Greene v. State of Tennessee, The

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

COREY DEVELL GREENE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) NO. 3:24-cv-01153

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE CAMPBELL

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Corey Greene is a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office.

He filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. No. 1)

and an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). (Doc. No. 2.) Because the IFP

application complies with Rule 3(a)(2) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (“Habeas Rules”)1

and demonstrates that Petitioner cannot reasonably afford the five-dollar filing fee, the IFP

application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED.

The Petition is now before the Court for initial review.

I. INITIAL REVIEW

A. Legal Standard

Rule 4 of the Habeas Rules requires the Court to examine the Petition to ascertain as a

preliminary matter whether “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Habeas Rule 4. The Court is not only

“authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face,”

1 These Rules apply to Section 2241 cases as well as Section 2254 cases. See Habeas Rule 1(b).

McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994), but “has a duty to screen out” such petitions. Allen

v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2243).

B. The Petition

The Petition challenges the legality of proceedings in Davidson County case number 2023-

A-176. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) In that case, Petitioner is charged with two counts of aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon and one count of felon in possession of a firearm. See

https://sci.ccc.nashville.gov/Search/CaseSearchDetails/2324419%5E5666376%5ECJIS/COREY

%5EGREENE%5E12191978%5E188878/ (last visited July 17, 2025).2 Petitioner asserts his rights

to a speedy trial and to be free from excessive bail, as well as his rights to due process and the

effective assistance of counsel. (Doc. No. 1 at 6–8.) He appears to have been jailed on the pending

charges since late 2022, during which time he has endured “constant continuances and deliberate

withdrawal by counsel,” as well as “false indictments and affidavits.” (Id. at 7.) Petitioner has filed

motions in the trial court (which he states were not heard) raising speedy trial, excessive bail,

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel, defective indictment, and false evidence concerns (id. at 2), and

he has filed two complaints with the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility (TBPR)

concerning his counsel’s performance with respect to speedy trial and suppression issues. (Id. at

3.) He asks this Court for “[d]ismissal of [the State’s] case for failure to prosecute and immediate

release.” (Id. at 8.)

2 The Court may take judicial notice of such facts. See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (allowing judicial notice of

adjudicative facts at any stage of the proceedings); see also Lyons v. Stovall, 188 F.3d 327, 332 n.3 (6th

Cir. 1999) (“[F]ederal courts may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts of record.” (quoting

Granader v. Pub. Bank, 417 F.2d 75, 82–83 (6th Cir. 1969))).

C. Analysis

Petitioner challenges the legality of his pretrial detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which

authorizes the Court to entertain a habeas application from a person “in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Section 2241

petitions filed while state charges are still pending are typically dismissed as premature, unless

they present exhausted claims that the proceedings violate double jeopardy or speedy trial rights,

Ealy v. Schrand, No. CV 2:20-21-DCR, 2020 WL 1031026, at *1–2 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 3, 2020)

(citing, e.g., Atkins v. Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 1981) and In re Justices of Superior

Court Dept. of Mass. Trial Ct., 218 F.3d 11, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2000)), or that the setting of bail

pending trial was unreasonable. Atkins, 644 F.2d at 549. While “[a] state pretrial detainee may

bring a federal habeas action to demand a speedy trial” pursuant to Section 2241, he “may not

generally seek habeas relief to forestall state prosecution altogether.” Abernathy v. U.S. Marshal

Serv., No. 2:08-CV-14663, 2008 WL 4858442, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 10, 2008) (citing Braden

v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489–91 (1973)).

Even when a colorable Section 2241 claim is presented, the Court must abstain from

exercising habeas jurisdiction as a matter of comity “if the issues raised in the petition may be

resolved either by trial on the merits or by other available state procedures.” Abernathy, 2008 WL

4858442, at *1 (citing Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546). “Intrusion into state proceedings already underway

is warranted only in extraordinary circumstances.” Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546; see Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). The requirement that a federal habeas petitioner first exhaust his available

state remedies is thus “especially forceful in a situation involving a speedy trial claim,” because

the remedy for such a violation will either involve dismissal of the indictment (if the petitioner

establishes that the delay has prejudiced his defense) or a federal order requiring the state to bring

the petitioner promptly to trial––remedies which “could not be more disruptive of pending state

actions.” Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546–47.

Here, although the Petition refers to a motion filed in the trial court and two complaints

filed before the TBPR, it does not demonstrate that Petitioner “availed himself fully of the state

machinery in attempting to have the state commence trial on the charges pending against him,” as

required to properly exhaust a speedy trial claim. Atkins, 644 F.2d at 547. In particular, the Petition

does not suggest that Petitioner appealed from the trial court’s denial of his speedy-trial motion or,

if the motion was “not heard” (Doc. No. 1 at 2), that he sought mandamus or other relief in the

Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals to remedy the trial court’s failure to rule.

By way of comparison, the Supreme Court has found the exhaustion requirement met

where the claimant demonstrated that he had made “repeated demands for trial to the courts of

Kentucky, offering those courts”––trial and appellate–––“an opportunity to consider on the merits

his constitutional claim of the present denial of a speedy trial.” Braden, 410 U.S. at 490 (noting

that “[i]t is important that petitioners reach state appellate courts” in their efforts to exhaust). And

the Sixth Circuit has found an unreasonable bail claim exhausted only after the claimant appealed

the matter to the intermediate state appellate court and sought leave to further appeal to the state

supreme court. Atkins, 644 F.2d at 550. Here, the Petition fails to support an inference that

Petitioner’s speedy-trial or excessive-bail claims have been fully exhausted.

The Petition’s due process claim based on “false indictments and affidavits” (Doc. No. 1

at 7) and its ineffective-assistance claim based on counsel’s alleged lack of communication or

work product and his eventual withdrawal from the representation (id. at 8), even if colorably

stated, are not properly before the Court in this pretrial habeas case and will therefore be dismissed.

As this Court has previously stated:

As to both Petitioner’s due process claim and his ineffective-assistance claim,

moreover, a Section 2241 habeas petition is not the proper vehicle to consider these

claims. That is because they “fall within the rule that federal courts generally

abstain from intervening in pending state proceedings to address issues that ‘may

be resolved either by trial on the merits in the state courts or by other state

procedures available to the petitioner.’” MPawinayo v. Hall, No. 3:20-cv-01097,

2021 WL 1984944, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. May 18, 2021) (citing Atkins v. People of

State of Mich., 644 F.2d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 1981)) (rejecting pretrial detainee’s

federal habeas claims of ineffective assistance and “prosecution by valid indictment

or presentment”). If Petitioner is convicted in state court, he may bring due process

and/or ineffective-assistance claims in a federal habeas petition filed under 28

U.S.C. § 2254, following the proper exhaustion of state court remedies for those

claims. See Gully v. Kunzman, 592 F.2d 283, 287–88 (6th Cir. 1979) (rejecting due

process claim in pretrial habeas petition because “post-conviction habeas corpus

remedies are available in the federal courts” “[a]fter exhaustion of remedies in the

state courts”); Williams v. Burt, 949 F.3d 966, 969 (6th Cir. 2020) (addressing

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim brought in “a petition for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254” “[f]ollowing [petitioner’s] state court proceedings”). In this pretrial

habeas proceeding, however, these two claims will be summarily dismissed.

Taylor v. Hall, No. 3:22-CV-00616, 2022 WL 6225465, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 7, 2022).

In sum, given the ongoing proceedings against Petitioner in state court and his failure to

exhaust available remedies there, the Court cannot find that his “only recourse was to the federal

courts by way of a petition for habeas corpus.” Atkins, 644 F.2d at 550. Accordingly, the Court

must refrain from exercising jurisdiction under Section 2241.

II. CONCLUSION

As explained above, upon initial review of the Petition it plainly appears that Petitioner is

not entitled to habeas relief in district court at this time. Further proceedings in this Court are not

warranted.

Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED as premature, without prejudice to Petitioner’s

ability to refile a habeas petition after fully exhausting his state remedies.

Because “a plain procedural bar is present” in this case and jurists of reason could not find

that it was incorrectly invoked or that Petitioner should be allowed to proceed further, no certificate

of appealability shall issue. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c);

Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). For the same reasons, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this

dismissal would not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

It is so ORDERED.

WILLIAM L. CAMP by

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE