IN RE: GASTON BROWNE CORRUPTION DISCOVERY APPLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-CV-21129-MOORE/Elfenbein

In re

GASTON BROWNE

CORRUPTION DISCOVERY APPLICATION,

YULIA GURYEVA-MOTLOKHOV,

Applicant,

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for

Judicial Assistance in Obtaining

Evidence for Use in a Foreign Proceeding.

/

ORDER ON YULIA GURYEVA-MOTLOKHOV’S EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR

JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING EVIDENCE FOR USE IN A FOREIGN

PROCEEDING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1782

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Applicant Yulia Guryeva-Motlokhov’s Ex Parte

Application for Judicial Assistance Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (the “Application”), ECF No.

[1]. The Honorable K. Michael Moore referred this matter to me “to take all necessary and proper

action as required by law regarding all pre-trial, non-dispositive matters and for a Report and

Recommendation on any dispositive matters.” See ECF No. [6]. For the reasons explained below,

the Application, ECF No. [1], is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

In the Application, Applicant asks the Court for an order allowing her to serve Northrop &

Johnson Yachts-Ships LLC (“Northrop”) with “the subpoena attached as Exhibit 13” to the

Application. See ECF No. [1] at 1. Applicant explains “the requested relief aims to obtain

necessary discovery to support three ongoing foreign proceedings,” see ECF No. [1] at 1, that she

has initiated or intends to initiate: (1) a 2023 civil action in Antigua and Barbuda “challenging the

constitutionality of” a legislative act Applicant claims violated her rights “under sections 3 and 9

of the Constitution of Antigua and Barbuda” (the “Antiguan Proceeding”), see ECF No. [1-1] at

9; (2) a “recently instituted civil” action in the Russian Federation “seeking recovery of damages”

for the illegal expropriation of Applicant’s yacht and artwork (the “Russian Proceeding”), see ECF

No. [1-1] at 38; and (3) a “criminal complaint” Applicant “is contemplating filing” in the United

Arab Emirates (the “Contemplated Criminal Proceeding”), see ECF No. [1-1] at 38.

In a Memorandum in Support of the Application (the “Supporting Memo”), Applicant

further explains that all three proceedings arise out of what she contends was the illegal seizure

and sale of the $120 million superyacht Alfa Nero. See ECF No. [1-1] at 5–17. Two trusts of

which “Applicant is currently the sole adult beneficiary,” owned the Alfa Nero and its onboard

artwork. See ECF No. [1-1] at 5–6. “When conflict in Ukraine broke out in February 2022, the

Alfa Nero was located in Antigua and was not sanctioned,”1 but “Antiguan officials publicly

refused to allow the vessel to leave the harbor or provide fuel for the vessel except limited

emergency supplies to keep the vessel functional,” leaving it “effectively frozen by Antiguan

authorities and functionally unable to leave Antigua.” See ECF No. [1-1] at 6–7.

Beginning in early March 2023, Applicant’s agent repeatedly tried to inform the Antiguan

Attorney General of Applicant’s ownership interests in the Alfa Nero and its onboard artwork, but

the agent got no response. See ECF No. [1-1] at 8–9. Several weeks later, in late March 2023, the

Antiguan government passed legislation authorizing the Antiguan port manager “to declare vessels

abandoned” and “sell them at auction.” See ECF No. [1-1] at 10–11. Using his new powers, the

1 Applicant notes that the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned her

father and declared the Alfa Nero “blocked property” in August 2022, but the vessel was removed from the

sanctions list in June 2023 “to facilitate the Antiguan government’s attempts to sell” it. See ECF No. [1-1]

at 7.

port manager “determined that the Alfa Nero posed an imminent threat to the harbor and the

economy of Antigua and announc[ed] an intent to auction” it. See ECF No. [1-1] at 11. When

Applicant’s agent finally spoke to the Attorney General in early April, he was redirected to the

port manager, but despite “repeatedly” emailing and otherwise attempting to contact the port

manager to “prevent any confiscation or sale” of the Alfa Nero, he never responded. See ECF No.

[1-1] at 8. So, in June 2023, Applicant filed the Antiguan Proceeding, which she notes is

“ongoing.” See ECF No. [1-1] at 8–10.

The Alfa Nero was ultimately sold in July 2024 through Northrop, which is a yacht broker.

See ECF No. [1-1] at 14. The sale was “a private transaction” to an “undisclosed” buyer. See ECF

No. [1-1] at 14. The purchase price was reportedly $40 million, which is less than the $67 million

high bid received during the public auction. See ECF No. [1-1] at 11–13.

“Following the July 2024 sale, Applicant sought disclosure from the Antiguan courts

regarding the distribution of the proceeds.” See ECF No. [1-1] at 15. After the court in the

Antiguan Proceedings “ordered the government to file an affidavit and submit relevant documents

detailing the sale of the Alfa Nero,” the government disclosed documents accounting for about $36

million of the $40 million purchase price. See ECF No. [1-1] at 15–16. But the disclosures failed

to account for the remaining $4 million, did not indicate whether there had been a pre-sale deposit,

and did not include the payment of Northrop’s 4.5% commission. See ECF No. [1-1] at 16. The

disclosures also did not identify the buyer, but according to Applicant’s investigators, the buyers

were “Robert Yildirim and Ali Riza Yildirim of the Yildirim Group,” a Turkish construction and

shipping conglomerate, which holds the Alfa Nero through the Maltese entity YM Thunder I

Shipping Limited (“YM Thunder”). See ECF No. [1-1] at 14.

Applicant’s investigators tried to review “the original sale and payment records for the

2024 Alfa Nero sale” using Antiguan public records laws, but they were unable to do so because

“they had apparently gone missing.” See ECF No. [1-1] at 17. The Financial Secretary of the

Antiguan Ministry of Finance and Corporate Governance “speculated to the investigators that the”

documents “had possibly been moved within the custody of the Ministry of Finance,” which is run

by Minister of Finance and Prime Minister Gaston Browne. See ECF No. [1-1] at 17. According

to Applicant, “Browne was strategically involved in the acquisition and subsequent sale of the Alfa

Nero,” see ECF No. [1-1] at 19, and his “administration was set to receive up to a 50%

commission” on the sale, see ECF No. [1-1] at 15. He has also generally “faced various allegations

of corruption, illegal enrichment, and conflicts of interest.” See ECF No. [1-1] at 19.

Applicant asserts that “Browne orchestrated the sale of the Alfa Nero for self-interested

purposes, and evidence of this corrupt motive would be critical in the” three foreign proceedings

for which she seeks discovery through § 1782. See ECF No. [1-1] at 20. In addition to helping

prove in the Antiguan Proceeding that the sale of the Alfa Nero was the improper result of Prime

Minister Browne’s self-interest, the discovery Applicant seeks would aid the Russian Proceeding

because it is directed at the buyers (the Yildirim Group) and current owner (YM Thunder) of the

Alfa Nero. See ECF No. [1-1] at 38. And it would aid the Contemplated Criminal Proceeding

because that litigation will likely include “claims against Browne and potentially the Yildirims”

for “transacting in or hiding criminal proceeds under” UAE law. See ECF No. [1-1] at 38.

As to the specific materials sought, Applicant seeks documents from Northrop, the yacht

broker that facilitated the sale of the Alfa Nero, see ECF No. [1-1] at 39, concerning the sale,

including: (1) any prospective or actual buyer; (2) any payment for the yacht; (3) the disposition

of the sale proceeds; (4) any charter or rental of the yacht; and (5) all communications with

Browne, the port manager, the Finance Secretary, the Yildirims, the Yildirim Group, and several

others, see ECF No. [1-15] at 7, 11. Northrop has offices in this District, but it does not have

offices in Antigua. See ECF No. [1-1] at 39.

Applicant argues the Court should grant the Application because it meets all four statutory

requirements under § 1782 and all four discretionary factors the Supreme Court set out in Intel

Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004). See ECF No. [1] at 2; ECF No. [1-

1] at 39–47. Specifically, as to the statutory requirements, Applicant argues: (1) she is an interested

person because she “is or will be a litigant in the” Antigua Proceeding, Russian Proceeding, and

Contemplated Criminal Proceeding; (2) the Application seeks documentary evidence; (3) the

discovery sought is for use in the Antigua Proceeding, Russian Proceeding, and Contemplated

Criminal Proceeding; and (4) Northrop is found in this District. See ECF No. [1] at 2; ECF No.

[1-1] at 39–47. And as to the discretionary factors, Applicant argues: (1) Northrop is not a party

to the Antigua Proceeding, Russian Proceeding, or Contemplated Criminal Proceeding; (2) the

Antiguan, Russian Federation, and UAE Courts will likely be receptive to this Court’s judicial

assistance; (3) Applicant is not attempting to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions; and

(4) the discovery sought is not intrusive or burdensome. See ECF No. [1] at 2; ECF No. [1-1] at

47–52.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

“Section 1782 is the product of congressional efforts, over the span of nearly 150 years, to

provide federal-court assistance in gathering evidence for use in foreign tribunals.” Intel Corp.,

542 U.S. at 247. The “history of Section 1782 reveals Congress’ wish to strengthen the power of

district courts to respond to requests for international assistance.” Application of Consorcio

Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. v. JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc., 747 F.3d 1262, 1269

(11th Cir. 2014) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted).

“A district court has the authority to grant an application for judicial assistance if the

following statutory requirements in § 1782(a) are met: (1) the request must be made ‘by a foreign

or international tribunal,’ or by ‘any interested person’; (2) the request must seek evidence, whether

it be the ‘testimony or statement’ of a person or the production of ‘a document or other thing’; (3)

the evidence must be ‘for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal’; and (4) the

person from whom discovery is sought must reside or be found in the district of the district court

ruling on the application for assistance.” In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2007)

(footnote omitted) (quoting § 1782(a)). “If these requirements are met, then § 1782 ‘authorizes,

but does not require, a federal district court to provide assistance.’” Id. at 1332 (quoting Intel, 542

U.S. at 255); see also United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001)

(“[A] district court’s compliance with a § 1782 request is not mandatory.”).

“Once the prima facie [statutory] requirements are satisfied, the Supreme Court in Intel

noted these factors to be considered in exercising the discretion granted under § 1782(a): (1)

whether ‘the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding,’

because ‘the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence

is sought from a nonparticipant’; (2) ‘the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the

proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency

abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance’; (3) ‘whether the § 1782(a) request conceals an

attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or

the United States’; and (4) whether the request is otherwise ‘unduly intrusive or burdensome.’” In

re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1334 (quoting Intel, 542 U.S. at 264–65). None of these factors is required

or automatically dispositive — they simply “bear consideration in ruling on a § 1782(a) request.”

See Intel, 542 U.S. at 264. In fact, even if a court concludes an application contains “unduly

intrusive or burdensome requests,” it may still exercise its discretion to grant the application

because those specific requests “may be rejected or trimmed.” Id. at 265.

Finally, though the Supreme Court has not specifically listed it as a factor in the analysis,

sometimes courts look at how granting or denying a § 1782 application would impact international

comity concerns. That’s because “the animating purpose of § 1782 is comity: Permitting federal

courts to assist foreign and international governmental bodies promotes respect for foreign

governments and encourages reciprocal assistance.” ZF Auto. US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 596 U.S.

619, 632 (2022); see also In re Pimenta, 942 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (noting “the

twin aims of the statute: providing an efficient means of assistance to participants in international

litigation and encouraging foreign countries to provide reciprocal assistance to our courts”).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Applicant Has Met the Four Requirements of § 1782

As noted above, the four factors set out in the statute govern the first step in the § 1782

analysis. See In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1331–32. Here, Applicant has met each of them.

First, an “interested person” is making Applicant’s request. See § 1782(a); In re Clerici,

481 F.3d at 1331. Applicant “is or will be a litigant in the” Antigua Proceeding, Russian

Proceeding, and Contemplated Criminal Proceeding. See ECF No. [1-1] at 47. That makes

Applicant a party to all three relevant foreign proceedings, and as the Supreme Court has noted,

“litigants are included among, and may be the most common example of, the ‘interested persons’

who may invoke § 1782.” See Intel, 542 U.S. at 256 (alteration adopted).

Second, Applicant’s request “seek[s] evidence,” including the production of “‘a document

or other thing.’” See In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1331– 32 (quoting § 1782(a)). Indeed, the Supporting

Memo explicitly notes that “the proposed subpoena plainly seeks documents, in the form of sale

records and communications with a discrete set of identified individuals,” and the document

requests within the subpoena are consistent with those representations. See ECF No. [1-1] at 42;

ECF No. [1-15].

Third, the evidence Applicant seeks is “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international

tribunal.” See § 1782(a); In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1332. As Applicant explains in the Supporting

Memo, the Antiguan, Russian Federation, and UAE courts are all foreign tribunals within the scope

of § 1782. See ECF No. [1-1] at 43. The Eleventh Circuit has “recognized that the courts of the

Russian Federation qualify as foreign tribunals under” § 1782, see Sergeeva, 834 F.3d at 1196,

and other district courts have recognized the same about Antiguan courts and UAE courts. See

ECF No. [1-1] at 43–44. The requested discovery is for use in those proceedings because it “will

be used in litigation with the Yildirim Group in the Russian Federation,” with “the Government of

Antigua” in the Antiguan Court, and with Browne, the Yildirim Group, and any “accomplices” in

the UAE. See ECF No. [1-1] at 45–46.

More specifically, in the Russian Proceeding it “is expected to identify the specific

transactions involved in the corrupt sale of the Alfa Nero,” the “disposition of any ill-gotten

proceeds” of that sale, and “any coconspirators who may be additional sources of evidence.” See

ECF No. [1-1] at 45. In the Antiguan Proceeding, it “will be used to challenge the seizure and sale

of the Alfa Nero.” See ECF No. [1-1] at 45. And in the Contemplated Criminal Proceeding, it

“will be used to support a criminal complaint and respond to requests for supporting evidence from

the Dubai Public Prosecutor, as well as to identify presently-unknown accomplices who may have

helped to hide or launder the proceeds of the Alfa Nero sale on Browne’s behalf.” See ECF No.

[1-1] at 45–46.

Finally, the entity from which Applicant seeks the evidence “resides or is found” in this

District. See § 1782(a); In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1332. As the Supporting Memo notes,

Northrop’s headquarters are in Fort Lauderdale and its registered agent is in North Palm Beach.2

See ECF No. [1-1] at 40–41. When a corporation “has an office and does business in” this District,

it is found in the Southern District of Florida for purposes of § 1782. See Consorcio Ecuatoriano,

747 F.3d at 1269.

For those reasons, the Court finds that Applicant has satisfied the four statutory factors

under § 1782.

B. The Intel Factors Weigh In Favor of Granting the Application

Once the statutory requirements are satisfied, the discretionary factors the Supreme Court

set out in Intel govern the second step in the § 1782 analysis. See 542 U.S. at 264–65; In re Clerici,

481 F.3d at 1334. Here, each of the four Intel factors weighs in favor of granting the Application.

First, the entity from which Applicant seeks the discovery is not a participant in the foreign

proceedings. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 264; In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1334. As the Supreme Court has

explained, “when the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign

proceeding,” the “need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily is when

evidence is sought from a nonparticipant in the matter arising abroad” because a “foreign tribunal

has jurisdiction over those appearing before it, and can itself order them to produce evidence.”

Intel, 542 U.S. at 264. “In contrast, nonparticipants in the foreign proceeding may be outside the

foreign tribunal’s jurisdictional reach; hence, their evidence, available in the United States, may

be unobtainable absent § 1782(a) aid.” Id. Northrop is not a participant in the Antigua Proceeding,

Russian Proceeding, or Contemplated Criminal Proceeding, “nor is it expected to become a

2 Applicant acknowledges that the relevant Northrop broker “is based in Northrop’s Monaco office,” but

she argues that “the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that applications under § 1782 can properly be used to

obtain documents stored overseas.” See ECF No. [1-1] at 41–42 (citing Sergeeva v. Tripleton Int’l Ltd.,

834 F.3d 1194, 1200 (11th Cir. 2016)).

participant.” See ECF No. [1-1] at 47–48. So the first Intel factor weighs in favor of granting

Applicant § 1782(a) aid.

Second, the “nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway

abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-

court judicial assistance” all suggest that the Application should be granted. See Intel, 542 U.S. at

264; In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1334. As Applicant explains, federal courts have granted § 1782

applications for evidence to be used in proceedings in Antigua, the Russian Federation, and the

UAE. See ECF No. [1-1] at 48–50. To do so, those courts recognized that the Antiguan, Russian

Federation, and UAE courts were “likely to be receptive to such discovery.” See ECF No. [1-1]

at 48–50. Because it appears that the relevant foreign courts would be receptive to evidence

gathered through a § 1782(a) proceeding, the second Intel factor weighs in favor of granting the

Application.

Third, the Application does not “conceal[] an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-

gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States.” See Intel, 542

U.S. at 265; In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1334. Applicant asserts that she “seeks this discovery in

good faith and is not attempting to circumvent” any of the foreign tribunals’ proof-gathering

restrictions. See ECF No. [1-1] at 50–51. She notes “there is no requirement to first seek discovery

from the non-US tribunal or exhaust other options before applying to a district court for § 1782

discovery,” see ECF No. [1-1] at 50 (quoting In re Application of Bracha Found., 663 F. App’x

755, 765 (11th Cir. 2016)), but she argues that, even if there were such a requirement, it would be

met here because “the Antiguan court ordered disclosure of much of this same evidence,” see ECF

No. [1-1] at 51. Because it has gone missing, however, it is “unlikely to be available in the”

Antiguan Proceeding and must instead “be obtained or recreated through” § 1782 discovery. See

ECF No. [1-1] at 51. For that reason, she argues that granting the Application “would show comity

with” the Antiguan court, “not the other way around.” See ECF No. [1-1] at 51. Because the

“Application is brought in good faith and does not seek to circumvent any discovery procedures

of the” Antigua Proceeding, Russian Proceeding, or Contemplated Criminal Proceeding, see ECF

No. [1-1] at 51, the third Intel factor weighs in favor of granting the Application.

Finally, Applicant’s request is not unduly intrusive or burdensome. See Intel, 542 U.S. at

265; In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1334. The Application seeks “documents and information regarding

the sale and any charter of the Alfa Nero.” See ECF No. [1-1] at 52; ECF No. [1-15]. As the

Supporting Memo notes, the “burden of responding to” the “subpoena should be minimal, as these

are the types of records that Northrop would logically maintain and produce in the regular course

of business.” See ECF No. [1-1] at 52. The Court agrees with Applicant that the § 1782(a) requests

seek information that is “relevant and narrowly tailored to the” Antigua Proceeding, Russian

Proceeding, and Contemplated Criminal Proceeding, see ECF No. [1-1] at 52, making the fourth

Intel factor weigh in favor of granting the Application.

For these reasons, the Court finds that all four Intel factors weigh in favor of granting the

Application for § 1782 aid.

C. Granting the Application Would Further the Policy Underlying § 1782

As a final consideration, the Court evaluates whether granting the application would further

the policy underlying § 1782, which is to encourage international comity. See ZF Auto., 596 U.S.

at 632; In re Pimenta, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 1289. Allowing Applicant to marshal the power of our

courts to assist her in gathering evidence to use in the Antigua Proceeding, Russian Proceeding,

and Contemplated Criminal Proceeding aligns with “Congress’ wish to strengthen the power of

district courts to respond to requests for international assistance.” See Consorcio Ecuatoriano, 747

CASE NO. 25-CV-21129-MOORE/Elfenbein

F.3d at 1269 (emphasis and quotation marks omitted). And it would certainly “encourag[e] foreign

countries to provide reciprocal assistance to our courts.” See In re Pimenta, 942 F. Supp. 2d at

1289. As a result, the Court finds that granting the application would further the international

comity concerns that underlie § 1782.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because Applicant has satisfied the four statutory factors under § 1782, all four /nte/ factors

weigh in favor of granting the Application, and granting the application would further the

international comity policy underlying § 1782, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Application, ECF No. [1], is GRANTED;

2. Applicant is authorized to issue subpoenas for documents in the form of the subpoena

attached to the Application as Exhibit 13, ECF No. [1-15];

3. Discovery shall be conducted in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

4. The Court reserves jurisdiction to enter further orders that are necessary and proper to

enforce this Order; and

5. Applicant shall file a status report on or before October 16, 2025, indicating the status of

the discovery identified in the Application and whether this matter may be closed.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on July 16, 2025.

j—+<S

Mo4s CC

MARTY FULGUEIRA ELFENBEIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ce: All counsel of record

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