutional rights. A

violated constitutional right is a natural prerequisite to a claim of conspiracy to violate such

right." Romer v. Morgenthau, 119 F. Supp. 2d 346, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Malsh v. Austin,

901 F. Supp. 757, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). "[I]f a plaintiff cannot sufficiently allege a violation of

his rights, it follows that he cannot sustain a claim of conspiracy to violate those rights." Id.

(citation omitted). Plaintiff's allegations are conclusory and lack a constitutional violation on

which to stand because, as explained later in this Memorandum-Decision and Order, no

constitutional violation has been properly alleged. See Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622

(1915).

The Court also agrees with Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation to dismiss

Plaintiff's alleged §§ 1985 and 1986 claims whereby there must be "'(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the

purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal

protection of the laws, . . . ; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is . . .

deprived of any right of a citizen of the United States.'" Brown v. City of Oneonta, New York, 221

F.3d 329, 341 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[A] § 1986 claim must be predicated on a valid § 1985 claim").

Such claims must be motivated by "'some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously

discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action.'" Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 130

(1985) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). As noted by Magistrate Judge

Evangelista, Plaintiff has not alleged class-based or racial animus. See Dkt. No. 6 at 20.

Therefore, the Court adopts that portion of the Report-Recommendation and Order which

recommends the §§ 1985 and 1986 claims be dismissed. See id. at 19-20.

Next, as to Defendant Scaturro, a Greene County Public Defender, Plaintiff's claims must

also be dismissed. The Supreme Court has noted "that a public defender does not act under color

of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a

criminal proceeding." Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); see also Tapp v.

Champagne, 164 Fed. Appx. 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2006). Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant

Scaturro has acted outside his traditional functions as a public defender. See Dkt. No. 1 at 18-19.

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot bring a cause of action under § 1983 against Defendant Scaturro and

the claim must be dismissed. See id.

F. Failure to State a Claim

Magistrate Judge Evangelista concluded Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed as

frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). See Dkt. No. 6 at 28. The Second Circuit has defined "an action [as]

'frivolous' when either: (1) 'the "factual contentions are clearly baseless, such as when allegations

are the product of delusion or fantasy;' or (2) 'the claim is based on an "indisputably meritless

legal theory."'" Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998)

(quoting Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990)) (additional quotation omitted).

Plaintiff's complaint and the basis of his objections turn on whether the State of New York

can constitutionally require an individual to maintain a valid driver's license and vehicle

registration. See Dkt. No. 1 at 9; see also Dkt. No. 7 at 15-16. The Supreme Court addressed this

issue in Hendrick v. Maryland, and stated as follows:

In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state

may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public

safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all

motor vehicles, []those moving in interstate commerce as well as

others. And to this end it may require the registration of such

vehicles and the licensing of their drivers, charging therefor

reasonable fees graduated according to the horse-power of the

engines, []a practical measure of size, speed, and difficulty of

control. This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly

recognized as belonging to the states and essential to the

preservation of the health, safety, and comfort of their citizens; and

it does not constitute a direct and material burden on interstate

commerce.

Ali v. Siwek, No. 23-CV-354, 2023 WL 9184481, *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2023) (quoting

Hendrick, 235 U.S. at 622) (alterations omitted). Driving a vehicle, as Plaintiff was witnessed

doing by Defendant Schrader, has never been recognized as a fundamental constitutional right;

therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right. See Dkt. No. 6 at 8; see

also Crandall v. New York State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, No. 1:10-CV-918, 2011 WL 2295742,

*2 (N.D.N.Y June 8, 2011) (quoting Haselton v. Amestoy, No. 1:03-CV-223, 2003 WL 23273581,

*2 (D. Vt. Mar. 16, 2004)).

It has been recognized that the states have the constitutional police power to regulate and

"enact laws requiring owners of motor vehicles to register those vehicles." Ali, 2023 WL 9184481

at *3 ; see also Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 143 (1927); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167

(1916) ("The power of a state to regulate the use of motor vehicles on its highways has been

recently considered by this court and broadly sustained"). The Second Circuit has acknowledged

an "undenied power of a state to impose a registration or license fee on those using motor vehicles

in the state[.]" Spector Motor Serv. Inc., v. Walsh, Tax Com'r, 139 F.2d 809, 814 (2d Cir. 1943)

(citing Hendrick, 235 U.S. at 622). "[T]here cannot be the slightest doubt of the validity of th[e]

requirement" for states to mandate individuals to have a valid vehicle registration. Munz v.

Harnett, 6 F. Supp. 158, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (citing Hendrick, 235 U.S. at 622).

It is well established that a state may "prescribe uniform regulations covering the

ownership and operation of these vehicles" in order to minimize risks to public safety on

highways. Id.; see also Morris, 274 U.S. at 143; Kane, 242 U.S. at 167. "The enforcement and

documentation of New York's license requirements thus fall squarely within the parameters of the

state's constitutional authority and cannot form the basis of Plaintiff's constitutional deprivation

claim." Scalpi v. Town of E. Fishkill, No. 14-CV-2126, 2016 WL 831956, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29,

2016); see also Ali, 2023 WL 9184481, at *3 (concluding that the plaintiff was unable to bring a §

1983 action because he had not plausibly alleged that by being required to register his vehicle, he

was denied "a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States") (citing Whalen v. Cnty. of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997)).

Plaintiff's belief that he is exempt from having a driver's license because he was

"traveling," is unfounded, as the statutory definition he relies on is confined to commercial drivers

during mandatory travel rest times. See 49 C.F.R. § 395.1(j)(1). Plaintiff claims he was not

"driving" without a license because he defines "driving" as "ranching parlance to drive cattle to

market, a commercial activity." Dkt. No. 1 at 7. Magistrate Judge Evangelista explained that the

1894 Supreme Court case cited by Plaintiff does not support Plaintiff's assertion that states only

have authority to regulate the use of "public roads for commercial activity." Dkt. No. 1 at 7; see

Dkt. No 6. at 19 n.13 (citing Interstate Com. Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894)). The

Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Evangelista that Plaintiff's belief is misplaced and there is no

valid legal support for the position that Plaintiff is exempt from state laws requiring a driver's

license and vehicle registration. See Dkt. No. 6 at 17.

Additionally, the term "motor vehicle" in 18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(6) is applicable only to the

referenced chapter of the statute regarding crimes and criminal procedures of aircraft and motor

vehicles—not to the personal use Plaintiff describes in the complaint. See 18 U.S.C. § 31(a).

Therefore, Plaintiff's argument that he was not operating a motor vehicle is meritless. See Dkt.

No. 1 at 6. This further renders Plaintiff's objection stating he was using an "automobile for

private purposes" under New Hampshire case law and not a "motor vehicle" used for commercial

purposes, frivolous. Dkt. No. 7 at 8; see American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Chaput, 95 N.H. 200,

203 (N.H. 1948).

The majority of Plaintiff's objections echo the same premise of his complaint. See Dkt.

No. 7 at 19-37. In Plaintiff's objections, he argues the "real purpose" of requiring driver's licenses

is an "insidious" scheme requiring citizens to "give up his/her Constitutional Right to travel in

order to accept and exercise a privilege under Contract" so that the legislature may execute a

"slow, meticulous, calculated encroachment upon the Citizen's Right to travel." Id. at 34, 51.

Plaintiff contends that state driver's license and vehicle registration laws are an abuse of the

Constitutional "right to travel," Congressional "taxing power," are a "conversion of a right to a

crime," and a violation of Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution because driver's

licenses "are obviously[] Noble entitlements and franchises[.]" Id. at 13-19, 25-26, 39. As the

Court has explained in this Memorandum-Decision and Order, these arguments do not support a

cognizable legal claim and, therefore, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's conclusion

that Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed. See Dkt. No. 6 at 15.

G. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Magistrate Judge Evangelista recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's state law claims

because, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over state law claims if:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the

claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over

which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district

court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other

compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see Dkt. No. 6 at 26. In the present case, all claims over which the Court

would have original jurisdiction have been dismissed, leaving only Plaintiff's state law claims.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), Magistrate Judge Evangelista correctly recommends that the

Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also Chompupong v. City of Schenectedy, No. 1:17-CV-929, 2021 WL

1758803, *3 (N.D.N.Y. May 4, 2021). Accordingly, Plaintiff's state law claims are dismissed.9

H. Dismissal and Leave to Amend

Finally, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation that

Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. See Dkt. No. 6 at 27. Generally, "'[a]

pro se complaint should not be dismissed without the Court granting leave to amend at least once

when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.'"

Edwards v. Penix, 388 F. Supp. 3d 135, 144 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d

58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014)). "However, if the problems with a complaint are 'substantive' rather than

the result of an 'inadequately or inartfully pleaded' complaint, an opportunity to re-plead would be

'futile' and 'should be denied.'" Id. at 144-45 (quoting Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d

Cir. 2000)). Due to the substantive deficiencies in Plaintiff's complaint, amendment would be

9 Additionally, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation that insofar as

Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1589, Plaintiff has no private right of action to

enforce a state or federal criminal law statute. See Dkt. No. 6 at 24; see also McFadden v. Ortiz,

No. 5:12-CV-1244, 2013 WL 1789593, *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2013).

futile and leave to amend will not be granted.

The Court also agrees with Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation to dismiss

Plaintiff's claims against the State of New York and Commissioner Mark J.F. Schroeder based on

sovereign immunity without prejudice because "[g]enerally, dismissals for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction must be without prejudice[.]" Mulhern Gas Co. v. Rodriguez, No. 1:23-CV-1267,

2024 WL 3992588, *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2024) (citing Katz v. Donna Karan Co., L.L.C., 872

F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 2017)); Karupaiyan v. New York, No. 23-1257, 2024 WL 2174272, *2 (2d

Cir. May 15, 2024). Therefore, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recommendation

to dismiss the claims against the State of New York and Commissioner Mark J.F. Schroeder

without prejudice. See Dkt. No. 6 at 28.

For the remaining portions of Plaintiff's federal claims, the Court agrees with Magistrate

Judge Evangelista's recommendation to dismiss the claims with prejudice because "[d]ismissals

for failure to state a claim . . . are generally with prejudice." Miller v. Brightstar Asia, Ltd., 43

F.4th 112, 126 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Donnelly v. CARRP, 37 F.4th 44, 57 (2d Cir. 2022)); see

also FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IV. CONCLUSION

After carefully considering Plaintiff's submissions, Magistrate Judge Evangelista's Report-

Recommendation and Order, and the applicable law, the Court hereby

ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Evangelista's Report-Recommendation and Order (Dkt.

No. 6) is ADOPTED in its entirety for the reasons set forth herein; and the Court further

ORDERS that Plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) asserted against Defendants State of New

York and Commissioner Mark J.F. Schroeder in his official capacity is DISMISSED without

prejudice and without leave to amend; and the Court further

ORDERS that the remainder of Plaintiff's federal claims are DISMISSED with

prejudice and without leave to amend; and the Court further

ORDERS that the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's

state law claims, which are DISMISSED without prejudice; and the Court further

ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Defendants’ favor and close

this case; and the Court further

ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and

Order on Plaintiff in accordance with the local rules.

IT ISSO ORDERED.

Dated: July 22, 2025 t .

Albany, New York Lak Dihgths

U.S. District Judge

22