Havens v. Mills

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT July 18, 2025

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER DALE HAVENS, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:22-CV-00299

§

BILL MILLS, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on

qualified immunity. D.E. 77. On March 3, 2025, United States Magistrate Judge Mitchel

Neurock issued his “Memorandum and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge.”

M&R, D.E. 93. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the motion be granted in part and

denied in part. Plaintiff and Defendants timely filed their objections (D.E. 95, 97). The Court

considers each party’s objections.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court conducts a de novo review of any part of a magistrate judge’s

disposition that has been properly objected to. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b)(3); Warren v. Miles, 230 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2000). “Parties filing objections must

specifically identify those findings objected to. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections

need not be considered by the district court.” Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419,

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421 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (discussing pro se petitioner’s objections to M&R), overruled

on other grounds by Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996)). As

to any portion for which no objection is filed, a district court reviews for clearly erroneous

factual findings and conclusions of law. United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir.

1989) (per curiam).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s Objections

Plaintiff first objects to the Magistrate Judge’s statement that Plaintiff did not respond

to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, claiming this is untrue. D.E. 95, p. 1. While

there is no response to the motion on record, Plaintiff’s amended complaint and questionnaire

answers include a signed declaration under penalty of perjury stating that the foregoing

pleadings are true and correct, and therefore these serve as relevant summary judgment

evidence that the Court may consider. D.E. 44, 46; see Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 765

(5th Cir. 2003) (“[Plaintiff], however, attached to his original complaint a signed declaration

under penalty of perjury that ‘the foregoing is true and correct.’ On summary judgment,

factual allegations set forth in a verified complaint may be treated the same as when they are

contained in an affidavit.”). The Magistrate Judge’s observation regarding a lack of a response

as well as his consideration of Plaintiff’s summary judgment evidence were accurate and

proper. The objection is OVERRULED.

Plaintiff next contends that Defendants have submitted edited video without audio,

which Plaintiff has not had the opportunity to inspect, and which he represents as inaccurate

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or altered. D.E. 95, p. 1. He also states that there is missing evidence not considered, related

to grievances, witness statements, medical records, and request forms. Id. at p. 2. However,

the video evidence is supported by other summary judgment evidence, including declarations

with a perjury clause from Sheriff Bill Mills, Deputy Chief Armando Chapa, and Sergeant

Miles Dugger, as well as post-incident reports. See D.E. 77-1, 77-3, 77-5, 77-6, 77-7. Plaintiff

could have requested additional time to respond with additional evidence if he required it. His

protestations that the evidence, which he has not reviewed, is inaccurate are without

evidentiary basis. This objection is OVERRULED.

A. Excessive Force Claim

The Magistrate Judge recommends granting summary judgment on the excessive force

claim because the evidence shows that the officers’ conduct during the relevant event did not

amount to a constitutional violation. D.E. 93, p. 32. The Magistrate Judge thoroughly analyzed

the Kingsley factors to assess the reasonableness of the force used. Id. at pp. 32-36; see

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015).

Plaintiff objects to this recommendation, analyzing the Kingsley factors himself to

assess whether the use of force was reasonable. D.E. 95, p. 6-10. Plaintiff points to what he

contends to be inaccuracies in the video evidence, including that the video does not show that

he was dragged, the use of force lasted more than two minutes, an officer kneeled on his

throat, and Officer Arisola spit chewing tobacco on him. D.E. 95, p. 3.

Plaintiff also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s interpretation of the video evidence

from the isolation cell, stating that he was carried and then dropped which damaged his back,

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and that he had the weight of the officers press down on him while a female guard kicked his

legs. D.E. 95, p. 4. He states that he was in extreme pain and had difficulty breathing, all while

he remained handcuffed. Id. Plaintiff states that he was not struggling, rather he had an asthma

attack and fainted, and he alerted the officers to his need for medical attention, which was

denied. Id. He states that the Magistrate Judge failed to observe his arms being hyperextended

and pulled, causing pain to his shoulders. Id. He also states that though he was given a bucket

of water to rinse off the OC spray (pepper spray), it was insufficient to rinse off the spray. Id.

at p. 5. Plaintiff states that he received a positive diagnosis for chronic and severe eczema a

year later, which was attributed to the OC spray that covered his body for three to four hours.

Id. Plaintiff also challenges the finding that he is a combative inmate. Id. at p. 9.

In sum, Plaintiff objects to the finding that there was no unconstitutional use of force

and objects to the recommendation to grant qualified immunity to Defendants on this claim.

D.E. 95, p. 5. He argues that the missing audio of the video recordings has made it difficult

for the Court to ascertain whether the amount of force used against him was objectively

unreasonable. Id.1

A pretrial detainee has the right to be free from excessive force. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at

395 (analyzing pretrial detainee’s excessive use of force claim). To establish an excessive

force claim, a pretrial detainee must show “that the force purposely or knowingly used against

him was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 396-97. In order to determine whether use of force

1 Additional objections by Plaintiff, such as his statements that he was being moved to solitary confinement without a

hearing and that this act was retaliatory (D.E. 95, pp. 8, 9), are the subject of different causes of action.

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was unreasonable, courts must consider several factors, which include: (1) the relationship

between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; (2) the extent of the

plaintiff's injury; (3) any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force;

(4) the severity of the security problem at issue; (5) the threat reasonably perceived by the

officer; and (6) whether the plaintiff was actively resisting. Id. at 397. The Court analyzes

each factor in turn.

Regarding the first Kingsley factor—the relationship between the need for force and

amount of force used—it appears from the video evidence that Plaintiff was asked to exit the

cell and refused, prompting the use of OC spray and the subsequent altercation with the

officers. See Ex. 2-E. When the officers first step into the cell, they motion to Plaintiff to step

out, seen clearly as an officer gestures toward the door with his arm. Id. at 22:39:43. Plaintiff

refuses to move, thereby prompting the use of some degree of force by the officers. See

Sanchez v. Griffis, 569 F. Supp. 3d 496, 510 (W.D. Tex. 2021), aff'd, No. 21-51160, 2023 WL

7984732 (5th Cir. Nov. 17, 2023) (collecting cases to show that officials are justified in using

some degree of force when a prisoner refuses to cooperate with an officer’s legitimate

directives). This factor weighs in favor of finding that the officer’s use of force was

reasonable.

The second factor—the extent of Plaintiff’s injury—is disputed. The video evidence

does not show Plaintiff being injured disproportionately to the amount of force used, as he is

seen moving about the isolation cell freely and without noticeable injuries after the altercation.

See Ex. 2-F. However, Plaintiff was pepper-sprayed and spent nearly ten minutes trying to

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wash the spray off. See Ex. 2-E, 2-F. Additionally, Plaintiff and the officers are out of the

frame for a brief portion of the video so the officers’ actions cannot be seen during this time.

Ex. 2-E at 22:41:04-22:41:17. Plaintiff claims that he was elbowed in the face and back of the

head, punched in the face and stomach, kneed on his side, and his feet and legs were stepped

on. D.E. 44, pp. 6-7. He states that he had so much weight on him that he could not breathe

properly, and he blacked out at some point during this event. Id. at p. 7. He states that he was

in extreme pain and could not turn his neck properly afterward. Id. at pp. 7-8. Due to the

injuries described by Plaintiff, this factor weighs in favor of finding that the use of force was

unreasonable.

Regarding the third factor—efforts made by the officers to temper or limit the amount

of force—the multiple incident reports (D.E. 77-5) describe that the officers only attempted

to do what was necessary to obtain Plaintiff’s compliance and escort him out of the cell. The

video evidence also demonstrates this—once the officers were able to place Plaintiff on the

ground face down to handcuff him, they stood him up and escorted him out of the cell. Ex. 2-

E at 22:41:24. This factor weighs in favor of finding that the use of force was reasonable.

The fourth factor—the severity of the security problem at issue—weighs in favor of

finding that the use of force was unreasonable. There is no evidence regarding any particular

incident occurring at the time of the event, and though Plaintiff was resisting orders, he did

not appear to be lashing out in a threatening way. He did not react menacingly to the OC spray.

He merely wiped it from his face while continuing to stand in the same location before the

officers converged on him, at which point he began to physically resist. Ex. 2-E at 22:40:56.

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The video does not demonstrate that Plaintiff was posing a particularly dangerous security

problem. This factor favors a finding of unreasonable use of force.

The fifth factor—the threat reasonably perceived by the officer—weighs in favor of

finding that the use of force was reasonable. As Sheriff Mills’s affidavit states, Plaintiff was

known as a verbally and physically combative detainee. D.E. 77-1, p. 1. This reputation,

combined with the fact that Plaintiff was refusing to follow orders, demonstrates that the

officers did not unreasonably respond to the perceived “threat” of obtaining Plaintiff’s

compliance.

The sixth and final factor—whether Plaintiff was actively resisting—is answered in

the affirmative. From the video evidence, Plaintiff had to be pepper-sprayed, and once officers

converged on him, it took a few moments before they were able to place him face down on

the ground with his arms behind his back to handcuff him. See Ex. 2-E at 22:40:54-22:42:55.

This factor weighs in favor of finding that the use of force was reasonable.

On balance, the majority of the Kingsley factors—factors one, three, five, and six—

weigh in favor of finding that the use of force during this event was reasonable. Plaintiff’s

objection is OVERRULED.

B. Denial of Medical Care

The Magistrate Judge recommends granting Defendant’s summary judgment regarding

Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied medical care after the use of force incident because

Plaintiff failed to show a severe injury that the officers knew about and that Defendants

responded to his medical needs with deliberate indifference. D.E. 93, pp. 36-37.

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Plaintiff objects to this finding, stating that he experienced more force than that

depicted in the video and that he was not treated by a medical professional or given adequate

medical care. D.E. 95, p. 10. He repeats his claim that the videos in evidence have been

doctored. Id. at p. 11.

To state a claim for an episodic act or omission for the unconstitutional denial of

medical care, a plaintiff must show that an officer “had subjective knowledge of a substantial

risk of serious harm to a pretrial detainee but responded with deliberate indifference to that

risk.” Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996). To establish that

officials responded with deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that officials “refused

to treat [plaintiff], ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in

any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical

needs.” Robinson v. Midland Cnty., Tex., 80 F.4th 704, 711 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Alderson

v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 422 (5th Cir. 2017)), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct.

1010 (2024).

The available summary judgment evidence does not show that the officers responded

to Plaintiff’s medical problems with deliberate indifference. Approximately ten minutes after

Plaintiff was placed in the isolation cell, officers came in to take Plaintiff’s blood pressure

and to leave a bucket of water. D.E. 2-F at 22:53:44. The attempt to check the blood pressure

lasted approximately four minutes and was not successful. See Ex. 2-F; D.E. 77-5, p. 3.

Plaintiff then washed his face with the water for several minutes. Id. The video has no audio

so there is no evidence regarding what Plaintiff may have stated as to his injuries.

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While Defendants may have had knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to

Plaintiff following the altercation depicted in Exhibit 2-E, the video evidence demonstrates

that they did not act with deliberate indifference. Minutes after his placement in the isolation

cell, officers attended to Plaintiff and provided him with a bucket of water to wash off the OC

spray. This conduct does not clearly evince a wanton disregard for Plaintiff’s medical needs.

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that there was deliberate indifference. Thus, Plaintiff’s objection

is OVERRULED.

C. Retaliation: Solitary Confinement (June 2023 Incident)

The Magistrate Judge recommends granting summary judgment for Defendants on

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim regarding placement in solitary confinement because Plaintiff did

not establish a constitutional violation. D.E. 93, p. 47. Plaintiff objects, stating that he was not

given the opportunity to have a hearing on this issue, and that the officers, taking orders from

Deputy Chief Chapa, planned to document that he had refused a hearing in order to keep him

in solitary confinement. D.E. 95, p. 13.

This claim stems from Plaintiff’s 20-day disciplinary confinement due to a June 19,

2023 incident. See D.E. 46, p. 10; D.E. 77-6. According to Deputy Chief Chapa’s affidavit,

Plaintiff had been constantly pushing the intercom button and alerting to an emergency when

there was not one. D.E. 77-3, p. 2. Officers served Plaintiff with a Discipline Procedure and

Notice Form, which he did not sign, and the officers deemed this a waiver of a disciplinary

hearing. Id. Plaintiff claims that he was placed in solitary confinement in retaliation for filing

a grievance or this lawsuit. D.E. 46, p. 10.

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A claim for retaliation requires that a plaintiff establish: (1) the exercise of a specific

constitutional right, (2) a defendant’s intent to retaliate for the exercise of the right, (3) a

retaliatory act, and (4) causation. Baughman v. Seale, 761 F. App'x 371, 382 (5th Cir. 2019)

(citing McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1998)). To prove the causation

element, a “plaintiff must establish that but for the retaliatory motive, the defendants’ act of

retaliation would not have occurred.” Id. (citing McDonald, 132 F.3d at 231).

Plaintiff has failed to establish the causation element. He is able to “allege a chronology

of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred,” id. (citing Woods v. Smith, 60

F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995), because the solitary confinement occurred shortly after the

June 19, 2023 incident, for which Plaintiff was written up for conduct that disrupts the safety

and security of the facility (D.E. 77-6). However, the reports make clear that Plaintiff would

have faced this disciplinary action, even in the absence of any retaliatory motive, because his

actions in alerting to a false emergency had disrupted the safety and security of the facility.

See D.E. 77-6. Because Plaintiff pled a retaliation claim, not a due process claim for lack of a

hearing regarding this incident, and the causation prong cannot be established, Plaintiff’s

objection is OVERRULED.

D. Additional Objections

Plaintiff makes additional comments and objections that do not directly address the

M&R. First, he states that his claim for denial or confiscation of medical passes and mats

should include additional defendants. D.E. 95, p. 11. The Court has previously addressed this

objection and will not address it further. See D.E. 35, p. 14; D.E. 81, p. 4. It is OVERRULED.

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Next, Plaintiff provides further statements and information regarding his prehearing

detention, the disciplinary hearing, and the retaliation claim for being transferred to the

Kleberg County jail. D.E. 95, pp. 12-13. These do not appear to be specific objections to the

M&R and are not analyzed further. See Battle, 834 F.2d at 421 (“Parties filing objections must

specifically identify those findings objected to.”). The objections are OVERRULED as

improper or insufficient.

II. Defendants’ Objections

A. Three Strikes Rule

Defendants first object by stating that Plaintiff has filed three cases in which a

magistrate judge has recommended dismissal, and he is therefore subject to the three strikes

rule. D.E. 97, p. 3. This argument was not brought before the Magistrate Judge in the first

instance and has been waived. Freeman v. Cnty. of Bexar, 142 F.3d 848, 851 (5th Cir. 1998).

Moreover, the M&Rs in those cases have not yet been adopted by the district court and the

cases have not been counted as strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) or been noticed to

the Manager of the Three Strikes List for the Southern District of Texas. Furthermore, those

cases were filed after the present case was filed. See Porter v. Lemire, No. 24-504, 2024 WL

5006296 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 2024), adopted, 2024 WL 4719507 (Nov. 8, 2024) (“the PLRA’s

three strikes rule is one to be applied at the time suit is filed, when the court considers the

application to proceed in forma pauperis.”). Defendants’ objection is OVERRULED.

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B. Failure to Respond to Motion

Defendants next object to Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the summary judgment

motion, stating that this failure should be taken as no opposition pursuant to Local Rule 7.4,

and the motion should be granted in its entirety. D.E. 97, p. 3.

“[S]ummary judgment may not be awarded by default ‘simply because there is no

opposition, even if the failure to oppose violated a local rule.’” Howe v. Adams, No. 3:14-CV-

349, 2018 WL 1427175, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2018) (quoting Hibernia Nat'l Bank v.

Administracion Cent. Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir. 1985)). Defendants’

objection is OVERRULED.

C. Clearly Established Law

Defendants object that the law was not clearly established that any of their conduct

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. D.E. 97, p. 4. They note that Plaintiff did not respond

to the summary judgment motion or identify a case demonstrating that Defendants’ actions

violated clearly established law. Id. They state that once they pled qualified immunity, the

burden shifted to Plaintiff to rebut the defense. However, the M&R incorrectly places the

burden on Defendants to show that the law is not clearly established. Id. at pp. 4-5.

Some portions of the M&R might be construed as placing the burden on Defendants

to establish a lack of clearly established law. See D.E. 93, pp. 39-40, 42 (“While these

defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on ‘all constitutional claims

made against them,’ they do not offer any specific argument in support of their qualified

immunity claim.”). However, the Magistrate Judge properly applied clearly established law

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to Plaintiff’s evidence, and the Court further delineates the clearly established law on a claim-

by-claim basis in the sections below.

Defendants’ objection is OVERRULED.

D. Denial or Confiscation of Medical Passes

The Magistrate Judge recommends denying Defendants’ motion on the deliberate

indifference claim regarding the denial or confiscation of medical passes, finding that Plaintiff

met the burden of showing an issue of material fact regarding Deputy Chief Chapa’s conduct

and whether the conduct violated clearly established law. D.E. 93, p. 38.

Defendants object that the evidence conclusively establishes that Chapa did not

confiscate Plaintiff’s mattress or blanket, and did not deny him medical passes or bottom bunk

privileges. D.E. 97, p. 5. Instead, the evidence shows that these actions were taken by Officer

Arisola. Id. In any event, Defendants argue that the law is not clearly established that Chapa’s

alleged conduct violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. at pp. 5-6.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the state has a duty to provide for a detainee’s basic

human needs, including medical care. Hare, 74 F.3d at 639 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago

Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)). This is a clearly established

constitutional right and interference with prescribed medical treatment can rise to deliberate

indifference. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (“deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain .

. . [t]his is true whether the indifference is manifested by . . . prison guards in intentionally

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denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once

prescribed.” (internal quotations omitted)).

Deputy Chief Chapa states in his affidavit that he did not confiscate Plaintiff’s medical

passes and double mattress, and that he was not aware of Plaintiff’s double mattress being

removed. D.E. 77-3, pp. 1-2. In his complaint, Plaintiff states that Chapa confiscated his

passes, and claims, in his questionnaire, that he spoke directly to Chapa about his medical

needs. Thus, Chapa was aware of the need for the passes and the extra mattress. D.E. 44, p.

9; D.E. 46, p. 3. The summary judgment evidence shows that Plaintiff had a medical pass that

authorized him to have an additional mattress. See D.E. 46-1, p. 4. Whether Chapa actually

denied Plaintiff’s passes is a fact question that cannot be decided through summary judgment.

Defendants’ objection is OVERRULED.

E. Prehearing Segregation Prior to the August 2022 Disciplinary Hearing

The Magistrate Judge recommends denying summary judgment on the due process

claim regarding prehearing disciplinary segregation because Defendants do not offer a

specific argument in support of their qualified immunity defense. D.E. 93, p. 40. Defendants

object that the M&R incorrectly places the burden on them to show that the law is not clearly

established for this claim, and that, based on the events leading to the disciplinary hearing,

Plaintiff’s prehearing detention would not be unconstitutional. D.E. 97, p. 6.

“When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to

demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense.” Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 416 (5th Cir.

2021) (quoting McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).

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Plaintiff has made a due process claim for the time he spent in disciplinary segregation from

August 23-26 before his disciplinary hearing on August 25. D.E. 44, p. 10. “[U]nder the Due

Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance

with due process of law.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. However, “[n]ot every disability imposed

during pretrial detention amounts to ‘punishment’ in the constitutional sense.” Id. at 537.

“Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security

do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment . . . .” Id. at 540. The question

is whether Plaintiff’s prehearing segregation was an action meant to further a legitimate

governmental purpose, or whether it amounted to punishment. See Martinez v. Harris Cnty.

Jail, 71 F.3d 876 (5th Cir. 1995) (“If no legitimate governmental purpose for the action can

be ascertained, then we may infer an intent to punish.”).

Sergeant Dugger’s affidavit states that on August 23, 2022, officers attempted to move

Plaintiff to another cell. D.E. 77-7, p. 1. This move resulted in an altercation, requiring officers

to administer OC spray and then physically gain control of Plaintiff and escort him out of his

cell. Id. at p. 2. This altercation led to the disciplinary hearing held on August 25, 2022. D.E.

77-3, p. 2. The reason behind the officers’ attempt to get Plaintiff out of his cell initially is not

clear to the Court. Deputy Chief Chapa’s declaration suggests that the August 23, 2022 move

was initiated because there had been a dispute between Plaintiff and the officers regarding the

removal of Plaintiff’s mattress. Id. Defendants state that after removing Plaintiff’s mattress,

he “became noncompliant and verbally and physically combative with the correction

officers.” D.E. 77-3, p. 2. Additionally, Plaintiff began to cause a disturbance as he demanded

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that officers bring back his second mattress. See D.E. 77-5, p. 3. Plaintiff was then placed into

segregation (the reports refer to placing him in cell “A-8”) due to his failure to follow orders

and for conduct which disrupts the safety and security of the facility. Id. at p. 5.

Plaintiff contends that his prehearing segregation was a form of punishment because

Sheriff Mills told him it was “his [the Sheriff’s] jail,” and Sheriff Mills and Chapa stated that

“[they] make the rules.” D.E. 46, p. 7. The reason behind Plaintiff’s prehearing segregation is

a genuine issue of material fact that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Defendants’

objection is OVERRULED.

F. Disciplinary Hearing Due Process Claim

The Magistrate Judge recommends denying summary judgment on Plaintiff’s due

process claim regarding the disciplinary hearing. D.E. 93, p. 40. The M&R notes that while

there was a hearing notice that stated Plaintiff had a right to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence, nothing in the summary judgment evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff

was actually afforded that opportunity. Id. at p. 41.

Defendants again object that the M&R incorrectly places the burden on them to

establish that the law in this regard is not clearly established. They argue they are entitled to

qualified immunity. D.E. 97, p. 6. They also state that though there is no audio of the hearing,

“notice of the hearing was provided and a hearing was conducted and, as such, due process

was afforded to Plaintiff.” Id. at pp. 6-7.

Plaintiff has alleged a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process

based on a lack of an adequate hearing. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)

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(“Prisoners may also claim the protections of the Due Process Clause. They may not be

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”). It is clearly established law

that pretrial detainees have the same due process protections as convicted prisoners at a

disciplinary hearing. See Frank v. Larpenter, 234 F.3d 706 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The best approach

is to treat pretrial detainees and convicted inmates equally at disciplinary hearings.”). The

elements of due process in a disciplinary hearing are: “(1) advance notice of claimed violation,

(2) a written statement of the fact finders as to the evidence relied upon and a reason for

disciplinary action taken, and (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary

evidence.” Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Smith v. Rabalais,

659 F.2d 539, 542 (1981)).

As Deputy Chief Chapa has stated in his affidavit, Plaintiff was provided with notice

and a hearing, which is evident in the video recording of the hearing itself. However, Plaintiff

has stated that he was not allowed to call witnesses or present evidence at the hearing, a

violation of his clearly established due process right. D.E. 46, p. 8. Defendants do not address

this point in any of their affidavits. Defendants’ objection is OVERRULED.

G. Retaliation: Transfer to Kleberg County Jail

The Magistrate Judge recommends denying summary judgment to Defendants on

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim for being transferred to the Kleberg County jail because there

exists a question of fact as to the reason Plaintiff was transferred to another facility. DE. 93,

pp. 43-44. Defendants object that the evidence “conclusively establishes” that the temporary

transfer of Plaintiff to another facility was an attempt to restore order and security within the

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Aransas County Detention Center. Thus, the transfer did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights. Additionally, the law is not clearly established that the transfer would violate Plaintiff’s

rights. DE. 97, p. 7.

“The law of this circuit is clearly established . . . that a prison official may not retaliate

against or harass an inmate for exercising the right of access to the courts . . . .” Woods, 60

F.3d at 1164. A claim for retaliation requires that a plaintiff establish: (1) the exercise of a

specific constitutional right, (2) a defendant’s intent to retaliate for the exercise of the right,

(3) a retaliatory act, and (4) causation. Baughman, 761 F. App'x at 382 (citing McDonald, 132

F.3d at 231). “A plaintiff must ‘produce direct evidence of motivation’ or ‘allege a chronology

of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.’” Id. (citing Woods, 60 F.3d at

1166).

Plaintiff exercised his constitutional right of access to the courts by filing the present

lawsuit in December 2022. See D.E. 1. He was transferred to the Kleberg County jail on July

15, 2023, which he claims was in retaliation for filing the lawsuit. D.E. 46, p. 12. He claims

he was placed in solitary confinement, drugged, and assaulted during his time at the Kleberg

County jail. D.E. 44, p. 19. The transfer to a more dangerous prison can support the

“retaliatory act” element of the retaliation claim. See Parker v. Carpenter, 978 F.2d 190, 192

(5th Cir. 1992) (“[pretrial detainee] has plead that his transfer to the violent inmate section

was an act of punishment which is a legal claim cognizable under a § 1983 claim.”).

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There is a fact question regarding the reason for the transfer, precluding summary

judgment. If the transfer was effectuated for retaliatory purposes, the law is clearly established

on this point. Defendants’ objection is OVERRULED.

CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations set

forth in the Magistrate Judge’s memorandum and recommendation, as well as Plaintiff’s and

Defendants’ objections, and all other relevant documents in the record, and having made a de

novo disposition of the portions of the Magistrate Judge’s memorandum and recommendation

to which objections were specifically directed, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s and

Defendants’ objections and ADOPTS as its own the findings and conclusions of the

Magistrate Judge (D.E. 93). Specifically, the Court:

• GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Officer Maddox, Sergeant Dugger,

Officer Arisola, and Corporal Urrea on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim;

• GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Officer Maddox, Sergeant Dugger,

Officer Arisola, and Corporal Urrea on Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claim;

• GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Deputy Chief Chapa on Plaintiff’s

solitary confinement retaliation claim arising from the June 2023 incident;

• DENIES summary judgment for Deputy Chief Chapa on Plaintiff’s claim

regarding the denial or confiscation of medical passes;

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e DENIES summary judgment for Sheriff Mills and Deputy Chief Chapa on

Plaintiff's claim regarding prehearing segregation arising from the August 2022

incident;

e DENIES summary judgment for Deputy Chief Chapa, Lieutenant Martinez,

Corporal Tober, and Officer Alvarado on Plaintiff’s due process claim for the

August 2022 disciplinary hearing; and

e DENIES summary judgment for Sheriff Mills on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim

for the transfer to the Kleberg County jail.

ORDERED on July 18, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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