Moore v. Shelby County Criminal Justice System

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

RANDALL MOORE,

Plaintiff,

vs. Civil No. 2:23-cv-02238-SHM-tmp

SHELBY COUNTY CRIMINAL

JUSTICE SYSTEM, ET AL.,

Defendants.

ORDER DISMISSING THE CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT

(ECF NOS. 1, 5, 8, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24 & 26); GRANTING LEAVE TO

AMEND THE CLAIMS DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; AND DIRECTING

CLERK TO MODIFY THE DOCKET

_____________________________________________________________________________

On April 21, 2023, Plaintiff Randall Moore, Tennessee Department of Correction

identification number 652591, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the

“Complaint”, ECF No. 1) and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2). Moore

was incarcerated at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Center (the “SCCJC”) in Memphis,

Tennessee when he filed the Complaint. (ECF Nos. 1 & 1-2 at PageID 3, 16.) On October 4,

2023, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the three hundred and

fifty dollar ($350.00) civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§

1915, et seq. (the “PLRA”). (ECF No. 16.) Moore has filed numerous letters between April 2023

and December 2024 seeking to add allegations to the Complaint. (ECF Nos. 5, 8, 10, 13, 14, 17,

18, 21, 22, 23, 24 & 26.)

The Complaint and Moore’s letters are consolidated for screening purposes as the

“Consolidated Complaint.” (ECF Nos. 1, 5, 8, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24 & 26.)

The Consolidated Complaint is based on incidents that occurred at the SCCJC, Regional

One Hospital (the “ROH”), Bledsoe County Correctional Complex (the “BCCC”) and Morgan

County Correctional Complex (the “MCCC”) from April 2023 through December 2024, between

Moore and various employees of SCCJC, BCCC, MCCC, and ROH. (See ECF Nos. 1, 5, 8, 10,

13, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24 & 26.) The Consolidated Complaint is liberally construed to assert

delay or denial of medical care, conditions of confinement, and verbal harassment in violation of

the Eighth Amendment. (ECF Nos. 1, 5, 8, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24 & 26 at PageID 2, 9,

16, 21, 34, 39, 47, 49, 57, 59, 61-62, 64, 70.) Moore names two Defendants: (1) Shelby County

Justice System; and (2) the ROH. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1, 2.) Moore seeks twenty million dollars

($20,000,000.00) as “compensation for excruciating pain [and] suffering[.]” (ECF No. 1 at PageID

2-3.)

For the reasons explained below: (1) the Consolidated Complaint (ECF Nos. 1, 5, 8, 10,

13, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24 & 26) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART and

WITH PREJUDICE IN PART; and (2) leave to amend the claims dismissed without prejudice

is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court assumes Moore’s allegations are true for the purpose of screening the

Consolidated Complaint. Moore alleges that “[t]hey have denied paying for my treatment[]” and

that his requests for “medical care for my cancer” have been denied. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.)

Moore alleges ROH has “wrongfully charged my insurance carrier” when the “Justice System” is

responsible. (Id.) Moore alleges that ROH “erased my medical records” and that Dr. Webb at the

SCCJC, who is not named as a defendant, can corroborate that allegation. (ECF No. 5 at PageID

9.) Moore alleges that he is not receiving any medical treatment for a growing cyst and that he has

been “trying to get medical treatment for [his] ear.” (Id.) Moore alleges that his sleeping mat

“has lice” and that his mouth “is broken out in sores.” (Id.) Moore alleges that he needs antibiotics.

(Id.)

Moore alleges he has been billed for an “MRI, catscan [and] ultrasound” that he received

while incarcerated. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 21.) Moore does not allege a date that he received

these tests. (See id.) Moore alleges that in August 2023, he did not receive “adequate medical

treatment” and that his tumor was growing. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 21.)

Moore alleges that “jail administration is being dishonest.” (ECF No. 13 at PageID 34.)

Moore alleges SCCJC transported Moore to BCCC “in an attempt to bypass paying for my dire

medical needs [and] [BCCC] sent [Moore] back [to SCCJC] the same day.” (Id.) Moore alleges

SCCJC is not providing Moore with “the correct care” because Moore is “troublesome.” (Id.)

Moore alleges his “hot water release button” is broken and that it can take days or weeks for the

button to be fixed. (Id.) Moore alleges that he has made many sick call requests and that his pain

medicine prescriptions have been restarted and cancelled. (Id.) Moore alleges that “I am in severe

pain.” (Id. at PageID 34-35.)

Moore alleges he was seen at ROH and returned to the SCCJC on September 11, 2023.

(ECF No. 14 at PageID 39.) Moore alleges that “[t]hey wanted me to sign papers saying I refuse

treatment.” Moore alleges that “they” have not treated “the issue.” (Id.) Moore alleges “they”

have diagnosed Moore with cancer and that “they” have been lying to him. (Id.) Moore alleges

his pain medication has been stopped and that he can “hardly sleep at night.” Moore alleges that

he needs medical treatment. (Id.)

Moore alleges that he is “still awaiting to have x-rays conducted regarding my tumor.”

(ECF No. 17 at PageID 47.) Moore alleges that he has made medical requests to receive baby

aspirin for muscle spasms and “reduced blood circulation” and that those requests have been

denied. (Id.) Moore alleges that he has been denied medical treatment for what “feels like [a]

bug” in his ear. (Id.)

Moore alleges receiving an ultra-sound and that he was told by the nurse that his tumor

“has grown.” (ECF No. 18 at PageID 49.) Moore alleges that he has received no radiation

treatment or surgery. (Id.) Moore alleges that he is being housed in the general population and

that he needs to be housed in “an area where [his] needs can be effectively accommodated.” (Id.)

Moore alleges that “[t]hey try to avoid giving me medical treatment” by transferring Moore to

BCCC, but that BCCC “sent me right back[.]” (Id.)

Moore alleges that he was transferred to BCCC on or around April 9th1 and that he was in

“more pain than ever.” (ECF No. 21 at PageID 57.) Moore alleges that while at BCCC he was

“still not getting the proper care.” (Id.) Moore alleges suffering from a hernia “the size of [a] golf

ball” and a swollen foot that requires “special shoes[.]” (Id.) Moore alleges that he needs to

transferred to “Special Needs: Nashville[.]” (Id.) Moore alleges that “[t]hey have violated my

medical rights[.]” Moore alleges he is being “charged” for medical treatments. (Id.) Moore

alleges that his growing hernia needs “medical treatment[]” and that the dye from “clothes here

[is] causing people to break out in rashes[.]” (Id.) Moore “request[s] a catscan and ultrasound” to

assess his “health problems.” (Id.)

Moore alleges that his body is “breaking out” and he is not receiving the correct medication

for his skin at BCCC. (ECF No. 23 at PageID 61.) Moore alleges that Officer Skylar, who is not

1 Moore does not allege the year of his transfer to BCCC. (See ECF No. 21).

named as a Defendant, called him a “[b]itch.” (Id.) Moore alleges that he is not receiving money,

hygiene or his indigent kit. (Id.) Moore alleges that he is being given medication that “is not

helping.” (ECF No. 24 at PageID 64.) Moore alleges that his “lung cancer has done flaired (sic)

back up” and that he is not receiving “any medical treatment.” Moore alleges that he has difficulty

breathing and walking. (Id.)

II. SCREENING

A. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of

it, if the complaint —

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court

applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57

(2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Applying those standards, the

Court accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and determines whether

the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383

(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). The Court does not assume that conclusory

allegations are true, because they are not “factual,” and all legal conclusions in a complaint “must

be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” it also requires

factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting

Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are not exempt from the

requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

1989); see Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal

of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court

cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v.

Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).

B. REQUIREMENTS TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER § 1983

Moore sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1.) To state a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the

“Constitution and laws” of the United States, and (2) that a defendant caused harm while acting

under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Shelby County Criminal Justice System

Moore names the Shelby County Criminal Justice System “at 201 Poplar” as a Defendant.

(ECF No. 1 at PageID 1-2.) Under § 1983, a jail is not a “person” subject to suit. See Marbry v.

Corr. Med. Serv., No. 99-6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (“[T]he Shelby

County Jail is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983”) (citing Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d

117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991)).

The Clerk is DIRECTED to modify the docket to remove the Shelby County Criminal

Justice System as a Defendant and to add Shelby County, Tennessee as a Defendant.

B. Shelby County, Tennessee

Shelby County may be held liable only if Moore’s injuries were sustained pursuant to an

unconstitutional custom or policy of Shelby County. See Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S.

658, 691-92 (1978). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the

municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his

particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815

(6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). “[T]he

touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts

of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to

action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485

U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986) (emphasis in

original)). Moroe does not allege that he has been deprived of a right because of a Shelby County

policy or custom. Moore instead seeks relief based on his general allegations about his treatment

at SCCJC. Although civil rights plaintiffs are not required to plead the facts demonstrating

municipal liability with particularity, Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence &

Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993), the complaint must be sufficient to put

the municipality on notice of the plaintiff's theory of liability, see, e.g., Fowler v. Campbell, No.

3:06CV-P610-H, 2007 WL 1035007, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007). The allegations of the

Consolidated Complaint in this case fail to identify an official policy or custom of

Shelby County which caused injury to Moore.

Moore does not state a claim against Shelby County, Tennessee. Moore’s claims against

Shelby County, Tennessee are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

C. ROH

Moore names the ROH as a Defendant. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.)

ROH’s website demonstrates that it is a private organization with no supervisory oversight

by a governmental entity. (See https://www.regionalonehealth.org/discover-us/ (last accessed July

17, 2025). That distinction is dispositive for Moore’s § 1983 claims against ROH.

"A § 1983 plaintiff may not sue purely private parties." Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d

552, 567 (6th Cir. 1999). Thus, “[i]n order to be subject to suit under § 1983, [a] defendant’s

actions must be fairly attributable to the state.” Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 231-32 (6th Cir.

1997). To be considered to have acted “under color of state law,” an individual must be a state or

local government official or employee. A private party may act under color of state law to

establish the first element of this cause of action only when the party “acted together with or ...

obtained significant aid from state officials” and did so to such a degree that its actions may

properly be characterized as “state action.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102

S. Ct. 2744, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1982). An individual may also be considered a state actor if he or

she exercises powers traditionally reserved to a state. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,

352, 95 S. Ct. 449, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1974).

Moore makes no factual allegations about any of these potential “state actor”

circumstances. There is nothing in the record from which the Court may plausibly infer that ROH

is a state actor for § 1983 purposes. Moore fails to state a claim to relief against ROH, and that

claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IV. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint

to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th Cir.

2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e hold, like every

other circuit to have reached the issue, that under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff

to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA”)); see

also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal

for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the

deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded”). Leave to amend is not required where a

deficiency cannot be cured. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001)

(“This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to

the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that ... amending the complaint

would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284

(10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless

complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe

the right of access to the courts”). The Court grants leave to amend the Consolidated Complaint

under the conditions set forth below.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

A. The Clerk is DIRECTED to add Shelby County, Tennessee as a Defendant and to

terminate the reference to Shelby County Criminal Justice System as a Defendant

on the docket;

B. Moore’s § 1983 claims against Shelby County, Tennessee are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1);

C. Moore’s § 1983 claims against the ROH are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

for failure to allege facts stating a claim to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Leave to amend the claims dismissed with prejudice is DENIED;

D. Leave to amend the claims dismissed without prejudice is GRANTED. Amended

claims must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. An

amended pleading must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

including but not limited to Rule Eight’s requirement of a short and plain statement

of Moore’s claims. An amended complaint supersedes the Consolidated Complaint

and must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. Moore or

his counsel must sign the amended complaint, and the text of the amended

complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to

any extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text

of the amended complaint and must be attached to the complaint. All claims alleged

in an amended complaint must arise from the facts alleged in the Consolidated

Complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate count and must

identify each Defendant sued on that count. If Moore fails to file an amended

complaint within the time specified, the Court will dismiss the Consolidated

Complaint with prejudice and enter judgment. For § 1915(g) analysis, the Court

recommends that any such dismissal should be treated as a strike pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Simons v. Washington, 996 F.3d 350, 353 (6th Cir. 2021).

The “three strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prevents a court from granting

in forma pauperis status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while

incarcerated . . . brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was

dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); and

E. Moore must promptly notify the Clerk, in writing, of any change of address or

extended absence. Failure to comply with these requirements, or any other order

of the Court, may result in the dismissal of this case without further notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 17th day of July, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr. .

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE