instructing that Courts must “construe pro se complaints liberally and hold them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”
How later courts described this case
- instructing that Courts must “construe pro se complaints liberally and hold them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”
- “Instead, a plausible claim must include ‘factual content’ sufficient to allow the court ‘to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”
- “To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
EDWARD C. HANKS,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:24-cv-03051-JEH
KATHY ASHCRAFT et al.,
Defendants.
Order
Before the Court for screening is a Motion for Leave to File a Second
Amended Complaint (Doc. 38) filed by Plaintiff Edward C. Hanks, an inmate at
Illinois River Correctional Center. Motions for Extensions of Time have also been
filed by Defendants Shana Clarkson and Zorian Trusewych (Doc. 44) and
Defendants Kathy Ashcroft, Christian Spears, Jon Wessel, and the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) (Doc. 46). For the following reasons,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint is denied, and
Defendants’ Motions for Extensions of Time are granted.
I
In March 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 12), alleging
constitutional violations at Western Illinois Correctional Center. After screening
the pleading, the Court determined that Plaintiff’s pleading stated the following
claims: (1) an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
claim against Defendants Ashcroft, Clarkson, and Trusewych; (2) a First
Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants Spears and Wessel; (3) a
Rehabilitation Act claim against IDOC. (Mer. Rev., Doc. 17 at 10:2.)
II
A
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is before the Court for merit review
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to “screen” the pleading and,
through such process, identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the
entire action if warranted. A claim is defective if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court
accepts Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construes them liberally in his
favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory
statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418,
422 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2013)).
B
Plaintiff’s second amended pleading spans nineteen pages with an
additional seventy pages of exhibits, consisting of numerous grievances and
correspondences. (Pl. Sec. Amend. Compl., Doc. 38 at 1-89.) As in his amended
pleading, Plaintiff realleges constitutional violations at Western Illinois
Correctional Center (“WICC”) against Healthcare Administrator Ashcraft, Nurse
Practitioner Clarkson, Medical Director Trusewych, Corrections Officers Spears
and Wessel, and IDOC as earlier mentioned. However, Plaintiff’s second amended
pleading seeks to add claims against Placement Officer Bright, Dietician Jody
Parish, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), which this Court had
previously dismissed for failure to state a claim when screening Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint. (Mer. Rev., Doc. 17 at 5-6, 9.)
C
The Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. 38).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint need only contain
a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “This requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1)
describes the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the
plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level.” Bravo v. Midland Credit
Mgmt., 812 F.3d 599, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 741 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Instead, a plausible claim must
include ‘factual content’ sufficient to allow the court ‘to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
A prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation requires a plaintiff to
establish “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he
suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the
future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was ‘at least a motivating factor’ in
the Defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d
541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional violations against Defendants Bright,
Parish, and Wexford follows a pattern of citing to grievances submitted or that
were processed without elaboration, noting the date, and then alleging either a
vague assertion or conclusory violation based on an event that occurred shortly
thereafter. However, “[s]peculation based on suspicious timing alone . . . does not
support a reasonable inference of retaliation.” Burks v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 464
F.3d 744, 758 (7th Cir. 2006).
For example, Plaintiff asserts that after submitting a grievance on August
23, 2023, he was assigned a cellmate. Plaintiff then claims “Defendant Bright [also]
starts … acting under false information” provided by Defendant Ashcraft. (Pl. Sec.
Amend. Compl., Doc 38 at 10-11:19.) Similarly, Plaintiff asserts that after
submitting a grievance on January 18, 2023, Defendant Parish retaliated on
January 31, 2023. (Id. at 12:23.) Plaintiff continues by citing a response provided to
a grievance he filed, which he surmises “clearly states Wexford … is basically
responsible for the delays by not supplying a medical director.” (Id. at 14:25.)
The length of Plaintiff’s second amended pleading and the vague and
conclusory allegations contained therein violate the intent of Rule 8(a). A pleading
filed by an inmate need not provide a lengthy account of the circumstances
underlying the alleged constitutional violations. Instead, a pleading need only to
specify the constitutional violation, when it occurred, and the Defendant or
Defendants personally involved. See Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir.
1995) (“To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a
defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional
right.”).
The Court notes that Plaintiff has filed multiple pleadings, none of which
have been dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief. Thus, the Court infers
that Plaintiff can allege a claim that satisfies the intent of Rule 8, given his
demonstrated knowledge of the facts in the instant case and the relaxed pleading
standard afforded to pro se litigants. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th
Cir. 2011) (instructing that Courts must “construe pro se complaints liberally and
hold them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”).
If Plaintiff elects to file a Third Amended Complaint, his filing shall not exceed ten
pages total, shall contain his alleged constitutional violations against all
Defendants, and shall not include exhibits.
III
The Court grants Defendants’ Motions for Extensions of Time (Docs. 44, 46).
Defendants have until August 1, 2025, to respond to Plaintiff’s outstanding
discovery requests.
IV
In light of the foregoing, the Court Orders as follows:
1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 38)
is denied.
2) Defendants’ Motions for Extensions of Time (Docs. 44, 46) are granted.
Defendants have until August 1, 2025, to respond to Plaintiff’s outstanding
discovery requests.
It is so ordered.
Entered: July 21, 2025
s/Jonathan E. Hawley
U.S. District Judge