Hamer v. Obion County Detention Center

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

EASTERN DIVISION

)

HERBERT HAMER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:23-cv-01208-SHM-tmp

)

OBION COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, )

)

Defendant. )

)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO MODIFY DOCKET, DISMISSING THE

CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT (ECF NOS. 1 & 5) WITHOUT PREJUDICE; AND

GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND CLAIMS DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

On October 5, 2023, Plaintiff Herbert Hamer1, Tennessee Department of Correction

(“TDOC”) identification number 166875, filed a pro se civil complaint, and a motion to proceed

in forma pauperis as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) When Hamer filed the

complaint, he was incarcerated at the Obion County Detention Center (the “OCDC”) in Union

City, Tennessee. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 2.) On October 11, 2023, the Court denied Hamer’s

application to proceed in forma pauperis and directed Hamer to pay the four hundred and two

dollar ($402.00) civil filing fee. (ECF No. 4.) On October 19, 2023, Hamer filed an amended

complaint. (ECF No. 5.) On November 27, 2023, Hamer paid the civil filing fee. (ECF No. 9.)

On February 1, 2024, Hamer filed a change of address notice informing the Court of his release

from the OCDC. (See ECF No. 10.)

1 The TDOC Felony Offender Information website shows that Hamer is presently listed as

absconded. (See https://foil.app.tn.gov/foil/details.jsp (last accessed July 17, 2025).)

The Court CONSOLIDATES the complaint (ECF No. 1) and the amended complaint (ECF

No. 5) as the “Consolidated Complaint” for the purpose of screening Hamer’s claims pursuant to

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, et seq. Hamer’s

Consolidated Complaint is before the Court.

The Consolidated Complaint is based on an incident that occurred during Hamer’s

incarceration at the OCDC. (See ECF Nos. 1 & 5.) The Consolidated Complaint is liberally

construed to assert claims for: (1) violation of Hamer’s right not to be subject to double jeopardy

(the “Double Jeopardy Claim”); and (2) personal injury due to Hamer’s slip and fall accident in

the OCDC shower during February 2023 (the “Negligence Claim”). (ECF Nos. 1 & 5 at PageID

1, 9, 11-12.) Hamer names the OCDC as the sole Defendant. (ECF Nos. 1 & 5 at PageID 1, 9.)

Hamer seeks “immediate release and dismissal of all charges”, and damages in the amount

of five hundred million dollars ($500,000,000.00). (ECF Nos. 1 & 5 at PageID 1, 9, 11-13.)

For the reasons explained below, the Court: (1) DIRECTS the Clerk to modify the docket;

(2) DISMISSES Hamer’s Consolidated Complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state

a claim to relief (ECF Nos. 1 & 5); and (3) GRANTS leave to amend the claims dismissed without

prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Hamer alleges that in February 2023, he broke his pelvis during a fall in the OCDC’s

shower that “was not handicap equip (sic).” (ECF Nos. 1 & 5 at PageID 1, 9, 12.) Hamer alleges

that he is “handicapped.” (ECF No. 5 at PageID 12.) Hamer alleges he was taken to Baptist

Memorial Hospital for medical treatment after the slip and fall incident. (Id.) Hamer alleges that,

the day after his fall, “[t]hey installed a [h]andicap [h]and [r]ail . . . to cover up their mistake.”

(Id.) Hamer alleges that he is “currently incarcerated in [the] Obion County Jail . . . for an alleged

crime that was alleged to have been committed in Vietnam in 1967.” (Id. at PageID 11.) Hamer

alleges that “neither Obion County or (sic) the State of Tennessee has jurisdiction over a case that

was alleged to have been committed in another country while I was enlisted in the U.S. Army.”

(Id.) Hamer alleges he was incarcerated in a federal prison for the “[a]lleged crime” for more than

thirteen years. (Id.) Hamer alleges “[b]eing charged with it again is clearly double [j]eopardy and

a violation of my [c]ivil [r]ights.” (Id.) Hamer alleges the Obion County Sheriff’s Department is

“[r]esponsible [f]or bringing up [t]hese past [a]lledged (sic) [c]harges.” (Id. at PageID 12.)

II. SCREENING

A. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of

it, if the complaint — (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In assessing whether the complaint states a claim

on which relief may be granted, the Court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009), in Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007), and in Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th

Cir. 2010). Applying those standards, the Court accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual

allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement

to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681).

The Court does not assume that conclusory allegations are true, because they are not “factual,” and

all legal conclusions in a complaint “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

679. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides guidance on this issue. Rule 8 requires a

complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” It also requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion,

of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3. Courts screening cases accord more

deference to pro se complaints than to those drafted by lawyers. “Pro se complaints are to be held

‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be

liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712

(6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak,

415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to

comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a

plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518

F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).

B. § 1983 Claims

Hamer sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1 PageID 1.) To state a claim under § 1983,

a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and

laws” of the United States, and (2) that a defendant caused harm while acting under color of state

law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).

III. ANALYSIS

A. OCDC

Hamer sues the OCDC as the sole Defendant. (ECF Nos. 1 & 5 at PageID 1, 9.) “To state

a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff . . . must show that the alleged violation was committed by a

person acting under color of state law.” Redding v. St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2001)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The OCDC is neither a “person” under § 1983

nor an entity capable of being sued under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 691 (1978); see also Marbry v. Corr. Med. Serv., No. 99-6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th

Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (noting that “the Shelby County Jail is not an entity subject to suit under §

1983”); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that a police

department is not an entity capable of being sued under § 1983); Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d

117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that a sheriff’s department “is not a legal entity subject to suit”

under § 1983).

The Court construes Hamer’s claim against the OCDC as a claim against Obion County,

Tennessee, (the “County”). See Matthews, 35 F.3d at 1049. The County may be held liable only

if Hamer’s injuries were sustained pursuant to an unconstitutional custom or policy of the County.

See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or

custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was

incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003).

“[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts

of employees of the municipality, and thereby making clear that municipal liability is limited to

action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485

U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)).

Hamer’s Consolidated Complaint does not allege any deprivation of a constitutional right

because of a policy or custom of the County. Hamer’s allegations are based on his particular

experience at the OCDC. (See ECF Nos. 1 & 5 at PageID 1, 9-12.) Hamer does not state a claim

to relief against the County because Hamer fails to allege facts demonstrating any official policy

or custom of the County, much less an unconstitutional policy that injured Hamer.

Hamer’s § 1983 claim against the County is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for

failure to allege facts stating a claim to relief.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to add Obion County, Tennessee as a Defendant and to remove

all reference to OCDC as a Defendant.

B. The Double Jeopardy Claim

To the extent Hamer alleges that he is being illegally confined by OCDC, his claim is

barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court ruled that a state

prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 action directly challenging his confinement until and unless the

reason for his continued confinement has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has otherwise been called into question by a federal

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 486–87. A claim challenging confinement must

be dismissed regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks injunctive or monetary relief. Id. at 489–90;

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488–90 (1973). Heck applies to suits filed by pretrial detainees.

Adams v. Morris, 90 F. App’x 856, 858 (6th Cir. 2004). Hamer’s Double Jeopardy Claim is not

cognizable under § 1983 because Hamer does not allege that he has satisfied any of the criteria

stated in Heck.

C. The Negligence Claim

Liberally construed, Hamer’s Negligence Claim alleges lack of due care in the maintenance

of the showers at the OCDC. (See ECF Nos. 1 & 5 at PageID 1, 9, 12 (“I took a fall in the shower”).)

Negligent conduct is not actionable under § 1983 because it does not rise to the level of a

constitutional deprivation. See Lewellen v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Co.,

Tenn., 34 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is now firmly settled that injury caused by negligence

does not constitute a ‘deprivation’ of any constitutionally protected interest”). The Negligence

Claim does not allege facts demonstrating that Hamer was deprived of a constitutional right.

IV. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint

to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th Cir.

2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e hold, like every

other circuit to have reached the issue, that under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff

to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA”)); see

also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal

for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the

deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded”). Leave to amend is not required where a

deficiency cannot be cured. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001)

(“This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to

the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that ... amending the complaint

would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284

(10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless

complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe

the right of access to the courts”). The Court GRANTS leave to amend within 21 days of the date

of this Order, and under the guidelines set forth below.

An amended pleading must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including

but not limited to Rule 8’s requirement of a short and plain statement of claims. If Hamer decides

to amend his claims, he shall: (1) comprehensively and particularly list, in ONE document, all

defendants and all claims within this Court’s jurisdiction; and (2) submit the amended complaint

on the Court’s official form: Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(See https://www.tnwd.uscourts.gov/sites/tnwd/files/CivilRightsComplaint.pdf.)

An amended complaint supersedes the Consolidated Complaint and must be complete in

itself without reference to the prior pleadings. Hamer must sign the amended complaint, and the

text of the amended complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference

to any extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended

complaint and must be attached to the complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate

count and must identify each Defendant sued on that count. All claims alleged in the amended

complaint must arise from the facts alleges in the Consolidated Complaint.

If Hamer fails to file an amended complaint in a timely manner, the Court will dismiss the

case and enter judgment. The Court recommends that any such dismissal of this case be treated as

a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Simons v. Washington, 996 F.3d 350, 353 (6th Cir.

2021). The “three strikes” provision of § 1915(g) prevents a court from granting in forma pauperis

status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated . . . brought an

action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

A. The Clerk is DIRECTED to remove any reference to OCDC as a Defendant;

B. Hamer’s § 1983 claims against the County are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE for failure to allege facts stating a claim to relief. See § 1915A(b)(1);

C. Leave to amend the Consolidated Complaint is GRANTED. Hamer may amend

his complaint within 21 days of the date of this Order, under the guidelines set forth

supra; and

D. Hamer is ORDERED to notify the Court immediately, in writing, of his current

address, if his address changes. If Hamer fails to provide the Court with his current

address or fails to follow any other requirements of this order, the Court may

impose appropriate sanctions, up to and including dismissal of this action, without

any additional notice or hearing by the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 17th day of July 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr. .

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE