a loose factual connection between the federal and state claims is generally sufficient
How later courts described this case
- a loose factual connection between the federal and state claims is generally sufficient
- an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”
- “requirement for [an excessive force claim] is that [the officer] used force not ‘in a good- faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,’ but ‘maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CORDELL SANDERS,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 25-cv-1009-RJD
J. TAYLOR, J. CAMARILLO, DARRELL
MELLENDORF, ROBERT E. REID,
SERGEANT STOVER, LIEUTENANT
LENEAR, OFFICER MASSEY, OFFICER
WOODWARD, OFFICER HART,
OFFICER MABREY, SERGEANT TATE,
BRANDY THOMASON, LIEUTENANT
GIPSON, SERGEANT FRITZGERALD,
OFFICER CANCINO, SERGEANT
JENKINS, NURSE WELTY, NURSE
KILL, NURSE ECHOLS, NURSE
RUHOL, NURSE LISA BROWN,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Cordell Sanders, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who
is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights while at Lawrence Correctional
Center. In the Complaint, Sanders alleges that he was denied mental health and medical
care. He also alleges that officers used excessive force and failed to protect him, all in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1 Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen
prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any
portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is
immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The Complaint
Cordell Sanders is classified as seriously mentally ill (“SMI”) and has a history of
suicide attempts (Doc. 1, p. 2). On May 17, 2024, while in segregation at Lawrence,
Sanders began feeling depressed and hopeless due to his lack of prescriptions for Prozac
(an anti-depressant) and Depakote (a mood stabilizing medication) (Id.). Both
medications had expired, and Sanders had not yet received a refill (Id.). At approximately
2:30 p.m., he informed Lieutenant J. Taylor that he was suicidal and in need of crisis
intervention (Id.). Taylor merely made vomiting sounds and rejected Sanders’s request
for care (Id.).
Sanders later summoned Correctional Officer Stanley and requested crisis
intervention. Stanley informed Behavior Health Technician J. Camarillo who was in the
unit assessing another inmate (Doc. 1, p. 3). But Camarillo failed to evaluate Sanders. As
1 The Court has jurisdiction to screen the Complaint in light of Plaintiff’s consent to the full
jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge, and the limited consent by the Illinois Department of
Corrections and Wexford Health Sources, Inc., to the exercise of Magistrate Judge jurisdiction as
set forth in the Memoranda of Understanding between this Court and these two entities.
a result, he was unable to explain the expiration of his medications to her (Id.). At 3:30
p.m. Sanders informed Darrell Mellendorf of his need for crisis intervention, but
Mellendorf refused his request (Id.). Sanders eventually became suicidal and set his cell
on fire (Id.). The fire was immediately extinguished by prison guards.
In response to Sanders’s mental health crisis, Robert Reid and Brandy Thomason
opened the cell door and began spraying Sanders with an excessive amount of pepper
spray (Doc. 1, p. 3). Sanders alleges there was no reason for the use of pepper spray. Reid,
Mellendorf, and Sergeant Stover then entered Sanders’s cell and punched him in the face,
knocking off his eyeglasses and injuring his nose (Id. at p. 4). Mellendorf yanked Sanders
out of his cell and body slammed him onto the concrete floor onto the right side of his
face and punched him in the face (Id.). Reid then laid on top of Sanders and placed him
in a chokehold, choking him unconscious (Id.). Sanders regained consciousness when
Reid started kicking him in the stomach and face (Id.). Stover then laid on Sanders’s back
and attempted to choke him unconscious again. Mellendorf then choked Sanders until he
fell unconscious (Id.). Reid sprayed Sanders again with pepper spray (Id.). Due to his
inability to breath, Sanders flailed his legs and Lieutenant Gipson held his legs down and
Officer Woodward held his left arm, rendering him defenseless (Id.).
Eventually Reid handcuffed Sanders and placed him into a restraint chair (Doc. 1,
p. 4). He was placed in a soothing room in restraints for over four hours, unable to move
(Id.). As a result of his injuries, Sanders urinated blood for four days (Id. at p. 5). Upon
transferring to Pontiac Correctional Center on May 20, 2024, doctors there documented
his injuries including tenderness in his nose, neck, stomach, and groin, as well as trauma
to his head (Id.).
Sanders alleges that during the attack, Lieutenant Lenear, Officer Massey, Officer
Woodward, Officer Hart, Officer Mabrey, Sergeant Tate, Brandy Thomason, Lieutenant
Gipson, Sergeant Fritzgerald, and Officer Cacino stood around watching the assault (Doc.
1, p. 6) None of the officers sought to intervene in the assault.
After the assault, Nurse Welty examined Sanders’s injuries briefly (Doc. 1, p. 6).
Sanders informed her about the attack, but she merely high fived Reid. She then squirted
saline solution in his face and dumped some water on his head (Id.). Sanders alleges that
Welty’s actions merely caused the pepper spray to run off of his face to other parts of his
body (Id.). Welty failed to document his injuries, nor did she contact a doctor about his
head trauma (Id.). Sanders later informed Lieutenant Lenear that he was urinating blood
and Lenear called Welty to examine him a second time (Id. at p. 7). But she failed to treat
his issues. While on suicide watch, Sanders informed Sergeant Jenkins of his injuries, but
Jenkins said Sanders would not be allowed to go to an outside hospital (Id.). He refused
to obtain medical care for Sanders. From May 17 through May 20, 2024, Sanders informed
numerous nurses of his headache from the beating and blood in his urine (Id. at p. 7).
Sanders spoke with Nurse Welty, Nurse Kill, Nurse Echols, Nurse Ruhol, and Nurse Lisa
Brown, but no one would help him (Id.).
Discussion
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide
the pro se action into the following enumerated counts:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to mental
health needs against J. Taylor, J. Camarillo, and Darrell
Mellendorf for failing to provide Sanders with crisis care.
Count 2: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Darrell
Mellendorf, Robert Reid, Brandy Thomason, Sergeant
Stover, Lieutenant Gipson, and Officer Woodward for the
May 17, 2024 attack on Sanders.
Count 3: Illinois state law assault and battery claim against Darrell
Mellendorf, Robert Reid, Brandy Thomason, Sergeant
Stover, Lieutenant Gipson, and Officer Woodward for the
May 17, 2024 attack on Sanders.
Count 4: Eighth Amendment failure to intervene claim against
Lieutenant Lenear, Officer Massey, Officer Woodward,
Officer Hart, Officer Mabrey, Sergeant Tate, Brandy
Thomason, Lieutenant Gipson, Sergeant Fritzgerald, and
Officer Cacino for refusing to intervene in the May 17, 2024
attack.
Count 5: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical
needs claim against Nurse Welty, Sergeant Jenkins, Nurse
Kill, Nurse Echols, Nurse Ruhol, and Nurse Lisa Brown for
failing to provide Sanders with medical care after the attack.
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is
mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered
dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading
standard.2
2 This includes Sanders’s request to bring criminal charges of attempted murder, official
misconduct, and hate crime charges. Sanders cannot use Section 1983 to criminally charge a
person. A private citizen “has no right to compel a criminal prosecution.” Wimberly v. Julius, 606
F. App’x 309, 311 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied 577 U.S. 987 (2015). See also Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
At this stage, Sanders adequately alleges claims for deliberate indifference to his
mental health and medical needs in Counts 1 and 5. He alleges that he spoke to officials
about his need for crisis intervention, but they refused to obtain care for him. He also
alleges that after the May 17, 2024 attack, he sought care from several officers and nurses
to no avail. Thus, Sanders states viable claims in Counts 1 and 5. Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d
859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012).
Sanders also adequately alleges an excessive force claim in Count 2. Sanders
alleges that officers sprayed him with pepper spray and then proceeded to beat him,
resulting in severe injuries to his head and torso. He further alleges that there was no
justification for the assault and that it was malicious and sadistic. Thus, Count 2 shall
proceed against the officers. Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“requirement for [an excessive force claim] is that [the officer] used force not ‘in a good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,’ but ‘maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm.’”). Sanders also states a viable state law claim for assault and battery in Count 3.
Where a district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action, it also has supplemental
jurisdiction over related state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Sanders’s state
law claims derive from the same factual allegations as his federal claims. Wisconsin v. Ho-
Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008) (a loose factual connection between the
federal and state claims is generally sufficient). Thus, the Court will exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim in Count 3.
Finally, Sanders states a viable claim for officials’ failure to intervene in the assault.
He alleges that numerous officers were present during the attack but merely stood by
and failed to stop the assault. Thus, the claims against Defendants in Count 4 shall
proceed.
Disposition
For the reasons stated above, Count 1 shall proceed against J. Taylor, J Camarillo,
and Darrell Mellendorf. Count 2 shall proceed against Darrell Mellendorf, Robert Reid,
Brandy Thomason, Sergeant Stover, Lieutenant Gipson, and Officer Woodward. Count 3
shall proceed against Darrell Mellendorf, Robert Reid, Brandy Thomason, Sergeant
Stover, Lieutenant Gipson, and Officer Woodward. Count 4 shall proceed against
Lieutenant Lenear, Officer Massey, Officer Woodward, Officer Hart, Officer Mabrey,
Sergeant Tate, Brandy Thomason, Lieutenant Gipson, Sergeant Fritzgerald, and Officer
Cacino. Count 5 shall proceed against Nurse Welty, Sergeant Jenkins, Nurse Kill, Nurse
Echols, Nurse Ruhol, and Nurse Lisa Brown.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for J. Taylor, J. Camarillo, Darrell Mellendorf,
Robert Reid, Brandy Thomason, Sergeant Stover, Lieutenant Gipson, Lieutenant Lenear,
Officer Massey, Officer Woodward, Officer Hart, Officer Mabrey, Sergeant Tate, Sergeant
Fritzgerald, Officer Cacino, Nurse Welty, Sergeant Jenkins, Nurse Kill, Nurse Echols,
Nurse Ruhol, and Nurse Lisa Brown: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to
Waive Service of a Summons) and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk
is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and
Order to each defendant’s place of employment as identified by Sanders. If a defendant
fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30
days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect
formal service on that defendant, and the Court will require that defendant to pay the
full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
If a defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Sanders,
the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if not
known, defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the
address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained
in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to
the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues
stated in this Merit Review Order.
Because Sanders’s claims involve his mental health and medical care, the Clerk of
Court is DIRECTED to enter the Court’s standard HIPAA Qualified Protective Order.
If judgment is rendered against Sanders, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under Section 1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,
regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(f)(2)(A).
Finally, Sanders is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court
will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not
later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply
with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result
in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 21, 2025.
/s/ Reona J. Daly
REONA J. DALY
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Notice to Plaintiff
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of
your lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been
achieved, the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to your
Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the
defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all
the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing
important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to
wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the
defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature.
Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically
directed to do so.