Mooney v. Logan County Commission

FOR TINH TEH SEO UUTNHITEERDN S DTIASTTERSI CDTI SOTFR WICETS CTO VUIRRGT INIA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

RANDALL TODD MOONEY,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-cv-00304

LOGAN COUNTY COMMISSION, et al.,

Defendants.

PROPOSED FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

This matter is assigned to the Honorable Frank W. Volk, Chief United States

District Judge, and it is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge by

standing order for submission of proposed findings and recommendations for disposition

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (ECF No. 4). Before this Court are Motions for

Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendants, Logan County Sheriff Paul D. Clemons

(ECF No. 38) and Logan County Deputy Lieutenant Matt Carter (ECF No. 40),

respectively. For the reasons explained herein, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that

Defendants’ motions be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Randall Todd Mooney (“Plaintiff”), who is proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, initiated this civil action on June 20, 2024. (ECF No. 2). Plaintiff alleges a civil-

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against eight named Defendants: (1) the Logan

County Commission (“LCC”); (2) Logan County Sheriff Paul D. Clemons (“Clemons”); (3)

Corporal Nick Tucker (“Tucker”); (5) Logan County Deputy Corporal Coty Crum

(“Crum”); (6) Logan County Home Confinement (“LCHC”); (7) Logan County Home

Confinement Officer Marie Belcher (“Belcher”); and (8) Logan County K9 Deputy

Timothy C. Johnson (“Johnson”) (collectively, the “Defendants”). Id. at 1.

In his operative Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, Deputy

Tucker and Deputy Crum, entered his home by force without a warrant on the morning

of June 22, 2022. (ECF No. 21 at 3). While there, Deputy Tucker seized cash from the

home and questioned Plaintiff after informing him that a tip from a confidential

informant led them to believe that Plaintiff had a large amount of money in a freezer. Id.

According to the Complaint, Deputy Tucker threatened to take Plaintiff to jail for

marijuana possession when Plaintiff refused to answer questions. Id. Plaintiff alleges that

the marijuana in his possession was his “legal medical marijuana.” Id. Plaintiff alleges

that the officers next dragged him from the home, dislocating Plaintiff’s left shoulder and

“causing permanent damage” to Plaintiff’s right foot in the process. Id. Plaintiff was

handcuffed and placed in Deputy Carter’s vehicle, where he was questioned by Carter. Id.

Plaintiff further alleges that, although he refused to consent to a search, Deputy Tucker

and Deputy Crum conducted a warrantless search of his home anyway “and used the

medicine that I legally procured against me and created false charges on me.” Id.

Ultimately, Plaintiff was transported to the regional jail where he was held for

approximately ten days before being released on bond. Id. at 3-4.

After posting bond, Plaintiff alleges that he was returned to jail based upon a

nonexistent detainer, and “held for appx 10 days illegally, filing multiple grievances for

medical attention and wondering why I was being held after I posted bond.” Id. at 4.

Ultimately Plaintiff was informed that the detainer was a “clerical error,” and he was

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released. Id. Plaintiff then walked to Med Express to seek medical treatment for his

injuries, and by the time he left Med Express, the home confinement office was already

closed. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Belcher “procured a capias” in order to secure

his arrest, despite being aware that Plaintiff was seeking medical treatment and was

unable to walk to the home confinement office to report in time before it closed. Id.

According to Plaintiff, Officer Belcher thus “used her power to illegally lock me up again.”

Id. Plaintiff was then jailed “for 15 more days based on lies and abuse of power by Marie

Belcher.” Id.

According to the Complaint, after his release Plaintiff filed complaints against

Deputy Tucker, Deputy Crum, and Officer Belcher with the Sheriff. Id. Then, “[t]he very

next morning [Officer Belcher] pulled the GPS on [Plaintiff’s] home confinement box”

and learned that Plaintiff had been to a storage unit. Id. According to Plaintiff, his

supervising officer Jamie Sparks had given Plaintiff permission to do so. Id. Plaintiff

alleges that, despite having permission to visit his storage unit, Officer Belcher informed

Chief Deputy Fauci that Plaintiff “had been acting suspiciously.” Id. According to Plaintiff,

Officer Belcher did so “in retaliation because I filed [a] complaint” against her with the

Sheriff. Id. The Complaint further alleges that Defendant, Deputy Johnson, “then used

false information, along with the created information from [Officer] Belcher, and put it

on an affidavit to search” the storage unit. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Johnson swore

falsely on the affidavit that Plaintiff “did commit the crime of delivery of a controlled

substance,” despite the fact that Plaintiff had not been found guilty of this charge. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that, on or about August 12, 2022, Deputy Johnson then “executed

the search warrant with falsified evidence and information.” Id. After the search of the

storage unit, “[t]hey returned with ZERO evidence of a crime being committed, yet over

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$100,000 worth of high end collectibles was destroyed.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that the

criminal case against him was ultimately dismissed. Id. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result

of Defendants’ actions, he has sustained physical injuries, emotional and psychological

injuries, financial injuries, reputational injuries, and loss of liberty. Id. at 5. He seeks

compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 6.

On September 20, 2024, each of the named Defendants filed a separate Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings. (ECF Nos. 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44). The undersigned

then entered an Order and Notice setting forth a briefing schedule and informing Plaintiff

of his rights and responsibilities in responding to the motions in accordance with the

Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975).

Plaintiff then filed timely responses on November 6, 2024. (ECF Nos. 54, 55, 56, 57, 58,

59, 60, 61). In turn, Defendants filed their reply briefs on November 13, 2024. (ECF Nos.

62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69). Lastly, Plaintiff filed surreply briefs on November 25, 2024.

(ECF Nos. 70-1, 70-2, 70-3, 70-4, 70-5, 70-6, 70-7, 70-8). As such, the motions are ripe

for adjudication. The instant Proposed Findings and Recommendation takes up the

motions filed by Defendants Clemons (ECF No. 38) and Carter (ECF No. 40), respectively.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(c), this Court applies the same standard it applies to a motion to

dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Drager v. PLIVA

USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 474 (4th Cir. 2014). That is, this Court accepts as true all the well-

pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable factual inferences

in the non-movant’s favor. Pulte Home Corp. v. Montgomery Cty., 909 F.3d 685, 691 (4th

Cir. 2018).

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Pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal

is proper when, even if the facts alleged by the plaintiff are true, the complaint fails to

state “a claim upon which relief can be granted” under the applicable law. Glessner v.

Chardan, LLC, 22-cv-3333, 2023 WL 4351331, at *2 (D. Md. July 5, 2023) (citing In re

Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). To survive a

motion to dismiss under this minimal standard, the complaint only needs to set forth

enough allegations of fact which, if true, suggest a clearly-identifiable legal claim for relief

that “is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For a

claim to be “plausible,” the complaint does not need to include “detailed factual

allegations.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Further, a complaint should not be dismissed

simply because the actual proof of those facts is improbable, because recovery is unlikely,

or because the legal theory supporting the claim is not stated perfectly. Id.; accord

Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam).

On the other hand, a complaint may not simply rely on bald accusations,

conclusory statements, or mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter’s Mill

Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). The U.S. Supreme Court has

explained that if the complaint provides no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” dismissal is proper. Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555. In other words, it is fundamentally insufficient for a complaint to be

made up of nothing more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555). Instead, the complaint must plead facts which move the claim beyond the realm

of mere possibility, and allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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When reviewing a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court decides whether the

complaint met this standard by separating the legal conclusions from the factual

allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining

whether those allegations allow the court to “reasonably infer” that the plaintiff is entitled

to the legal remedy he or she seeks. A Soc’y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342,

346 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).

Where, as here, a plaintiff is proceeding “pro se”—or in other words, without legal

counsel—the Court must “liberally construe” the complaint, meaning that it is held to a

less stringent standard than if it had been drafted by an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Therefore, when a potentially-viable complaint is deficient but its

shortcomings can be remedied by amendment, the pro-se plaintiff should be given an

opportunity to amend the complaint and “particularize” his or her allegations. See

Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); accord Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151-53

(4th Cir. 1978) (“What might be a meritorious claim on the part of a pro se litigant

unversed in the law should not be defeated without affording the pleader a reasonable

opportunity to articulate his cause of action.”); Coleman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 603, 604

(4th Cir. 1965) (reversing dismissal and explaining that “claims of legal substance should

not be forfeited because of a failure to state them with technical precision”). Nevertheless,

the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court may ignore a clear

failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v.

Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 (2009).

Likewise, “a district court is not required to recognize obscure or extravagant claims

defying the most concerted efforts to unravel them.” Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901

F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[E]ven a solicitous examination of the allegations reveals

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little on which federal subject matter jurisdiction may be based.”) (internal markings

omitted). In other words, the mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings

means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which

the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so; however, a district court may not rewrite a

complaint to include claims that were never presented, construct the plaintiff's legal

arguments for him or her, or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the

Court. Randolph v. Baltimore City, 14-3176, 2014 WL 5293708, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 14,

2014), aff’d sub nom. Randolph v. New Tech, 588 Fed. App’x 219 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations

omitted) (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)). See

also Weller, 901 F.2d at 391 (affirming dismissal where the “complaint fail[ed] to allege

anything that even remotely suggests a factual basis for the claim,” and explaining that

“[t]he ‘special judicial solicitude’ with which a district court should view such pro se

complaints does not transform the court into an advocate”). Consequently, the Court may

deny leave to amend when “the amendment would be futile,” such that “it is clearly

insufficient or frivolous on its face” or “if the claim it presents would not survive a motion

to dismiss.” Equal Rights Ctr. v. Niles Bolton Assocs., 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 2010);

Save Our Sound OBX, Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 914 F.3d 213, 228 (4th Cir. 2019).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Clemons’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 38)

In his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 38), Sheriff Clemons

argues that dismissal is proper because, as a government employee, he is only liable for

his own misconduct—and the Amended Complaint sets forth no allegations which could

support an inference that he personally committed any constitutional violations. (ECF

No. 39 at 3) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). Further, Sheriff Clemons argues that the

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doctrine of qualified immunity shields him from liability, because Plaintiff “pleads no

facts to support any claim” against him, and “has failed to identify any clearly established

law that Defendant Clemons violated” in support of his § 1983 claims. Id. at 6.

In his response brief, Plaintiff argues that supervisory liability applies “because the

Amended Complaint presents substantial evidence of [Sheriff Clemons’s] deliberate

indifference to and active pa1ticipation in constitutional violations, including but not

limited to his knowing tolerance of Deputy Crum's documented pe1jury and abuse of

power.” (ECF No. 59 at 1). In support of his argument, Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he evidence

demonstrates . . . (1) a pattern of deliberate indifference to widespread misconduct; (2)

failure to supervise and discipline deputies despite known violations; (3) active

facilitation of retaliatory conduct; and (4) continued endorsement of Deputy Crum’s

perjured testimony and abuse of authority.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that an

unspecified audio recording of Sheriff Clemons will show him “admitting knowledge of

Deputies Tucker and Crum ‘robbing people for years[.]’” Id. at 2. According to Plaintiff,

this constitutes the requisite “evidence of a pattern of similar constitutional violations by

untrained employees,” as well as Sheriff Clemons’s “continued inaction in the face of

documented widespread abuses[.]” Id. Lastly, Plaintiff argues that qualified immunity

does not apply when a supervisor knowingly permits constitutional violations by

subordinates. Id. at 5.

In his reply brief, Sheriff Clemons argues that Plaintiff cannot overcome the

deficiencies in his pleading by advancing new theories that are “no where stated in his

Amended Complaint, namely supervisory liability.” (ECF No. 62 at 1). Further, Sheriff

Clemons argues that, “[e]ven considering these new allegations . . . [they] fail to support

a claim” nonetheless. Id. at 1-2. Relying on the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in King v. Riley,

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Sheriff Clemons emphasizes that “a supervisor’s ‘mere knowledge’ that his subordinates

are engaged in unconstitutional conduct is not enough.” King v. Riley, 76 F.4th 259, 269

(4th Cir. 2023). Because Plaintiff has alleged nothing more than “mere knowledge” of

rumors of misconduct, Sheriff Clemons argues that the Amended Complaint fails to allege

the requisite ratification to meet the supervisory-liability standard under § 1983. (ECF

No. 62 at 2).

In his surreply brief, Plaintiff argues that Clemons “fundamentally misapprehends

both the nature of supervisory liability and the scope of qualified immunity protection in

the context of documented constitutional violations.” (ECF No. 70-3). Without pointing

to any particular portion of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff argues vaguely that his

pleading “establishes knowledge through multiple avenues recognized by controlling

precedent[.]” Id. at 2. Without elaboration, Plaintiff then merely sets forth a list of legal

authority before concluding that his pleading “properly establishes supervisory liability

through: (1) Direct evidence of Sheriff Clemons’ knowledge of constitutional violations;

(2) Pattern evidence of systematic misconduct; (3) Failure to take corrective action

despite knowledge; (4) Active facilitation of continuing violations; [and] (5) Direct causal

connection between supervision and violations.” Id. at 7.

When a state official is sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in his supervisory

capacity, liability arises where “(1) he knew that his subordinate was engaged in conduct

that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) his response

showed deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;

and (3) there was an affirmative causal link between his inaction and the constitutional

injury.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 224 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud,

13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)).

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Here, even assuming that the doctrine of qualified immunity did not bar Plaintiff’s

suit against Sheriff Clemons, dismissal is proper nonetheless. Contrary to the argument

in Plaintiff’s briefing on this motion, the Amended Complaint is devoid of any plausible

allegations to meet the elements of supervisory liability. In his Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings (ECF No. 38), Sheriff Clemons points out that the entirety of Plaintiff’s

allegations concerning acts taken by Clemons in the Amended Complaint consist of only

three assertions. (ECF No. 39 at 2). First, Plaintiff alleges that after he made complaints

against Tucker, Crum, and Belcher, “Sheriff Clemons admitted he had many of the same

complaints against these same officers but no one would ever stand up and press it.” (ECF

No. 21 at 4). Second, Plaintiff alleges that, after he told Sheriff Clemons that he “offered

to be the first” to “stand up and press” complaints against Tucker, Crum, and Belcher,

“[t]he Sheriff then informed Marie Belcher of the complaint I filed against her.” Id. Lastly,

after criminal charges against Plaintiff were dismissed, Plaintiff spoke with the Sheriff

and informed him “of the pending lawsuit.” Id. None of these allegations state a plausible

“pattern . . . of systematic misconduct,” “failure to take corrective action,” or any “direct

causal connection between supervision and violations” as Plaintiff claims. At most, these

allegations merely give rise to an inference that Sheriff Clemons knew of complaints of

misconduct by his officers.

The Fourth Circuit explained in Shaw that “[e]stablishing a ‘pervasive’ and

‘unreasonable’ risk of harm” in satisfaction of the first element of a supervisory-liability

claim “requires evidence that the conduct is widespread,” and establishing “deliberate

indifference to or tacit authorization” in satisfaction of the second element likewise

requires “demonstrating a supervisor’s continued inaction in the face of documented

widespread abuses.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. Simply put, the Amended Complaint fails to

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allege sufficient facts to support a plausible claim that the officers had behaved in such a

manner in the past that their conduct was “widespread.” Plaintiff’s vague allusions to

other complaints is far too formulaic and threadbare to sufficiently state a claim. See Sosa

v. Hill, 1:24-cv-499, 2025 WL 864291, at *16 (E.D. Va. Mar. 19, 2025) (rejecting

supervisory-liability claim when the plaintiff “provide[d] no examples” of widespread

misconduct).

Nor do any of the allegations in the Amended Complaint give rise to a plausible

inference that Sheriff Clemons engaged in “continued inaction” in response—or, in other

words, that Sheriff Clemons chose to do nothing to remedy what he knew to be a

widespread problem. To the contrary, Plaintiff’s own allegations indicate that he was “the

first” to “stand up and press” complaints against Tucker, Crum, and Belcher. (ECF No. 21

at 4). This falls far short of the deliberate-indifference standard set forth in Shaw. Lastly,

the Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations which could give rise to a plausible

claim of an “affirmative causal link” between Sheriff Clemons’s alleged inaction and the

alleged harm. Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully

recommends that Sheriff Clemons’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 38)

be GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims against him be DISMISSED.

B. Carter’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 40)

In his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 40), Deputy Carter argues

that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint “pleads no facts to support any claim” against him;

in particular, the Amended Complaint “makes no allegation that Defendant searched or

seized Plaintiff or his property.” (ECF No. 41 at 3). Because an officer may not be liable

for the alleged actions of others under § 1983, Deputy Carter argues that dismissal of

Plaintiff’s claims against him is proper. See id. Additionally, Deputy Carter argues that he

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is entitled to qualified immunity, because the Amended Complaint fails to make a

“particularized showing” that Deputy Carter violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id.

at 5-6. Deputy Carter argues that, based upon the allegations in the Amended Complaint,

he “merely was sitting outside in his cruiser when the Plaintiff was placed into the

cruiser,” and “then spoke to the Plaintiff.” Id. at 6. Accordingly, Deputy Carter concludes

that “Plaintiff pleads no facts to support any claim against Defendant Carter.” Id.

In his response brief, Plaintiff argues that Deputy Carter “directly participated in

and “facilitated subordinates’ misconduct” while knowing that their actions were

unconstitutional, giving rise to bystander liability under § 1983. (ECF No. 55 at 2, 4)

(citing Stevenson v. City of Seat Pleasant, Md., 743 F.3d 411, 416-17 (4th Cir. 2014)).

Plaintiff further argues that Deputy Carter’s “supervisory position created [a] duty to

prevent known violations,” that Deputy Carter’s “prior involvement” in the search of

Plaintiff’s home in 2018 “establishes pattern and knowledge,” and that “[q]ualified

immunity does not protect knowing and repeated violations[.]” (ECF No. 55 at 4-5).

In his reply brief, Deputy Carter essentially argues that the Amended Complaint

fails to demonstrate he knew that the search was improper. (ECF No. 63 at 2).1

In his surreply brief, Plaintiff argues that Deputy Carter “disregards clear evidence

of direct participation.” (ECF No. 70-2). Further, Plaintiff argues that Carter’s mere

“knowledge of violations [is] sufficient” to establish liability under § 1983. Id. at 3 (citing

Camilo-Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1999)). Plaintiff asserts that Carter’s

statement that “we wouldn’t have any more encounters like this”—ostensibly, the 2018

search of Plaintiff’s home—is sufficient to demonstrate “consistent methodology in

1 Deputy Carter also argued that the owner of the premises, a “Mr. Esposito,” consented to the search. (ECF

No. 63 at 1-2). However, Defendant failed to raise this issue in his motion; therefore, the undersigned will

not consider it.

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violations.” Id. at 3.

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning Deputy Carter are

solely limited to the following:

As Tucker gets me outside, he puts me into Lieutenant Matt Carter’s vehicle.

Lt. Carter was in the driver’s seat and spoke about how he told me last time

how “we wouldn’t have any more encounters like this” (Old case 18-80 that

got dismissed for no warrant at same exact address), but Tucker had

thought he had good information. I asked why they allow them (Tucker &

Crum) to do whatever they want & Carter replied that “they love em”

(referring to the Sheriff). Carter kept asking me if there was any truth to the

information they had, stating that if I just cooperated they would go easy.

Carter acknowledge[d] he didn’t have a search warrant and asked me if I

would give consent to search, which I denied . . . . Carter then transports me

to the Logan County Sheriff Office.

(ECF No. 21 at 3).

It is well-established that, “[i]n a § 1983 personal or individual capacity suit, a

plaintiff must show that the official charged personally caused the deprivation of his

federal rights.” Karn v. PTS of America, LLC, 590 F. Supp. 3d 780, 821 (D. Md. 2022)

(citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)). “The law is clear that personal

participation of a defendant is a necessary element of a Section 1983 claim against

government officials in their individual capacities.” Blessing v. Scaturo, 6:16-cv-1832,

2017 WL 3575734, at *9 (D.S.C. July 28, 2017) (citing Trulock v. Free, 275 F.3d 391, 402

(4th Cir. 2001)). “In order for an individual to be liable under Section 1983, it must be

‘affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the

plaintiff's rights, [and the defendant] must have had personal knowledge of and

involvement in the alleged deprivation of [the plaintiff's] rights[.]’” Id. (emphasis added).

An officer may be liable under § 1983, on a theory of bystander liability, only if he: (1)

knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual's constitutional rights; (2) has a

reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to act. Randall v. Prince

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George’s Cty., Md., 302 F.3d 188, 204 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that “mere inference”

officers knew of involuntary detention was insufficient to demonstrate bystander

liability).

Here, the Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations which show that Deputy

Carter exercised supervisory authority over the other two officers. Moreover, one prior

incident—the 2018 search of Plaintiff’s residence—is simply insufficient to demonstrate a

“persistent and widespread” pattern giving rise to supervisory liability under § 1983. See

Davis v. Lilly, 2023 WL 6565288, at *5 (W.D. Va. Oct. 10, 2023); Robinson v. Baltimore

Cnty., 2022 WL 3577267, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 2022).

Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege sufficient plausible facts to establish that

Deputy Carter was personally involved in committing an alleged constitutional violation.

Plaintiff alleges that Officers Tucker and Crum—not Deputy Carter—conducted the

warrantless search of his home. See id. There is no allegation that Deputy Carter

participated in the search of Plaintiff’s home, or used excessive force against Plaintiff at

any time. At most, Deputy Carter was present on the scene and questioned Plaintiff.

Therefore, by the plain language of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Deputy Carter did not

personally engage in any of the conduct of which Plaintiff complains.

Plaintiff asserts in his response brief that Deputy Carter’s knowledge of the past

search incident of Plaintiff’s home is sufficient to demonstrate Deputy Carter’s knowledge

of a pattern of misconduct. However, by the plain language of the Amended Complaint,

Deputy Carter stated to Plaintiff that “Tucker had thought he had good information” when

he performed the prior search. Not all warrantless searches are unconstitutional.

Likewise, the allegations are insufficient to give rise to the inference that Deputy Carter

knew that there was no probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff. Simply put, without more,

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the allegations in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fail to demonstrate that Deputy Carter

knowingly condoned unconstitutional conduct. Thus, even assuming arguendo that

qualified immunity did not bar Plaintiff’s suit against Deputy Carter, Plaintiff has failed

to state a plausible claim for relief pursuant to § 1983. Accordingly, the undersigned

respectfully recommends that Deputy Carter’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

(ECF No. 40) be GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims against him be DISMISSED.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Defendant

Logan County Sheriff Paul D. Clemons’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No.

38) be GRANTED, Defendant Logan County Deputy Lieutenant Matt Carter’s Motion

for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 40) be GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims

against these two of the eight named Defendants in this civil action be dismissed.

The parties are notified that this Proposed Findings and Recommendation is

hereby FILED, and a copy will be submitted to the Honorable Frank W. Volk, Chief

United States District Judge. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and

Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14)

days from the date of the filing of this Proposed Findings and Recommendation to file

with the Clerk of this Court specific written objections identifying the portions of the

Proposed Findings and Recommendation to which objection is made and the basis of such

objection; further, pursuant to Rule 6(d), any unrepresented party shall have an

additional three (3) days after this fourteen-day period if service is made via U.S. Mail.

Extension of this time period may be granted by the presiding District Judge for good

cause shown. A copy of any objections shall be provided to Judge Volk, and to each

opposing party—except that, if any opposing party is represented by counsel, that party’s

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copy should be provided to his or her counsel.

Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of de

novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Fourth Circuit

Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(4); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985);

Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841,

846 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1984).

The Clerk is DIRECTED to file this Proposed Findings and Recommendation, and

to transmit a copy to counsel of record and any unrepresented party.

ENTERED: June 20, 2025

□□ Dwane L. Tinsley

___ United States Magistrate Judge

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