Brown v. LaTorre III

USDC SDNY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT BLAME

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED

DOC #:

MELISSA BROWN DATE FILED: 07/15/2025

Plaintiff,

-against- No. 7:24-cv-04761-NSR

THE TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN, CLARKSTOWN POLICE OPINION & ORDER

OFFICER THOMAS LaTORRE III, CLARKSTOWN POLICE

EMPLOYEES “JOHN/JANE DOE,” THE UNITED STATES

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTATION, THE COUNTY

OF ROCKLAND, and ROCKLAND COUNTY ASSISTANT

DISTRICT ATTORNEY “JOHN/JANE DOE,”

Defendants.

NELSON S. ROMAN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Melissa Brown (“Plaintiff’ or “Brown”) commenced this action on June 24, 2024

asserting various constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Town of

Clarkstown (“Town of Clarkstown”), Clarkstown Police Department Officer Thomas LaTorre

(“Officer LaTorre”), Clarkstown Police John/Jane Doe (“Clarkstown Police John/Jane Doe”); the

United States Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”); the County of Rockland (“Rockland

County”); and the Rockland County Assistant District Attorney John/Jane Doe (“Rockland ADA

John/Jane Doe”) (collectively, Defendants). In her Amended Complaint (“AC”), Plaintiff brings (1)

false arrest claims under the Fourth Amendment against Defendants Officer LaTorre and

Clarkstown Police John/Jane Doe; (2) malicious prosecution claims against Officer LaTorre,

Clarkstown Police John/Jane Doe, and Rockland John/Jane Doe, (3) Monell! claims against the

Town of Clarkstown, Rockland County, and the DEA; and (4) stigma-plus defamation claims under

the Fourteenth Amendment against the DEA and Town of Clarkstown. (ECF No. 21.)

Defendants Town of Clarkstown and Officer LaTorre (collectively, the “Town Defendants”)

and Rockland County (“Rockland Defendant”) move to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 37, 41.) For the following reasons, Town

Defendants’ and Rockland Defendant’s motions to dismiss are granted in their entirety without

prejudice. Further, while the motions to dismiss pending before the Court do not address claims

against the DEA, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not properly brought claims against the DEA

and dismisses without prejudice claims against the agency as well.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

For the purpose of ruling on the instant motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-

pleaded factual allegations in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and draws all reasonable inferences

in Plaintiff's favor, as summarized below.

On February 10, 2023, on the basis of two separate search warrants issued by Rockland County

Court Judge Hon. Larry J. Schwartz and Town of Clarkstown Judge Hon. David Ascher, Plaintiff

was detained, searched, and arrested at her residence in Congers, New York, which she shared with

her former partner Carl Desir (“Desir”). (AC ¶ 13.) On that date, Plaintiff was in her kitchen when

Officer LaTorre entered Plaintiff’s home and ordered her to vacate the premises. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) An

unidentified Officer Jane Doe placed Plaintiff in the back of a police car and Plaintiff alleges that

she was neither read her Miranda rights nor shown the search warrant before the officers entered

her home. (Id. ¶ 19.) During the search of Plaintiff’s residence, law enforcement found, inter alia,

172 ounces of cocaine, drug paraphernalia and a loaded handgun with a magazine capable of

holding over fifteen rounds of ammunition in different rooms of Plaintiff’s home. Plaintiff was

eventually read her Miranda rights after being held for hours at the Clarkstown Police station. (AC

¶ 19.)

The following day, on February 11, 2023, Plaintiff was arraigned and charged with Criminal

Possession of a Controlled Substance in the First Degree, two counts of Criminal Possession of

Weapon in the Second Degree, and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree. (Id. ¶

21.) The Amended Complaint avers that Plaintiff was arraigned after Desir both pled guilty to

firearms and narcotics charges and informed police that Plaintiff had no knowledge of the weapon

or narcotics found at Plaintiff’s home. (AC ¶¶ 20, 22.)

On February 15, 2023, the Clarkstown Police and the DEA released information about the arrest

of Plaintiff and Desir and included Plaintiff’s full name, age, and town of residence. (AC ¶ 22.) The

information was reported on by several news agencies, which published the same or similar details,

including one referring to Plaintiff as a “significant drug trafficker.” (AC ¶ 23.) The Amended

Complaint alleges that on the same day as the press release, Plaintiff’s criminal defense attorney at

the time received a call from ADA Doe informing her that she was not the subject of the

investigation. (AC ¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges that she was arrested in order to pressure Desir to plead

to the crimes for which he was charged. (AC ¶ 27.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendants’

wrongful conduct, she was fired from her job as the Senior Director of Human Resources at

Columbia University, where she had been employed for 17 years. (AC ¶ 25.)

In March of 2023, an unidentified Rockland County District Attorney offered a cooperation

agreement to Plaintiff which her criminal defense attorney advised her not to sign. (AC ¶ 26.) On

or about July 31, 2023, Plaintiff’s then-criminal defense attorney requested that Plaintiff’s file be

sealed pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure § 160.50, and the request was granted on the same

day. (AC ¶ 30.) On August 3, 2023, the Town of Clarkstown, via the Clarkstown Town Court,

issued a Certificate of Disposition dismissing all charges against Ms. Brown. (Id. ¶ 28.) The

Amended Complaint avers that in September 2023, after alleged violations to the sealing order,

Plaintiff’s then-criminal defense attorney contacted the Rockland County District Attorney to seek

compliance though the outcome of that communication is not clear from the Amended Complaint.

(AC ¶ 33.) Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff avers that she suffered injury, humiliation,

embarrassment, injury to her reputation, loss of her profession, and inability to obtain employment,

and other economic damages. (AC ¶ 34.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this action on June 24, 2024. (ECF No. 2.) With leave from this Court,

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on September 9, 2024. (ECF No. 21.) Defendants Town of

Clarkstown (the “Town”) and Clarkstown Police Officer Thomas LaTorre III (“Officer LaTorre”)

(collectively, the “Town Defendants”) and Defendant Rockland County filed motions to dismiss on

February 18, 2025. (ECF Nos. 37, 41.) Defendant Rockland County filed a memorandum of law

(“Rockland Mem.”), declaration (“Rockland Decl.”), and reply (“Rockland Reply”) in connection

with its motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 38-40.) Town Defendants also filed a declaration (“Town

Decl.”), memorandum of law (“Town Mem.”), and reply (“Town Reply”). (ECF Nos. 42, 43, 48.)

Plaintiff filed separate opposition briefs (“Pl. Town Opp’n.,” “Pl. County Opp’n.”) and declarations

(“Pl. Town Decl.,” “Pl. County Decl.”) to Town Defendants’ and Rockland County’s motions,

respectively. (ECF Nos. 44-47.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper unless the complaint

“contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When there are well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, “a court should

assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to

relief.” Id. at 679. While the Court must take all material factual allegations as true and draw

reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a

legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” or to credit “mere conclusory statements” or

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555). The Second Circuit “deem[s] a complaint to include any written instrument attached to it

as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference ... and documents that

plaintiffs either possessed or knew about and upon which they relied in bringing the suit.” Rotham

v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). The critical inquiry is whether

the Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to nudge the claims “across the line from conceivable to

plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A motion to dismiss will be denied where the allegations

“allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the Defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”)

Section 1983 provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured.” Section 1983 “is not itself a source

of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts

of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443

U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); see Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004). To

assert a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the challenged conduct was

attributable to a person who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of a right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.” Castilla v. City of New York, No. 09-CV-

5446 (SHS), 2013 WL 1803896, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 25, 2013); see Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d

121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010). Therefore, a Section 1983 claim has two essential elements: (1) the

defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) as a result of the defendant's actions, the plaintiff

suffered a denial of his federal statutory rights, or his constitutional rights or privileges. See Annis

v. County of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1998); Quinn v. Nassau Cty. Police Dep't, 53

F. Supp. 2d 347, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (Section 1983 “furnishes a cause of action for the violation

of federal rights created by the Constitution.”)

In order for a defendant in a Section 1983 action to be held liable, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that the defendant was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations.

Whitton v. Williams, 90 F. Supp. 2d 420, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Personal involvement is defined as

“direct participation, or failure to remedy the alleged wrong after learning of it, or creation of a

policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or gross negligence in managing

subordinates.” Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996). Important context is that a

defendant “in a § 1983 action is not liable simply on the basis of holding a high position of

authority.” Dawson v. Cnty. of Westchester, 351 F. Supp. 2d 176, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

Additionally, “[p]leadings pursuant to § 1983 must contain ‘more than mere conclusory

allegations.’” Richard v. Fischer, 38 F. Supp. 3d 340, 351 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Salahuddin

v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 1988)).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings (1) false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against Defendants Officer

LaTorre and Clarkstown Police John/Jane Doe; (2) malicious prosecution claims against and

Rockland ADA John/Jane Doe, (3) Monell liability claims against the Town of Clarkstown,

Rockland County, and the DEA; and (4) stigma-plus defamation claims against the DEA and Town

of Clarkstown. For the reasons that follow, the Court dismisses each of Plaintiff’s claims against

the multiple defendants without prejudice.

I. Monell and Stigma-Plus Defamation Claims Against the DEA

Plaintiff brings Monell claims and stigma-plus defamation claims under the Fourteenth

Amendment against the DEA. Claims against the DEA are dismissed because Plaintiff’s claims

against the DEA vis-à-vis § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, as constructed, are improper.

The Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 are inapplicable to the federal government,

therefore Plaintiff’s causes of action against the agency must be dismissed on this ground. Ricca v.

United States, 488 F. Supp. 1317, 1325 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (citing District of Columbia v. Carter, 409

U.S. 418, 93 S. Ct. 602, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973)). Suits against the United States and federal agencies

require “a cause of action, subject matter jurisdiction, and a waiver of sovereign immunity,” which

Plaintiff has not asserted here. Presidential Gardens Assoc. v. Sec'y of Hous. and Urban Dev., 175

F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983)); see also

Adeleke v. United States, 355 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2004). Unless Congress has specifically

authorized an agency of the federal government to be sued in its own name, an action may not be

maintained against that agency. Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 515 (1952). Since Congress has

not chosen to authorize suits against DEA, except in limited circumstances, which Plaintiff does

not assert here, the claims against DEA must be dismissed. Ricca, 488 F. Supp. at 1325.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses claims against the DEA without prejudice.

II. Claims Against Town Defendants

Next, the Court addresses claims against the Town Defendants—specifically Plaintiff’s

claims false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against Officer LaTorre and Monell claims

against the Town of Clarkstown based on alleged stigma-plus claims under the Fourteenth

Amended. For the reasons below, the Court dismisses all claims against the Town Defendants

without prejudice.

A. False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution Claims against Officer LaTorre

Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against

Officer LaTorre. Plaintiff fails to allege an absence of probable cause that led to the search of

Plaintiff’s residence such that the search was unconstitutional. Since the existence of probable cause

is a complete defense to § 1983 claims for both false arrest and malicious prosecution, the

shortcoming in the Amended Complaint necessitates the dismissal of both the false arrest and

malicious prosecution claims. See Richardson v. McMahon, No. 22-582, 2023 WL 3102910, at *1

(2d Cir. Apr. 27, 2023).

To prevail on a § 1983 false arrest claim, a plaintiff must allege “that the defendant

intentionally confined [the plaintiff] without his consent and without justification. Because probable

cause to arrest constitutes justification, there can be no claim for false arrest where the arresting

officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.” McCullough v. Graves, No. 24-506-CV, 2024

WL 4615821, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 2024) (quoting Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir.

2004)).

To prevail on a §1983 claim for malicious prosecution, “a plaintiff must demonstrate both

(i) a Fourth Amendment violation and (ii) the common-law elements of the tort of malicious

prosecution.” Guillen v. City of New York, 625 F. Supp. 3d 139, 154–55 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (citation

omitted). The common-law elements of the tort of malicious prosecution are as follows: “(1) the

initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding against plaintiff; (2) termination of the

proceeding in plaintiff's favor; (3) lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and (4)

actual malice as a motivation for the defendant's actions.” Dettelis v. Sharbaugh, 919 F.3d 161, 164

(2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 947 (2d Cir. 1997)).

In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff argues that Defendants neither had probable cause nor

an objectively reasonable basis to believe that they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. (AC ¶ 29.)

However, Plaintiff does not offer much more than threadbare assertions as to the alleged absence

of probable cause. The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to § 1983 claims for both

false arrest and malicious prosecution. Richardson at 1. A defense rooted in probable cause “may

be raised by a pre-answer motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), without resort to summary

judgment procedure, if the defense appears on the face of the complaint.” Pani v. Empire Blue Cross

Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1998). Which is the case here.

Probable cause to arrest exists where officers have knowledge of, or reasonably trustworthy

information, that sufficiently warrants a person of reasonable caution to believe that the person to

be arrested has or is committing a crime. See Fernandez-Bravo v. Town of Manchester, 711 F.

App’x 5 (2d Cir. 2018); see also Manganiello v. City of N.Y., 612 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). The

test for probable cause is an objective one and “depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn

from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Zellner v. Summerlin, 494

F.3d 344, 369 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004)). At the time

of the February 10 search, the arresting officers were executing a warrant based on the affidavit of

Officer LaTorre dated February 8, 2023. LaTorre’s affidavit contained ample probable cause to

search Plaintiff’s home, including references that Desir resided there and had sold controlled

substances to a confidential informant, including at least two in which Desir travelled either to the

drug sale from Plaintiff’s residence or returned to her residence after a sale was complete. Plaintiff

was also identified as the sole owner of the residence via a deed search.1 During the execution of

0F

the search warrant of Plaintiff’s residence, over ten pounds of cocaine, marijuana, cash, and other

items were recovered from Plaintiff’s home. After the initial search of the Plaintiff’s residence,

Officer LaTorre signed an affidavit that same day seeking a subsequent warrant to search and seize

1 “On a motion to dismiss, courts may take judicial notice of public records, such as properly recorded deeds.” Jaffer v.

Hirji, No. 14-CV-2127 KMK, 2015 WL 6473033, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2015), aff'd, 887 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2018).

firearms located at Plaintiff’s residence. On February 10, 2023, Town of Clarkstown Judge David

Ascher signed a Search Warrant Order, relying on Officer LaTorre’s February 10, 2023 affidavit,

wherein it was found “that there is reasonable cause to believe that a search of a … for a firearm …

will reveal evidence of violations of Penal Law Article 265.” (Town Decl., Ex. G.) An unlicensed

loaded handgun was ultimately seized. The Supreme Court has noted that there is “a presumption

of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant.” See Franks v. Delaware,

438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978); see also United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2008).

Moreover, “in the context of a civil case, the Second Circuit has noted that “[a] plaintiff who argues

that a warrant was issued on less than probable cause faces a heavy burden.” Balkanli v. City of

New York, No. 07 CV 2204 (NG), 2009 WL 1346736, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 14, 2009) (citing Rivera

v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1991)). Moreover, when inquiring as to whether a

search warrant was based on sufficient probable cause, the reviewing court pays substantial

deference to judicial determinations. See United States v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1966).

Here, both the Honorable Larry J. Schwartz and the Honorable David Ascher found probable caused

based on Officer LaTorre’s sworn affidavit. Plaintiff provides no sufficient reason to overturn this

finding and offers mere conclusory statements to support her assertions of the lack of probable

cause. Given the dismissal based on the presence of probable cause, the Court does not find it

necessary to address the Town Defendants’ post-arraignment detention argument with respect to

Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim at this time. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s arrest and malicious

prosecution claims against Officer LaTorre are dismissed without prejudice.

B. Claims Against the Town of Clarkstown

1. Monell Claims Based on Alleged Failure to Train And/or Supervise

Plaintiff asserts Monell claims against the Town of Clarkstown based on alleged failure to

train and/or supervise police officers regarding the execution of warrants, arrests, and prosecutions.

The Court dismisses these claims without prejudice because Plaintiff fails to offer more than

conclusory allegations that the municipality failed to train or supervise its employees.

A municipality, like Town of Clarkstown, may be sued under Section 1983 only “when

execution of [the] government's policy or custom ... inflicts the injury.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv.

of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A plaintiff asserting a Monell claim against a

municipal entity must “show that the challenged acts were performed pursuant to a municipal policy

or custom.” Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2004). Courts in this Circuit

generally apply a two-prong test for § 1983 claims brought against a municipal entity. Vippolis v.

Village of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1985). First, the plaintiff must “prove the existence

of a municipal policy or custom in order to show that the municipality took some action that caused

[the plaintiff's] injuries beyond merely employing the misbehaving officer.” Id. (internal citation

omitted). Second, the plaintiff must establish a “direct causal link between a municipal policy or

custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Hayes v. County of Sullivan, 853 F. Supp. 2d

400, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)).

For an unofficial policy or custom to invite Monell liability, the practice, custom or usage

must be so widespread and so persistent that it has the force of law. See Lauro v. City of New York,

39 F. Supp. 2d 351, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000). A

plaintiff may plausibly satisfy the “policy or custom” requirement by alleging:

(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality;

(2) actions taken by government officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies

that caused the particular deprivation in question;

(3) a practice so consistent and widespread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes

a custom or usage of which a supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or

(4) a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to subordinates to

such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those who come

into contact with the municipal employees.

See Brandon v. City of New York, 705 F. Supp. 2d 261, 276–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal citations

omitted).

To overcome a motion to dismiss, a complaint must include more than broad or vague

allegations to support a Monell claim. “[T]he simple recitation that there was a failure to train

municipal employees does not suffice to allege that a municipal custom or policy caused the

plaintiff's injury.” Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Davis v.

City of New York, No. 07-CV-1395 (RPP), 2008 WL 2511734, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008)

(holding that “conclusory allegations that a municipality failed to train and supervise its employees”

are insufficient to state a Monell claim absent supporting factual allegations). Similarly, it is not

enough to allege simply that a municipal policy or custom exists. Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48

F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995). Notably, a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 on a

respondeat superior theory solely because the municipality employs an individual who violated the

law. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692; see also Vassallo v. Lando, 591 F. Supp. 2d 172, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)

(noting that “a municipal entity may only be held liable where the entity itself commits a wrong”).

Here, other than general conclusory statements, Plaintiff offers no factual allegations

suggesting the plausible existence of a policy or custom which contributed to the alleged

misconduct. The Amended Complaint also fails to allege the existence of instances where Town

police officers executed search warrants without probable cause or detained, arrested, or charged

individuals without probable cause, or publicly disseminated defamatory information about an

arrest, such that the Town was on notice of a policy or custom that it then failed to correct. Further,

Plaintiff does not allege any misconduct or failure regarding the Town of Clarkstown occurring

prior to the execution of the search warrant on her home and her arrest. Based on Plaintiff’s failure

to sufficiently plead that the Town had unlawful policies or practices that led to a failure to train

and/or supervise employees, Plaintiff’s Monell claim is dismissed without prejudice to renew.

2. Stigma-Plus Defamation Under the Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that representatives of the Town of Clarkstown, acting within their official

capacity, published Plaintiff’s name, age, and town of residence in association with the crimes she

was accused of committing, which led to a loss of good reputation and caused her to be terminated

from her job at Columbia University. (AC ¶¶ 25, 61-70.) It is well-settled that “[a] person's interest

in his or her good reputation alone, apart from a more tangible interest, is not a liberty or property

interest sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause or create a cause

of action under § 1983.” Patterson v. City of Utica, 370 F.3d 322, 329–30 (2d Cir. 2004). “Rather,

loss of a person's reputation can rise to the level of a due process violation ‘if that loss is coupled

with the deprivation of a more tangible interest’; such a claim ‘is commonly referred to as a ‘stigma-

plus’ claim.’” Patterson, 370 F.3d at 330. To establish a “stigma-plus” claim, a plaintiff must

allege: “(1) ‘the utterance of a statement sufficiently derogatory to injure his or her reputation, that

is capable of being proved false, and that he or she claims is false,’ and (2) ‘a material state-imposed

burden or state-imposed alteration of the plaintiff's status or rights.’” Vega v. Lantz, 596 F.3d 77,

81 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Sadallah v. City of Utica, 383 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2004)). Further, “[t]he

statement must [ ] be ‘publicized.’” Filteau, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 291 (quoting Abramson, 278 F.3d

at 102). “[I]n ascertaining whether a complaint alleges the deprivation of a stigma-plus liberty

interest, [the Court] need only determine that both ‘stigma’ and ‘plus’ are claimed to be sufficiently

proximate.” Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 89 (2d Cir. 2005). “This requirement will be satisfied where

(1) the stigma and plus would, to a reasonable observer, appear connected—for example, due to

their order of occurrence or their origin—and (2) the actor imposing the plus adopted (explicitly or

implicitly) those statements in doing so.” Id. “There is no rigid requirement, therefore, that both the

‘stigma’ and the ‘plus’ must issue from the same government actor or at the same time.” Id.

In a defamation action, the Court can consider “documents containing the allegedly

defamatory statements.” Prince v. Intercept, No. 21-CV-10075 (LAP), 2023 WL 4492413, at *5

(S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2023) (quoting Biro v. Conde Nast (Biro I), 883 F. Supp. 2d 441, 455 (S.D.NLY.

2012)). Here, Plaintiff identifies a February 15, 2023 /ohud.com article which includes Plaintiffs

name, age, and town of residence in association with the crimes she was accused of committing.

Indeed, while the news article was not written by Defendants, DEA Special Agent Frank Tarentino

is quoted and refers to Desir and (presumably) Plaintiff as “significant drug traffickers.” To the

extent that Plaintiff alleges that Special Agent Tarentino’s statement was the impetus for her

termination, this statement was not made by Town Defendants and, as discussed supra, Plaintiff

has not properly alleged a stigma-plus claim against the DEA.

Plaintiff also avers that alleged defamatory statements were published on a Facebook

announcement posted by the Clarkstown Police Department on February 16, 2025 and news articles

that summarized details regarding the arrests of Plaintiff and Desir. The relevant Facebook post by

the Clarkstown Police Department reads:

Clarkstown Police Department & nes

8 February 16, 2023 -@

On Friday February 10, 2023, the Rockland County District Attorney’s

Drug Task Force and DEA Tactical Diversion Squad executed the search

warrants at residences in Congers, NY and Nyack, NY. The basis of the

search warrant was the result of a multi- agency investigation that

identified a Rockland man who was selling a large amount of

controlled substances throughout Rockland County. With the

assistance of the Clarkstown Police Department's Critical Incident

Response Team and the Orangetown Police Department, both the

suspedted drug dealer and an acquaintance of his were taken into

custody. Carl Desir, 48, of Congers, NY and Melissa Brown, 43, of

Congers, NY were arrested and charged with the following crimes:

Criminal Possession Controlled Substance 1st Degree (A-I felony)

Criminal Possession Weapon 2nd Degree (two counts) (C felony)

Criminal Possession Weapon 3rd Degree (D felony)

Both defendants were arraigned in Clarkstown Justice Court and were

remanded to Rockland County Jail. They are scheduled to return to

court on February 16, 2023

14

To the extent that the joint Facebook post contains the purported defamatory language, as

required by the first prong in the stigma-plus test in Sadallah, Plaintiff has also neither alleged that

the statement(s) she claims are sufficiently derogatory to injure her reputation are “capable of being

proved false [or] that he or she claims is false.” Sadallah, 383 F.3d 34, 38. Moreover, “[t]ruth is an

absolute, unqualified defense [to defamation claims].” Biro v. Conde Nast, 883 F. Supp. 2d 441,

458 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2012). Plaintiff does not allege that any statements concerning Plaintiff

contained in the press release are false. In fact, Plaintiff confirms each statement contained in the

Facebook post in her Amended Complaint. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that a search warrant was

executed at her home in Congers, New York, that she was an acquaintance of Desir, that she was

taken into custody, arrested, and arraigned with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the

first degree, two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal

possession of a weapon in the third degree. (AC ¶¶ 13, 15, 18-19, 21.) The Court finds that there is

no dispute that the allegedly defamatory statements were true. Thus, as the statements are

uncontested as true, Plaintiff’s defamation claim fails. See Savino v. City of New York, 168 F. Supp.

2d 172, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“a plaintiff in a defamation action has the burden of showing the

falsity of the factual assertions”) (quoting Prozeralik v. Capital Cities, 82 N.Y.2d 466, 473, 605

N.Y.S.2d 218, 626 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y.1993)). As the stigma-plus test in Sadallah is conjunctive, the

Court does not find it necessary to address the “plus” prong at this time. Accordingly, the Court

dismisses Plaintiff’s stigma-plus claim against the Town of Clarkstown without prejudice.

III. Claim against the Rockland Defendant

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for malicious prosecution against Defendant

Rockland County under Monell. Plaintiff neither pled that her Fourth Amendment rights were

violated nor that there was a lack of probable cause for commencing the proceedings against her.

As discussed supra, under Monell, a plaintiff must allege “that the municipality itself caused

or is implicated in the constitutional violation.” Amnesty Am. 361 F.3d 113 at 125. As Defendant

Rockland County notes in their Memorandum of Support and Reply, Plaintiff's Amended

Complaint, as constructed, does not include any facts concerning Defendant Rockland’s implication

in any alleged constitutional violation against Plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff failed to provide any facts

that support how, if at all, Defendant Rockland County, as a supervisory authority of the

unidentified ADA, deprived Plaintiff of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court dismisses

Plaintiff's Monell claim against Defendant Rockland County without prejudice to renew.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED in their entirety

without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff will have

until August 15, 2025 to do so, consistent with this Order. Plaintiff 1s advised that the Second

Amended Complaint will replace, not supplement, the Amended Complaint, and so any claims they

wish to pursue must be included in, or attached to, the Second Amended Complaint. Should Plaintiff

file a Second Amended Complaint, Defendants are directed to answer or otherwise respond to the

Second Amended Complaint by September 16, 2025.

If Plaintiff fails to file a Second Amended Complaint within the time allowed, those claims

dismissed without prejudice by this Order will be deemed dismissed with prejudice and the case

will be terminated. The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to terminate the motions at ECF Nos. 37

and 41.

SO ORDERED. 30 Ss.

Dated: July 15, 2025 (0 □□ Boy. ciaesseey

White Plains, New York HON-NELSONS. ROMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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