Opinion

Murray v. United States Department of Justice

Court
District Court, D. Oregon
Filed
Jul 17, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 38.0%

“[A]n agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion” and thus “presumed immune from judicial review under [the APA].”

How later courts described this case

  • “[A]n agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion” and thus “presumed immune from judicial review under [the APA].”
  • “The benefit that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause[.]”
  • courts may not review government’s alleged failure to enforce laws
  • “Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person ‘acting under color of State law’ . . . by its very terms, § 1983 precludes liability in federal government actors.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

SARA MURRAY, G.E.M., C.M.M., Case No. 6:25-cv-924-MC

Plaintiffs, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION, KASH PETAL, in his

official capacity as Director of the FBI, and

PAM BONDI, in her official capacity as U.S.

Attorney General,

Defendants.

MCSHANE, Judge:

Self-represented Plaintiff, Sara Murray, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)

in this action against the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the

Director of the FBI, and the U.S. Attorney General. Before the Court, in addition to Plaintiff’s

Complaint, is Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed IFP, Plaintiff’s Motion for ADA

Accommodations and Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel, and Plaintiff’s Motion to File Document

Under Seal, ECF Nos. 1–3, 7. Although the Court finds that Plaintiff is eligible to proceed IFP,

Plaintiff has failed to establish that she has valid, nonfrivolous claims against Defendants.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed IFP, ECF No. 2, is GRANTED, but her

Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Sara Murray1 is no stranger to the IFP process. She has initiated at least six federal

lawsuits since December 2023 across three judicial districts—the Western District of Washington,

the Northern District of California, and here in the District of Oregon. Each case relates to the

same fact pattern: Plaintiff is attempting to challenge custody proceedings in Washington State

court that granted custody of Plaintiff’s children to their father, Plaintiff’s ex-husband.

Plaintiff first brought suit in the District of Oregon, but the case was transferred to the

Western District of Washington where venue was proper. Murray v. King Cnty. Superior Ct., No.

24-239, 2024 WL 3792907 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 13, 2024). There, Judge Whitehead advised Plaintiff

that a federal court cannot review child custody decrees, that many of the officials she named as

defendants are immune from suit, and that the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and

Rehabilitation Act do not apply to the conduct challenged. Id. In response, Plaintiff moved for

Judge Whitehead’s recusal and accused him and all Washington judges of exhibiting bias toward

her. Murray v. King Cnty. Ct., No. 24-239, 2024 WL 4144153 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2024).

Plaintiff then initiated several other lawsuits alleging disability discrimination and

constitutional violations against dozens of individuals, judges, and agencies for failure to provide

ADA accommodations, including appointment of pro bono counsel, and failure to prosecute an

alleged conspiracy by the dozens of individuals involved in Plaintiff’s custody dispute and the

litany of claims she initiated thereafter. See, e.g., Murray v. Murguia, No. 25-1364, 2025 WL

1101515 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2025) (ADA claims against judiciary for failure to appoint Plaintiff

counsel); Murray v. Supreme Ct. of Wash., No. 25-5074, 2025 WL 745562 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 7,

1 Plaintiff also attempts to bring claims on behalf of her minor children, G.E.M. and C.M.M., but self-represented

parties may not proceed on behalf of others. See Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997);

C.E. Pope Equity Tr. v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, this Opinion refers only to

Plaintiff Sara Murray unless otherwise specified.

2025) (same); Murray v. Whitehead, No. 25-312, 2025 WL 949409 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 27, 2025)

(same); Murray v. U.S. Att’y’s Off., No. 25-259, 2025 WL 774918 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2025)

(ADA and constitutional claims against U.S. Attorney’s Office and others for discrimination and

failure to prosecute alleged conspiracy). In each case, the court informed Plaintiff of the

deficiencies in her claims, dismissed them, and afforded Plaintiff leave to amend with instructions

on how to remedy the deficiencies. Plaintiff never complied with those instructions and instead

continued to assert bias, insist that the judges recuse themselves, and file new lawsuits.

Now, Plaintiff returns to federal court for her seventh case in two years, continuing to allege

a conspiracy related to the above events.

LEGAL STANDARD

This Court has discretion in deciding whether to grant IFP. See O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920

F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990). To authorize a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must make two

determinations. First, a court must determine whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of

commencing the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Second, pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court

must screen the complaint to determine whether the plaintiff has raised a cognizable legal

claim. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2008). “[T]he court shall dismiss

the case at any time if the court determines that” the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to

state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court construes pleadings by self-represented

plaintiffs liberally and affords the plaintiffs the benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP

The Court is satisfied by Plaintiff’s representation that she has “disability-related

limitations and worsening financial hardship.” Mot. Proceed In Forma Pauperis 2. Plaintiff’s

Motion to Proceed IFP is GRANTED, and the Court moves on to screen Plaintiff’s Complaint for

claims that are frivolous or fail to state a claim for relief.

II. Plaintiff’s Complaint

A complaint is frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact,” and the Court

applies the familiar standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) when considering Plaintiff’s claims.

Cato v. U.S., 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.

2012). Under that standard, the Court takes as true all allegations of material fact and construes

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. Legal conclusions, however, “are not entitled

to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “Dismissal is proper only

if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle

him to relief.” Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112.

Plaintiff attempts to bring claims against the FBI and its director, Kash Patel, the U.S.

Department of Justice, and U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi. Plaintiff alleges that each “agency

deflected, retaliated, or suppressed Plaintiff, forming an unconstitutional, closed-loop structure

that denied her and her children access to justice, safety, and family unity.” Compl. 6. She claims

that the DOJ and FBI “received actual and constructive notice of an ongoing, procedurally

admitted RICO and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy targeting Plaintiff,” but she does not offer any

facts to support her theory of a conspiracy.

Plaintiff alleges that she sought ADA accommodations in the form of a criminal

psychology expert and legal advocacy and that no such accommodations were provided. Id. at 10–

12. “Defendants DOJ and FBI have failed to intervene, investigate, or accommodate,” allegedly

“in violation of their obligations under Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and binding international obligations under the ICCPR,

CAT, and 8 C.F.R. §208.18.” Id. at 13. Plaintiff seeks a Temporary Restraining Order “[h]alting

further federal inaction and requiring provisional protection of Plaintiffs”; a preliminary and

permanent injunction requiring Defendants DOJ and FBI to “initiate an immediate, full-scope

investigation” of the alleged conspiracy and to “[c]oordinate immediate and covert recovery

(extraction) of [Plaintiff’s children] G.E.M. and C.M.M., without advance notice to [their father

and legal custodian] Alexander Murray”; a declaratory judgment that Defendants have violated

the Constitution and federal and international law; and a reassignment of all related civil actions

to a venue outside the State of Washington. Id. at 21–22.

Plaintiff’s current claims fail for many of the same reasons that her previous claims failed.

First, as Plaintiff has been told numerous times, her ADA claims fail because the federal

government is not a “public entity” under the ADA and Title II does not apply to federal

Defendants. See, e.g., Clagett v. Woodring, No. 08-6251, 2008 WL 11461743, at *4 (C.D. Cal.

Oct. 29, 2008) (“[T]he definition of ‘public entity’ set forth in Title II of the ADA does not include

the federal government. This statutory language has been held to clearly establish that Title II of

the ADA is inapplicable to the federal government, its agencies, and its officers and employees.”)

(citing cases).

Second, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a claim under the Rehabilitation Act. That Act

provides that no individual “shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination . . . under any program

or activity conducted by any Executive agency[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Plaintiff must demonstrate

that “(1) [s]he is an individual with a disability; (2) [s]he is otherwise qualified to receive the

benefit; (3) [s]he was denied the benefits of the program solely by reason of [her] disability; and

(4) the program receives federal financial assistance.” Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124,

1135 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff alleges that she has an ADA-covered disability, but never specifies

what that disability is or why she qualifies for accommodations. She alleges that Defendants denied

her “reasonable accommodations in communications and legal processes, and failed to ensure

program access and investigatory protection on the basis of disability[.]” Compl. 18. But the only

programs or activities Plaintiff alleges Defendants denied her were “trauma-informed reporting,

legal advocacy, and protective response,” and a “criminal psychology expert[.]” Id. at 11. Plaintiff

alleges that she was able to submit “written and electronic submissions through the DOJ tip portal,

direct phone calls, emails, and mailed reports,” in addition to submitting information through the

FBI’s online tip portal, directly emailing the FBI, submitting a formal criminal complaint to the

FBI, and “repeatedly contact[ing] the U.S. Department of Justice through its online complaint

portals, by email, phone, and formal correspondence.” Id. at 11–12. Plaintiff also alleges that the

Portland FBI office conducted a phone interview with her, and that she received automated

responses and “unexplained refusals to investigate.” Id. at 12.

These allegations demonstrate that Plaintiff was able to access the services and benefits of

Defendants FBI and DOJ and that she is merely challenging the agencies’ refusal to prosecute the

alleged crimes, not their alleged refusal to provide accommodations. Plaintiff has not demonstrated

that she was “qualified to receive the benefit[s]” that were denied to her, i.e., that she was owed a

formal investigation and prosecution of the alleged conspiracy. In essence, Plaintiff seeks as a

“reasonable accommodation” a court-ordered investigation and prosecution, including specialized

psychology experts and pro bono counsel, but neither the Rehabilitation Act nor the ADA require

such accommodations.

Third, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims fail because § 1983 applies only to state, not federal actors.

Morse v. N. Coast Opportunities, Inc., 118 F.3d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Section 1983

provides a cause of action against any person ‘acting under color of State law’ . . . by its very

terms, § 1983 precludes liability in federal government actors.”). Even construing Plaintiff’s §

1983 claims liberally and interpreting them as claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents

of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the claims do not survive. Bivens allows

damages suits against federal officials acting in their individual capacities, but here, Plaintiff does

not seek damages. Rather, she seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, which Bivens does not allow.

Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1173 (9th

Cir. 2007) (Bivens does not apply to suits seeking to enjoin official action and the federal court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity).

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges constitutional violations based on Defendants’ inaction,

she has no claims there, either. Plaintiff’s allegations are far too vague and conclusory to find that

Defendants acted unlawfully, and even if they were not, Plaintiff has no right to sue the DOJ and

FBI over their refusal to investigate and prosecute the alleged conspiracy. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents

of Univ. of Alaska, 673 f.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Vague and conclusory allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.”); Town

of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (“The benefit that a third party may receive

from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger protections under the

Due Process Clause[.]”); ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 283 (1987)

(courts may not review prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute); State of California v. United States,

104 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (courts may not review government’s alleged failure to

enforce laws); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a

judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”).

Going one step further and assuming Plaintiff intended to sue under the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706, Plaintiff’s claims fare no better because she has not alleged

any unlawful agency action. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s

decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision

generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion” and thus “presumed immune from judicial

review under [the APA].”).

Fourth, Plaintiff’s claims under international law also fail. Plaintiff alleges violations of

the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), 8 C.F.R. § 208.18, and the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). Plaintiff’s claim under 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 fails because

Plaintiff has not alleged that she suffered “torture” as defined in § 208.18(a). Further, the CAT and

ICCPR are not subject to judicial enforcement because they were ratified “on the express

understanding that [they] [were] not self-executing and so did not [themselves] create obligations

enforceable in the federal courts.” See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004)

(discussing the ICCPR); Nevius v. McDaniel, 218 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2000) (denying certificate of

appealability where court denied petitioner’s claim of a violation of the CAT); Boiko v. Santa Cruz

Cnty., No. 18-3324, 2018 WL 9563235, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2018) (noting that the

Convention Against Torture “is not self-executing and does not create judicially enforceable rights

unless given effect by implementing legislation”).

Finally, Plaintiff’s purported claims against Defendants John and Jane Does 1–20 must

also be dismissed. Though Plaintiff was not required to name each Doe Defendant when filing her

Complaint, she was required to allege enough information to show that someone violated her

rights. Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that dismissal is

appropriate where “even if Doe’s identity is discovered, the complaint would have to be dismissed

on other grounds”). As with the named Defendants, Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to state

a claim that any of the Doe Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights.

Because there is no reading of Plaintiff’s Complaint that could breathe life into her claims,

her Complaint is DISMISSED.

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for ADA Accommodations and Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel

Plaintiff asks the Court to appoint pro bono counsel under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2) and 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), recognize Plaintiff as next friend for her minor children G.E.M. and C.M.M.,

and expedite these proceedings. Mot. ADA Accommodations 1–2, ECF No. 3.

Plaintiff has been told before that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act do not apply to the

federal courts, that she is not entitled to appointment of counsel, and that the Court may “request”

counsel for indigent litigants only in “exceptional circumstances.” Murray v. U.S. Att’y’s Off.,

2025 WL 774918, at *3 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To determine whether

exceptional circumstances are present, the Court considers both “the likelihood of success on the

merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate [her] claims pro se in light of the complexity

of the legal issues involved.” Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal

citation and quotation marks omitted).

As discussed above, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on her claims.

And it is evident that Plaintiff’s claims fail not because she has trouble articulating them, but

because no valid claims exist for the conduct Plaintiff is challenging. Accordingly, the Court

declines to appoint pro bono counsel. Because Plaintiff is not represented by counsel, she may not

represent others in legal matters, including her children. See Johns v. County of San Diego, 114

F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997); C.E. Pope Equity Tr. v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir.

1987). In sum, Plaintiff’s Motion for ADA Accommodations and Appointment of Pro Bono

Counsel is DENIED.

IV. Denial of Leave to Amend & Revocation of IFP Status

When dismissing a self-represented plaintiff's complaint, the Court must give the plaintiff

leave to amend unless it is “absolutely clear” that amendment could not cure the defects. Lucas v.

Department of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). But “district courts are only required to

grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be saved. Courts are not required to grant leave

to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000).

Here, it is abundantly clear that Plaintiff’s claims are futile and that no amendment could

cure the above defects. Plaintiff, in this case and others, is asking federal agencies, officials, and

courts to intervene with the custody determination of Washington State courts and prosecute those

involved for a conspiracy that is, to date, unsupported by anything more than conclusory

allegations. Significant court resources have already been spent on Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated

claims, which remain frivolous despite myriad opportunities to amend. It is “absolutely clear” that

Plaintiff cannot amend her claims in a way that would allow them to survive, so Plaintiff’s

Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 2, is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, fails to state a claim and no amendment could cure the

deficiencies therein, so the Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff’s Motion for ADA

Accommodations and Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel, ECF No. 3, is DENIED. Plaintiff’s

Motion to File Document Under Seal, ECF No. 7, is DENIED as moot. Any appeal of this Order

or Judgment dismissing this action would be frivolous and not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(3). Plaintiff’s IFP status is REVOKED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 17th day of July 2025.

___s/Michael J. McShane_________

Michael McShane

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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