BUTLER v. FLOYD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN BUTLER, )

Plaintiff,

Vv. ) Case No. 1:23-cv-289

CAPTAIN FLOYD, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Plaintiff John Butler, a former inmate at SCI-Albion, commenced this action against

numerous officials employed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, claiming that they

violated his federal constitutional rights duting the course of-his confinement, eventually

transferring him to SCI-Houtzdale on an involuntary basis. After Defendants filed their answer,

the case proceeded to discovery, and Defendants have now filed a motion for summary

judgment, which remains pending before the Court. See ECF No..51.

The matter is currently referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge Christopher B. Brown for

| pretrial proceedings, in accordance with the Magistrate Judge's Act, 28 U.S.C. §636(0)(1) and

Local Civil Rule 72. On May 14, 2025, Judge Brown issued a Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”) in which he recommends the followirig: oe

‘ The Court grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Butler’s retaliation

_claim against Defendants Stafford and Nunez, _ oe

. In so far as Butler makes a retaliation claim against Defendant Boyce #2 and Defendant

Floyd, the Court sua sponte dismiss that claim pursuant to the Court’s authority under 42

— US.C. § 1997e(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); .

* The Court grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Butler’s claim for

delibérate indifference against Defendants Hafeli, Quinn, and Place;

. + The Court sua sponte dismiss Butler’s claim for deliberate indifference as to Defendant

Stokes pursuant to the Court’s authority under § 1997e(c) and § 1915(e)(2);

* The Court grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Butler’s allegation

that Defendant Boyce #1 threatened to slap him — whether characterized as a deliberate

indifference claim or an excessive force claim — be granted; [and]

* The Court sua sponte dismiss Butler’s failure to investigate claim against Defendant

Barnacle pursuant to the Court’s authority under § 1997e(c) and § 1915(e)(2).

ECFNo.74at2,28 □□

□ Butler has filed objections in which he challenges several aspects of the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendations. See ECF No. [79]. Objections to a magistrate judge's disposition of a

dispositive matter are subject to de novo review before the district judge. 28 U.S.C,

§636(b)(1)(B)-(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 2(b)(3). Following de novo review, “Tt}he district judge may

accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the

matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Applying this

standard, we address each objection in turn.

. . . A. .

Butler’s initial objections concern his First Amendment retaliation claims against

Defendants Stafford and Nunez. Relevantly, Butler has alleged that Defendant Stafford issued a

misconduct charge against him, which falsely accused him of organizing a hunger strike. Butler

also claims that Defendant Nunez yelled at him during his misconduct hearing and punished him

with 90 days of solitary confinement (instead of 30 days) because Butler refused to plead guilty

to the misconduct charge.

Judge Brown recommended that this Court enter summary judgment in favor of

Defendants Stafford and Nunez on the retaliation claims because Butler had not adduced

evidence establishing a causal connection between the Defendants’ alleged retaliatory acts and

any constitutionally protected conduct. Even if Butler had supplied such evidence, Judge Brown

opined that summary judgment was still appropriate because the Defendants had affirmatively

established, as a matter of law, that they would have engaged in the same adverse actions

irrespective of any constitutionally protected activity, for reasons that were reasonably related to

a legitimate penological interést.

Plaintiff’ initial arguments pertain to “issues hidden’ within” footnote 4 of the R&R.

ECF No. [79] at 1. The footnote reads as follows:

In his Opposition, Butler argues that his protected conduct was that “the Plaintiff

had a right to enter a plea of not guilty” at the misconduct hearing. ECF No. 68 at 2.

Defendants respond that “Plaintiff should not be permitted to change his pleadings

midstream” and that, regardless, “Plaintiff's response does nothing to refute Corrections

Defendants’ argument that there is no causal connection and that Corrections Defendants’

would not have made the same decision anyway.” ECF No 72 at 2. To the extent that

Plaintiff is basing his retaliation claim on his “not guilty” plea at the misconduct hearing,

it is respectfully recommended that summary judgment be granted for the Defendants as

this is not constitutionally protected conduct. See Hannan y. City of Phila., 306 F. App'x

735, 738 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that pleading not guilty to disciplinary charges wasn't

protected by First Amendment); Miller v. Lucas, No. 3:16-cv-01947, 2018 WL 4441534,

at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2018) (“[D]efending oneself against misconduct charges [doesn't]

constitute protected activity.”), accepted by 2018 WL 4404675 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2018)[.]

ECF No. 74 at 11, n. 4.

Butler deduces from this footnote that the Defendants’ filed a reply brief in support of

their motion, which he claims he did not receive. He notes that he did not see any request by the

Defendants for leave to file a reply, and he suggests that he should be given an opportunity to file

a sur-reply.

These objections state no basis for denying the Defendants’ Rule 56 motion. As Judge

Brown explained in a text order dated May 21, 2025, his prior briefing order permitted the

Defendants an opportunity to respond to Plaintiffs submissions in opposition to the pending

Rule 56 motion, “as is routine.” ECF No. [76]. This was consistent with the local rules of this

Court, which expressly contemplate that the party moving for summary judgment may reply to

the non-moving party’s submissions -- typically within a two-week timeframe, unless otherwise

specified by the Court. See LCvR 56(A) and (D). Sur-replies by the non-movant are not

normally contemplated or needed, as is true in this case. In order to protect Butler’s appellate

rights, the Court will direct that a courtesy copy of Defendants’ reply papers at ECF No. [72] be

served on him with this Memorandum Order. Nevertheless, the undersigned notes that Butler

has not been unfairly prejudiced by his failure to receive those filings to date, as he was given a

fair opportunity to respond to Defendants’ motion and would not normally be permitted or

required to file a sur-reply.

Regarding his claim against Defendant Stafford, Butler asserts that Stafford told him on

August 1, 2023 that “several” jailhouse informants had identified Plaintiff as the main organizer

of the hunger strike, whereas Stafford wrote in his misconduct report that only “one” informant

labeled him as the main organizer. ECF No. 79 at 1. Butler further notes that Stafford’s report

states only that he “was identified” as a main organizer, meaning that the confidential informant

provided only hearsay information. Jd. at 2.

To the extent these assertions are in the nature of “objections,” they are of no legal □

moment. Any discrepancy in Stafford’s reporting was evidentiary fodder that Plaintiff could

have raised at his misconduct hearing, but it does not amount to a genuinely disputed issue of

material fact concerning retaliation. And irrespective of whether Stafford prosecuted the

misconduct charge on the basis of one witness or several, the record reflects a sufficient quantum

of evidence -- ie, “some evidence’ supporting the guilty finding for the misconduct charge.”

Jones v. Davidson, 666 F. App’x 143, 148 (3d Cir. 2016). Moreover, prison disciplinary

hearings are not governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence and, therefore, the use of hearsay

evidence is not prohibited. See Moneyham y, Ebbert, No. 3:16-CV-01311, 2018 WL 4087555, at

*3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2018) (“There is no constitutional right to confront or cross-examine

adverse witnesses at a prison disciplinary hearing.”), report and recommendation adopted, No.

3:16CV1311, 2018 WL 4051746 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2018); Garcia v. Wetzel, No. 3:12-CV-68-

KRG-KAP, 2013 WL 638076, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2013) (stating “there is no bar to use of

hearsay evidence even in a hearing required under Wolff v. McDonnell, because there is no

constitutional right to confrontation of the prosecution's evidence”) (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano,

425 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1976)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:12-CV-68-KRG- □

KAP, 2013 WL 637975 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2013).

Butler also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that his First Amendment

retaliation claim could not be predicated on the allegation that he was unfairly penalized with a

harsher disciplinary penalty because of pleading “not guilty” to the misconduct charge. Judge

Brown reasoned that Plaintiff could not establish the first prong of his retaliation claim under

such a theory because pleading “not guilty” to a misconduct charge is not constitutionally

protected conduct. See ECF No. [74] at 11 n. 4. Although Plaintiff takes issue with this legal

premise, the Court finds that Judge Brown correctly stated and applied the law. See id. (citing

Hannan v. City of Phila., 306 F. App'x 735, 738 (3d Cir. 2009) and Miller v. Lucas, No. 3:16-cv-

01947, 2018 WL 4441534, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2018), accepted by 2018 WL 4404675 (M.D.

Pa. Sept. 17, 2018)). Butler’s insistence that there was a causal connection between his “not

guilty” plea and his harsher disciplinary sentence is therefore irrelevant because, without a

showing of constitutionally protected conduct, no unconstitutional retaliation can be established.

See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (“A prisoner alleging retaliation must

show (1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) an adverse action by prison officials sufficient to

deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights, and (3) a causal

link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.”)

(cleaned up).

B.

Butler next challenges the Magistrate Judge’s analysis as it relates to his First

Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Boyce #2 and Floyd. Butler has alleged that

Defendant Boyce #2 verbally abused him as a result of Butler having made previous allegations

of abuse against Boyce #2. Magistrate Brown recommended that the claims against Boyce #2 be

dismissed because “‘[ml]ere threats do not constitute retaliation.’”” ECF No. [74] at 17 (quoting

Burgos v, Canino, 358 F. App’x 302, 306 (3d Cir. 2009)).

Butler insists, however, that Boyce #2 “interfered with a ‘medical emergency” by coming

to the Psychiatric Observation Cell while Butler was on suicide watch and telling Butler “go

ahead and kill yourself!” ECF No. 79 at 3. While reprehensible, this alleged conduct is not

actionable as unconstitutional retaliation under the circumstances present here. See Booth v.

King, 228 Fed.Appx. 167 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Absent any allegation of physical harm, the

defendants’ verbal threats do not amount to a constitutional violation’); Jones v. Catell, No. 1:23-

CV-1991, 2025 WL 336729, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2025) (court dismissing retaliation claim

where defendant was alleged to have made a variety of threatening or abusive remarks to the

plaintiff as a result of prior complaints or grievances; court noted that “verbal abuse does not

sustain a retaliation claim, and the complaint does not describe any specific adverse action taken

by [the defendant] against [the plaintiff]”); Henry v. CO#2 Gilara, No. CV 16-167, 2017 WL

3424863, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2017) (“[V]erbal threats alone do not constitute adverse action

for the purposes of establishing a prima facie retaliation claim.”).

As for Defendant Floyd, the Magistrate Judge noted that it was “not clear what claim, if

any, Butler is bringing against Defendant Floyd.” ECF No. [74] at 17. Because Butler had

provided no further clarification at the Rule 56 stage to elucidate his claim, Judge Brown

recommended that it be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to the Court’s authority under 42 U.S.C.

§1997e(c) and 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2).

Butler states in his objections that Defendant Floyd was the Security Captain at SCI-

Albion and, according to DOC policy, Floyd should have sent someone from the Security Office

to meet with him regarding his reports that he had been abused by Boyce #1 while hospitalized

in Erie. Butler surmises that the issue was “covered-up.” ECF No. 79 at 3. He further states

that, upon being transferred to SCI-Houtzdale, he filed an “Allegations of Abuse” complaint

directly with Floyd. Butler alleges that he never received a response, and the allegations were

again “covered-up.” Id.

After review of the record, the Court concurs with Judge Brown’s recommendation that

the claim against Floyd should be dismissed. The “failure to follow DOC policy, alone, does not

amount to a constitutional violation,” Jackson v. Irwin, No. CV 22-352E, 2024 WL 2883226, at

*§ (W.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:22-CV-352, 2024 WL

2716858 (W.D. Pa. May 28, 2024), and “supervisory roles, and/or failure to respond to

grievances, are insufficient to infer personal involvement.” Stafford v. Stevens, No. 3:25 -CV-

00028, 2025 WL 1433671, at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 14, 2025) (citing Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d

366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020)). To the extent Butler is presenting Floyd’s failure to respond as a form

of retaliation, it is not clear that Floyd’s mere inaction can rise to the level of “adverse action”

for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim. See, e.g., Martinez v, Diaz, 2021 WL

8825219, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2021) (court noting that “the failure to respond to a prisoner's

,

grievance alone generally does not constitute an adverse action taken against the prisoner for

filing the grievance”). Moreover, Butler has not alleged or proved any facts to establish a causal

connection between his protected activity and Floyd’s alleged failure to investigate. Instead, he

relies entirely on speculation and conclusory averments of a “cover-up,” which are insufficient

both at the pleading and summary judgment stages. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S, 662, 678

(2009) (a pleading that offers “labels or conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action” is insufficient); Brill v. Einfalt #477, No. CV 24-00644, 2025 WL 1933717,

at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2025) (“speculation and conclusory allegations by the nonmoving party

are not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion”) (citing authority); Bullock v. Cohen, No.

CV171376NLHJS, 2018 WL 1293168, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2018) (dismissing retaliation clat

where the plaintiff “[did] not plead any facts that would allow [the] Court to reasonably infer that

[the warden’s] failure to directly respond [to plaintiffs grievance] was in any way related to—

much less motivated by—Plaintiff’s initiation of federal civil rights suits against her”).

Accordingly, Butler’s putative claim against Floyd will be dismissed.

C.

Butler next objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations relating to his Eighth

Amendment claims. Relevantly, Butler has claimed that Defendants Hafeli, Quinn, Place and

Stokes all displayed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in that they delayed

summoning the prison medical team and made callous remarks to him after he complained of

chest pain and eventually collapsed on the floor. Judge Brown noted Butler’s allegation thathe |

first reported chest pain between 7:00 and 7:30 a.m. on the morning of August 4, 2023. Judge

Brown further observed that Butler was seen by prison medical staff that same morning at 8:42

a.m. and 8:52 a.m., then transported to UPMC Hamot at 9:27 a.m. Butler remained at UPMC

Hamot for 23 hours while his vitals returned to normal limits, having tested negative for

coronary artery disease. Even giving “full credit to Butler’s version of events,” ECF No. 74 at

21, Judge Brown concluded that his Eighth Amendment claims could not withstand summary

judgment because Butler “‘presented no evidence of any harm resulting from a delay in medical

treatment.’” Id. (quoting Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000) and citing

additional authority).

Butler has also alleged that Defendant Boyce #1 threatened to slap him and interfered

with his medically necessary rest while he was hospitalized at UPMC Hamot. Judge Brown

determined that, even if Boyce #1 did threaten to slap Butler and/or verbally abused him while

he was recuperating, this would not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation because

the harm, if any was de minimis.

Butler’s objections relate only to the Eighth Amendment claims against Hafeli, Quinn,

Place, and Stokes. For the most part, Butler merely reiterates his allegations describing the

Defendants’ conduct. He does, however, take issue with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that

no harm was shown as a result of the Defendants’ conduct. Pointing to a medical report at ECF

No. 70-1, Butler states that, because of the delay in medical treatment, he passed out, his pulse

rate elevated to 117, his blood pressure rose to 167/98, and there were changes noted on his

EKG. The Court agrees with Judge Brown that these temporary symptoms are insufficient to

establish the type of harm necessary to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim. Accordingly,

Butler’s objections lack metit.

D.

Butler also appears to take issue with the Defendants’ position on exhaustion of

administrative remedies. Relevantly, Butler states that he filed various grievances, letters, and

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complaints alleging abuse during his confinement, to which he did not receive responses. While

Defendants have stated that they did not receive any of these submissions, Butler insists that

Defendants’ position is false and that he can prove he served the grievance.

These objections are of no legal moment because Judge Brown did not predicate any

recommendation on Plaintiffs failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Rather, Judge Brown

addressed the merits of each putative claim and found that Butler’s claims were not viable as a

matter of law. Because the Court agrees with Judge Brown’s analysis and recommendations,

there is no need for the Court to render a ruling on the exhaustion (or non-exhaustion) of

administrative remedies.

E.

Lastly, Butler argues the relevance of certain audio/video recordings, to which he has

been denied access. First, Butler objects to the apparent loss and/or destruction of: (i)

audio/video recording of him being escorted to the Restricted Housing Unit on August 1, 2023;

(ii) a recording of an “in camera interview” of Defendant Stafford that Defendant Nunez

conducted in connection with Butler’s misconduct charge; and (iii) video footage of Butler’s

misconduct hearing. ECF No. 79 at 5. Butler further objects to the denial of his request that the

Court obtain and view a recording of his own May 1, 2024 “Restricted Release Hearing” as well

as the hearings of ten other inmates. Jd. at 5-6.

Each of these matters was the subject of prior pretrial motions practice. Plaintiff initially

filed a motion to compel the production of certain recorded evidence, ECF No. [31], which was

denied by Chief U.S. Magistrate Judge Richard A. Lanzillo on August 13, 2024. ECF No. [35].

Plaintiff appealed those rulings, ECF No. [42], and this Court denied the appeal on January 8,

2025. ECF No. [61] at 3-5. Plaintiff subsequently reasserted his discovery requests and sought

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sanctions aghinst the Defendants in motions that were referred to Magistrate Judge Brown. ECF

Nos. 50 and 59. Judge Brown denied those motions in a ruling issued on May 14, 2025. ECF

No. [73]. Plaintiff did not appeal that ruling further, and there is no occasion for the Court to

now rtevisit it.

Accordingly, after de novo review of the Complaint and documents in the case, including

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and all filings relevant thereto, along with the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, ECF No. [74], and Plaintiffs objections to the

| R&R, ECF No. [79], the following Order is entered:

NOW, this 21st day of July, 2025, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, ECF No. [51], is GRANTED insofar as it relates to: (i) Plaintiff's First

Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Stafford and Nunez, (ii) Plaintiff's Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Hafeli, Quinn, and Place; and (iii)

Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference and/or excessive force claims against

Defendant Boyce #1, based on Boyce #1’s alleged threat to slap Plaintiff. As to each of the

foregoing claims, judgment shall be entered in favor of the Defendants and against Plaintiff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to the Court’s authority under 42 U.S.C.

§1997e(c) and 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2), that the following claims are DISMISSED with prejudice,

sua sponte, for failure to state a viable cause of action upon which relief can be granted:

(i) Plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation claims (if any) against Defendant Boyce #2 and

Defendant Floyd; (ii) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Stokes; and (iii) Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Barnacle predicated upon

Defendant Barnacle’s alleged failure to investigate Plaintiffs allegations of abuse.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of United States

Magistrate Judge Christopher B. Brown, issued on May 14, 2025, ECF No. [74], as

supplemented herein, is adopted as the Opinion of this Court. Plaintiff's objections to the Report

and Recommendation, ECF No. [79], are OVERRULED.

The Clerk is directed to serve upon Plaintiff a courtesy copy of Defendants’ filings at

ECF No. [72], along with a copy of this Memorandum Order. There being no additional claims

before the Court in this civil action, the Clerk is directed to mark this case “CLOSED.”

Co ge □□

Me. fUlhhAtD □□□

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

United States District Judge

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