Sarhadi v. Geever

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

KRISTINA SARHADI,

Plaintiff, 1:24-cv-31 (BKS/PJE)

v.

JUSTIN CATHAL GEEVER, also known as Justin Sane,

Defendant.

Appearances:

For Plaintiff:

John F.O McAllister

McAllister Olivarius

641 Lexington Avenue, 13th Floor

New York, NY 10022

Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Kristina Sarhadi brings this diversity action alleging claims of assault,

battery/sexual battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant Justin

Geever. (Dkt. No. 25).1 Defendant Geever has not answered the Complaint or otherwise

appeared in this action. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment as to

Geever and motion to seal. (Dkt. Nos. 44–45). For the following reasons, the Court grants

Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment and grants Plaintiff’s motion to seal.

1 The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Hardwork Distribution, Inc. on December 18, 2024. (Dkt.

No. 40).

II. FACTS2

A. Anti-Flag

Geever was the lead guitarist, singer, and songwriter for a well-known punk rock band

with left-wing political views called Anti-Flag from 1988 until July 2023, when the band

disbanded. (Dkt. No. 25, ¶ 31). From the time Anti-Flag formed, the band had a “‘straight edge’

platform” of anti-drugs, anti-alcohol, and pro-feminism. (Id. ¶ 38). In 2005, the band released a

track titled, “Feminism is For Everybody” as part of a compilation album and donated proceeds

from the sale of the album to Protect, a non-profit organization aimed at combating child abuse

and exploitation. (Id. ¶ 43). Two years later, in 2007, the band released an EP titled, “A Benefit

for Victims of Violent Crime.” (Id. ¶ 44). Geever backed criticisms of the punk scene as sexist

and predatory towards young women, saying that “sexualizing women and calling them the c-

word is not something that should be tolerated.” (Id. ¶ 45). Anti-Flag “created and maintained

what was perceived as a safe space for young female fans who attended Anti-Flag’s shows,

followed them on tour, and purchased their merchandise.” (Id. ¶ 46).

In 2000, when Plaintiff Kristina Sarhadi was eleven years old, she began listening to

Anti-Flag. (Id. ¶ 58). She felt like she was in a like-minded safe community and became deeply

committed to the band because she “identified with its unusual, counter-cultural message and

looked up to its members as brave, exciting exemplars of a better way of organizing society.”

(Id. ¶ 59). Anti-Flag became her favorite band, and she listened to their music, attended their

concerts, and collected their merchandise until the assault in 2010. (Id. ¶¶ 60–61).

2 The facts are taken from the Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 25). Because Defendant Geever has failed to respond

to the Complaint, the well-pleaded allegations therein are deemed admitted and assumed to be true for purposes of

this Motion. See Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992).

B. The Underlying Incident

On September 22, 2010, Sarhadi attended an Anti-Flag concert in Brooklyn, New York.

(Id. ¶ 62). As Sarhadi watched from the front row, Geever locked eyes with her and began

singing to and winking at her. (Id. ¶ 63). After the concert, Geever jumped off the stage, hugged

Sarhadi, and asked for her name and where she was from. (Id. ¶ 64). Although Geever was

flirtatious with Sarhadi, she did not reciprocate because she had a long-time boyfriend. (Id. ¶ 65).

In each conversation they had, she made it clear that “she was in a committed relationship and

not romantically interested in him.” (Id.). That night, Geever invited Sarhadi to an upcoming film

festival to attend a screening of the film “Sounds Like a Revolution.” (Id. ¶ 66).

Sarhadi decided to go to the film festival and on October 1, 2010, she arrived at the

theater in Rosendale, New York. (Id. ¶ 69). She felt safe to go, because she trusted in Geever’s

strong feminist stance, was a loyal fan of Anti-Flag, knew that Geever had a serious girlfriend,

and he was twice her age. (Id. ¶¶ 67–68). She waited at the gate for Geever to let her in, as he

had promised, but he never showed up and Sarhadi missed the screening. (Id. ¶ 70). Sarhadi did,

however, meet Geever after the screening and they travelled together to a separate theater in

Woodstock, New York, where Geever did a solo acoustic performance. (Id. ¶ 71).

After the performance, Geever asked Sarhadi to accompany him to an afterparty at a

private house nearby. (Id. ¶ 72). Sarhadi agreed and drove the two of them to the party. (Id. ¶

73). When the party was over, Geever mentioned that he had recorded a song with Billy Bragg,

another famous singer, and wanted her to be the first to hear it. (Id. ¶ 76). He said the song was

on his laptop at his motel, and Sarhadi agreed to go with him to hear the song. (Id. ¶ 77). Geever

then suggested that they stop at a bar and drink together, despite his and Anti-Flag’s pro-sobriety

messaging. (Id. ¶ 79). At the time, Sarhadi was “straight edge,” meaning she did not drink

alcohol or do drugs. (Id.). Geever acknowledged their mutual “straight edge” stance, but he

suggested they should “break edge” that night since they were each dealing with unfortunate

personal circumstances—Geever with a deceased nephew and cheating partner and Sarhadi with

a long-distance boyfriend. (Id. ¶¶ 78–79). Geever’s motel had a bar, and upon arrival, he ordered

beers and pickleback shots for both of them. (Id. ¶ 80). Geever “continued drinking and dancing

in the bar.” (Id. ¶ 81).

After a while, Geever and Sarhadi walked to his motel room to listen to the song. (Id. ¶

82). Geever then closed the curtains, locked the door, screamed “Football Tackle!” and tackled

Sarhadi from behind onto the bed. (Id. ¶¶ 84–85). Geever had a “strange, scary look, as if he had

turned into a different person.” (Id. ¶ 86). He began restraining and strangling Sarhadi and forced

her to perform oral sex on him. (Id. ¶ 87). When Sarhadi could breathe, she repeatedly pleaded

with him to stop. (Id. ¶ 88). She was crying and was shocked by his mean and violent behavior.

(Id. ¶ 89). Geever then non-consensually penetrated Sarhadi’s vagina with his penis. (Id. ¶ 90).

Afterwards, Geever passed out on top of her and Sarhadi was able to escape the motel room

without waking him. (Id. ¶¶ 91–92).

On July 19, 2023, Sarhadi discussed the assault on a podcast, and although she did not

name Anti-Flag or Geever, she gave the details of that night she was assaulted and described

“how she was betrayed by the ‘anti-rape’ lead singer of a political punk band.” (Id. ¶ 93). Anti-

Flag was in the middle of a European tour, but that same day the podcast episode was released,

they announced the band was dissolving, took down their website, and deleted the band’s social

media accounts. (Id. ¶ 94). A week later, Geever categorically denied, via Instagram, that he was

the person Sarhadi had described. (Id. ¶ 95).

As a result of this incident, Sarhadi alleges that she “suffered, continues to suffer, and

will suffer in the future, psychological injuries”; she has been diagnosed with and treated for,

inter alia, C-PTSD, clinical depression, ADHD resulting from trauma, emotional hyperarousal,

and rejection sensitive dysphoria. (Id. ¶ 100).

C. Plaintiff’s Injuries3

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration in support of this motion attesting that “[a]s a direct

result of Geever’s conduct, [she] sustained serious and permanent psychological, mental, and

emotional injuries, including “low self-esteem, anxiety, panic attacks, post-traumatic stress

disorder, disordered eating, stress, insomnia, night terrors, depression, suicidality, shame,

disassociation, intimacy and trust issues, fear, embarrassment, mental anguish, and loss of

enjoyment of life.” (Dkt. No. 44-1, at 72, ¶¶ 37–38). She has been diagnosed with and treated for

“C-PTSD, clinical depression, Major Depressive Disorder, Anxiety Disorder, migraines, ADHD

resulting from trauma, emotional hyperarousal, and rejection sensitivity dysphoria.” (Id. at 72, ¶

39).

Immediately after the assault, Plaintiff told her primary care physician that she “was in a

consistent state of depression,” “was physically fatigued,” was having nightmares, and was

experiencing appetite changes that led to weight fluctuation, although Plaintiff was “ashamed

and afraid to discuss the assault.” (Id. at 72, ¶¶ 40–41). From 2013 to 2016, Plaintiff underwent

treatment with a clinical psychologist, and although Plaintiff remained too afraid to disclose the

assault, they discussed “current life circumstances, maintaining healthy relationships, and

unspecified past trauma.” (Id. at 72–73, ¶ 42). The psychologist informed Plaintiff that she

displayed symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder relating to her past trauma. (Id.). In 2014,

Plaintiff began treatment with another provider, was diagnosed with clinical depression, and

prescribed Prozac. (Id.at 73, ¶ 43). In December 2014, Plaintiff learned she was pregnant. (Id. at

3 The facts in this part are taken from the affidavits submitted in connection with the instant motion.

73, ¶ 44). Although she had always wanted to be a mother, she and her partner decided to

“medically terminate the pregnancy with extreme sadness.” (Id.). Plaintiff spent weeks “crying

and mourning the loss of what could have been” but knew she was “in no state to raise a child”

due to the impact Geever’s sexual assault had on her emotions and behaviors, including her deep

depression and fear of regular gynecological examinations. (Id.). Plaintiff has continued to

undergo treatment, including medication, for her depression and emotional dysregulation. (Id. at

73–74, ¶¶ 45–48). In 2021, Plaintiff was diagnosed with Major Depressive Order and ADHD.

(Id. at 74, ¶ 47).

In addition to these mental health challenges, Plaintiff also attests that her “entire life

changed following Geever’s rape.” (Id. at 74, ¶ 49). She describes personality and physical

changes, challenges with intimacy, regular night terrors, flashbacks, isolation and loss of

community, career setbacks, and alcohol use. (Id. at 74–76, ¶¶ 50–59). She engaged in “reckless

and out of character” behavior including, “self-medicating with alcohol and marijuana” and

jumping off a forty-foot cliff into an abandoned quarry. (Id. at 76, ¶ 60). Plaintiff “began

contemplating suicide following Geever’s rape” and “nearly followed through with an attempt in

2022.” (Id. at 77, ¶ 61). She has “adjusted [her] entire life as a result of Geever’s rape, in an

effort to prevent this from ever happening to [her] again,” and takes measures such as working

and travelling alone, avoiding crowds and being alone with men, having multiple locks on her

doors, and carrying personal protective devices (Id. at 77, ¶ 62).

Plaintiff’s sister submitted an affidavit corroborating the “severe and permanent mental,

psychological, and emotional injuries” Plaintiff sustained as a result of Geever’s sexual assault

including executive dysfunction, new and intense mood episodes, a fear of others, and chronic

fatigue. (Id. at 86–88, ¶¶ 5–17). Plaintiff’s partner also submitted an affidavit describing

Plaintiff’s night terrors and how she has “struggle[d] every day with the effects of Geever’s

sexual assault.” (Id. at 90–91, ¶¶ 5–8). He describes her “suicidal ideation” and “inability to

control her emotions” as well as the strain her trauma has had on their relationship. (Id. at 91–92,

¶¶ 9–12).

Plaintiff also underwent an evaluation with a clinical psychologist in January 2025, and

the evaluating psychologist submitted an affidavit as well as a report detailing Plaintiff’s

diagnoses and recommended course of treatment.4 (Id. at 94–95, ¶¶ 2, 6–7). The psychologist

opined that Plaintiff meets the diagnostic criteria for PTSD with a “trauma index” of Geever’s

sexual assault, and “debilitating” symptoms including intrusive memories, flashbacks,

nightmares, avoidance of internal thoughts and external reminders, negative changes to mood

and cognition, irritability, hypervigilance, recklessness, difficulty with concentration, problems

with sleep, and relationship challenges. (Id. at 96, ¶ 9). The psychologist also attests that Plaintiff

meets the diagnostic criteria for C-PTSD given Plaintiff’s difficulties with managing and

regulating emotions, persistent negative beliefs, and difficulties sustaining relationships. (Id. at

96–97, ¶ 10). Additionally, Plaintiff meets the diagnostic criteria for Major Depressive Disorder,

displaying eight of nine symptoms,5 including: (1) Plaintiff feels debilitatingly depressed for

days at a time; (2) Plaintiff has lost interest in activities she used to love doing; (3) Plaintiff lost

weight unintentionally, regularly lacks appetite, and struggles to pay attention to food intake; (4)

Plaintiff suffers from significantly disrupted sleep; (5) Plaintiff struggles with a lack of

motivation, fatigue, and exhaustion; (6) Plaintiff experiences persistent feelings of self-blame

and guilt; (7) Plaintiff reports inability to function day to day; and (8) Plaintiff reports passive

4 The report was filed under seal. (Dkt. No. 44-1, at 100).

5 Only five symptoms are required to meet the diagnostic criteria. (Dkt. No. 44-1, at 97, ¶ 11).

suicidal ideation. (Id. at 97–98, ¶ 11). The psychologist attests that Plaintiff would benefit from

“therapeutic, medical, and pharmacological treatment for the debilitating mental health

difficulties stemming from the sexual assault.” (Id. at 98, ¶ 14).

III. MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

A. Procedural Requirements

“Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a two-step process for

obtaining a default judgment.” Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 2011).

First, under Rule 55(a), the plaintiff must obtain a clerk’s entry of default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)

(“When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or

otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the

party’s default.”); see also Local Rule 55.1 (requiring a party seeking a clerk’s entry of default to

“submit an affidavit showing that (1) the party against whom it seeks a judgment . . . is not an

infant, in the military, or an incompetent person (2) a party against whom it seeks a judgment for

affirmative relief has failed to plead or otherwise defend the action . . . and (3) it has properly

served the pleading to which the opposing party has not responded”). Second, under Federal

Rule 55(b)(2), the plaintiff must “apply to the court for entry of a default judgment.” Priestley,

647 F.3d at 505; see also Local Rule 55.2(b) (“A party shall accompany a motion to the Court

for the entry of a default judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), with a clerk’s certificate

of entry of default[,] . . . a proposed form of default judgment, and a copy of the pleading to

which no response has been made.”).

Here, Plaintiff has complied with the procedural requirements for obtaining a default

judgment against Defendant Geever. On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff requested a clerk’s entry of

default under Rule 55(a), and, as required by Local Rule 55.1, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit

affirming that Defendant Geever (1) is not an infant, in the military, or an incompetent person;

(2) was properly served; and (3) has defaulted in this action. (Dkt. No. 27). On April 23, 2024,

Plaintiff received a clerk’s entry of default against Defendant Geever. (Dkt. No. 29). And, on

January 30, 2025, Plaintiff moved for a default judgment against Defendant Gever under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) and Local Rule 55.2(b). (Dkt. No. 44). Therefore, as the

procedural requirements for entry of a default judgment are met, the Court will address liability.

B. Liability

By failing to appear in this action or respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendant Geever

is deemed to have admitted the factual allegations in the Complaint with respect to liability (as

distinct from damages). Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc., 973 F.2d at 158 (“[A] party’s default is

deemed to constitute a concession of all well pleaded allegations of liability”). “The decision

whether to enter default judgment is committed to the district court’s discretion.” Greathouse v.

JHS Sec. Inc., 784 F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Even where a defendant has

admitted all well-pleaded facts in the complaint by virtue of default, a district court “need not

agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action,” and may decline to enter a default

judgment on that ground. City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d

Cir. 2011) (quoting Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981)). Indeed,

the Second Circuit has “suggested that, prior to entering default judgment, a district court is

‘required to determine whether the [plaintiff’s] allegations establish [the defendant’s] liability as

a matter of law.’” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court considers

whether Plaintiff’s allegations establish Defendant Geever’s liability with respect to each of the

three claims brought against him: (1) assault, (2) battery/sexual battery, and (3) intentional

infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). (Dkt. No. 25, ¶¶ 102–132).

An “assault” is an “intentional placing of another person in fear of imminent harmful or

offensive contact” and a “battery” is an “intentional wrongful physical contact with another

person without consent.” United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Waterfront N.Y. Realty Corp., 994 F.2d 105,

108 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing cases). “[R]ape is ‘an undisputed assault and battery.’” Id. (quoting

United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. The Tunnel, Inc., 988 F.2d 351, 354 (2d Cir. 1993)). Here, the Complaint

plainly alleges that Defendant Geever raped Plaintiff. (See Dkt. No. 25, ¶¶ 84–92, 104–08, 114–

17).

An IIED claim has four elements: “(i) extreme and outrageous conduct; (ii) intent to

cause, or disregard of a substantial probability of causing, severe emotional distress; (iii) a causal

connection between the conduct and injury; and (iv) severe emotional distress.” Howell v. New

York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121 (1993). The New York Court of Appeals, however, “has

cautioned that a claim for IIED may not be sustainable ‘where the conduct complained of falls

well within the ambit of other traditional tort liability.’” Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774

F.3d 140, 159 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 557–58 (1978)).

Here, Plaintiff identifies Geever’s alleged outrageous conduct as “locking [Plaintiff] in his motel

room and isolating her in close quarters; tackling and physically restraining her on the bed;

choking her with his hands for his own sexual gratification; forcing oral sex on her; ignoring her

cries for him to stop; and forcibly penetrating her with his penis.” (Dkt. No. 25, ¶ 124). The IIED

claim therefore “depends [on] conduct that amounts to a sexual assault or battery.” Henry v.

Oluwole, 108 F. 4th 45, 61 (2d Cir. 2024). Because the Complaint “does not plead facts distinct

from sexual assault, assault, or battery,” and “contains no separate allegations of outrageous

conduct,” the Court finds that Plaintiff’s IIED claim fails as a matter of law as duplicative. See

id.; see also Stines v. Sanchez, No. 21-cv-7884, 2025 WL 1435067, at *5, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

95145, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2025) (denying summary judgment and dismissing IIED claim

because it “overlap[ped] with [the] sexual assault and battery claims such that it [was] subsumed

within those claims”); but cf. Dixon v. Reid, 744 F. Supp. 3d 323, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (denying

motion to dismiss IIED claim because it did “not so completely overlap with [the] sexual

assault/battery claim that it [was] subsumed within that claim”) and Doe v. Hyassat, No. 18-cv-

6110, 2024 WL 1955354, at *4, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81448, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2024)

(finding defendant liable for IIED on motion for default judgment where defendant drugged

plaintiff without her knowledge, sexually assaulted her, and infected her with a venereal disease

that caused her to suffer vision loss).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations establish Defendant Geever’s

liability with respect to the assault and battery/sexual battery claims but not with respect to the

IIED claim.

C. Damages

“[I]t is well established that ‘[w]hile a party’s default is deemed to constitute a

concession of all well pleaded allegations of liability, it is not considered an admission of

damages.’” Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Metro Found.

Contractors Inc., 699 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “There must be an

evidentiary basis for the damages sought by plaintiff, and a district court may determine there is

sufficient evidence either based upon evidence presented at a hearing or upon a review of

affidavits and documentary evidence.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)). A court may rely

“upon detailed affidavits and documentary evidence, supplemented by the District Judge’s

personal knowledge of the record.” Fustok v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 873 F.2d 38, 40 (2d

Cir. 1989).

Here, Plaintiff’s request is supported by her own affidavit (Dkt. No. 44-1, at 65–78), her

sister’s affidavit, (id. at 86–88), her partner’s affidavit, (id. at 90–92), and medical records,

including an affidavit from a clinical psychologist, (id. at 94–99), and a report prepared by that

psychologist detailing Plaintiff’s diagnoses and recommended course of treatment, (id. at 100).

In other cases, including in the sexual assault context, courts have found similar offers of

evidentiary support to be sufficient to assess damages without a hearing. See Gavel v. Korang,

No. 20-cv-3475, 2024 WL 4203732, at *2, 4, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155940, at *6, 9–10

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2024) (recommending that plaintiff’s uncontested submissions, which

included her declaration, medical reports, expense sheet, and receipts, were sufficient for the

court to determine damages without a hearing), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL

4203248, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165915 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2024); Hyassat, 2024 WL

1955354, at *5 & n.3, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81448, at *11 & n.3 (finding plaintiff “provided

significant evidentiary support for the damage awards” she sought in the form of her own

affidavit, her mother’s affidavit, and medical records); A.B. v. Staropoli, No. 08-cv-4585, 2013

WL 12441525, at *3–6, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206771, at *8–19 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2013)

(awarding damages on the basis of an affidavit from each plaintiff and an evaluating

psychiatrist); Estevez-Yalcin v. Children’s Vill., No. 01-cv-8784, 2007 WL 2746807, at *1, 2007

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69511, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2007) (finding a hearing on damages

unnecessary because plaintiffs submitted detailed affidavits, neither party requested a hearing,

and there were no contested issues of fact). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

supporting documentation provides a sufficient evidentiary basis to award damages such that the

Court finds a hearing would be unnecessary.

1. Non-Economic Compensatory Damages

“Compensatory damages recoverable for sexual assault include compensation for the

injury itself, conscious pain and suffering including mental and emotional anxiety which can be

based on the plaintiff’s subjective testimony plus special damages, which need not be pleaded.”

Doe v. Alsaud, No. 13-cv-571, 2017 WL 4541426, at *3, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167359, at *10

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2017) (cleaned up) (citations omitted). “The measure of damages for pain and

suffering and emotional distress is fair and reasonable compensation to be fixed by the trier of

fact in the light of all the evidence in the case.” Mathie v. Fries, 935 F. Supp. 1284, 1304

(E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d 121 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1997). Because there is no “mathematical

computation” or “precise formula” to measure such damages, courts should review precedents

and make “[r]eference to other awards in similar cases.” Id. at 1304–05; Ismail v. Cohen, 899

F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1990). Courts can consider and evaluate many factors in “assessing the

appropriateness of an award of damages for a sexual assault,” including “the social and

emotional betrayal, humiliation and isolation suffered by the victim as well as the threat to the

victim’s self-esteem and physical, psychic and emotional integrity and health, in addition to

actual therapeutic and medical expenses.” Mathie, 935 F. Supp. at 1306.

In assessing non-economic damages, “[a] review of other cases involving sexual assaults

reflects that they frequently trigger substantial compensatory awards, typically in the low-to-mid

hundreds of thousands of dollars.” Offei v. Omar, No. 11-cv-4283, 2012 WL 2086294, at *5,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80171, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2012) (citing cases), report and

recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 2086356, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80144 (S.D.N.Y. June 8,

2012); see also Angulo v. 36th St. Hospitality LLC, 19-cv-5075, 2020 WL 4938188, at *12–14,

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137816, at *32–38 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2020) (awarding $300,000 in

emotional distress damages where defendant raped plaintiff once and harassed her on an ongoing

basis), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 4936961, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153278

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2020); see also Staropoli, 2013 WL 12441525, at *6–8, 2013 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 206771, at *19–25 (awarding $600,000 in compensatory damages where plaintiff, a

minor, was groomed and sexually abused in numerous instances by defendant, her soccer coach

but noting that there was “little evidence” concerning the plaintiff’s more recent psychological

state).

However, courts have also awarded higher damages in sexual assault cases, depending on

the specific circumstances of each case. In support of her request for $1,250,000 in past and

future pain and suffering, Plaintiff cites a number of cases where courts awarded similar

amounts. (Dkt. No. 44-2, at 16–17 (citing Lent v. CCNH, Inc., No. 13-cv-942, 2015 WL

7283186, at *5, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154349, at *13–14 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2015) (awarding

$1.25 million in past and future pain and suffering where plaintiff endured “ongoing sexual

assault [as] a minor, inaction by employers to correct abusive work settings, and documented

psychological conditions resulting from depression and PTSD”); Alsaud, 2017 WL 4541426, at

*1–2, 6, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167359, at *2, 4, 16 (awarding $1.25 million in past and future

pain and suffering to plaintiff who was drugged and repeatedly raped over the course of several

hours, resulting in “significant and disturbing physical injuries”); Hyassat, 2024 WL 1955354, at

*1, 5, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81448, at *2, 12–13 (awarding $1.25 million for past and future

pain and suffering to a plaintiff who was drugged and raped and suffered sexually transmitted

diseases); Noonan v. Becker, No. 14-cv-4084, 2018 WL 1738746, at *1–2, 7, 2018 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 60704, at *3, 18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2018) (awarding $1 million in non-economic

compensatory damages to a plaintiff who was assaulted and raped), report and recommendation

adopted, 2018 WL 2088279, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75313 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2018); Ortiz v.

New York City Hous. Auth., 22 F. Supp. 2d 15, 38–40 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (upholding jury verdict of

$3 million in compensatory damages for past and future pain and suffering where plaintiff was

raped at gunpoint); Splawn v. Lextaj Corp., 197 A.D.2d 479, 480–81 (1st Dep’t 1993) (upholding

$2 million award for past and future pain and suffering in rape case); Pantages v. L.G. Airport

Hotel Assocs., Inc., 187 A.D.2d 273, 273 (1st Dep’t 1992) (upholding $1.875 million award for

past and future pain and suffering where plaintiff was raped, sodomized, and assaulted by three

men))).

While there are factual differences between the cited cases and the instant case, the Court

finds the cited cases instructive given the fact that each case involves sexual assault, “the

ultimate violation of self” which is “very often accompanied by physical injury” and “can also

inflict mental and psychological damage.” Alsaud, 2017 WL 4541426, at *4, 2017 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 167359, at *11 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597–98 (1977)). Indeed, like

many of the cited cases, the record here shows that Defendant Geever’s conduct “has manifested

itself in several psychological and emotional conditions that Plaintiff has had to suffer through,

and which will continue to burden her for the foreseeable future.” Lent, 2015 WL 7283186, at

*4, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154349, at *12. It is well-documented through the supporting

affidavits that Plaintiff has suffered extreme emotional distress and a complete upending of her

life, as evidenced by her symptoms which have persisted fifteen years since the date of the

attack.

Having considered compensatory awards in the Circuit in comparable cases, the specific

circumstances of this case, and the significant effects the attack has had and will continue to have

on Plaintiff, the Court finds that $750,000 is fair and reasonable for Plaintiff’s past and future

pain and suffering.

2. Economic Compensatory Damages

In addition to the non-economic damages for pain and suffering, Plaintiff also seeks

economic compensatory damages in the amount of $520,900 for future medical and

psychological treatment. (Dkt. No. 44-2, at 21). Such damages must be “reasonably certain to be

incurred and necessitated by plaintiff’s injuries.” Rivera v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 776 F. App’x

4, 7 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Schultz v. Harrison Radiator Div. Gen. Motors Corp., 90 N.Y.2d

311, 321 (1997)) (upholding a damage award based on an expert report that included line-by-line

estimates of what the plaintiff would need going forward based on review of the plaintiff’s

medical records). The award must be “supported by competent evidence,” that is not “purely

speculative” which “establishes the need for, and the cost of, medical care.” Abedin v. Osorio,

216 A.D. 3d 708, 709–10 (2d Dep’t 2023) (citations omitted). In other sexual assault cases,

courts have awarded economic damages for future counseling where an expert testifies that the

plaintiff likely needs additional counseling. See Lent, 2015 WL 7283186, at *5, 2015 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 154349, at *15.

Here, the clinical psychologist who evaluated Plaintiff recommended the following

treatments as directly attributable to the harm caused by Defendant:

Treatment Cost per Session Total Cost

Individual Trauma-Focused Therapy $325 $169,000

Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (“CBT”) $325 $33,800

Individual Therapy $325 $84,500

Collateral Couples Therapy $425 $88,400

Family Therapy $425 $44,200

Psychiatric Visits $425 $51,000

Psychiatric Medication $5,000 per year $50,000

(Dkt. No. 44-1, at 98–99). Together, these treatments total $520,900. The report provides further

details about each kind of treatment and why it is recommended for Plaintiff. (See id. at 100).

Although Plaintiff has not affirmed that she plans to follow the recommended course of

treatment, the evaluating psychologist has documented the necessity of these treatments to her

mental health. (Id.); cf. D.R. v. Santos Bakery, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 3d 228, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2024)

(finding a jury’s award for future medical expenses impermissibly speculative where nobody

testified at trial that plaintiff would elect to undergo the surgery, and the doctor did not testify

that the surgery was necessary or recommended).

The Court finds the declaration and report from the evaluating psychologist to be

competent and non-speculative evidence that establishes the need for, and the cost of, some of

the recommended medical care. The psychologist’s explanation for CBT, however, is founded on

the possibility of unresolved depression. (See Dkt. No. 44-4, at 124). The Court finds that this

recommendation is too vague and that it is not reasonably certain Plaintiff will incur this

expense. The Court also reduces the family therapy duration to one year and the couples therapy

duration to two years, finding such an award reasonable and supportable on the instant record.

See Register v. SAS Morrison LLC, 189 A.D.3d 591, 593 (1st Dep’t 2020) (reducing a jury award

for future medical expenses because “there was inadequate support in the record for . . . clinical

psychologist services”); Jansen v. C. Raimondo & Son Constr. Corp., 293 A.D.2d 574, 575 (2d

Dep’t 2002) (reducing jury award as speculative where doctor testified that plaintiff may need

additional occupational therapy, but only testified to a definite period of two to four months at

three sessions each week). Therefore, the Court awards Plaintiff a total of $420,800 for future

medical and psychological treatment.

3. Punitive Damages

Plaintiff further seeks punitive damages in the amount of $1,250,000. (Dkt. No. 44-2, at

22–24). Punitive damages are appropriate under New York law where “the wrong complained of

is morally culpable, or is actuated by evil and reprehensible motives, not only to punish the

defendant but to deter him.” Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 404 (1961). An award of

punitive damages is justified it there is evidence in the record of “quasicriminal conduct,”

“utterly reckless behavior,” “malicious intent on the part of defendants to injure plaintiffs,” or

“gross, wanton or willful fraud or other morally culpable conduct.” See Maitrejean v. Levon

Properties Corp., 87 A.D.2d 605, 605–06 (2d Dep’t 1982), aff’d 57 N.Y.2d 902 (1982).

Although there is “no such thing as a correct amount of punitive damages, a legal system has an

obligation to ensure that such awards for intangibles be fair, reasonable, predictable, and

proportionate.” Payne v. Jones, 711 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2012). In awarding punitive damages,

courts should consider (1) “the degree of reprehensibility of the tortious conduct,” (2) the ratio of

punitive damages to compensatory damages, and (3) awards imposed in comparable cases.

Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Here, “[t]he sexual violence committed by the Defendant undeniably constitutes morally

reprehensible or utterly reckless behavior making a punitive damage award proper.” Alsaud,

2017 WL 4541426, at *7, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167359, at *19. Defendant sexually assaulted

Plaintiff and “shattered [her] emotional well-being,” causing life-long ramifications years after

the attack. Id. Defendant’s conduct is even more morally reprehensible because he used his fame

and status to lure a much younger fan into his hotel room under false pretenses. See Doe v.

Hyassat, No. 18-cv-6110, 2024 WL 2862547, at *6, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67482, at *15

(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2024) (detailing how the defendant abused the prestige of his position to lure

the plaintiff under false pretenses), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1955354,

2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81448 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2024).

As to the second factor, courts are to determine “whether there is a reasonable

relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the

defendant’s conduct as well as the harm that actually occurred.” Alla v. Verkay, 979 F. Supp. 2d

349, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting B.M.W. of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996)). In a

case with “substantial compensatory damages,” a 1:1 ratio is permissible. Id.

In considering comparable cases, courts have awarded similar amounts in punitive

damages. See Alsaud, 2017 WL 4541426, at *7, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167359, at *20

(awarding $1 million in punitive damages in sexual assault case); Hyassat, 2024 WL 1955354, at

*6, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81448, at *14 (awarding $1.25 million in punitive damages in sexual

assault case); Noonan, 2018 WL 2088279, at *1, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75313, at *2 (awarding

$1 million in punitive damages in sexual assault case).

Accordingly, the Court finds that an award of $750,000 is “fair, reasonable, predictable,

and proportionate.” Payne, 711 F.3d at 93.

IV. MOTION TO SEAL

A. Legal Standard

“The notion that the public should have access to the proceedings and documents of

courts is integral to our system of government.” United States v. Erie Cnty., 763 F.3d 235, 238–

39 (2d Cir. 2014). “Indeed, the common law right of public access to judicial documents is said

to predate even the Constitution itself.” Id. at 239. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

“also protects the public’s right to have access to judicial documents.” Id. A party seeking to seal

documents submitted to a court bears the burden of showing that sealing is proper. See DiRussa

v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 826 (2d Cir. 1997).

1. Common Law Right of Access

The Second Circuit has articulated a three-step process for determining whether

documents should be sealed in light of the common law right of access. “Before any such

common law right can attach . . . a court must first conclude that the documents at issue are

indeed ‘judicial documents.’” Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir.

2006). To constitute a judicial document, “the item filed must be relevant to the performance of

the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.” United States v. Amodeo (Amodeo I), 44

F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995).

Second, after determining that the documents are judicial documents and that the

“common law presumption of access attaches,” the court must “determine the weight of that

presumption.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119. According to the Second Circuit,

[T]he weight to be given the presumption of access must be

governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article

III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to

those monitoring the federal courts. Generally, the information will

fall somewhere on a continuum from matters that directly affect an

adjudication to matters that come within a court’s purview solely to

insure their irrelevance.

United States v. Amodeo (Amodeo II), 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995). When a document

plays a role in a court’s adjudication of litigants’ substantive rights—a function that is “at the

heart of Article III”—the presumption is strong, but “[a]s one moves along the continuum, the

weight of the presumption declines.” Id. When “documents are usually filed with the court and

are generally available, the weight of the presumption is stronger than where filing with the court

is unusual or is generally under seal.” Id. at 1050.

Third, the court must balance any “competing considerations” against the weight of the

presumption of access. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120. “Such countervailing factors include but are

not limited to ‘the danger of impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency’ and ‘the privacy

interests of those resisting disclosure.’” Id. (quoting Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050); accord

Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 2016).

When weighing privacy interests, courts should consider “the degree to which the subject matter

is traditionally considered private rather than public.” Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051. Courts should

also assess the “nature and degree of injury,” paying heed to “the sensitivity of the information

and the subject” and “how the person seeking access intends to use the information.” Id. at 1051.

2. First Amendment

The First Amendment right of access stems from the qualified right of the public and the

press “to attend judicial proceedings and to access certain judicial documents.” Lugosch, 435

F.3d at 120 (quoting Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2004)). Once

a court concludes that there is a qualified First Amendment right of access to the judicial

documents at issue, it may only seal the documents “if specific, on the record findings are made

demonstrating the closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve

that interest.” Id. (quoting In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987)). “Broad and

general findings by the trial court . . . are not sufficient to justify closure.” Id. (quoting In re N.Y.

Times Co., 828 F.2d at 116). Examples of “higher values” may include law enforcement

interests, the privacy of innocent third parties, Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050, and the attorney-

client privilege, Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 125.

B. Discussion

With the motion for default judgment, Plaintiff contemporaneously filed a Motion for

Leave to Redact and/or Seal Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment. (Dkt. No. 45). Specifically,

Plaintiff seeks leave to redact the identities of (1) non-party family members that submitted

affidavits in support of her motion for default judgment; (2) non-party medical professionals that

treated Plaintiff; and (3) a non-party expert witness who opined as to Plaintiff’s injuries and

damages. (Dkt. No. 45-2, at 1). Plaintiff also seeks leave to file the medical report prepared by

her expert witness under seal as it contains sensitive medical information. (Id.).

The documents at issue here are clearly judicial documents. See Spin Master, Ltd. v.

Aomore-Us, No. 23-cv-7099, 2024 WL 3250815, at *2, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116960, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2024) (“There can be no doubt that the documents [associated with plaintiff’s

motions for preliminary injunction and default judgment] are judicial documents[.]”).

Having determined that the documents at issue are judicial documents, the Court must assess

weight of the presumption of documents. A strong presumption attaches to materials filed in

connection with a dispositive motion, Olson v. Major League Baseball, 29 F.4th 59, 90 (2d Cir.

2022).

Finally, the Court must assess whether the privacy interests of the Plaintiff and the non-

parties justify redaction or filing under seal. Courts in this Circuit repeatedly held that “privacy

interests of innocent third parties should weigh heavily in a court’s balancing equation,” and that

“[s]uch interests . . . are a venerable common law exception to the presumption of access.”

Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051 (cleaned up) (collecting cases). Therefore, consistent with this

Circuit’s precedent, the non-parties identified in Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment have a

substantial overriding privacy interest that justifies their redaction.

Courts have also recognized that an individual has a substantial privacy interest in their

medical information that warrants filing under seal. See AngioDynamics, Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,

No. 17-cv-598, 2022 WL 2643583, at *25, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120384, at *77 (N.D.N.Y.

July 8, 2022). The expert medical report submitted with Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment

contains sensitive information relating to Plaintiff’s medical history and treatment that justify

filing under seal. The public’s right to access court records is not prejudiced as substantial

portions of the expert’s findings are publicly available through the expert’s declaration. Having

reviewed Plaintiff’s proposed redactions and medical reports, and finding them to be narrowly

tailored and consistent with Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119-27, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to

redact and seal, (Dkt. No. 45), the stated portions of Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment.

V. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for default judgment (Dkt. No. 44) is GRANTED in

part with respect to the assault and battery/sexual battery claims; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for default judgment (Dkt. No. 44) is otherwise

DENIED with respect to the ITED claim; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded default judgment against Defendant Geever on the

assault and battery/sexual battery causes of action in the sum of $1,170,800; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded punitive damages against Defendant Geever in the

sum of $750,000; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to seal (Dkt. No. 45) is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on

Defendant and file a certificate of service by August 11, 2025; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

IT ISSO ORDERED.

Dated: July 22, 2025

Syracuse, New York Ag ad a Cn AAee

Brenda K. Sannes

Chief U.S. District Judge

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