Hicks v. Jacksonville Sheriff's Office

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

EDWARD L. HICKS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-225-MMH-LLL

JACKSONVILLE SHERIFF’S

OFFICE, et al.,

Defendants.

_________________________________

ORDER

Plaintiff Edward L. Hicks, an inmate in the custody of the Florida penal

system, initiated this action on February 28, 2025, by filing a pro se Complaint

for Violation of Civil Rights (Doc. 1). He names the following Defendants: (1)

the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (JSO); (2) Officer S. Stewart; (3) Christina

Bennett Jeffries; (4) Officer H.C. McCollum; (5) Officer A. Martin; (6) Officer

M.L. Jones; and (7) Officer C.L. Johns. See Doc. 1 at 2–3, 13. In the Complaint,

Hicks alleges that Defendants “fabricated evidence” in the criminal proceeding

against him. See id. at 4. According to Hicks, he was arrested on March 7, 2022,

based on Jeffries’s false accusation that he shot and beat her. See id. at 5. Hicks

also appears to assert that Officers Stewart, McCollum, Martin, Jones, and

Johns falsely testified during his trial. See id. at 12. As relief, he requests

damages. See id. at 5.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss

this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.1 See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable

merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)

(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A

complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should

only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,

or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims

‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district

judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears

1 Hicks requests to proceed as a pauper. See Motion (Doc. 2).

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that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint

“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the

PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.2 Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517

F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v.

Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under

Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show

“an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and

the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,

401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306

n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

2 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)).

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Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences

should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal

pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,

1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]”

the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not required to

include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

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elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration

omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions[,]”which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a

federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff

cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Hicks’s pro se

allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And,

while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings

drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum

v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not

give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air

Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc.

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v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted),

overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

Hicks’s Complaint is subject to dismissal pursuant to the Court’s

screening obligation. Hicks alleges that Defendants violated the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments when they fabricated evidence in the criminal

proceeding against him. See Doc. 1 at 4. Similar to a malicious prosecution

claim, a due process claim regarding fabrication of evidence requires Hicks to

show the criminal proceeding against him has been terminated in his favor.

See McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 117–118 (2019). In other words, Hicks

cannot bring a § 1983 action for that claim until “his conviction [has] been

invalidated in some way.” Id. at 119 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,

486 (1994)). “Only once the criminal proceeding has ended in the [criminal]

defendant’s favor, or a resulting conviction has been invalidated . . . will the

statute of limitations begin to run.” Id. at 119–20. Here, Hicks has failed to

allege that his state criminal proceeding has terminated in his favor. See

generally Doc. 1. And a review of the state court docket confirms that his

conviction has not been overturned or invalidated. See State v. Hicks, No.

2022-CF-002178 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct.).3 Thus, Hicks fails to allege that the

3 The Court takes judicial notice of Hicks’s state court docket. See Fed. R. Evid.

201(b)(2) (“The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable

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proceeding terminated in his favor, and to that end, he fails to state a plausible

claim for relief.

For additional reasons, Hicks fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim

against Jeffries and JSO. A plaintiff can only raise § 1983 claims against “a

person acting under the color of state law.” Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261

F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). Hicks does not allege that Jeffries, who

appears to be a civilian, is a state actor subject to liability under § 1983, nor

does the Complaint contain factual allegations suggesting a close nexus

between Jeffries and the state such that her activity may be attributable to the

state. Moreover, JSO is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, and

therefore is not a proper defendant. See Faulkner v. Monroe Cnty. Sheriff’s

Dep’t, 523 F. App’x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2013)4 (per curiam) (“Florida law has

not established Sheriff’s offices as separate legal entities with the capacity to

be sued.”). As such, the Complaint is due to be dismissed,

dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”); Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 947

F.3d 649, 651 (11th Cir. 2020) (“State court records of an inmate’s postconviction

proceedings generally satisfy [the Rule 201(b)(2)] standard.”).

4 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61

(11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished

opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive

authority.”).

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Therefore, it is now ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 17th day of

July, 2025.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

Jax-9 7/17

C: Edward L. Hicks, #462957