Henson, Sr. v. Lucas County Sheriff's Office

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

DARNELL HENSON, SR., CASE NO. 3:24 CV 2089

Plaintiff,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

LUCAS COUNTY SHERIFF’S

OFFICE, et al.,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

Defendants. ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Currently pending in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are

Motions to Dismiss brought by Defendant Lucas County Sheriff’s Office (Doc. 13) and

Defendants Lucas County Deputy Sheriffs Hunter Baum, Nicholas Danielski, Steven McClellan,

and Joseph Navarre (“Individual Deputies”) (Doc. 16). Plaintiff opposes (Doc. 22), and

Defendants filed a combined reply (Doc. 23). Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For

the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendant Lucas County Sheriff’s Office’s Motion

(Doc. 13), and grants in part and denies in part the individual Deputies’ Motion (Doc. 16).

BACKGROUND

In his original Complaint,1 Plaintiff alleged the following:

On September 03, 2023 around 2 p.m. I, Darnell L. Henson, Sr. was racial[ly]

profiled by the Lucas County Sheriffs [D]epartment deputies. They violated my

4th and 14th amendment rights. Held me against my will. Prolonged the traffic

stop to involve the Toledo police K-9 unit in an[] “unlawful” search and seizure

1. Defendants’ motions address the allegations in both Plaintiff’s original Complaint and

Amended Complaint combined; the Court does so also.

of me and my property. They must be held accountable for their actions on that

day. “Abuse of Power.” Hunter Baum stated to me that he had to fin[]d a reason

to pull me over which created “False” citations in the court. I never committed a

crime.

(Doc. 1, at 8).

To his Complaint, Plaintiff attached photographs (id. at 11-14), as well as citations and

court documents related to the traffic stop (id. at 15-25). The citations were issued on September

3, 2023, by Baum, and indicate a marked lane violation (Ohio Revised Code § 4811.33) and a

cracked front windshield. Id. at 16-17. The citation states Plaintiff told Baum “that he has plans

to fix the window” and the “[c]harge can be dropped if fixes window.” Id. at 16. To the citation

is attached a “Citation Statement of Fact” wherein Baum stated: “The vehicle was observed

driving with a cracked front windshield.” Id. at 17. Baum did not appear at the court proceeding

and the case was dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 19-25.

Plaintiff also attached to his Complaint a letter entitled: “Final Demand Letter of a

Section 1983 Claim.” Id. at 27 (capitalization altered). Therein, he described in greater detail the

events leading up to the at-issue traffic stop as follows. Plaintiff and his passenger (Angela

Walker)2 were driving on Crissey Road near Angola, passing a parked Lucas County Deputy

Sheriff (Baum). They turned onto Old State Line Road and then made a right turn onto Irwin

Road. As they were approaching the Angola and Irwin intersection, Plaintiff observed a Deputy

Sheriff (Danielski) with his left turn signal on. Both Plaintiff and the Deputy Sheriff crossed the

intersection, but then the Deputy made a U-turn and was “quickly approaching [Plaintiff’s]

vehicle.” Id. Plaintiff and his passenger were worried because they are scared of the police. Id.

2. The passenger in the vehicle also filed her own cases relative to the same traffic stop, each of

which was also removed to this Court. See Walker v. Danielski, et al., No. 24 CV 2091 (N.D.

Ohio); Walker v. Comes, et al., No. 25 CV 35 (N.D. Ohio); Walker v. Lucas Cnty. Sheriff’s

Dep’t., No. 24 CV 36 (N.D. Ohio).

Plaintiff continued driving, making his way back to the Crissey Road intersection where they

saw Baum still parked, while Danielski “still followed behind” him. Id. As he approached the

stop sign, Baum “jumped in front of” Danielski and pulled Plaintiff over. Id. Baum asked

Plaintiff if the vehicle was registered in his name, and for his driver’s license. Id. Baum also said

“I see you have a cracked windshield, I could give you a ticket for that too.” Id. Baum asked

Plaintiff permission to search his vehicle and Plaintiff denied consent. Id. Danielski questioned

Walker. Id. Plaintiff asked Baum if this was a routine traffic stop and why he could not simply be

issued a citation and let go. Id. Plaintiff asserts he and his passenger were “held against [their]

will, kidnap[ed] [] for approximately a half [an] hour.” Id. He contends there were Deputies

“everywhere” and “they prolonged the traffic stop.” Id. A Toledo Police Officer (Sgt. Don

Comes) and his police canine arrived; Comes walked the dog around Plaintiff’s vehicle. Id.

Comes stated that “the dog hit on something.” Id. At this point, Lucas County Deputy Sheriffs

“searched [Plaintiff], [his] wallet, Angla Walker’s purse, and [Plaintiff’s] vehicle.” Id. Plaintiff

states that the search did not reveal anything and violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights. Id. at 27-28.

In other demand letters attached to the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts Danielski’s actions

were racial profiling (id. at 45) and that Navarre and McClellan “assisted” Baum and Danielski

“with the unlawful search and seizure of [Plaintiff] and [his] property” (id. at 47, 48).

Plaintiff asserts he suffered resulting damages in the form of a PTSD diagnosis and

emotional distress. Id. at 28. He attached medical records. Id. at 32-42.

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on September 3, 2023, Deputy Sheriff

Hunter Baum issued him two citations – one for a marked lane violation. (Doc. 11, at 1). He

asserts that he told Baum he did not commit such a violation, and repeats that Baum told him he

“had to find a reason to pull [Plaintiff] over.” Id. He reiterates that Danielski made the U-turn at

Angola and Irwin, “racial profiling” him. Id. Plaintiff again states these deputies then “involved”

Navarre and McClellan and that he declined a request to search his vehicle. Id. He contends the

traffic stop was prolonged to involve Comes to “perform an unconstitutional search of [Plaintiff]

and [his] property”, citing Rodriguez v. United States. He contends he was held against his will

“for approximately 45 minutes” after he refused consent to search. (Doc. 12).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Civil Rule 12(b)(6), the function of the

Court is to test the legal sufficiency of the Complaint. In scrutinizing the Complaint, this Court

accepts the allegations stated within as true, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984),

while viewing the Complaint in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir. 1976). Although the

Complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it does require more than “labels and

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, the Complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it

“contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

And “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678).

Additionally, this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent

standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th

Cir. 2008). However, the “lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.”

Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants

does not “abrogate basic pleading essentials”. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

The Court is not required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against defendants on

behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See Bassett v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir.

2008); Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (district courts “have no obligation to act as

counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants”); Payne v. Sec’y of Treasury, 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th

Cir. 2003) (district courts are not “required to create” a pro se litigant’s claim for her). Rather,

the complaint must give the defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests. Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir. 1996). The

complaint must still “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’” Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 F. App’x 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

DISCUSSION

Lucas County Sheriff’s Office

The Lucas County Sheriff’s Office moves to dismiss the claims against it arguing: (1) the

Lucas County Sheriff’s Office lacks capacity to be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2)

alternatively, Plaintiff has failed to allege plausible claims against the Lucas County Sheriff’s

Office. (Doc. 13). In his opposition, Plaintiff argues the facts underlying his claim, but does not

directly respond to the Sherriff’s Office’s legal arguments. (Doc. 22). For the reasons set forth

below, the Court finds the Sheriff’s Office is entitled to dismissal.

The Lucas County Sheriff’s Office is not sui juris, meaning it lacks capacity to be sued.

Petty v. Cnty. of Franklin, 478 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[U]nder Ohio law, a county

sheriff’s office is not a legal entity capable of being sued for purposes of § 1983.”), overruled on

other grounds by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561-62.

Even assuming the Sheriff’s Office were capable of being sued, or liberally construing

Plaintiff’s Complaints to name the correct governmental entity, dismissal remains proper. Under

§ 1983, local governments are not liable simply because they employ someone who commits a

constitutional violation—that is, they cannot be held liable under a respondeat superior theory.

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a

government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts

may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity

is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694; see also Heyerman v. Cnty. of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642,

648 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Municipal liability only attaches where a custom, policy, or practice

attributable to the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the violation of the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights.”).

Plaintiff’s Complaints contain no suggestion of a custom or policy of Lucas County

which deprived him of a federally protected right. For these reasons, the Lucas County Sheriff’s

Office is entitled to dismissal of the claims against it.

Lucas County Deputy Sheriffs

The individual Lucas County Deputy Sheriffs (Baum, Danielski, McClellan, and

Navarre) also move for dismissal, alleging they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 16).

Specifically, they assert (1) the factual allegations demonstrate that there was probable cause for

the stop; (2) the use of the drug-sniffing dog in and of itself is not a search and therefore not a

constitutional violation; (3) the documents accompanying the Complaint demonstrate the

reasonable suspicion for the extension of the traffic stop; and (4) the Complaint does not allege

specific allegations of misconduct against Danielski, McClellan, or Navarre. (Doc. 18). For the

reasons set forth below, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims that officers lacked probable cause for

the traffic stop and unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop may proceed as against Baum and

Danielski, but all other claims against the individual Defendants are dismissed.

To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead two elements: “(1)

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a

person acting under color of state law.” Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542

F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 463 (6th

Cir. 2006)). To sufficiently plead the second element, a plaintiff must allege “personal

involvement.” Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). To do so,

“a plaintiff must show that the official either actively participated in the alleged unconstitutional

conduct or ‘implicitly authorized, approved[,] or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged

unconstitutional conduct of an offending subordinate.’” Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647,

659 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Scott v. City of Cleveland, 555 F. Supp. 2d 890, 896 (N.D. Ohio

2008)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”)

(emphasis added). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific

conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal even under the liberal construction afforded to pro

se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004)

(dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in

the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002)

(dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity

which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged

violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir.) (requiring

allegations of personal involvement against each defendant); Rodriguez v. Jabe, 1990 WL

82722, at *1 (6th Cir.) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as

the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement

in the events leading to his injuries”).

The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary

functions where their “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982). This defense “can be raised at various stages of the litigation including at the

pleading stage in a motion to dismiss”. English v. Dyke, 23 F.3d 1086, 1089 (6th Cir. 1994).

When a defendant raises qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show “that the

challenged conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right, and that the right was so clearly

established at the time of the conduct ‘that every reasonable official would have understood that

what he was doing violated that right.’” T.S. v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632, 635 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)) (citation modified).

The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, made

applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects individuals from: (1) traffic

stops when the officer lacks probable cause to believe that a civil infraction occurred or

reasonable suspicion that a crime is being committed; and (2) arrests or detentions without

probable cause. See Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] vehicle

stop by a police officer is a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”) (citation

modified). In the traffic stop context, the probable cause determination “is fact-dependent and

will turn on what the officer knew at the time he made the stop.” United States v. Ferguson, 8

F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir. 1993).

“Generally, a dog sniff does not require separate reasonable suspicion because it is not a

search under the Fourth Amendment. If a dog sniff is conducted while someone is otherwise

properly seized, such as in a lawful traffic stop, the dog sniff may render an otherwise lawful

seizure unlawful only if it unreasonably prolongs the initial stop and the officer lacked an

independent reasonable suspicion to extend the stop.” United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 663

(6th Cir. 2012) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005)). In Rodriguez v. United

States (the case upon which Plaintiff relies), the Supreme Court held that officers may not

prolong a traffic stop to have a drug dog sniff a car—a crime detecting action not ordinarily

incident to a traffic stop—absent independent reasonable suspicion to detain the motorist. 575

U.S. 348, 354-57 (2015). Finally, “[a]n alert to the presence of drugs by a properly trained

narcotics detection dog is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a vehicle.” United

States v. Sharp, 689 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir. 2012); Nykoriak v. Wileczek, 666 F. App’x 441, 445

(6th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he positive indication by the canine was sufficient to establish probable

cause for the presence of a controlled substance to justify the warrantless search of [the]

vehicle.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Baum

As noted above, in the context of a traffic stop, the probable cause determination turns on

“what the officer knew at the time he made the stop.” Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 391. Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint alleges Baum told Henson he was pulled over for a marked lane violation,

but Henson denied committing such a violation. (Doc. 11, at 1). The Individual Deputy

Defendants rely on the fact that Henson was also cited for driving with a cracked windshield and

that he acknowledged the violation, contending this provides a constitutional basis for the stop.

See Doc. 16, at 11. The fact that Henson was cited is accurate. However, it does not show that

Baum knew about the cracked windshield prior to making the stop. That is, the Complaint at

least plausibly alleges that Baum lacked probable cause to pull the car over. This claim may

proceed to discovery.

The Court also finds at this juncture that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged Baum

unreasonably prolonged the stop to bring in the Toledo Police Officer (Comes) and the canine.

The Complaint alleges Baum pulled Plaintiff over, and after Plaintiff denied consent to search

and asked to be issued a citation and released, Baum “held [Plaintiff] against [his] will,

kidnapping [him] for approximately half [an] hour.” (Doc. 1, at 27); see also Doc. 12, at 1

(stating he was held against his will “[f]or approximately 45 minutes [a]fter [he] refused to let

them search [his] vehicle.”).

Although the Individual Deputy Defendants argue “the facts—i.e., the reasonable

suspicion for—justifying that extension [of the traffic stop] are contained in the exhibits now

before the Court” (Doc. 16, at 12), the Court finds the material Defendants reference not

appropriate for consideration at this stage. Defendants ask the Court to consider exhibits attached

to their answer, including a statement from an Internal Affairs Bureau response to a complaint

that states: “After the stop[,] Mr. He[n]son’s driving pattern, criminal history and acting

suspicious were reasons given for calling the Toledo Police K9 unit.” (Doc. 1, at 25). But

Defendants’ argument asks the Court to take this statement as established fact. Defendants

contend the Court can consider these documents because they are attached to the pleadings and

matters of public record. The Court cannot ordinarily consider evidence outside the pleadings in

ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion. Weiner v. Knight, 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1997). A court may,

however, consider exhibits attached to the complaint, public records, and exhibits attached to the

motion to dismiss if they are referred to in the complaint and central to the plaintiff’s claims.

Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 680-81 (6th Cir. 2011). “[I]n general, a

court may only take judicial notice of a public record whose existence or contents prove facts

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Passa v. City of Columbus, 123 F. App’x

694, 697 (6th Cir. 2005).

Because Plaintiff could reasonably question the accuracy of the contents of the Internal

Bureau Affairs complaint response, and because it is not central to Plaintiff’s complaint, the

Court finds consideration of such documents better suited for a summary judgment motion. Cf.,

e.g., Linden v. City of Lansing, 2013 WL 6858459, at *3 (W.D. Mich.) (“Most courts that have

considered the issue have determined that police reports may not be considered as public

records”) (citing Blackwell v. Kalinowski, 2009 WL 1702992, at *2 (N.D. Ill.) (“[T]he factual

allegations contained in the police report do not become matters of public record suitable for

consideration on a motion to dismiss.”)).

Whether a dog sniff unreasonably prolonged a traffic stop “is the type of circumstance-

specific Fourth Amendment inquiry that, in the civil context, is generally reserved to the jury[.]”

Hernandez v. Boles, 949 F.3d 251, 257 (6th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Baxter, 2018

WL 1598950, at *6 (E.D. Tenn.) (“To evaluate the reasonableness of a stop, a court considers the

diligence of the officer. A court must conduct a fact-bound, context-dependent inquiry in each

case to determine whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop indicates that the

duration of the stop as a whole . . . was reasonable.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)),

report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1594778; Davila v. N. Reg’l Joint Police Bd.,

2016 WL 1252986, at *3 (W.D. Pa.) (“While it may indeed turn out, with the benefit of

discovery, that [the officer] had probable cause or at least a reasonable basis to suspect [plaintiff]

had violated some law other than that requiring her headlights to be on, the Court concludes that

at this juncture, it is just too soon to tell as a factual matter.”).

Here, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to proceed to discovery

regarding what information Baum knew and/or acted upon. Discovery will also reveal whether,

as the County Defendants assert, Baum had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop, if it

was so extended. The Court therefore finds Plaintiff’s claim that Baum unreasonably prolonged

the traffic stop may proceed.

By contrast, the Court finds Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the search of the car

itself violated his rights. As the County Defendants correctly contend, a drug dog’s alert

establishes probable cause for a search. See Sharp, 689 F.3d at 618; Nykoriak, 666 F. App’x at

445. Plaintiff provides no argument in opposition, and repeats that “[t]he dog alerted there were

drugs in my vehicle.” (Doc. 22, at 2). Although Plaintiff’s Complaints plausibly assert the dog

alerted incorrectly (because no drugs were ultimately found in the car), his Complaint contains

no allegations from which the Court could conclude the dog in fact did not alert. Thus, under the

facts as asserted in the Complaint, officers had probable cause for the search.

Danielski

As to Danielski, Plaintiff’s Complaint identifies him as the officer who followed the car

just before the traffic stop and describes how he questioned Walker while Baum questioned

Plaintiff. (Doc. 1, at 27). Plaintiff further asserts that during this questioning, after asking to be

cited and released, “[t]hey didn’t, they held us against our will, kidnapping us for approximately

a half [an] hour.” Id.

Although a close call, the Court finds that the Complaint plausibly alleges Danielski’s

personal involvement in both the traffic stop and the subsequent decision to call in the Toledo

Police Department officer and canine. See, e.g., Webb, 789 F.3d at 659 (stating that to allege

personal involvement, “a plaintiff must allege the official either actively participated in the

alleged unconstitutional conduct or implicitly authorized, approved[,] or knowingly acquiesced

in the alleged unconstitutional conduct of an offending subordinate.”). Plaintiff’s claims against

Danielski may proceed.

Navarre/McClellan

As to Navarre and McClellan, the Complaint simply alleges that Baum and Danielski

“involved” them and that an “unlawful and unconstitutional search of [him] and [his] property”

violated his rights. (Doc. 11, at 1); see also Doc. 12, at 1 (“Steven McClelan and Joseph Navarre

[a]ssisted them with an unlawful and unconstitutional search of [him] and [his] property.”). He

further alleges all of the officers violated their oath of office and department policies, but

provides no additional detail. (Doc. 12, at 1). There are no other specific factual allegations as to

either of these Defendants.

The pleading standard requires more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a

simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id.

The Court finds Plaintiff has not plausibly pled a § 1983 claim against either Navarre or

McClellan and they are entitled to dismissal. Id. at 676 (“a plaintiff must plead that each

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the

Constitution”); Frazier, 41 F. App’x at 764 (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint

did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally

involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights).

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged claims against Danielski and

Baum, but his claims against Navarre, McClellan, and the Lucas County Sheriff’s Department

must be dismissed.

Remaining Defendant

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint also asserts claims against Toledo Police Sergeant Don

Comes. See Doc. 11. Plaintiff attempted to serve Comes by certified mail. See Doc. 25. Plaintiff

filed a return of service, attaching the certified mail return “green card”. See id. The green card

is, however, unsigned. See id. at 3.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1) authorizes service of process in accordance with

applicable law. Ohio law authorizes service of process by certified mail. Ohio Civ. R.

4.1(A)(1)(a). Ohio Civil Rule 4.1(A)(1)(a) specifically explains that service of process by

certified mail is “[e]videnced by return receipt signed by any person[.]” Notably, “[a] signed

return receipt raises a presumption of proper service, which can be rebutted with evidence that

service never occurred.” Breezley v. Hamilton Cnty., 2017 WL 36148, at *3 (6th Cir.) (citing

Ohio Civ. Rights Comm’n. v. First Am. Props., Inc., 113 Ohio App. 3d 233 (1996); TCC Mgmt.,

Inc. v. Clapp, 2005 WL 2008677, at *34 (Ohio Ct. App.)); see also Brownfield v. Krupman, 2015

WL 2452048, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App.) (“When service is attempted by certified mail, a signed

receipt returned to the sender establishes a prima facie case of delivery to the addressee.”

(quoting Clapp, 2005 WL 2008677, at *2)). Where “there is no signed return receipt in the

record, valid service cannot be presumed.” Brownfield, 2015 WL 2452048, at *5.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides:

(m) Time Limit for Service. If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the

complaint is filed, the court--on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff--

must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that

service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for

the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.

Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint in this case on February 7, 2025. (Doc. 11).

Nothing in the record presently before the Court establishes a presumption or prima facie case of

service of process by certified mail on Comes. Instead, the record reflects only an unsigned

return receipt. Pursuant to Federal Civil Rule 4(m), Plaintiff had until May 8, 2025, to serve

Comes. Because, however, it appears Plaintiff attempted to serve Comes in accordance with state

law as permitted by Federal Civil Rule 4(e), but the card was returned without a signature, the

Court will sua sponte find good cause for Plaintiff’s failure to timely serve Comes and grants

him an additional thirty (30) days from the date of this order to complete service. If Plaintiff fails

to do so, his claims against Comes will be dismissed for lack of service pursuant to Rule 4(m).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

ORDERED that Defendant Lucas County Sheriff’s Office’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13)

be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Lucas County Deputy Sheriffs Hunter Baum,

Nicholas Danielski, Steven McClellan, and Joseph Navarre’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16) be

and the same hereby is, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED in part. Specifically, Plaintiff’s

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Baum and Danielski regarding the lack of

probable cause and prolonging of the traffic stop may proceed; all other claims asserted against

the Individual County Defendants are dismissed; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is sua sponte GRANTED an additional thirty (30)

days from the date of this Order in which to serve Defendant Don Comes.

s/ James R. Knepp II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: July 17, 2025