Salinas v. Ramirez

Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT July 18, 2025

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

ROBERTO SALINAS, §

§

Plaintiff, §

V. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-CV-00168

§

ROMEO R. RAMIREZ, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court are Magistrate Judge Julie Hampton’s March 11, 2025 Memorandum and

Recommendation (“M&R”), (D.E. 38), and April 28, 2025 M&R, (D.E. 50). The March 11, 2025

M&R recommends that the Court:

(1) Grant Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (D.E. 27);

(2) Dismiss Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Sheriff Ramirez

in his individual capacity, and

(3) Deny Defendant’s Motion for Rule 7 Reply, (D.E. 27),

(D.E. 38, p. 17). Plaintiff filed written objections to the M&R. (D.E. 40; D.E. 42; D.E. 45).

The April 28, 2025 M&R recommends that the Court:

(4) Deny Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, (D.E. 46), without prejudice to re-

urge if and when this Court declines to adopt Magistrate Judge Hampton’s March 11,

2025 M&R,; and

(5) Deny Defendant Sheriff Ramirez’s Motion to Strike as moot, (D.E. 47),

(D.E. 50, p. 4). Plaintiff filed written objections to the M&R. (D.E. 52; D.E. 55).

When a party objects to the recommendations of a magistrate judge, the district judge “shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). As to any portion for

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which no objection is filed, a district court reviews for clearly erroneous factual findings and

conclusions of law. United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

I. March 11, 2025 M&R

Plaintiff objects to the M&R’s recommendation that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings should be granted. (D.E. 40, p. 1). Plaintiff maintains that a defendant may lose their

immunity “by knowingly violating the law or acting in a way that a reasonable person would know

is unlawful.” Jd. at 1-2. In support, Plaintiff argues that Defendant should “know right from

wrong,” that Defendant violated the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and that Defendant

deliberately delayed Plaintiff's release in contravention of the County Judge. /d.; (D.E. 45, p. □□

2). Plaintiff also cites several cases in support. (D.E. 42, p. 2; D.E. 45, p. 2).

Plaintiff's objections are conclusory—and the Court does not consider conclusory

objections that do not specifically assert why the M&R is wrong. See Perez v. Stephens, No. 2:15-

CV-409, 2016 WL 722466, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2016) (Ramos, J.), aff'd sub nom., 690 F.

App’x 200 (Sth Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Martinez v. Torok, No. 2:21-CV-113, 2022 LEXIS

133239, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 27, 2022) (Tipton, J.) (“[A] party must object to the magistrate’s

finding or recommendation with sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert the district court of

the true ground for the objection.” (quoting United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 428 (4th Cir.

2008)) (cleaned up)). Plaintiff's contentions that Defendant should know right from wrong; that

Defendant violated the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code; and that Defendant should not

have denied Plaintiff's release do not address the M&R’s findings that Plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate that Defendant’s conduct was in violation of a clearly established right.

Furthermore, the cases that Plaintiff cites do not establish that Defendant’s actions were

objectively unreasonable under clearly established law. See Harlow vy. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

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818 (1982). Plaintiff cites to cases that are too factually distinct from the present case. See Sweetin

v. City of Texas, 48 F.4th 387, 390 (5th Cir. 2022) (concerning a permit officer’s detention of

ambulance drivers); Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8 (2020) (per curiam) (concerning correctional

officer housing plaintiff in deplorably unsanitary conditions); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 733

(2002) (concerning defendant’s punishment of plaintiff by use of a hitching post); Tucker v.

Outwater, 118 F.3d 930, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1997) (concerning the application of judicial immunity).

Plaintiff's other cited cases concerning prisoner detainment are similarly inapposite

because Plaintiff was allegedly detained for less than twelve hours and released after the conditions

of his confinement were satisfied. See Harris v. Clay Cnty., 47 F.4th 271, 274 (Sth Cir. 2022)

(concerning plaintiffs six-year detention by defendant in violation of a court order); Whirl v. Kern,

407 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir. 1968) (concerning, inter alia, plaintiff's nine-month detention even

though all charges were dismissed). As Judge Hampton noted, there is “no robust consensus of

persuasive authority finding due process violations in scenarios similar to the one at issue in this

case.” (D.E. 38, p. 15). Plaintiff's cases do not alter this conclusion and do not establish that “every

reasonable official would have understood what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S.

at 741 (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED.

(D.E. 40; D.E. 42; D.E. 45).

II. April 28, 2025 M&R

Plaintiff objects to the April 28, 2025 M&R recommendation that Plaintiff's motion for

summary judgment be denied without prejudice. (D.E. 52; D.E. 55). Plaintiff argues that his

detention constituted a due process violation (D.E. 52, p. 2; D-E. 55, p. 4). In support, Plaintiff

cites various cases.

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Once again, Plaintiff's objections are largely conclusory and do not disrupt the M&R’s

findings that Plaintiff failed to show that Defendant’s conduct violated a clearly established right.

See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. As before, Plaintiffs cases are largely dissimilar from the present

case. See ODonnell v. Harris Cnty., 260 F. Supp. 3d 810, 813 (S.D. Tex. May 11, 2017)

(Rosenthal, CJ.), aff'd, 882 F.3d 528, 535 (Sth Cir. 2018) (concerning a policy of detaining

indigent defendants before trial on secure money bail without procedural protections); United

States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 713 (1990) (concerning whether failure to comply with

the prompt hearing provision of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 requires release).

Further, Plaintiff cites to cases that concern unlawful detention for periods of time far

greater than the less than twelve-hour period that Plaintiff suffered. See Hicks v. LeBlanc, 81 F.Ath

497, 500 (Sth Cir. 2023) (concerning plaintiff's unlawful detention for sixty days); Porter v. Epps,

659 F.3d 440, 443 (Sth Cir. 2011) (concerning prisoner’s detention fifteen months beyond his

sentence); Plumb v. Prinslow, 847 F. Supp. 1509, 1513 (D. Or. Mar. 14, 1994) (Panner, J.)

(concerning plaintiff's wrongful imprisonment for seventy days). Plaintiff is correct in his

assertion that some delay in a pretrial detainee’s release “may constitute a violation of an inmate’s

clearly established right to timely release.” (D.E. 55, p. 7). However, the cited cases do not

establish Plaintiff's right to not be detained for less than twelve hours after bail has been set. See

Vincent v. City of Sulphur, 805 F.3d 543, 547 (Sth Cir. 2015) (“The plaintiff has the burden of

demonstrating that the defendant official is not entitled to qualified immunity.”).

Lastly, Plaintiff's reliance on Hopkins v. Bradley County is misplaced. 338 S.W.3d 529,

530 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2010). There, the defendants allegedly violated plaintiffs rights by

denying him the ability to post bail and holding him for twelve hours. /d. at 530-31. Though the

trial court found such conduct violated due process, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed in

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part, holding that “being held for twelve hours before being released on bail does not automatically

constitute a constitutional violation.” /d. at 538 (citing Tate v. Hartsville/Trousdale County, No.

3:09-0201, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109714, at *22 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 14, 2010) (Campbell, J.)).

Though not binding authorities, Hopkins and Tate undermine Plaintiff's claims. See id. At the

least, the cases support the March 11, 2025 M&R’s conclusion that there is no robust consensus

of persuasive authority finding due process violations where plaintiff was detained for less than

twelve hours after bail had been set. (D.E. 38, p. 15). And, in any event, Plaintiff's objections do

not explain how the April 28, 2025 M&R’s conclusion that Plaintiff's motion is a premature

motion is wrong. Accordingly, Plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED. (D.E. 52; D.E. 55).

III. Conclusion

Having reviewed the proposed findings and conclusions of the M&R, the record, the

applicable law, and having made a de novo review of the portions of the M&R to which the parties’

objections are directed, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs objections,

(D.E. 40; D.E. 42; D.E. 45), DISMISSES Defendant’s objections as moot! (D.E. 44), and

ADOPTS the findings and conclusions of the March 11, 2025 M&R, (D.E. 38). Furthermore, the

Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's objections (D.E. 52; D.E. 55), and ADOPTS the findings and

conclusions of the April 28, 2025 M&R, (D.E. 50). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (D.E. 27), DISMISSES Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment

due process claim against Sherriff Ramirez in his individual capacity, DENIES Defendant’s

' Defendant presented a conditional objection to the March 11, 2025 M&R, stating that should the Court

not accept the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to grant a complete judgment on the pleadings,

Defendant objects to the recommendation that the Court should deny Defendant’s Motion for a Rule 7

Reply. (D.E. 44, p. 4). Because the Court has adopted the M&R and granted Defendant’s Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings, the Court DISMISSES Defendant’s conditional motion as moot.

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Motion for Rule 7 Reply, (D.E. 27), DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment as moot, (D.E. 46), and DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Strike as moot, (D;E. 47).

SO ORDERED. / /

\

DAVID'S . MORALES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Signed: Corpus Christi, Texas

July; 94+~ 2025

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