Jennings v. Alexander

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

PERRY LEE JENNINGS, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Civil Action No. SAG-24-43

C/O ALEXANDER, and *

SERGEANT CHARLES TUCKSON,

*

Defendants.

*

***

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Perry Lee Jennings filed this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that officers used excessive force during his detention at the Montgomery County

Correctional Facility (“MCCF”). ECF No. 1. Plaintiff then filed a court-directed Amended

Complaint (ECF No. 4) against Defendants Ronald Alexander and Sergeant Charles Tuckson.1

ECF No. 5. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 12. Plaintiff was advised of his right

to oppose the motion pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.1975), ECF Nos.

14-15, but he has not done so.

Having reviewed the submitted materials, the court finds that no hearing is necessary. See

Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

will be denied.

1 The Clerk will be directed to amend the docket to reflect the full name of Defendant Ronald

Alexander. See ECF No. 12.

I. Background2

On December 6, 2023, at about 6 p.m., Plaintiff was in a holding cell at MCCF for booking

and processing when Sergeant Tuckson and Officer Alexander asked him to provide fingerprints.

ECF No. 5 at 4. Plaintiff lifted his head and indicated that he declined to provide the requested

fingerprints. Id. Defendants returned a few moments later with more officers, who yelled at

Plaintiff and pulled him. Id. As Plaintiff became scared and called for help, Officer Alexander

and Sergeant Tuckson “began pulling, twisting, punching and kicking [him] all over [his] body.”

Id. Plaintiff heard Officer Alexander tell him to stop resisting, even though he was not resisting.

Id. at 4-5. Following the assault, the officers handcuffed Plaintiff tightly and his right wrist began

to swell. Id. at 5. Officer Alexander, Sergeant Tuckson, and the other officers dragged him to a

restraint chair where he was tied up and left unattended for 5-6 hours, during which time he

urinated on himself. Id. Plaintiff yelled for help, but no one came. Id. Plaintiff suffered bruises

on his wrists and a small fracture to his right wrist, as well as minor cuts on his ankles. Id. He is

awaiting surgery for the wrist fracture. Id.

II. Standard of Review

In reviewing the amended complaint in light of a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “the court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should

view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari,

7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires

only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (stating

that a complaint need only satisfy the “simplified pleading standard” of Rule 8(a)).

2 Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are those set forth in the Amended Complaint

(ECF No. 5) and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

The Supreme Court of the United States explained that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide

the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). Nonetheless, the complaint does not need

“detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. Instead, “once a claim has been

stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations

in the complaint.” Id. at 563. To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “But

where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to

relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

III. Analysis

Defendants seek dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that

Plaintiff fails to state a claim, or alternatively, that they are entitled to qualified immunity. ECF

No. 12.

A. Dismissal

Defendants first argue that “[t]here is no legal basis to support Plaintiff’s claim that the

Fifth Amendment provides Plaintiff with the right to be free from ‘cruel and unusual

punishment/excessive force.’” ECF No. 12-1 at 4. Defendants apparently rely on Plaintiff having

written “5th Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment/excessive force” on the

Court’s complaint form when asked to state the legal basis for his claim. ECF No. 5. There is, of

course, no Fifth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, but that right is

governed by other amendments. Defendants either contend that the Amended Complaint should

be dismissed on the basis of what is essentially a typo, or they ignore the Court’s obligation to

liberally construe pro se pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Granting Defendants’ Motion on the basis that Plaintiff cited the

incorrect amendment would be erroneous.

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of excessive use of force.

ECF No. 12-1 at 8. Because Plaintiff states that the incident took place during booking and

processing, it appears that he was a pretrial detainee at the time. ECF No. 5 at 4. Therefore, his

claim is properly considered under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. ECF No. 28

at 5. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)) (“the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of

excessive force that amounts to punishment[.]”). The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause

protects pretrial detainees from “governmental action” that is not “rationally related to a legitimate

nonpunitive governmental purpose” or that is “excessive in relation to that purpose.” Short v.

Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 608-609 (4th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, No. 23-1097, 2024 WL 2883766

(U.S. June 10, 2024) citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561

(1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To state a claim of excessive force in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights as a

pre-trial detainee, a plaintiff may prevail upon evidence that “the use of force is deliberate – i.e.,

purposeful or knowing.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 395. Plaintiff’s claim need not detail a subjective

element of his alleged assailant’s subjective state of mind but “a pretrial detainee must show only

that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 396-

97. Objective reasonableness turns on the “facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id.

at 397 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (1989)). To determine if the force used was reasonable,

the following factors may be considered: “the relationship between the need for the use of force

and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to

temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat

reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Kingsley,

576 U.S. at 397.

Taking the Kingsley factors into account, the court finds that Plaintiff has adequately stated

a claim that Defendants used excessive force. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. Plaintiff alleges that

both Defendants “began pulling, twisting, punching and kicking [him] all over [his] body,” in

response to his having declined to provide fingerprints upon request. ECF No. 5 at 4. He alleges

that both Defendants “dragged [him] to a restraint chair where [he] was tied up and left unattended

for 5 to 6 hours,” and that he was left with a broken wrist. Id. at 5. Taken as true, these actions

clearly amount to an excessive use of force in response to an inmate indicating that he would not

provide fingerprints when asked to do so.

Defendants’ argument that the entire Complaint must be dismissed because Plaintiff did

not claim with specificity which Defendant took which particular action during the course of the

incident is unavailing. See ECF No. 12-1 at 6-8. Likewise, their reliance on technicalities such as

that “[t]here is no legal basis to construe moving an inmate to a restraint chair as utilizing excessive

force” asks this Court to ignore common sense, much less its obligation to liberally construe

Plaintiff’s pleadings – the excessive force was quite obviously the restraint of Plaintiff, not the

moving him to the restraint chair. Id. at 8. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants assaulted him, moved

him to a restraint chair, restrained him in the chair, and left him unattended for five or six hours,

all because he declined to provide fingerprints upon request. No liberal construction is necessary;

Plaintiff has stated a claim of excessive force against Defendants.

B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants assert that if Plaintiff has stated a viable claim, they are entitled to qualified

immunity because it was not clearly established at the time of the incident that their actions

constituted an excessive use of force. ECF No. 12-1 at 9. The United States Court of Appeals for

the Fourth Circuit has recently summarized the qualified immunity analysis.

Officers are immune from liability “insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have been known.” (quoting Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (emphasis added). This standard

leads to two questions: (1) whether any right was violated, (2) whether

that right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. See

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).

“[T]o conclude that a right is “clearly established,” we must inquire whether

an objectively reasonable officer in the defendant's shoes would

“understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). We examine the alleged right at a

“high level of particularity.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,

251 (4th Cir. 1999). . . But, by the same token, a rejection of excessive

generality does not equate to an insistence on exactitude. Few situations are

exactly the same and to require that plaintiffs produce identical precedent

would transform qualified immunity into a grant of absolute immunity for

defendants.

Somers v. Devine, 132 F.4th 689, 696 (4th Cir. 2025).

As discussed, the court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged a violation of a

constitutional right, and the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis is therefore met. The

second prong requires the court to determine whether Defendants should have known that their

conduct constituted an excessive use of force at the time of their actions.

The Fourth Circuit has held that the use of excessive force analysis is the same under both

the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendment, because the standard for both is “objective

unreasonableness.” See.Somers v. Devine, 132 F.4th at 698 citing Lombardo v. City of St. Louis,

594 U.S. 464, 466 n.2 2021 (“Whatever the source of law, in analyzing an excessive force claim,

a court must determine whether the force was objectively unreasonable in light of the ‘facts and

circumstances of each particular case.’” (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397

(2015)). This Court finds that at the time Plaintiff was assaulted and restrained, there were

sufficient Fourth Circuit cases putting Defendants on reasonable notice that their conduct was

unlawful. See Atkinson v. Godfrey, 100 F.4th 498, 506 (4th Cir. 2024)( citing Edwards v. City of

Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 251 (4th Cir. 1999) (to determine if the right was clearly established,

the court is to consider decisions of the Supreme Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the

highest court of the state in which the case arose).)

In Fourth Amendment excessive force cases, the Fourth Circuit has consistently applied

the Graham factors to determine if there has been an excessive use of force. Specifically “an officer

must carefully measure the force used to respond to the particulars of a case including the

wrongdoing at issue, the safety threat posed by the suspect, and any attempt to evade arrest or

flee.” E.W. by & through T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 186 (4th Cir. 2018)( citing Graham, 490

U.S. at 396.) E.W. involved the handcuffing of a calm and complaint child at school resulting in

de minimis injury, although there was probable cause for arrest. The Fourth Circuit granted

qualified immunity to the officer, holding it was not clear at the time that the officer’s use of

handcuffs would be considered excessive force, and stated “our excessive force holding is clearly

established for any future qualified immunity cases involving similar circumstances.” Id. at 186-

187.

In Brooks v. McKimmie, No. CV DLB-23-0208, 2025 WL 1018882, at *13 (D. Md. Apr.

4, 2025), the district court denied qualified immunity to the defendant based on well-established

Fourth Circuit caselaw that “it is objectively unreasonable for a police officer to apply additional

force once an unarmed suspect is secured.” In doing so, the court cited to Kane v. Hargis, 987 F.2d

1005, 1008 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (it was clearly established that once a suspect is pinned to

the ground the officer should not use additional force); Valladares v. Cordero, 552 F.3d 384, 390–

91 (4th Cir. 2009) (it was clearly established that an officer could not use “unnecessary, gratuitous,

and disproportionate” force after the officer had the plaintiff “under full control.”); and Bailey v.

Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 745 (4th Cir. 2003) (it was clearly established that the officers could not

use force after the plaintiff was secured face down on the floor in handcuffs and leg restraints,

when the plaintiff had not committed a crime and he was not a danger to himself or others). See

also Pegg v. Herrnberger, 845 F.3d 112, 120 (4th Cir. 2017) (qualified immunity granted where

suspect resisted arrest causing the officer to take him to the ground to be handcuffed resulting in

de minimis injury).

The facts alleged in the Amended Complaint are that Plaintiff declined to be fingerprinted

and was subsequently assaulted, placed in tight handcuffs, and left alone in a restraint chair for

hours. While Plaintiff acknowledges that he did not cooperate with being fingerprinted, he

contends that he did not otherwise resist during the entire episode. In fact, Plaintiff alleges that he

merely “lifted [his] head and declined” when Defendants “asked if [he] would do [his]

fingerprints.” ECF No. 5 at 4. Accordingly, Defendants’ argument that they reasonably believed

that assault, handcuffing, and restraint for hours is a constitutionally reasonable manner in which

to gain compliance for fingerprinting is not persuasive. The Court concludes that Defendants are

not entitled to qualified immunity as they were on reasonable notice that their actions in assaulting

Plaintiff and subsequently restraining him under the circumstances alleged were unlawful. The

qualified immunity defense will be denied at this stage of the case. Defendants, of course, will be

free to re-raise the defense as the case proceeds.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied. Defendants will be

required to Answer the Amended Complaint. A separate Order follows.

___J_u_l_y_ 1_7_,_ 2__0_2_5__ ___________/_s_/________________

Date Stephanie A. Gallagher

United States District Judge