Collins v. City of Norwood Ohio

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

YVONNE E. COLLINS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:23-cv-632

v.

JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE

CITY OF NORWOOD OHIO, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Yvonne E. Collins alleges that the Defendants in this case—a

municipality, a hospital, and a collection of police officers and medical providers—

violated a bevy of her federal constitutional rights over the course of a more-than-ten-

day ordeal that started with her arrest and carried through into her involuntary

detention for psychiatric treatment. (See generally Am. Comp., Doc. 25). So she sued

those Defendants, raising a number of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

accompanying Ohio state law tort claims. (Id.). All of the Defendants, acting in groups

roughly reflecting their professional affiliations, answered and promptly moved for

partial judgment on the pleadings.1 (Docs. 29, 31, 32). For the reasons stated below,

the Court GRANTS those motions and DISMISSES Collins’s § 1983 claims against

the non-state-actor Defendants (identified below) and her state-law tort claims

1 Two of the three motions are styled as requesting complete judgment on the pleadings.

(Docs. 29, 32). But as explained below, they are more properly construed as motions for

partial judgment on the pleadings.

against the state-actor Defendants (also identified below). But because Collins may

be able to cure the deficiencies in both sets of claims if she can plead additional facts

in response to the concerns the Court identifies in this Opinion, the Court dismisses

the claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND2

This case’s facts are straightforward, if troubling. Plaintiff Yvonne E. Collins

lives alone in a break-in-prone neighborhood in Norwood, Ohio. (Am. Compl., Doc. 25,

#162). The frequency of the break-ins, coupled with the sight of “an individual

repeatedly staring at her and her property,” put Collins on edge. (Id.). On October 3,

2022, those feelings came to a head. While washing her car in front of her home that

day, a “strange man” (not a party to this case) accosted her “without any reason.”

(Id.). After arguing with Collins, the stranger called a police non-emergency line,

reporting that Collins “flagged him down for help and then threatened him.” (Id.).

City of Norwood police officers Ryan Harrison, Michael Castanias, and Kim

Brucker (all of whom are Defendants here) responded to the stranger’s call. (Id. at

#163). Collins “reported the [stranger’s] suspicious behavior” to the Officers, but

instead of addressing her concerns, they “treat[ed] [her] as if she were mentally

disturbed without any observation of any conduct that indicated” such a state of

mind. (Id.). Officer Castanias cuffed Collins and “placed her in his police cruiser.”

(Id.). After that, the Officers—despite the fact they “had not witnessed any presence

2 While the Court “must accept as true all [of Collins’s] well-pleaded factual allegations” at

this stage, Bates v. Green Farm Condominium Ass’n, 958 F.3d 470, 480 (6th Cir. 2020), it

reminds the reader that they are just that—allegations.

of a weapon or [] received any complaint of a weapon”—asked Collins if she had a

weapon. (Id.). She responded truthfully: yes, her properly licensed gun was in her

purse, which was in her car. (Id.). Without obtaining her consent, Officers Brucker

and Harrison searched Collins’s car and purse, seizing her handgun. (Id.).

Collins’s misfortune didn’t stop there. After Officers Brucker and Harrison

searched for and seized Collins’s firearm, Officer Castanias drove her to the

University of Cincinnati Medical Center (UCMC)—another one of the Defendants

here—for a 72-hour psychiatric hold under Ohio Revised Code § 5122.10. (Id. at

#164). He “signed an affidavit requesting [Collins’s] detention by UCMC without any

observed behavior that would require said restraint, but merely stating that [she]

owned and possessed a gun.” (Id.).

For over ten days, Collins remained involuntarily confined at the UCMC. (Id.).

By her telling, the UCMC’s medical personnel didn’t pay her case particularly close

attention during that time. Upon her arrival, she “spoke to a social worker,”

Defendant Michelle Trenn. (Id.). “[W]ithout having performed any evaluation,” Trenn

and Defendant Dr. Rosemary Szparagowski (one of the two psychiatrists involved in

Collins’s case at the UCMC) filed affidavits with the Hamilton County Probate Court

requesting Collins’s detention for mental health evaluation. (Id.). And Defendant Dr.

Michael Newton (the second of the two psychiatrists involved here) “signed an

observation statement regarding [] Collins without having directly interacted with

her,” either. (Id.). The bottom line, in Collins’s telling: all three medical personnel

“failed to properly interview [her], instead repeating allegations from Officer

Castanias’ affidavit.” (Id. at #165).

Based on those allegations, Collins sued nine Defendants,3 asserting eleven

counts.4 Broadly speaking, those Defendants fall into two groups. The first group—

the Officer Defendants—comprises the three Officers present at Collins’s home, along

with Chief Dwayne Sumner and an indeterminate number of Unknown Officers

Jane/John Does. The second group—the UCMC Defendants—includes the three

medical personnel named above, along with the UCMC itself. But those groups aren’t

exhaustive: the City of Norwood, also a Defendant, doesn’t fall into either one.

While the parties are relatively straightforward, the Complaint’s counts

require some untangling. Counts One through Nine raise claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, which allows individuals to sue state actors (or, more technically, persons

acting “under color of” state law) for federal-rights deprivations. Many of those counts

overlap. (Compare, e.g., Doc. 25, #165–66 (Count One, alleging, among other things,

that the Officer Defendants violated Collins’s Fourth Amendment rights by

unlawfully seizing her firearm), with id. at #166–67 (Count Two, alleging, among

other things, the same violation)). So instead of merely listing them out, the Court

3 Not counting the indeterminate number of John/Jane Does.

4 Collins’s initial Complaint (Doc. 1) raised six counts. After various Defendants moved to

dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings, (see Docs. 20, 22), Collins moved to amend, (Doc.

23). With the parties’ consent, the Court granted Collins’s motion to file her Amended

Complaint (Doc. 25), mooting the Defendants’ dispositive motions without prejudice as to

later refiling. (8/7/2024 Not. Order).

will sort them into the distinct claims it understands Collins to be pursuing against

each Defendant (or group of Defendants).

Start with the § 1983 claims against the Officer Defendants. The Amended

Complaint splits them into four separate counts. The Court understands those four

counts to allege that the Officer Defendants violated Collins’s (1) Second Amendment

rights by confiscating her firearm; (2) Fourth Amendment rights by unreasonably

searching and seizing her person and property; (3) Fifth Amendment rights by failing

to inform her of her rights upon taking her into custody; and (4) Fourteenth

Amendment rights by committing her to involuntary psychiatric treatment without

due process.5 (Id. at #165–68).

Relatedly, Collins brought a § 1983 claim against the City itself. She alleges

that the City is municipally liable for failing to train or supervise the Officer

Defendants, making it responsible for the Officer Defendants’ federal-rights

violations. (Id. at #171–72). This is typically called a Monell claim.

Moving on from the Officer Defendants and the City, the Amended Complaint

also asserts four § 1983 counts against the UCMC Defendants. Those counts allege

5 Technically, all of Collins’s constitutional claims against the Officer Defendants arise under

the Fourteenth Amendment, even if their substance lies in the Second, Fourth, or Fifth

Amendments. That’s because those latter amendments apply directly only to the federal

government. But they’ve nonetheless been “incorporate[d]” into the Fourteenth Amendment

and made applicable to the states, and therefore to state actors. See Gammarino v. Sycamore

Twp., No. 1:22-cv-200, 2024 WL 760097, at *4 n.7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 22, 2024) (citing Mapp v.

Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650–51 (1961) (incorporating Fourth Amendment)); see also Malloy v.

Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (incorporating Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 770–78 (2010) (incorporating

Second Amendment). For clarity, though, the Court will refer to the § 1983 claims arising

under the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments in terms of the substantive right claimed,

channeled as they may be through the Fourteenth Amendment in this context.

that the UCMC Defendants violated Collins’s (1) Fourth Amendment rights by

unreasonably seizing her person; and (2) Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by

detaining her for psychiatric treatment without due process.6 (Id. at #168–70).

Finally, Collins brought a single § 1983 count against all the Defendants

together, alleging that they conspired to violate all of her foregoing constitutional

rights. (Id. at #170–71).

Apart from the § 1983 claims, Collins also brought two state-law tort claims.

The first, against the City, is for negligent and reckless hiring, retention, and

supervision7 (Count Ten). (Id. at #172–73). The second, against all Defendants, is for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, or IIED (Count Eleven). (Id. at #173–74).

In responding to Collins’s claims, the Defendants subdivided themselves

differently from the Amended Complaint’s groupings. Defendants Szparagowski and

Newton—whom the Court will refer to as the Psychiatrist Defendants—answered,

(Doc. 26), and moved for judgment on the pleadings, (Doc. 29). For the remainder of

this Opinion and Order, the Psychiatrist Defendants are their own group—which

means that the Court will use the “UCMC Defendants” label to refer only to

Defendants Trenn and the UCMC. Thus understood, the UCMC Defendants also

6 As explained above, see supra note 5, the Fourteenth Amendment is the conduit through

which most of Collins’s other constitutional claims flow. With respect to her due-process

claim, though, things are a bit different. The Fifth Amendment’s due-process guarantee (as

opposed to the right against self-incrimination) applies only to federal actors, see Luckett v.

Turner, 18 F. Supp. 2d 835, 838–39 (W.D. Tenn. 1998), so the Court treats the due-process

claim as arising under only the Fourteenth Amendment’s due-process guarantee, which

covers state actors.

7 The Court will refer to this claim as the “negligent-employment claim” for brevity’s sake.

answered, (Doc. 28), and moved for judgment on the pleadings, (Doc. 32). Although

the Psychiatrist and UCMC Defendants both styled their motions as seeking full

judgment on the pleadings, they’re more properly understood as motions for partial

judgment on the pleadings, since neither one argues for judgment on Collins’s state-

law IIED claim. (See generally Docs. 29, 32). Finally, the Officer Defendants and the

City—collectively, the Norwood Defendants—answered together, (Doc. 27), and

moved for partial judgment on the pleadings on Collins’s state-law claims, (Doc. 31),

i.e., the non-§ 1983 claims. In other words, the Psychiatrist and UCMC Defendants

are moving for judgment on the pleadings only as to Collins’s § 1983 claims, while the

Norwood Defendants are moving for judgment on the pleadings only as to Collins’s

state-law claims.

Collins, for her part, filed a single consolidated Response (Doc. 35) to the

Defendants’ motions, and the three Defendant groups replied, (Docs. 37, 38, 39). The

matter is now ripe for the Court’s review.

LEGAL STANDARD

When a defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(c), the analysis “generally follows the same rules as a motion to

dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).” Bates v. Green Farm Condominium Ass’n,

958 F.3d 470, 480 (6th Cir. 2020). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),

in turn, a plaintiff must allege “sufficient factual matter ... to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up).

While a “plausible” claim for relief does not require a showing of probable liability, it

requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

The complaint must allege sufficient facts for the Court “to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable.” Id. In determining whether the allegations

meet that standard, the Court “construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff, draw[s] all reasonable inferences in its favor, and accept[s] all well-

pleaded allegations in the complaint as true.” Keene Grp., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,

998 F.3d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 2021). But that does not mean the Court must take the

allegations as gospel, no matter how unsupported they are. The Court may disregard

“naked assertions” of fact or “formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of

action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up).

In other words, a plaintiff must provide a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d

605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). To meet this pleading

standard, a complaint must contain “either direct or inferential allegations respecting

all material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Terry v.

Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 275–76 (6th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). And

“conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will

not suffice.” Id. at 276 (quotation omitted). In short, a court will dismiss an action

when “there is no law to support the claims made” or “the facts alleged are insufficient

to state a claim.” Stew Farm, Ltd. v. Nat. Res. Conservation Serv., 967 F. Supp. 2d

1164, 1169 (S.D. Ohio 2013).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

All three groups of Defendants moved for partial judgment on the pleadings.

The Norwood Defendants argue that they’re entitled to judgment on Collins’s state-

law claims. And the Psychiatrist and UCMC Defendants argue that they’re not

subject to liability on Collins’s § 1983 claims. All three groups are correct. So, as

explained further below, the Court dismisses the state-law claims against the

Norwood Defendants (leaving in place the § 1983 claims against them), and inversely

dismisses the § 1983 claims against the Psychiatrist and UCMC Defendants (leaving

in place the state-law IIED claim against them).

A. Collins’s State Law Claims Fail, But Only as to the Norwood

Defendants.

Only the Norwood Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on

Collins’s two state-law tort claims. (Doc. 31). First, with respect to the negligent-

employment claim (which Collins brought only against the City), the City argues that

Collins failed to plausibly allege the claim’s required elements. Second, with respect

to the IIED claim (which Collins brought against all the Defendants), the Norwood

Defendants make the same argument: that Collins failed to plausibly allege its

elements. Separately, and with respect to both state-law claims, the Norwood

Defendants invoke state-law immunities for political subdivisions (for the City) and

for public employees (for the Officer Defendants). The Court agrees that Collins failed

to plausibly allege her negligent-employment claim, so it need not reach the City’s

assertion of immunity on that front. Inversely, because the Court agrees that Ohio

law immunizes all the Norwood Defendants from the IIED claim, it need not reach

the question of whether Collins plausibly alleged that claim. The Court addresses

both topics in turn.

1. Collins Failed to Plausibly Allege Her Claim for Negligent

Hiring, Retention, and Supervision Against the City.

Collins’s negligent-employment claim isn’t adequately pleaded to survive a

motion to dismiss. Claims of that sort are “negligence-based torts which require proof

of the basic elements of negligence: duty, breach, proximate cause, and damages.”

Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, 16 N.E.3d 687, 699 (Ohio Ct. App.

2014).

The negligent-employment claim stumbles on the very first element—duty.

“The existence of an employer-employee relationship imposes a duty upon the

employer to prevent foreseeable injury to others by exercising reasonable care to

refrain from employing an incompetent employee.” Id. (emphasis added). The trouble,

as the City notes, is that Collins failed to plausibly allege that the municipality had

any reason to foresee that its employees—the Officer Defendants—were injuriously

incompetent. (See Doc. 31, #249). The Court can’t find a single allegation in the

Amended Complaint that, if true, would show, or even suggest, that the City had any

reason to foresee that the Officer Defendants were bad hires or incompetent at their

jobs. See, e.g., Simpkins, 16 N.E.3d at 699–700 (explaining that the relevant inquiry

is whether the employer “exercis[ed] reasonable care to refrain from employing an

incompetent employee”).

What’s more, Collins made no effort in her Response to point out any

allegations supporting the elements of her claim. Instead, she dove straight into

responding to the City’s immunity argument. (Doc. 35, #292–94). That won’t do.

Because Collins failed to plausibly allege the very first element of her negligent-

employment claim, the Court need not even reach the question of immunity. So the

Court GRANTS the Norwood Defendants’ request to DISMISS Collins’s negligent-

employment claim. But because the identified deficiency perhaps could be cured

through additional pleading (at least if Collins has additional facts), that dismissal

shall be WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. Ohio Law Immunizes the Norwood Defendants from Collins’s

IIED Claim.

The Norwood Defendants point to two state-law sources of immunity—one for

the City, and the other for the Officer Defendants—to shield them from liability on

Collins’s IIED claim. The Court agrees that both apply.

First, the City invokes the “general grant of immunity” afforded to political

subdivisions (like municipalities) under Ohio Revised Code § 2744.02. Lambert v.

Clancy, 927 N.E.2d 585, 588 (Ohio 2010); (Doc. 31, #251). That shield protects

political subdivisions from intentional torts claims like IIED. Hubbard v. Canton City

Sch. Bd. of Educ., 780 N.E.2d 543, 545–46 (Ohio 2002). And Collins doesn’t argue

otherwise in her Response, so the Court understands her to concede the point. (See

generally Doc. 35, #292–96). True, she points to the exception for such immunity in

Ohio Revised Code § 2744.02(B). (Doc. 35, #293). But she makes that argument only

as to the negligent-retention claim—which as noted above fails for other reasons—

not as to the IIED claim. And that makes sense, as that exception applies only to

negligence actions, not intentional tort claims. Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.02(B)(2)

(“Except as otherwise provided in sections 3314.07 and 3746.24 of the Revised Code,

political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused

by the negligent performance of acts by their employees with respect to proprietary

functions of the political subdivisions.” (emphasis added)); see also Hubbard, 780

N.E.2d at 545–46 (explaining that “[t]here are no exceptions to immunity [under Ohio

Revised Code § 2744.02] for the intentional tort[] of … intentional infliction of

emotional distress” (quotation omitted)).

Second, the Officer Defendants invoke the immunity granted to employees of

political subdivisions under Ohio Revised Code § 2744.03. (Doc. 31, #251–52).

Municipal employees are immune from liability unless they (1) acted “manifestly

outside the scope of [their] employment or official responsibilities;” (2) acted with

“malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner;” or (3) a provision

of the Ohio Revised code expressly imposes liability on the employee. Ohio Rev. Code

§ 2744.03(A)(6); see also Stager v. Hanshaw, No. 1:23-cv-120, 2024 WL 1556708, at

*11 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2024). Collins focuses her efforts on only the second exception,

arguing that she has plausibly alleged conduct on the part of the Officer Defendants

that “fall[s] squarely within” the carveout for reckless behavior. (Doc. 35, #295). The

Court disagrees.

To see why Collins’s allegations don’t suffice to plausibly suggest the

recklessness required to strip the Defendant Officers’ immunity, it’s helpful to look

at what sorts of allegations passed muster in other cases. To start with, recklessness

is characterized by “the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious

risk of harm … and is substantially greater than negligent conduct.” Rural Bldg. of

Cincinnati, LLC v. Mercer, 96 N.E.3d 882, 888 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). In Stager v.

Hanshaw, this Court explained that a defendant police officer acted recklessly—and

therefore wasn’t entitled immunity—where he’d “found [the plaintiff] sleeping in his

car, opened his door, and battered him with ‘unnecessary and dangerous physical

maneuvers.’” 2024 WL 1556708, at *11. And in Waddell v. Lewis, another court in

this district reached the same conclusion where the defendant police officer had

“throw[n] [the plaintiff] from the porch” and “pepper sprayed him twice.” No. 1:22-cv-

635, 2024 WL 1071900, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2024). Finally, in Shoup v. Doyle,

yet another court in this district found that the allegations sufficed to show

recklessness at the pleading stage where the officer “knew that [the plaintiff] had just

been physically assaulted, and she was visibly injured,” but still “thr[ew] her to the

ground” and “prevent[ed] her from immediately going to the hospital.” 974 F. Supp.

2d 1058, 1091 (S.D. Ohio 2013).

Those examples share a common feature: plaintiffs who overcome the arresting

officer’s invocation of immunity based on the recklessness exception allege more than

the arrest’s mere unlawfulness. In the Court’s review of the caselaw, the “plus factor”

that ratchets an arresting officer’s conduct from wrongful up to reckless—and

therefore strips their immunity shield—is most often some form of violence. See, e.g.,

Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 480 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding a jury-triable issue on

whether officers who “slammed [the plaintiff] to the ground,” causing “serious facial

and skull fractures,” had acted recklessly).

Collins hasn’t pointed to any such plus factor here, violence or otherwise.

Indeed, her recounting of events paints a peaceful scene (at least insofar as an arrest

can be peaceful). Collins describes how she was “placed … in handcuffs” after being

informed that “it was for her safety,” and that the Officers “inquired whether she had

a weapon” before “transport[ing]” her to the UCMC. (Doc. 25, #163–64). Those actions

could very well be unlawful—the subject of Collins’s § 1983 claims against the Officer

Defendants, which aren’t presently before the Court—but there’s no evidence that

they were violent. And absent something of the sort, they do not plausibly establish

recklessness.

For those reasons, the Court GRANTS the Norwood Defendants’ request to

DISMISS Collins’s IIED claim against them. But since that claim’s deficiencies again

perhaps could be rectified as to the Officer Defendants with facts supporting a finding

of recklessness, that dismissal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to those defendants

only.

B. Collins’s § 1983 Claims Fail, But Only as to the Psychiatrist

Defendants and the UCMC Defendants.

Only the Psychiatrist Defendants and the UCMC Defendants moved for

judgment on the pleadings with respect to Collins’s § 1983 claims against them. As a

reminder, those claims are identical as between the two groups—Collins lumped

them all under the label “UCMC Defendants,” as described earlier. And those claims

all spring out of those Defendants’ participation in Collins’s involuntary confinement

for psychiatric treatment under Ohio Revised Code § 5122.10. (See Doc. 25, #168–70).

Each group argues it is entitled to judgment in its favor for a variety of different

reasons. One shared argument—that neither the Psychiatrist Defendants nor the

UCMC Defendants qualify as “state actors” subject to liability under § 1983—carries

the day for both groups, so the Court will focus its attention there.

Generally speaking, § 1983 doesn’t “prohibit the conduct of private parties

acting in their individual capacities.”8 Snodgrass-King Pediatric Dental Assocs., P.C.

v. DentaQuest USA Ins. Co., 780 F. App’x 197, 204 (6th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).

But in three situations, that general rule gives way: (1) when the private entity’s

conduct “concern[s] traditionally exclusive governmental functions;” (2) when the

private entity’s conduct “reflect[s] entwinement, a nexus, or joint action with state

officials;” and (3) when the private entity’s conduct “involve[s] compulsion by the

government.” Ciraci v. J.M. Smucker Co., 62 F.4th 278, 281–82 (6th Cir. 2023). In

those three circumstances, a private entity’s “actions so approximate state action”

that it may be held liable under § 1983. Snodgrass-King, 780 F. App’x at 204.

8 It bears noting that the UCMC itself, though bearing the name of a public institution—the

University of Cincinnati—appears to be a private party (and Collins hasn’t alleged or argued

otherwise). According to the Ohio Secretary of State’s business records—of which this Court

can take judicial notice, see Overall v. Ascension, 23 F. Supp. 3d 816, 824–25 (E.D. Mich.

2014)—the UCMC’s moniker is a trade name for a privately organized, non-profit entity

called University Hospital, LLC. See Articles of Incorporation for University Hospital, Inc.

(articles of incorporation for predecessor entity), https://perma.cc/6EY2-UTXC; Certificate of

Conversion for University Hospital, LLC (converting predecessor corporation into an LLC),

https://perma.cc/8FLV-RAH2; Trade Name Renewal for University Of Cincinnati Medical

Center (assigning “University of Cincinnati Medical Center” trade name to University

Hospital, LLC), https://perma.cc/D7RR-PARB. Simply stated, the mere fact that the UCMC

bears the name of a public institution doesn’t automatically turn it into one, especially in the

absence of any non-conclusory allegations explaining how it’s a public institution. See, e.g.,

Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal where “[n]othing in

[the plaintiff’s] complaint suggests that” the defendant-hospitals were state actors); Vires v.

Univ. of Louisville Hosp., No. 3:12-cv-P488, 2013 WL 173953, at *3 n.1 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 16,

2013).

None of the three tests for state action work for Collins, even accepting all her

allegations as true. First, on the exclusive-governmental-function test, the Sixth

Circuit has explained that plaintiffs are required to furnish “some historical analysis

to determine whether an action is one traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the

state.” Ellison v. Univ. Hospital Mobile Crisis Team, 108 F. App’x 224, 227 (6th Cir.

2004) (quoting Ellison v. Garbarino, 48 F.3d 192, 196 (6th Cir. 1995)). Collins’s

Amended Complaint and responsive briefing are both bereft of any such analysis.

Instead, she argues flatly that the text of Ohio Revised Code § 5122.10—the statute

allowing private actors to take “person[s] with mental illness” into custody for

treatment—“shows that involuntary commitment is a function deeply rooted in state

authority.” (Doc. 35, #285). That doesn’t cut it. And her assertion of that bare legal

conclusion offers no reason to depart from the Sixth Circuit’s contrary conclusion that

“as the law currently stands, traditional authority for involuntary commitment is not

exclusive to the state in Ohio,” since “private actors have had authority to commit

people involuntarily for around two hundred years.” Ellison, 108 F. App’x at 226–27.

In other words, neither the Psychiatrist Defendants nor the UCMC Defendants

exercised a role traditionally within the government’s exclusive domain when they

detained Collins for psychiatric treatment, so they aren’t state actors on that theory.

Second, Collins hasn’t alleged facts showing “a sufficiently close nexus between

the government” and the Psychiatrist and UCMC Defendants’ conduct. Kister v.

Henry, No. 2:12-cv-119, 2014 WL 12770095, at*8 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 13, 2014). The

closest that Collins comes is by alleging that her involuntary commitment was

initiated by the police, and that these Defendants merely parroted the police’s

allegations of Collins’s mental state in their statutorily-required affidavits justifying

her detention. (Doc. 25, #164–65). But as another court in this district explained, “the

fact that [a medical provider] was made aware of Plaintiff’s medical condition from

[the police] does not transform his private activity of writing [an affidavit supporting

involuntary commitment] into state activity” under the nexus test. Kister, 2014 WL

12770095, at*8. While it may have been wrongful, either as a matter of medical best-

practices or of state law (neither of which is before the Court), for the Psychiatrist

and UCMC Defendants to detain Collins for treatment if they truly hadn’t examined

her to determine for themselves whether such detention was necessary, that doesn’t

entwine them with the state for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Finally, Collins hasn’t alleged that the government compelled the Psychiatrist

or UCMC Defendants to detain her for psychiatric treatment. To make that showing,

she’d have to allege facts that making it plausible that the government “offered [these

Defendants] such significant encouragement that [their] choice must in law be

deemed to be that of the State.” Ciraci, 62 F.4th at 283 (cleaned up). When that

“encouragement” rises to the level of a mandate or requirement imposed on the

private actor by the government, the coercion theory comes into play. Id. But where

the government “let[s] [the private party] decide on its own” who should be detained

for psychiatric treatment, and the private party “exercise[s] that discretion, the

government did not coerce it.” Id. at 283–84. Here, Collins alleges only that Officer

Castanias (whose status as a government actor isn’t in question) delivered Collins to

the Psychiatrist and UCMC Defendants and “request[ed]” that they detain her under

Ohio Revised Code § 5122. (Doc. 25, #164–65). From that point forward, it was the

Psychiatrist and UCMC Defendants’ own choice to “sign[] and file[] affidavits with

the probate court” to meet that statute’s requirements for involuntary detention—or,

at the very least, Collins doesn’t allege that they were coerced into doing so. (Id.).

At bottom, the Psychiatrist and UCMC Defendants are all private entities. And

even though private entities’ conduct can constitute state action in some

circumstances, Collins failed to allege any such circumstances here. For that reason,

the Court GRANTS the Psychiatrist and UCMC Defendants’ motions and

DISMISSES Collins’s § 1983 claims against them. But because Collins could

plausibly allege further factual matter satisfying one of the three state-action tests

for private entities, that dismissal shall be WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS all three pending motions for

judgment on the pleadings as construed above. More specifically, the Court GRANTS

the Norwood Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 31) and

DISMISSES Counts Ten and Eleven, but only to the extent that they apply to the

Norwood Defendants, leaving the IIED claim (Count Eleven) in place with respect to

the Psychiatrist and UCMC Defendants. The Court also GRANTS the Psychiatrist

and UCMC Defendants’ Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docs. 29, 32), subject

to the understanding that they are properly construed as motions for partial

judgment on the pleadings directed only to Collins’s § 1983 claims. Therefore, the

Court DISMISSES Counts One through Nine, but only to the extent that they apply

to the Psychiatrist and UCMC Defendants, leaving them in place with respect to the

Norwood Defendants. Finally, those dismissals shall be WITHOUT PREJUDICE,

since each claim’s deficiencies can be rectified if Collins elects to move for leave to

plead additional factual matter.

SO ORDERED.

July 18, 2025

DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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