Aase v. East Peoria Community School District 309

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

STEPHANIE AASE as Next Friend on

behalf of her minor son, Q.D., and in her

individual capacity,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-01043-JEH-RLH

v.

EAST PEORIA COMMUNITY

SCHOOL DISTRICT 309 et al,

Defendant.

Order

Now before the Court is the Defendant East Peoria Community School

District 309’s Motion to Dismiss (D. 33).1 For the reasons stated, infra, the Motion

is GRANTED. The Plaintiff shall have leave to amend her Complaint within

twenty-one days if she believes she can state a claim in accordance with this Order.

I

Plaintiff, Stephanie Aase (“Aase”), filed her Complaint on behalf of her

minor son, Q.D, as Next Friend and in her individual capacity on January 31, 2025.

(D. 1). On May 28, 2025, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint naming as

Defendants East Peoria Community School District 309 (“School District”), the

City of East Peoria (“City”), and East Peoria Police Officer David Roos (“Officer

Roos”). (D. 27). On June 5, 2025, the School District filed a Motion to Dismiss (D.

33). On June 20, 2025, the Plaintiff filed her Memorandum in Opposition. (D. 34).

The matter is now fully briefed.

1 Citations to the electronic docket are abbreviated as “D. ___ at ECF p. ___.”

II

According to the Amended Complaint, “Plaintiff Q.D. is a fifteen-year-old

boy who resides with his mother, Plaintiff Stephanie Aase, in East Peoria, Illinois.”

(D. 27 at ECF p. 2). Q.D. is a student at the School District and has multiple

disabilities, including diagnoses for Emotional Disorder, Attention Deficit

Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), and anxiety. Id. at ECF p. 4. As a result of these

disabilities, Plaintiff alleges that Q.D. is substantially limited in “his ability to

engage in one or more life activities in that he is unable to build or maintain

satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers or teachers; has inappropriate

types of behaviors or feelings under normal circumstances; has a general pervasive

mood of unhappiness or depression; tends to develop symptoms or fears

associated with personal or school problems; is easily annoyed, irritated, nervous

or anxious; has difficulty following rules/questions authority; has difficulty

handling and coping with frustration; has low self-esteem; has intense, persistent

emotional responses that can interfere with daily function; and has difficulty

managing and expressing emotions.” Id. at ECF p. 4. Plaintiff also states that Q.D.

elopes as a coping skill. Id. at ECF p. 4.

Because of these disabilities, Plaintiff states that the School District provides

Q.D. with reasonable accommodations that provide him with the ability “to leave

class as needed in order to calm himself and self-regulate” and “call Aase as

needed”. Id. at ECF p. 4-5. Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendants are aware

of Q.D.’s disabilities and of Plaintiff’s association with Q.D. as a disabled person.

Id. at ECF p. 5. On August 31, 2023, Plaintiff alleges that a math teacher believed

Q.D. and two other students were cheating on a math test and sent Q.D. to the

principal’s office, but not the two other students, who Plaintiff believes do not

have the same disabilities as Q.D. Id. Once Q.D. arrived in the principal’s office,

Plaintiff alleges Q.D. was lectured and subsequently became dysregulated,

ultimately leading to Q.D. leaving the principal’s office when the bell rang “in

order to self-regulate per his accommodation” and that the principal then went to

Q.D.’s class and “tried to force him out of the room.” Id. at ECF p. 5. Plaintiff states

that Q.D. became further dysregulated and attempted to call Aase, per his

accommodation, which the principal did not allow, and then physically removed

Q.D. from the classroom. Id. at ECF p. 5.

After being removed from the classroom, Plaintiff alleges that Q.D. tried to

elope to the bathroom but was restrained by the principal who then called Officer

Roos. Id. at ECF p. 6. The Plaintiff alleges Officer Roos “responded by pushing

[Q.D.] to the ground in a prone restraint”2 and held him there until a second officer

arrived to hold Q.D. “face-down on the ground” while Officer Roos handcuffed

him and “’perp walked’ him to a police car parked outside the school building.”

Id. at ECF p. 6. When Aase arrived, Q.D. was uncuffed and ultimately released into

Aase’s care, but Plaintiff alleges Officer Roos told Aase that “he told her this

summer, this is how it’s going to be if he doesn’t act right.” Id. at ECF p. 6-7.

Following the incident, Plaintiff alleges that Q.D. suffered marks and bruising on

his wrist from the handcuffs, and that Q.D. “repeatedly stated he was hurt[,] could

not feel his hands”, and was having trouble breathing, all while the officers failed

to assist him. Id. Officer Roos reported that Q.D. kicked him during the incident,

but Plaintiff disputes this. Id. Plaintiff states the City charged Q.D. with aggravated

battery and resisting a peace officer, but that the Court dismissed the charges “in

a manner indicative” of Q.D.’s innocence. Id. at ECF p. 7. Following this incident,

Plaintiff alleges Q.D. endured additional psychological injuries because of the

City’s failure to train officers to render aid to individuals with mental health

disabilities and that the School District “did not discipline the two non-disabled

2 Plaintiff claims that “Per 23 IAC 1.285(d)(4)(F), prone restraint is prohibited in all Illinois public schools,

special education cooperatives, and nonpublic facilities.” (D. 27 at ECF p. 6).

individuals involved in the incident with the math teacher.” Id. Following this

incident, Aase began expressing concerns about Q.D.’s safety and whether he was

being provided with his accommodations. Id.

Later, on January 26, 2024, Plaintiff alleges the School District sent Q.D.

home because he requested it. Id. at ECF p. 8. But Plaintiff disputes this, alleging

Q.D. did not want to leave, and Aase informed the School District that she believed

he was sent home as a pretext for the School District to avoid providing him with

his accommodations. Id. Five days later, on January 31, 2024, Plaintiff alleges the

School District tried to send Q.D. home again even though he did not want to

leave, and that the School District “attempted multiple times to force” Q.D. to

leave class so as to avoid providing him with reasonable accommodation. Id. Aase

informed the School District again that she believed its attempts to send Q.D. home

were to avoid accommodating his disabilities. Id. Thereafter, Plaintiff alleges the

education director called Aase and informed her that the School District wanted

to change Q.D.’s educational placement which the Plaintiff alleges was in

retaliation to her informing them she believed they were discriminating against

Q.D. Id.

In response to these allegations, Plaintiff filed charges of discrimination with

the Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”) on February 28, 2024. Id. at

ECF p. 9. Plaintiff states that on November 2, 2024, the IDHR issues its notice of

dismissal on the two charges and received a right to sue.3 In the Amended

Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges eighteen counts against varying Defendants. (D.

27 at ECF p. 1-32). The School District is the only Defendant that filed a Motion to

Dismiss. (D. 33). Accordingly, the Court considers the Motion to Dismiss

according to the Counts alleged against the School District. The Plaintiff first

3 Plaintiffs stated they “attach the rights [sic] to sue as Exhibit 1” but no exhibit was attached.

alleges violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) in Counts One

through Four for failure to accommodate, disability discrimination, retaliation,

and association, respectively. (D. 27 at ECF p. 9-16). In Counts Five through Eight,

the Plaintiff alleges violations of the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) for

failure to accommodate, disability discrimination, retaliation, and association,

respectively. Id. at ECF p. 16-23. In Counts Nine and Eighteen, the Plaintiff alleges

a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and a violation of the Illinois

Civil Rights Remedies Restoration Act, respectively. Id. at ECF p. 23 & 31.

III

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs whether a complaint fails

to state a claim. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)

provides that a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A “complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at

663. A plaintiff “must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to

present a story that holds together.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404

(7th Cir. 2010). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Similarly, a complaint that “tenders

‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” will not survive a

motion to dismiss. Id. The Court is to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

non-movant, but the Court “need not accept as true any legal assertions or recital

of the elements of a cause of action ‘supported by mere conclusory statements.’”

Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Alam v. Miller

Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2013)).

At the outset, the School District asserts that it does not have the legal

capacity to be sued and, because of that, all claims against the School District ought

to be dismissed with prejudice.4 (D. 33 at ECF p. 8-9). The Plaintiff disputes this

point arguing that the School District can be joined properly as a Defendant in this

case. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees with the Defendant that the

School District does not have the capacity to be sued under the instant cause of

action.

The School District relies on Illinois law for the proposition that “only a

board of education is amenable to suit, not its corresponding school district or the

individual schools within those districts.” (D. 33 at ECF p. 8) (citing 105 ILL. COMP.

STAT. § 5/10-2). Federal courts look to state law “to determine if a defendant is

amenable to suit.” DeGenova v. Sheriff of Dupage Cnty., 209 F.3d 973, 976 n.2 (7th

Cir. 2000) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)). Under Illinois law, § 5/10-2, it states, “The

directors of each district shall be a body politic and corporate, by the name of

‘school directors of district No. . . . , county of . . . . and State of Illinois,’ and by that

name may sue and be sued in all courts and places where judicial proceedings are

had.” 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/10-2. Indeed, in Klean v. Bd. of Educ. of Proviso Twp.

Sch. Dist. 209, 2010 WL 3732218, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2010), the Court observed,

“According to Illinois law, the District is a geographical area in which the Board

operates schools.” “Moreover, the Illinois School Code makes the Board, not the

District, amenable to suit.” Id. (citing 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/10-2). The Court in

Klean went on to hold, “the Board, not the District, is the proper defendant in this

4 “The case law supports the idea that issues of capacity under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) raised by a motion to

dismiss are sufficient to state a negative averment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(a).” Cooper v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc., 959 F. Supp. 964, 966 n.2 (C.D. Ill. 1997).

suit. Therefore, the Court dismisses the claims plaintiff asserts against the

District.” Id. (dismissing Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983 claims against the district).

Indeed, many Illinois courts have held similarly. In Smoler v. Bd. of Educ. for W.

Northfield Sch. Dist. No. 31, 524 F. Supp. 3d 794, 802 (N.D. Ill. 2021), the Court

observed, “Illinois courts have held that while a school board is a proper

defendant, a school district is not, unless another provision of the school code or

another statute specifically authorizes a school district to sue or be sued.” See also

Doe v. School District U-46, 557 F. Supp. 3d 860, 871 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (dismissing

claims against the school district when plaintiffs did not argue any statute

specifically authorized the suit against the district); Peoples v. Oswego Cmty. Sch.

Dist., 2020 WL 1330652, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (dismissing § 1983 and state law tort

claims against the school district because it was an improper defendant); Snow v.

J. Sterling Morton High Sch. Dist. No. 201, 2016 WL 5391222, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2016)

(granting defendants motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Title VII claims because the

school board, not the school district, was the proper defendant); Matavka v. Bd. of

Educ. of J. Sterling Morton High Sch. Dist. No. 201, 2016 WL 4119949, at *1 n. 1 (N.D.

Ill. 2016) (“[U]nder Illinois law the Board of Education of such a school district is

the appropriate defendant with the exclusive right to sue or be sued.”); Veazey v.

Bd. of Educ. of Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 227, 59 N.E.3d 857, 885 (Ill. App. Ct.

2016) (“[A] school district lacks the capacity to sue on its own behalf unless

specifically permitted by a companion statute.”); Bd. of Educ. of Bremen High Sch.

Dist. No. 228 v. Mitchell, 899 N.E.2d 1160, 1162 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (“Moreover, a

board of education is expressly authorized to sue and be sued in all judicial

proceedings involving the school district . . . our courts have defined a school

district as a geographical area that generally lacks the capacity to sue unless

expressly authorized by statute to do so.”). Given this precedent, the Court’s

conclusion that the school district lacks legal capacity in this case is bolstered by

the Illinois Supreme Court’s determination that a school district “is composed of

the territory included within its corporate boundaries” whereas the “board of

education of the particular district, being an agency of the state and not a

subdivision thereof, is a separate and distinct corporation, which furnishes the

method and machinery for the government and management of the district.” Bd.

of Educ. of Dist. No. 88, Cook Cnty. v. Home Real Est. Imp. Corp., 38 N.E.2d 17, 20 (Ill.

1941); see also Cooney v. Soc’y Of Mt. Carmel, 389 N.E.2d 549, 551 (Ill. 1979) (“The

term ‘school district’ refers to a geographical area and the term ‘school board’

refers to a group of persons . . ..”).

To overcome the School District’s argument, the Plaintiff argues that various

statutes authorize his claims. See Smoler, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 802. (“Illinois courts

have held that while a school board is a proper defendant, a school district is not,

unless another provision of the school code or another statute specifically

authorizes a school district to sue or be sued.”). Plaintiff first argues that the IHRA

authorizes his claim pursuant to 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/5-102(C), which covers

civil rights violations in public accommodations, and further states that it is a civil

rights violation for any public official to “[d]eny or refuse to another, as a public

official, the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantage, facilities

or privileges of the official’s office or services or of any property under the official’s

care because of unlawful discrimination.” The term “public official” means “any

officer or employee of the state or any agency thereof, including state political

subdivisions, municipal corporations, park districts, forest preserve districts,

educational institutions, and schools.” 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5-101(C). It also

defines places of public accommodation to include “elementary” and “secondary”

schools. See 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5-101(A)(11). True, those provisions of the IHRA

may apply to schools. However, the IHRA does not explicitly authorize suit

against a “school district,” instead, Illinois law provides that the school board

would be amenable to suit on behalf of the school district. See Smoler, 524 F. Supp.

at 802. That is because the school board is “the method and machinery for the

government and management of the district.” Mitchell, 899 N.E.2d at 1163.

Moreover, the plain language of the IHRA applies to “any agency” of the state, 775

ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5-101(C), and in People ex rel Gibson v. Peller, 181 N.E.2d 376, 377

(Ill. App. Ct. 1962), the Illinois Appellate Court explicitly held that a school board

“is an agency of the state government”, further confirming that the IHRA applies

to school boards, and not school districts. The Plaintiff relies on Lewis v. Collinsville

Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 10, 511 N.E.2d 899, 901 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) and submits

that it held that a plaintiff could file a claim “against the school district alleging

discriminatory discharge in violation of the IHRA.” (D. 34 at ECF p. 14). To the

contrary, however, the Court in Lewis held that the “plaintiff’s direct civil suit was

improperly brought and accordingly should have been dismissed by the trial

court” because the plaintiff failed to follow the IHRA’s procedures for alleging

human rights violations. Lewis, 511 N.E.2d at 901. Second, Plaintiff relies on River

Bend Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 597 N.E.2d 842, 843 (Ill. App.

Ct. 1992), in which the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the Illinois Human Rights

Commission’s determination that the school district had engaged in unlawful

discrimination. However, that case both predates and is against the manifest

weight of the cases previously discussed by the Court that together have held the

school board, not the school district, as the proper defendant under similar

circumstances. Moreover, the Court in River Bend did not consider the issue of

whether the school district was a properly named defendant. 597 N.E.2d at 840.

And the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that it has “not faced the question

whether an Illinois school district may be sued in its own name” while also

observing in the same context that “the unexamined assumptions of prior cases do

not control the disposition of a contested issue.” Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit

Sch. Dist. No. 303, 783 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2015). Therefore, the unexamined

assumptions of River Bend are not controlling here, particularly where Stanek left

open the question of whether the school district may be sued in its own name and

did not discuss the IHRA. See id. Thus, without the IHRA authorizing the suit

against the school district, Plaintiff’s IHRA claims are dismissed without

prejudice.

With respect to the ADA, the Plaintiff first relies on Stanek for the

proposition that the Seventh Circuit “acknowledged that school districts could be

sued under the ADA for failing to accommodate disabilities . . ..” (D. 34 at ECF p.

13). But Stanek only held that school districts could be sued under the IDEA

because Illinois “defines the ‘local educational agency’ for purposes of IDEA to

include a school board or school district.” See 783 F.3d at 640. The Court in Stanek

assumed—without discussion—that a school district could be sued pursuant to

the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; but the Court did not go so far as to

explicitly hold that a plaintiff can sue a school district under either the ADA or §

504. Id. at 640-41. Nor has the Plaintiff identified a statute like the one at issue in

Stanek, in which the Court observed that Illinois had adopted a definition of “local

educational agency,” for purposes of the IDEA, which included school boards and

school districts. Id. Instead, Plaintiff relies on § 12181(7)(J) of the ADA to argue that

the ADA applies to school districts because § 12181(7)(J) defines a place of public

accommodation to include “elementary, secondary . . . or other place of

education”. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J). But it does not include in its definition “school

district,” nor does it suffice to argue—as the Plaintiff does—that because a school

itself may be a place of public accommodation, that the school district is the proper

entity to be sued for alleged shortcomings in a school’s policies. To the contrary,

Illinois law vests the school board with “all other powers not inconsistent with this

Act that may be requisite or proper for the maintenance, operation, and

development of any school or schools under the jurisdiction of the board.” 105 ILL.

COMP. STAT. § 5/10-20. As such, without a statute authorizing suit against the

school district itself, the Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant pursuant to the

ADA are dismissed without prejudice.

For similar reasons, the same fate awaits Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to 29

U.S.C. § 794, also known as the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination

against individuals with disabilities by virtue of federal grants and programming.

See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); see also Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi.

and N.W. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 516 (7th Cir. 2015). Though it may apply to “school

system[s]” broadly, that does not mean that it authorizes suit against the school

district itself as opposed to the school board. And the Plaintiff all but concedes as

much in stating the “Illinois School Code defines a school district as the

geographical area within which the board of education operates schools, while the

board of education is the governing body responsible for the management of the

district.” (D. 34 at ECF p. 13). The receipt and use of federal funds alone does not

change the fact that the board is the decisionmaker authorized by Illinois law to

be sued, and the school district, a mere geographical area. Without the

Rehabilitation Act or another statute explicitly authorizing suit against the school

district, Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act are dismissed without

prejudice.5

IV

For the reasons stated, supra, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED. The Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her Complaint within twenty-

one days if she believes she can state a claim in accordance with this Order.

5 Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s argument with respect to its lack of capacity to be sued under the

Illinois Civil Rights Remedies and Restoration Act. (D. 34 at ECF p. 14). Failing to respond results in waiver.

LeSEA Inc. v. LeSEA Broad. Corp., 379 F. Supp. 3d 732, 739 (N.D. Ind. 2019) (citing Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,

624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010)). Accordingly, Count Eighteen is dismissed as to the School District.

It is so ordered.

Entered on July 16, 2025

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE