Pedraza v. Dill

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

DANIEL PEDRAZA PLAINTIFF

ADC #155040

V. Case No. 4:22-CV-01119-BSM-BBM

DARREN DILL, Lieutenant/Sergeant,

Arkansas Department of Corrections,

Cummins Unit DEFENDANTS

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to

United States District Judge Brian S. Miller. You may file written objections to all or part

of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the

factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court

within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Recommendation. If you do not file objections,

Judge Miller may adopt this Recommendation without independently reviewing all the

evidence in the record. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of

fact.

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 17, 2022, Plaintiff Daniel Pedraza (“Pedraza”), a prisoner in the

Cummins Unit of the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”), filed a pro se Complaint

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 2). After

screening and initial summary judgment motions, there is only one claim remaining: a First

Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Darren Dill (“Dill”) in his individual

capacity. (Doc. 8; Doc. 56; Doc. 71-1 at 42:16–22). Pedraza alleges that he filed a grievance

after he was attacked by a fellow inmate in the prison barbershop, and that Dill retaliated

by refusing to let Pedraza return to his job at the barbershop. (Doc. 2 at 13, ¶ 3).

On February 20, 2025, Dill filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, Brief in Support,

and a Statement of Facts, arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity because

Pedraza’s retaliation claim fails on the merits. (Docs. 71–73). Pedraza filed a timely

Response and a Statement of Disputed Facts but noted that he had not received a copy of

Dill’s summary judgment papers. (Docs. 78–79). The Court directed the Clerk of the Court

to send Pedraza a copy of Dill’s summary judgment filings and allowed Pedraza to file a

supplemental response and statement of disputed facts. (Doc. 80). Pedraza filed the

supplemental papers (Docs. 82–83), but still claims that he received only pages 1–4 of

Dill’s Brief and has not received Dill’s Statement of Facts, (Doc. 82 at 3). Regardless,

Pedraza admits that he received all evidence upon which Dill relies, which consists of

Pedraza’s deposition testimony, (Doc. 71-1), and Dill’s affidavit, (Doc. 71-3). See (Doc.

82 at 3). And Pedraza has had ample opportunity to produce his own evidence and describe

how Dill allegedly deprived him of his First Amendment rights. Moreover, Pedraza has not

requested additional time or briefing.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the issues are joined and ready for review.1 After

careful examination of the record, the Court finds that Pedraza was not deprived of his First

1 Because Pedraza did not receive Dill’s Statement of Facts, the Court stops short of categorically

deeming all of Dill’s facts admitted. See Local Rule 56.1(c). Instead, the Court will look at the evidence to

determine the material facts of this case.

Amendment rights, Dill is entitled to qualified immunity, and the Motion for Summary

Judgment should be granted.2

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND3

Pedraza began working in the Cummins Unit barbershop in June 2014. (Doc. 2 at

13; Doc. 71-1 at 11, 37:10–18). At the time, the barbershop was supervised by non-party

Sergeant Collins. (Doc. 2 at 13; Doc. 71-1 at 11, 37:10–18). When Collins retired in 2017

or 2018, Dill took over. (Doc. 2 at 13; Doc. 71-1 at 13, 43:9–11). For three or four years,

Pedraza worked under Dill in the barbershop and, occasionally, in the adjoining clothing

room. (Doc. 71-1 at 12–13, 40:16–19, 43:9–17, 44:22–45:6).

According to Dill, Pedraza had daily mood swings and attitude and behavioral issues

and, sometimes, would act “very angry.” (Doc. 71-3 at 3, ¶ 13). Dill counseled Pedraza

about his behavior and, “[a]t one point,” took Pedraza out of the barbershop to work in the

clothing room because of his behavior. (Doc. 71-3 at 3, ¶¶ 13–14). Dill does not elaborate

any further on Pedraza’s “behavioral issues” or specify any dates when these interactions

occurred. See id.

2 Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986). The moving party

bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323. Thereafter, the nonmoving party must present specific facts demonstrating that there is a

material dispute for trial by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made

for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials[.]” Fed R. Civ. P.

56(c)(1)(A); see Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

3 These facts are sourced from Pedraza’s verified Complaint, (Doc. 2); Pedraza’s deposition

testimony, (Doc. 71-1); and Dill’s affidavit, (Doc. 71.3).

Pedraza has a different view of his time working under Dill. According to Pedraza,

he never disrespected Dill and was a reliable worker. (Doc. 2 at 13). Pedraza recalls his

relationship with Dill being “mainly good,” with only two occasions where he and Dill

disagreed. (Doc. 71-1 at 13, 44:2–5 & 45:7–9). On the first occasion, Dill came into the

barbershop “hollering” about Pedraza working too slow. (Doc. 71-1 at 14, 46:16–25). Dill

told Pedraza that he would give Pedraza a “job change” if Pedraza did not want to perform

his job duties. (Doc. 71-1 at 14, 46:23–25). Pedraza does not recall when this interaction

occurred. (Doc. 71-1 at 14, 47:1–2).

The second disagreement occurred around September or October of 2021. (Doc. 71-

1 at 13, 45:10–12). On that date, Dill came into the barbershop “hollering” about all the

barbershop workers’ behavior. (Doc. 71-1 at 13, 45:13–22). The inmates did not

understand why Dill was upset, so one inmate (not Pedraza) asked Dill why he was

disrespecting them. (Doc. 71-1 at 13–14, 45:23–46:2). After that, Dill calmed down,

apologized, and explained that “he was upset on some other things.” (Doc. 71-1 at 14,

46:2–5).

It is within this context that the main events in this action took place. On November

3, 2021, Pedraza was working a shift in the barbershop, and Dill was supervising the

barbershop and clothing room by himself. (Doc. 71-3 at 2, ¶¶ 2, 4; Doc. 71-1 at 9, 26:20–

24, 27:4–10). Without any help, Dill was required to walk back and forth between the

barbershop and adjoining clothing room and, periodically, to the east hall to retrieve

inmates who were on the list to receive haircuts that day. (Doc. 71-1 at 9, 26:13–27:3; Doc.

71-1 at 7, 21:16–19). While Dill was out of the barbershop, Pedraza was stabbed in the

neck by another inmate. (Doc. 2 at 13; Doc. 71-1 at 7–8, 21:14–22:4).

Pedraza was transferred to the hospital where he underwent surgery. (Doc. 2 at 6–

7). On November 22, 2021, after returning to the Cummins Unit, Pedraza filed a grievance

claiming that the ADC failed to protect him “because there was no security guard present

in the Barber Shop or Clothing Room.” (Doc. 2 at 28; Doc. 71-1 at 9–10, 29:6–31:24).

Pedraza did not name Dill in the grievance. (Doc. 2 at 28; Doc. 71-3 at 2, ¶¶ 5–6). Nor did

Pedraza discuss the grievance with Dill. (Doc. 71-1 at 15, 52:24–53:13). The grievance

was ultimately denied as untimely. (Doc. 2 at 28–30).

Pedraza was on bed rest until November 26, 2021. (Doc. 71-1 at 12, 40:20–24).

After he recovered from his injuries, Pedraza tried to return to his job at the barbershop.

(Doc. 71-1 at 12, 40:23–41:2). First, he saw Dill in the chow hall and asked Dill if he could

return to work. (Doc. 71-1 at 12, 40:23–41:2). Dill said he would “call” Pedraza for work,

but he never did. (Doc. 71-1 at 12, 41:1–2).

Non-party Sergeant Lee, however, called Pedraza into work on one occasion. (Doc.

71-1 at 12, 41:3–6). But when Pedraza arrived at the barbershop, Dill asked Pedraza what

he was doing there and said he did not call for Pedraza. (Doc. 71-1 at 12, 41:6–12). So,

Pedraza left. (Doc. 71-1 at 12, 41:13).

On another occasion, Pedraza went to the barbershop while Dill was on leave. (Doc.

71-1 at 12, 41:13–15). Pedraza asked the supervising officer, non-party Corporal Freeman,

if he could be called into work, but Freeman replied that Dill did not want Pedraza in the

barbershop. (Doc. 71-1 at 12, 41:13–17; Doc. 2 at 13). So, Pedraza stopped trying to return

to work. (Doc. 71-1 at 12, 41:17–18).

On March 10, 2022, Dill asked the classification committee to reassign Pedraza to

a different job. (Doc. 71-3 at 2, ¶ 9). When Pedraza appeared before the classification

committee, a member asked Pedraza why Dill had asked for him to be reassigned. (Doc. 2

at 9). Pedraza responded that he did not know. Id. Pedraza was reassigned to work in the

kitchen. (Doc. 71-1 at 12, 40:2–3).

After Pedraza’s interaction with the classification committee, he decided that Dill

must be retaliating against him due to the failure-to-protect grievance that he filed after the

barbershop attack. (Doc. 2 at 9; see also Doc. 71-1 at 14–15, 49:23–50:3). So, on March

17, 2022, Pedraza filed another grievance, writing that, “there is no justification other than

retaliation by Sergeant D. Dill for putting me up for a job change.” (Doc. 71-1 at 15, 52:14–

16; Doc. 2 at 31).

For his part, Dill claims Pedraza’s November 22, 2021 grievance for failure to

protect “had no bearing on [his] decision” to reassign Pedraza. (Doc. 71-3 at 3, ¶¶ 11, 18).

Instead, Dill testified that his decision was “due to Mr. Pedraza’s prior behavior” and for

the safety of Pedraza and the other workers and inmates in the barbershop. (Doc. 71-3 at

3, ¶¶ 16–17). Dill does not elaborate on the suggested safety concerns. See id.

III. DISCUSSION

Dill argues in his Motion for Summary Judgment that he is entitled to qualified

immunity because Pedraza was not deprived of a constitutional right. (Doc. 72 at 7–8).

Qualified immunity protects government officials from personal liability for damages

“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982). To overcome the defense at the summary judgment stage, Pedraza must

demonstrate: “(1) a deprivation of a constitutional right, [that was] (2) … clearly

established at the time of the deprivation.” Robbins v. City of Des Moines, 984 F.3d 673,

678 (8th Cir. 2021).

Whether qualified immunity applies to the case at hand is a question of law, not fact,

for the Court to decide. Kelsay v. Ernest, 933 F.3d 975, 981 (8th Cir. 2019). The Court may

address either inquiry first. See Duffie v. City of Lincoln, 834 F.3d 877, 832 (8th Cir. 2016).

Dill is entitled to qualified immunity should either prong be decided in his favor. Watson

v. Boyd, 2 F.4th 1106, 1112 (8th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). The Court considers first

whether Pedraza was deprived of a constitutional right, as that issue is dispositive.

To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, Pedraza must show that: (1) he

engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) Dill took an adverse action

against Pedraza that would chill a prisoner of ordinary firmness from engaging in that

activity; and (3) Pedraza’s protected activities were the “but-for cause” of Dill’s adverse

action. De Rossitte v. Correct Care Sols., LLC., 22 F.4th 796, 804 (8th Cir. 2022); Santiago

v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 992–93 (8th Cir. 2013); Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398–99

(2019). It is undisputed that Pedraza engaged in protected First Amendment activity by

filing his November 22, 2021 grievance. (Doc. 72 at 3); Gonzalez v. Bendt, 971 F.3d 742,

744–45 (8th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). However, Pedraza’s retaliation claim fails on

the other two prongs.

A. No Adverse Action

Pedraza alleges that Dill took an adverse action against him by refusing to let

Pedraza return to work at the barbershop and putting him up for a job reassignment. (Doc.

2 at 13). It is well-established that retaliatory actions that worsen a prisoner’s work

conditions can constitute an adverse action sufficient to chill a prisoner’s First Amendment

activity. Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). But Pedraza

does not explain how his work conditions were worsened when he was reassigned to work

in the kitchen.

When asked at his deposition whether he enjoyed working in the barbershop,

Pedraza replied that “[i]t had its ups and downs.” (Doc. 71-1 at 12, 38:16–17). And when

asked why he would want to return to work in the barbershop, Pedraza simply replied that

he wanted his job back.4 (Doc. 71-1 at 16, 57:11–13). Indeed, Pedraza writes that he was

“promoted to better positions in the kitchen and was ultimately assigned to work in Staff

Dining.” (Doc. 82 at 6). Thus, Dill’s actions did not worsen Pedraza’s work conditions.

And there is no other discernable reason that a job reassignment from the barbershop to the

kitchen would dissuade a prisoner of ordinary firmness from continuing to file grievances.

As Dill points out, Pedraza, himself, continued to file grievances. (Doc. 72 at 3).

Although not dispositive, a plaintiff’s own actions can be indicative of how a prisoner of

4 Pedraza also noted that he wanted his room in Barracks 3 back. (Doc. 71-1 at 16, 57:11–16).

Retaliatory actions that worsen a prisoner’s living conditions can also constitute a sufficiently adverse

action. See Spencer v. Jackson Cnty. Mo., 738 F.3d 907, 911–13 (8th Cir. 2013). But Pedraza’s removal

from a single-man cell in Barracks 3 to an open barracks occurred prior to the November 3, 2021 attack

and, thus, had nothing to do with Pedraza’s grievance of November 22, 2021, or his losing his barbershop

job, (Doc. 71-1 at 16, 57:16–19; Doc. 71-1 at 7, 19:15–20:17).

ordinary firmness would react to the alleged retaliation. Gonzalez, 971 F.3d at 745. Pedraza

admits that he continued to file grievances but argues that he “is no longer ‘a person of

ordinary firmness’” because of his near-death experience. (Doc. 82 at 5). Regardless,

Pedraza puts forth no evidence or argument explaining how Dill’s actions would dissuade

any prisoner from continuing to file grievances. Because there is insufficient evidence to

show that being reassigned from the barbershop to the kitchen would deter a prisoner of

ordinary firmness from continuing to file grievances, summary judgment is appropriate.

Gonzalez, 971 F.3d at 745.

B. No Causal Connection

Summary judgment is also appropriate because Pedraza has not established a causal

connection between his First Amendment activity and Dill’s subsequent decision to

reassign his job duties. In the prison context, “claims of unlawful retaliation must be treated

with skepticism,” and prisoners face a substantial burden in showing that a prison official’s

actions would not have occurred “but for” a retaliatory motive. Sisneros v. Nix, 95 F.3d

749, 752 (8th Cir. 1996); see Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1025 (8th Cir. 2012);

see also Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that

speculative and conclusory allegations cannot support a retaliation claim).

Despite his alleged “behavioral issues,” Pedraza worked under Dill for several years

with only minor disagreements—and only one instance where Dill threatened Pedraza with

a “job change.” See (Doc. 71-1 at 14, 46:23–25). It was not until after Pedraza was attacked,

and after he filed a grievance for failure to protect, that Dill asked the classification

committee to reassign Pedraza to another job. So, there is at least a temporal connection

between Pedraza’s November 22, 2021 grievance and Dill’s refusal to let him return to the

barbershop. But that is where the evidenced connection between the two events ends.

“[T]his temporal proximity, by itself, cannot show retaliatory motive.” Skalsky v. Indep.

Sch. Dist. No. 743, 772 F.3d 1126, 1131 (8th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added); but cf. Spencer,

738 F.3d at 912–13 (close temporal timing was “strong evidence” of retaliation, but, in

addition, the “defendants offered no nonretaliatory motive”).

On the record before the Court, there is no evidence that Dill was even aware of

Pedraza’s November 22, 2021 grievance, let alone that it was the “but for” cause of

Pedraza’s reassignment. Pedraza did not name Dill in the grievance, and Pedraza never

discussed the grievance with Dill. (Doc. 2 at 28; Doc. 71-3 at 2, ¶¶ 5–6; Doc. 71-1 at 15,

52:24–53:13).

Even assuming that Dill knew about the grievance, the evidence shows that he had

other motivations for not allowing Pedraza to return to his barbershop job. “[A]lthough it

may be dishonorable to act with an unconstitutional motive, an official’s action colored by

some degree of bad motive does not amount to a constitutional tort if that action would

have been taken anyway.” Nieves, 587 U.S. at 399 (cleaned up). Dill expressed his

displeasure at Pedraza’s work pace and threatened to have him reassigned prior to the

grievance. (Doc. 71-1 at 14, 46:16–25). Moreover, Pedraza was stabbed in the neck while

working in the often-unsupervised barbershop which, by its very nature, is full of sharp

instruments. Although Dill does not elaborate on his “safety” reasons for not letting

Pedraza return to the barbershop, see (Doc. 71-3 at 3, ¶¶ 16–17), one does not have to

stretch the imagination to conclude that placing a stabbing victim back in the environment

where he was stabbed could create safety issues.

Ultimately, the burden was on Pedraza to come forward with evidence that his

grievance was the “but for” cause of his removal from the barbershop, but he failed to meet

this heavy burden. Accordingly, summary judgment is also appropriate on the causal-

connection prong of Pedraza’s retaliation claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

Pedraza claims that he was reassigned from his barbershop position because he filed

a grievance against the barbershop supervisor, Dill. But Pedraza does not show that his

reassignment to a kitchen position would dissuade a prisoner of ordinary firmness from

filing a grievance. Nor does Pedraza show that he would not have been reassigned but for

his filing of the grievance. Thus, Pedraza has not shown that he was deprived of a First

Amendment right, and Dill is entitled to qualified immunity.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Dill’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 71), be GRANTED.

2. Pedraza’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Dill in his individual

capacity be dismissed with prejudice.

3. Judgment be entered accordingly.°

DATED this 17th day of June, 2025.

Sane a Uorve-

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

5 All other claims were dismissed without prejudice. (Docs. 8, 56).

11